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Abstract 
This thesis examines the factors, which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups 
and the evolution of their organisational structure. The three case studies used 
within this thesis examine terrorist groups as complex adaptive systems. 
Historically, the only group, which has been studied as a complex adaptive system, 
is Al Qaeda. This study builds on this work by examining three cases of historical 
terrorist groups: the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Weather Underground 
Organisation, and Kosovo Liberation Army, in an attempt to ascertain whether the 
concept of complex adaptive systems can be generalised to a broader range of 
groups. 
 
The thesis found the potential size of the pool of recruits available to a group, was 
directly related to the amount of homophily the target community shared with the 
group. It was determined the amount of homophily the community shared with the 
group, was related to the environment. It was found the group’s structure was a 
function of the physical length of the communications channels, the security of the 
channels of communications and the group’s size, all of which were dictated by the 
environmental conditions across the conflict space. 
 
The thesis argues the environment in which they emerge, drives the creation of 
these types of groups. The thesis further argues the structure these types of groups 
adopt is also a response to the environmental conditions. The thesis utilised the 
principles of preferential attachment (homophily) to describe how the environment 
affected the emergence of the group, its size, and its structure. The group’s 
structure is defined by the topology of its communications network.  
 
The case studies demonstrated the group structure was dynamic, was dependent 
on size, geographic dispersion, and lacked day-to-day centralised control. The 
structure of the groups was consistent with those of complex adaptive systems. The 
elements of the groups acted in parallel, working towards the same goal. The 
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structure of the group was built on pre-existing social structural elements, which 
acted as building blocks for the higher levels organisation. The various elements of 
the group adapted to meet the environmental challenges presented to the group 
over its life cycle, which led to the structure of the group evolving over time. It was 
found that groups, which were traditionally thought to maintain hierarchical 
structures, behaved more like networks, because of limitations placed on the 
communications channels by the environment. This led the groups to maintain a 
decentralised and distributed leadership model, where each of the elements 
worked independently towards the group’s goal. This network structure, model of 
leadership and control, was found to be consistent with a complex adaptive system. 
 
Even though all three case studies could be described as complex adaptive systems, 
further work will be required to ascertain whether this concept can be generalised 
to a greater diversity of groups. This analysis indicated this model holds promise 
and could assist in combating these types of groups. An understanding of the 
variables provides insight into methods, which could be used to mitigate the factors 
involved in the emergence of these types of groups. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of the organisational structure of 
terrorist groups. This study examines these two aspects of the groups in the context 
of the environment in which they operated. It argues the environment is central in 
emergence and a significant factor in determining the group’s structure. There have 
been extensive studies done over the last 50 years in this area. This study differs 
from those studies, in that it views emergence and the organisational structure of 
these types of groups from the context of complexity theory, and it examines these 
groups as potentially complex adaptive systems. This is not the first study to apply 
this methodology. There has been interesting work conducted by Bousquet, Marion 
and Uhl-Bien, and Beech, who have quite successfully viewed Al Qaeda through the 
lens of complex theory and specifically viewed Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive 
system. A literature review suggests this is the only terrorist group, which has been 
examined from this perspective. The aim of this dissertation is to extend and build 
on this work, which may assist in generalising this theoretical framework. 
 
The intent is to examine three other groups utilising the same theoretical principle. 
The thesis aims to ascertain whether groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, the Weather Underground Organisation, and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
have similar properties, which will permit them to be categorised as complex 
adaptive systems. The intention is then to determine the factors, which lead to 
group emergence and influence the organisational structure of the group as a 
complex adaptive system. 
 
The thesis examines the interrelationship of the emergence of these groups as a 
function of the environmental conditions. Bertuglia and Vaio describe a complex 
adaptive system as “… an open system, made up of numerous elements that interact 
with one another in a nonlinear way and that constitute a single, organized and 
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dynamic entity, able to evolve and adapt to the environment”.1 This definition 
suggests there is some validity in the assumption that terrorist groups are complex 
adaptive systems. Violent extremist or terrorist groups consist of a variety of 
elements, which interact with each other. In a way, they “…constitute a single, 
organized, and dynamic entity…”2 embedded in a dynamic environment that the 
group has to adapt to, in order to survive. 
 
The concepts of emergence and self-organising form part of complex adaptive 
systems. Each of these principles is interpreted within an environmental context. 
Every system is embedded within a dynamic environment, which drives emergence, 
self-organising, and complex adaptive systems. These processes rely on geographic 
proximity, which enables the various entities within the system to interact. These 
interactions are governed by a set of simple rules. The probability of interaction 
between the entities is determined by geographic location and the principles of 
homophily. As in network theory, structures emerge based on the capacity of the 
elements of the network to communicate. This capacity is determined by the 
length, security, and bandwidth of these communications channels. The geography 
distance between the components of the group determines length, which also 
influences bandwidth. The environment within a specific geographic location 
determines the security of the communication channels. Hence, the security of the 
communications channels can vary from location to location. The bandwidth of the 
channels is a function of how secure these channels are within that environment. 
 
The thesis consists of three case studies, which were selected because they offer 
differing perspectives on the emergence of a terrorist organisation within three 
distinctive environments. Each case study provides insight into the factors, which 
influenced their evolution. They are also unique because the groups varied in size 
and structure, from small to large. Furthermore, the study also examines how 
1 Christoforo Sergio Bertuglia and Franco Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social 
Systems  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p 276; ibid. 
2 Ibid., p 278. 
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successful these groups were in achieving their goals. All groups achieved different 
outcomes, one failed, one compromised, and one succeeded. 
 
This thesis has relevance, because it examines the factors, which are significant in a 
terrorist group’s lifecycle. This study attempts to extend the previous work on Al 
Qaeda as a complex adaptive system and generalise the model so that it could be 
used in the study of other terrorist groups. It examines the emergence and growth 
of these types of groups and the evolution of their structure as part of a complex 
adaptive system. It also studies what environmental factors led to their growth and 
their success, failure or otherwise, in achieving their goals.  
 
This type of study is relevant in the current environment with the emergence of the 
Islamic State (IS) and the potential rise of reactionary groups. The analysis may give 
some insight into how groups, like Islamic State, have been able to be so successful. 
It is also important to understand the environmental factors, which led to the 
emergence and growth of these types of groups. This knowledge could assist 
intelligence agencies, policing services and policy makers in mitigating the activities 
of terrorist and violent extremist groups. Further, an understanding of the structure 
and its evolution could also assist these government agencies in their disruption 
activities. 
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Chapter 2 – Definitions and key concepts 
This chapter defines the main concepts and variables utilised in discussion within 
the thesis. 
Defining Terrorism 
Attempts to find a universally accepted definition of terrorism has been ongoing for 
decades and as such, this section is not an extensive review of this struggle.3 It 
highlights the issues around deriving a definition and argues that rather than 
defining terrorism, it is more appropriate to identity key characteristics.  
 
Those definitions used by the various bodies, which are involved in the struggle 
against terrorism all have definitions that typically suit the objectives of the 
organisation.4 In the world of international relations, to have a universally agreed, 
clear and concise definition of terrorism, places governments in a difficult position. 
An international agreed definition of terrorism would place various governments 
around the world would potentially open them to allegations of being states, which 
sponsor terrorism. This would include governments in countries such as Africa, the 
Middle East, Asia, and the West, who support groups, which engage in terrorist 
activities.5 Countries support, or are sympathetic to, these types of groups for many 
reasons. In general, they are sympathetic to the group's cause due to, ethnic, 
cultural, political, or religious values.6 Further, some of these groups are state 
proxies, which facilitate a particular foreign policy agenda in another country. The 
use of these groups as proxies, avoids the two nations coming into direct conflict.7 
In addition, some states also label opposing groups within their own countries, 
terrorist organisations, in an attempt to delegitimise the group and its grievance. 
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The 2013 press release from the 68th United Nations Assembly highlighted the 
complexities of arriving at an internationally accepted definition:  
 
“In seeking a definition, many delegates spoke of the need to distinguish 
between terrorism and the legitimate effort for self-determination by people 
under foreign domination. Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Iran’s representative reminded those present that the 
“brutalization of peoples under foreign occupation should continue to be 
denounced as the gravest form of terrorism”.”8 
 
Researchers have argued any definition of terrorism should be all encompassing 
irrespective of the legitimacy of the group’s grievance or agenda.9 Academics 
require a definition to ensure they are using a common language and the terms 
used are agreed. This allows certainty in the discussion surrounding terrorism; 
everyone is discussing the same thing.  
 
The courts and the legal profession require a definition to test the evidence, to 
ensure any prosecution is sound. In the context of law enforcement, a useable 
definition is required to identify the evidence required by the courts under law and 
the legal boundaries in which they operate. As such, a common definition is 
essential in this instance. 
 
Within a national context, a definition has to serve a multitude of purposes. It must 
serve the government’s foreign policy needs and must serve the needs of the legal 
system. These varying interests have differing needs from a definition. As each 
definition serves a different purpose, the definition will vary depending on the 
organisational goals. Again, this is another reason why an agreed definition is so 
elusive. 
8 "As Sixth Committee Commences Session, Delegates Once Again Call for Clear Definition of Terrorism, Consensus on Draft 
Comprehensive Convention," United Nations, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gal3453.doc.htm. 
9 ———, "Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects," p 26. 
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By way of example, in a pamphlet issued by the Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, called “Australia’s counter-terrorism laws: Questions and Answers”, 
“terrorism” or “terrorist act” is defined as: 
 
“…an act, or a threat to commit an act, that is done with the intention to 
coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance 
a political, religious, or ideological cause, and the act causes: 
• death, serious harm or endangers a person  
• serious damage to property  
• a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or  
• seriously interferes with, disrupts or destroys critical 
infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity 
network.”10 
 
It does not define terrorism as such, but defines specific terrorism acts, which 
contravene the laws of Australia. These acts include being a member of, directing 
the activities of, recruiting for, training or receiving training from, acquire funds for, 
from or to, or providing support to a terrorist organisation.11 
 
The above definition summarises Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, 
which defines acts of terrorism within a legal context that can be tested in a court of 
law. The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation and the state legislation 
also define terrorism in the context of Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal 
Code. As such, the Australian government, law enforcement, and its intelligence 
community all use a legalistic definition of terrorism and terrorist acts. The 
Australian Government further describes a terrorist group as an organisation, “…a 
court finds is either directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in 
10 "Australia’s counter-terrorism laws: Questions and Answers," ed. Attorney General's Department (Australian Government), 
p 4. 
11 Ibid., p 7. 
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or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or an organisation that has been listed by 
the Government”.12 This definition of a terrorist organisation is flexible and is not 
constrained to acts carried out within Australia. It is also flexible in the fact the 
definition is limited to those groups the government or the courts deem to be 
terrorist organisations. As such, it does not impose an all-embracing definition, but 
provides flexibility in its application, which does not hinder the government’s 
foreign policy agenda. By way of example, currently there are 20 listed 
organisations.13 Of these 20 listed organisations, only parts of HAMAS and Hezbollah 
are on the list as terrorist organisations, Hamas' Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and 
Hezbollah's External Security Organisation (ESO).14 Thus, it demonstrates the 
flexibility in the application of the designation, which is prudent when HAMAS is 
effectively the governing authority in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah forms a 
significant part of the elected government of Lebanon. The listing of HAMAS and 
Hezbollah demonstrate the pragmatic approach governments have to adopt, to 
ensure flexibility in foreign policy and international relations. It also illustrates why 
governments have difficulty in defining terrorism or terrorist organisations. 
 
Academics and researchers face a different set of challenges. A significant number 
of researchers have attempted to address the issue of defining terrorism over the 
past 50 years.15 Over this period, no general definition for terrorism has gained 
general acceptance by members of the academic community. Any definition of 
terrorism generally suits the needs of the organisation, researcher, or individual, 
who has created it. In the academic community, hundreds of articles and many 
books have been written, which attempt to gain a universally agreed definition of 
terrorism. In dealing with this issue, some academics have taken a more pragmatic 
approach; rather than adopting a definition, they identify characteristics of 
12 Ibid., p 6. 
13 "Listed terrorist organisations," Attorney-General's Department, Commonwealth of Australia 
https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Dipak K. Gupta, "Towards An Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group 
Dynamics," Democracy and Security 1, no. 2005 (2005). p 5. 
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terrorism. Schmidt and Jongman conducted the most influential study in 1988. They 
carried out a survey of the definition of terrorism used by leading academics in the 
field at the time. They identified the key terms used in their definitions and 
summarised them into a table. The list below identifies the top twelve key 
characteristics listed by Schmidt and Jongman.16 
 
Table 1 List of Key Terms or Characteristics of definitions of Terrorism 
 Key terms or Characteristics  % use 
1.  Violence, force  83.5% 
2.  Political  65% 
3.  Fear, terror emphasised  51% 
4.  Threat  47% 
5.  (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions  41.5% 
6.  Victim - target differentiation  37.5% 
7.  Purposive, planned, systematic, organised action  32%  
8.  Method of combat, strategy, tactic  30.5% 
9.  Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints  30% 
10.  Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance  28% 
11.  Publicity aspect  21.5% 
12.  Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination  21% 
  
In recent times, Hoffman17, Makarenko18, Ganor19, and Williams20 have also departed 
from the use of a universal definition and have endeavoured to ascertain a set of 
characteristics or modus operandi to describe a terrorist organisation. Analysis 
carried out by Hoffman, Makarenko, Ganor and Williams determined that there is 
agreement that terrorism has a set of common characteristics, which was 
consistent with the findings of Schmidt and Jongman. In general, it is agreed 
terrorism involves the use of violence or threat of violence. It is used to support a 
political or ideological goal; it targets civilians or non-combatants to gain attention 
16 Alex P. Schmidt and Albert I. Jongman, eds., Political Terrorism (SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1998), p 5-6. 
17 B. Hoffman, "Chapter One: Inside Terrorism," in Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), p 40. 
18 T. Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: the emerging nexus," The Centre for study of Terrorism and 
Political Violence (2002): p 3. 
19 B. Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter," Police Practice and Research 3, no. 4 
(2002): p 294. 
20 Clive Williams, Terrorism Explained: The facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups  (New Holland Publishers, 2004), p 7-10. 
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and a reaction, it endeavours to create fear, and it is planned and involves target 
selection.  
 
As it is impossible to obtain a definition of terrorism, which has universal 
acceptance, this thesis will identify terrorist groups based on a set of generally 
accepted characteristics identified above. This will avoid the hazards of a universal 
definition.  
 
The above characteristics identified by Schmidt, Jongman, Hoffman, Makarenko and 
Williams when combined, provide a set of characteristics (below) by which groups 
can be tested and classified in this thesis.  
 
1. The use of violence or threat of the use of violence, 
2. The violence is selective and planned. 
3. The aim is political, religious, or ideological.21 
4. The targets are civilian or non-combatants. 
5. The intent of the violence is to draw the public’s attention to the group’s 
cause. 
6. The intent of the violence is to evoke a reaction. 
Defining the Environment 
The introduction highlighted within complexity theory, the influence the 
environment has on the emergence of groups. Further its influences on the 
bandwidth of the communications channels used by individuals and groups. The 
density and bandwidth of the communications channels influences the structure of 
groups. The introduction touched on the environmental variables, the next section 
defines these variables. 
21 Point 3 is not limited to Political goals. It also includes ideological and religious goals, which is reflection of the changing 
dynamics of terrorism and is consistent with Australian legislation dealing with acts of terrorism. 
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Defining the Environmental variables 
The business and intelligence communities have overcome the issue of defining the 
social environment, by utilising the work of Aguilar. Aguilar’s22 work on business 
environmental scanning indicated that businesses were influenced by economic, 
technological, political and socio-cultural factors of the business environment. This 
form of analysis became PEST23 analysis. Today, business schools and universities 
throughout the world, now teach this form of analytical methodology as part of 
their standard curriculum. This form of analysis further evolved. By the 1980s, two 
additional variables were added, the legal and environmental24 variables, creating 
the PESTLE25 model. Additionally, the concept of environmental scanning has been 
adopted by law enforcement agencies in crime analysis, this is especially true within 
the United Kingdom where this form of analytical method is a part of the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM). The NIM utilises a modified version of the PESTLE model, 
with the addition of an organisational variable, forming the PESTELO model. 
 
The PESTELO model requires an assessment of each of the variables to provide an 
environmental scan of the factors, which influence the structural organisation of 
terrorist groups. PESTELO is a dynamic analysis methodology and is valid for the 
period of the information capture. As such, any study of the dynamic changes of the 
organisational structure of pre-existing groups should consider the changes in the 
PESTELO environment prior to an analysis of the organisation. It is reasonable to 
suggest that these changes are a result and a response to, prior changes in the 
environment in which the group operates. It is also important to note that the 
PESTELO model utilises seven variables, but these variables are dependent. For 
example, political change may influence the other variables in the model. Likewise, 
the other variables may influence the political variable. This is the same situation 
faced by chaos theorists, who overcame this problem by taking a snapshot of the 
22 F.J  Aguilar, Scanning the business environment  (New York: Macmillan, 1967). 
23 Political, Economic, Socio-cultural and Technological (PEST) 
24 Environment includes the ecological dimension that is the impact a business has on the traditional environment. 
25 Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological, Legal and Environmental (PESTLE) 
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variables at the time of interest, separating the interdependencies and fixing the 
values for the variables of interest, as the initial conditions of the system. The intent 
is to adopt the same methodology in assessing the significances of the various 
PESTELO variables. That is, political grievances may not be the sole factor, which 
contributes to the emergence of a terrorist group or pre-existing groups engaging in 
terrorism, which is consistent with Crenshaw’s observations. The emergence of the 
PIRA resulted from a combination of factors, political, economic and socio-cultural, 
which combined and were triggered by the events of 1969.  
Definitions of the PESTELO variables 
Political - The political environment relates to government, the state, public 
administration, and policy making. The political environment is complex consisting 
of many layers, such as its role in social, institutional and international conflict.26 It 
also has a role in the economy and equality, political movements and the 
populations’ involvement in the political process.27 
 
Economic – Sociologists have studied the impact of economics on society for over a 
hundred years.28 The first substantive works were formulated by Marx, Weber and 
Durkhiem.29 It is generally agreed by sociologists that economic interaction occurs 
within a social context and that social interaction embodies power and inequality.30 
Thus, this analysis focuses on the disparities within the economic social context to 
ascertain whether this variable is a significant factor in the facilitation of the 
formation and lifecycle of a radical group. 
 
Socio-cultural - The socio-cultural variable “… Is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, laws customs, and any other capabilities and habits 
26 J. C. Johari, Comparative Politics  (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1984), p 65-67. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Second Edition ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), p 6-16. 
29 Ibid., p 4-5. 
30 Ibid. 
Stuart Groombridge  24 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
acquired by [a human] as a member of society.”31 The analysis of the socio-cultural 
variable, addresses the socio-cultural change at the micro and macro levels and the 
impact, which this has on the changes within the terrorist group.  
 
Technology - Technology is included as a variable, as it has been determined, 
technology alters any social form.32 Technology has the capacity to warp geographic 
space-time allowing rapid communications over vast distances. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt33 have argued that communications technology has significantly 
contributed to the current nature of covert groups or dark networks. The use of 
internet and other forms of modern communications technology have allowed 
these covert groups to decentralise. Arquilla and Ronfeldt34 have also argued that, in 
the case of anti-globalisation groups, technology has allowed the concept of 
swarming to be implemented. Swarming is a tactical technique, where disassociated 
groups using modern communications technology, can concentrate their limited 
resources on a single objective, using modern communication technology, such as 
mobile phones and the internet. The advances in communications technology has 
allowed the realisation of Louis Beam’s concept of leaderless resistance.35 
 
For clarity, the environmental variable within the PESTELO model is termed ecology, 
to avoid confusion in the different usages of the factor environment within this 
discussion. The ecology is the physical external ecological and geographic 
surroundings in which the groups exist. The reason for the analysis of this variable is 
to ascertain what influences it has on the size and structure of the group.  
 
31 "Learning to live together," United Nations Education, Scientific Organization (UNESCO), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/cultural-diversity/. 
32 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, "Introductory essay: the social shaping of technology," in The social shaping of 
technology., ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Buckingham,: Open University Press, 1999), p 20. 
33 J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, "Chapter 1 - The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)," in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, 
Crime and Militancy, ed. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (Rand Corporation, 2001), p 10. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Louis Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," The Sedition 12(1992). 
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The legal variable is the factor, which inhibits or enhances the group’s ability to 
carry out activities and build its network. This variable was relevant when evaluating 
Aum Shinrikyo. DCSINT Handbook No 1.01: Case Studies in Terrorism36 indicated 
that Aum Shinrikyo was able to maintain a complex organisational structure 
because the group exploited the Japanese Religious Corporation Law, which 
prevented Japanese law enforcement from investigating the activities of legally 
recognised religious groups. This legal protection created an environment, which 
shielded the group from oversight by law enforcement. Furthermore, the majority 
of Aum Shinrikyo’s members had joined the group for peaceful religious 
enlightenment, rather than the violent overthrow of the Japanese state. The group 
maintained a tiered structure, with the layman making up the general membership 
of the group. Above this group was a smaller group known as the true believers, 
who were considered more enlightened than the layman. From this group, Asahara 
chose a small select core to facilitate his apocalyptic vision.37 This environment of a 
tightly controlled small group, who had sole knowledge of the intent of the group’s 
leader, further protected the group’s agenda. 
 
The organisational variable is a micro level variable, which addresses the factors 
within the group, which may influence the group’s size and organisation. This 
includes factors such as the type of group (i.e. whether group goals are 
international, national, or local). The group type is based on the group’s political 
goals or objectives, which includes nationalist (including separatist), revolutionary, 
reactionary or issue based. The group’s ideological objectives can be divided into 
the following categories: left wing, right wing, anarchist, religious or issue based.38 
The methodological goal of the group: that is, does the group seek a military 
outcome; does the group seek a political outcome or a combination of both? Each 
of the objectives consists of strategic, operational, and tactical goals. In addition, 
there is an examination of the influence and role of leadership. 
36 Neal A. Clinehens, "Aum Shinrikyo and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study" (Air University, 2000), p 20. 
37 Ibid., p 6. 
38 Anti-Abortion, Environmental, Etc. 
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Defining Homophily 
The role of social affinity or homophily in group formation 
It is not the intention of this thesis to address the psychological motivations of why 
an individual becomes a member of a terrorist group. The intent is to adopt a 
different approach in describing terrorist organisations. This approach uses known 
principles of human interaction, embedding this behaviour within an environmental 
context. This is not to suggest that the psychological variable is not relevant.  
 
An individual’s reasons for joining a terrorist organisation are as diverse as the 
motivations of the terrorist groups. Within the same set of environmental 
conditions, which produces recruits for terrorist organisations, there is a majority of 
the population living under the same circumstances, who do not join. Not all those 
who become radicalised adopt violence and abandon the existing political, social, 
and legal frameworks to achieve their goal(s). Many will do nothing. Some may 
engage in the pre-existing political system to initiate change. Others may engage in 
non-violent direct action to bring the plight of the disadvantaged to the attention of 
the public and influence political change. If the preceding outcomes are more likely, 
it is important to understand how this small minority, which have concluded violent 
extremism and terrorism, is the only viable option, come together into groups.  
 
A significant amount of research has been conducted in this area. Sageman and 
others have adopted a social network approach in analysing the emergence of 
terrorist groups. They have emphasised the social connections, which distinguishes 
those who are at risk of becoming involved in terrorism. This research, although not 
discounting a psychological aspect of why an individual becomes a terrorist, does 
highlight the importance of an individual’s personal network of associates, as being 
a critical component of why individuals join and engage in terrorist activities. The 
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result of this research implies that social affinity (also known as homophily), is a 
prominent factor involved in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups.39  
 
The following discussion endeavours to understand the factors involved in 
homophily, which is hoped will provide a greater insight into terrorist group 
formation. McPherson’s et al40 discussion on homophily41 indicates that there is a 
clear link between geographic proximity and homophily. Social network theorists 
have also made a similar observation. Hanneman and Riddle stated that “The notion 
that similarity (or homophily) increases the probability of the formation of social ties 
is central to most sociological theories … It suggests that if two actors are similar in 
some way, it is more likely that there will be network ties between them”.42 Krebs 
and Holley observed that “networks, whether social or business…”43, which are 
“…left to grow without a plan” 44, are driven by two forces, homophily and 
geographic proximity.45 This type of network consists of dense clusters, where 
everyone knows everyone else. Additionally, in these types of networks, there is a 
lack of information diversity. This suggests those who are socially similar and are 
geographically close are likely to interact and form network clusters, which 
potentially excludes those who do not share their beliefs and aspirations.  
 
The concept of homophily indicates relationships are stratified. Within this 
stratification, race and ethnicity are the strongest of the homophyllic factors, 
followed in rough order of importance by other factors such as age, religion, 
education, occupation, and gender.46 This group of homophyllic factors defines 
39 Marc Sageman, "Understanding Jihadi Networks," Strategic Insights IV, no. 4 (2005): p 9-11. 
40 Miller McPherson, Lyn Smith-Lovin, and James. M Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," Annual. 
Review. Sociology 27(2001). 
41 Homophily is the concept that likeminded individuals in geographic proximity will come together, that is “Birds of a feather 
flock together”.” 
42 Robert A.  Hanneman and Mark Riddle, "Introduction to Social Network Methods," University of California, Riverside (2001): 
p 191. 
43 Valdis Krebs and June Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving," (2006): p 4. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 415. 
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status homophily. Status homophily describes a set of characteristics with which 
individuals may identify themselves.47 Other status homophyllic factors include 
social class and network position. Status homophily has the capacity to create social 
distance within a network.48 This distance can potentially divide society into clusters 
of similar individuals, which the environmental factor can affect differently. 
 
In addition to status homophily, there is also value homophily. Value homophily has 
also been determined to influence group and network formation, suggesting groups 
come together based on behaviour, attitude, abilities, beliefs, and aspirations. 
Variances in value homophily also influence social distance within a network.49 The 
social distance created by these factors, can further divide society within a given set 
of environmental conditions. These are the factors, which potentially lead to 
individuals gravitating to various groups. 
 
Both status and value homophily need a social context in which these homophyllic 
bonds can form. This context is based on geographic proximity, which enhances the 
capacity for information exchange. This information exchange takes place in the 
context of the family, within an organisation, or based on an individual’s isomorphic 
positions within a social system.50 Without this capacity to interact and exchange 
information groups would not form. 
 
Further, Agrawal’s51 et al discussion regarding proximity and knowledge exchange, 
argue that geographic proximity is important in the process of group formation, 
indicating that as geospatial distance increases, the capacity for individuals to 
exchange knowledge, decreases. Geographic distance constrains social interaction, 
which in turn limits the group formation process. Latané and Liu stated and have 
47 Ibid., p 419. 
48 Ibid., p 428. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ajay Agrawal, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale, "How do spatial and social proximity influence knowledge flows? Evidence 
from patent data," Journal of Urban Economics (2008): p 1. 
Stuart Groombridge  29 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
supported with empirical research, that spatial distance and the influence that an 
individual has on another, declines exponentially, the further individuals are from 
each other, suggesting a group’s influence on other groups or individuals would also 
decline with distance.52 Homophily suggests those who have significant influence 
within our social network are those who live closest to us, with their influence 
declining in a nonlinear manner as the geographic distance increases. This does not 
imply that this influence disappears, as the immediacy of modern communications 
technologies can facilitate communication over great distance, but it does suggest 
physical distance is still significant in attenuating this influence. The implications of 
these findings suggest that the emergence of terrorist groups is a localised process, 
due to the need for the immediacy of communications for the formation of these 
groups. This is consistent with the premise that homophyllic networks form, when 
likeminded individuals are in close proximity and interact. This feature of homophily 
could also explain why larger terrorist groups form regional organisational 
structures. It is suggested that these regional structures exist to manage extended 
communication networks and to address the variations in homophily from region to 
region.  
 
The prior discussion only describes part of the process of homophily. As implied by 
McCauley and Moskalenko53, this only describes a physical dimension. Agrawal et al  
further suggested that there is a social dimension involved in knowledge exchange. 
This social dimension exists outside of the physical domain. Agrawal et al argued a 
shared ethnic background enhances communications and knowledge exchange. 
Similar observations have been made within the academic community, where it was 
found there were limits on knowledge sharing between various academic 
disciplines, due to interdisciplinary prejudice. As such, physical geographic distance 
is not the only factor that hinders communications and the interchange of 
52 Bibb Latané et al., "Distance Matters: Physical Space and Social Impact," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
21(1995): p 795-96. 
53 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," Terrorism 
and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008). 
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knowledge. There are social factors, which creates social distance. Likewise, the 
absence of this trust hinders the sharing of information, creating isolation. In the 
context of a terrorist organisation, this factor can create an environment of secrecy, 
where a group is reluctant to share information with others who they do not share 
social affinity. In hostile environments, this secrecy is essential to the group’s 
survival. The use of secrecy to maintain security of the group also influences the 
density of the channels of communications and in turn the structure of the group.  
 
The work carried out by Agrawal et al implies that homophily can improve the 
capacity of groups to communicate, by reducing the social distance between groups 
and therefore improving a group’s capacity to communicate and share 
information.54 It can be argued that the greater the social similarity (homophily), the 
greater the levels of trust within the network because of shared values, attitudes 
and beliefs, which are interpreted within a common social context.  
 
The trust within the network increases when members of the group are operating 
from a common social rulebook, allowing each member of the group to predict the 
behaviour of the other members, with some level of certainty. The concept of a 
common social rulebook, within a terrorist organisation, is necessary for the group 
to operate. The group needs to share common goals, beliefs, attitudes, and 
aspirations for the group to be effective. The rulebook is also essential for the 
various elements of the group to trust each other. This is most likely why these 
types of groups train and indoctrinate new recruits to the organisation. This 
indoctrination ensures the recruit shares the organisation’s aspirations, and beliefs. 
It attempts to assure the other members the recruit’s attitudes and behaviours are 
consistent with the group’s objectives, creating trust between the group and the 
recruit. 
 
54 Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale, "How do spatial and social proximity influence knowledge flows? Evidence from patent data," 
p 2. 
Stuart Groombridge  31 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
McPherson et al explained that there was a significant body of research that 
demonstrated homophily existed between individuals and groups, due to shared 
gender, age, religion, education, occupation and social class, network position, 
behaviour, attitudes, abilities, beliefs and aspirations.55 He argued that “…homophily 
characterizes network systems, and homogeneity characterizes personal 
networks.”56 This comment indicates that our personal networks consist of people 
who are most like us. In addition, he highlights within “diverse societies, race, and 
race-like ethnicity create the starkest divides”.57 Further arguing that, “…gender, 
age, religion and education” are significant factors, which “…strongly structure our 
relations with others.”58 This indicates that similarities in race/ethnicity, age, 
religion, or education, are the strongest homophyllic factors.  
 
Other factors or variables, which demonstrate significant homophily, are social 
factors such as network position and occupation. These factors on an organisational 
level influence with whom we have contact. Other factors, which possess strong 
homophily, are behavioural traits and intra personal values, such as beliefs. These 
previous factors or variables are only important in certain types of specific networks 
and originate from the other more significant basic socio-demographic status 
homophyllic variables.59 These variables are potentially important in terrorism 
studies as many terrorist groups have political or social grievances based on 
race/ethnicity or religion. These groups typically maintain a Nationalist/Separatist 
or reactionary agenda, whereas other groups maintain agendas based on personal 
values or beliefs. These traits are typically associated with revolutionary or single-
issue groups. 
 
It has been argued that the importance of homophily increases in times of “crisis or 
trouble”. Wilhelmsen has claimed that the war within Chechnya, acted as a 
55 McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 419. 
56 Ibid., p 429. 
57 Ibid. 
58  ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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radicalising influence within this nation.60 Further, the terrorist group, the Islamic 
State (IS), is utilising the argument, Islam is under threat from Western values, to 
create a context of crisis, which successfully attracted over 20,000 recruits from 
overseas.61 These two cases are consistent with research into homophily at times of 
crisis. As such, war can act as a radicalising influence, or it can provide a catalyst in 
which shared homophyllic factors become significant, creating unity within a 
cultural or religious group, who perceive their society at risk. This allows individuals 
within a community to put aside other differences to protect their social grouping. 
These comments are consistent with Crenshaw’s contention that the formation of a 
terrorist group requires a trigger event (environmental perturbation). It is also 
consistent with other terrorism models, which implied that terrorism could not be 
detached from the specific political, economic, and social conditions within a 
designated geographic location. 
         
McPherson et al noted, “…different types of relations are structured by different 
levels of homophily on different dimensions, then multiplex relations among 
individuals may create systematic, important patterns of cross-cutting social 
circles”.62 McCauley and Moskalenko viewed radicalisation and thus terrorist group 
formation as a layered process.63 In any discussion on the formation of terrorist 
groups, it is not possible to separate the impacts of radicalisation. Without 
radicalisation, the trigger for radical group formation would be absent. Thus, it is 
hypothesised, homophily in combination with environmental perturbations (or 
trigger events), are factors that initiate the radicalisation process, which leads to the 
formation of terrorist organisations. 
60 Julie Wilhelmsen, "When Separatists become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya," in FFI/RAPPORT-2004/00445 (Kjeller, 
Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004), p 9. 
61 Peter R. Neumann, "Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s," 
ICSR, Department of War Studies, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-
afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. 
62 McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 437. 
63 McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," p 415 — 33. 
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Definition of the Homophyllic Variables 
The prior discussion within this dissertation has implied that variables related to 
homophily are important in understanding the size and structure of terrorist 
groups. Homophily implies that individuals and other social entities come together 
into groups based on similarity, which is “birds of a feather flock together”. As such, 
it argues that homophily gives society and organisations order, whether these 
entities are international alliances of nations, nations, businesses, governments, 
clubs, professional organisations, families, or friendship networks. Homophily is the 
social gravity, which binds us all.  
 
Homophily is also the factor, which creates social distance between individuals and 
groups.64 The model described within this dissertation, utilises homophily and the 
variables associated with homophily to describe and understand the accretion65 
process of extremist groups. Therefore, it is important to categorise the political 
and ideological objectives of the groups, in terms of the homophyllic variables.  
 
The prior discussion indicates that the principle of homophily is involved in social 
organisation, and this occurs based on two homophyllic variables, known as status 
and value homophily. Homophily defines an individual’s probable social affinity, 
that is, individuals are inclined to seek out groups and individuals like themselves. 
Individuals tend to choose to associate with groups, based on status homophily (i.e. 
race and ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, gender and social class) due 
to shared similarity. Value homophily further suggests that individuals tend to seek 
groups based on factors such as behaviour, attitude, abilities, beliefs and 
aspirations.  
 
64 Social distance is defined as “The similarity or closeness of social groups.” 
Miller McPherson, Pamela A. Popielarz, and Sonja Drobnic, "Social Networks and Organizational Dynamics," American 
Sociological Review 57, no. 2 (1992): p 155. 
65 Accretion is defined as a thing formed or added by gradual growth or increase. 
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The discussion within the previous section suggests it is possible to reduce the 
homophyllic factors into two single variables of political and ideological objectives. 
This distillation allows a simplification of the larger set of homophyllic variables into 
two variables, rather than the larger set described by homophily. The political 
objectives of the groups are Nationalist/Separatist, Structural/Revolutionary, 
Reactionary, or Agitation/Single Issue groups. Each of these categories is defined in 
terms of one or more of the two coarse homophyllic variables, status, or value 
homophily. 
 
As per the definition previously provided in this chapter, the motivations of the 
Nationalist/Separatist relates to racial, ethnic, or religious factors within a society. 
This suggests that the formation of Nationalist/Separatist groups originate from 
variations of the sub-variables of status homophily of race, ethnic, or religious belief 
within a social entity.  
 
The prior definition provided within this chapter suggests that the political aim of 
Structural/Revolutionary groups is to bring about a fundamental change in the 
existing political order based on their ideological or religious beliefs. The definition 
indicates that these groups are ideologically motivated. Ideology is “...a set of 
beliefs by which a group or society orders reality so as to render it intelligible”66. As 
such, ideological groups find unity and purpose through the value homophyllic 
variable of beliefs. These groups have a political goal to bring about a 
Structural/Revolutionary change within a society, although this goal may be 
motivated by other underlying grievances related to ethnicity, race, or religion. 
Thus, the group acquires unity and coalesces based on the value homophyllic 
variable of common beliefs, whether these beliefs are religious or based on a 
common political ideology such as Marxism. 
 
66 Richard L. Mayden, "Species, Trees, Characters, and Concepts: Ongoing Issues, Diverse Ideologies, and a Time for Reflection 
and Change," in Agricultural and Biological Sciences » "The Species Problem - Ongoing Issues, ed. Igor Ya. Pavlinov (Intech, 
2013), p 171. 
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Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary groups are characterised by their support for 
what they perceive as traditional values (status quo ante) or by their resistance to 
radical change. This suggests that the aim of these types of groups is to maintain 
the status quo, which places them in opposition to any group that destabilises this 
aspiration. Thus, these types of groups can coalesce based on the status 
homophyllic factors of race, ethnicity, or religion, if their opponent has a political 
objective based on Nationalist/Separatist goals. Likewise, they can accrete based on 
the value homophyllic variable of belief, if their opponents are a 
Structural/Revolutionary group whose political objectives are ideologically 
motivated. 
 
Northern Ireland offers a case study that can illustrate this point. Within Northern 
Ireland two types of groups operated. Firstly, there were the Republican groups, 
whose memberships were predominantly catholic and maintained a political goal of 
unity with the Republic of Ireland in the south. Secondly, there were the Loyalist 
groups whose memberships were predominantly protestant. They opposed unity 
with the Republic of Ireland, preferring to remain a part of the United Kingdom 
(Britain). The religious differences between the two groups suggest a religious 
motivation for the violence in Northern Ireland. The reality of the matter was that 
the Republicans sought union with the Republic of Ireland, as they perceived 
themselves as Irish, not British. They saw themselves as a distinct ethnic group 
whose religion was incidentally Catholic. Conversely, the Loyalist groups perceived 
themselves to be ethnically British and were incidentally Protestant. The Loyalist 
groups acted against the Republican groups and the Catholic population within 
Northern Ireland to ensure that Northern Ireland remained a part of the United 
Kingdom. The Loyalist groups acted to maintain the status quo, as such, defining 
groups as reactionary. The conflict was not about religion, it was about ethnicity. 
The two opposing groups coalesced, based on the status and value homophyllic 
variables of ethnicity, and shared aspirations. 
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Equally, in South America, in the 1970s, Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary groups 
coalesced, based on their opposition to left wing/Marxist groups. These groups 
typically maintained an ideology that supported capitalism and opposed the Marxist 
or Revolutionary groups’ concepts of state ownership and the empowerment of the 
so-called working classes. Thus, these groups accreted, based on a shared ideology. 
The members of each group shared the same beliefs and aspirations, both value 
homophyllic variables.  
 
Agitation/Single Issue groups typically do not maintain a political objective of seizing 
power or creating a separatist state, but rather through their actions change 
government policy or to influence their potential opponents such as businesses. 
These groups usually focus on social values such as the environment, abortion etc. 
Thus, the group comes together based on the value homophily factors of belief and 
shared aspiration. 
 
The ideological objectives of the groups are defined as left wing, right wing, 
anarchist, religious, or other. These goals are described by value homophily, which 
encompasses a set of beliefs and aspirations held in common by the group. A 
common homophyllic factor within terrorist groups is the belief that violence is a 
legitimate tool, which can be used to assist them in achieving their aspiration (goal). 
Radicalisation, value homophily and attitudes towards violence 
One of the features of terrorism is the use of violence to achieve its goals or 
influence the actions of its opponents. Radicalisation of the group by the 
environment and events creates changes in attitudes. The model argues that the 
group coalesces, based on the shared value homophyllic variable of attitude. Not all 
radical political or social groups accept violence as a legitimate tool to achieve their 
goals. This implies that radicalisation is critical in the process of emergence. Thus, 
there is a need to understand and define the process of radicalisation, therefore 
permitting the modelling of the processes of emergence and structure. 
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Defining Radicalisation 
Radicalisation is a commonly used term, which is rarely defined by those who use it. 
Reports and academic papers such as: 
• the NYPD report on “Radicalization in the West”67,  
• the Rand Corporation’s “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment”68,  
• the Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment) (FFI) report on “Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and 
Recruitment to Terror Networks”69,  
• Post’s paper “The Radical Group in Context”70, 
• “Psychology of Terrorism”71, 
 
do not define radicalisation. It is implied the reader has an intuitive understanding 
of the meaning of radicalisation. In addition, there is an implication of what 
radicalisation means within the context of their discussions. There is general 
agreement among academics that radicalisation is a process, suggesting that 
radicalisation is not an instantaneous state change in an individual’s or group’s 
beliefs, but a progressive change from one state to another. 
 
 The Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) (Dutch General 
Intelligence and Security Service) defines radicalism as:  
 
“The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society 
which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the 
democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic 
67 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," (New York: New York Police 
Department, 2007). 
68 S. Gerwehr and S. Daly, "Chapter 5: Al Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,"  (The Rand Corporation, 2006). 
69 Laila. Bokhari, Hegghammer, Thomas., Lia, Brynjar., Nesser, Petter., Tønnessen, Truls H., "Paths to Global Jihad: 
Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks." (paper presented at the Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, Norway, 
15 March 2006 2006). 
70 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, "The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the 
Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25(2002). 
71 Randy Borum, ed. Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004). 
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methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal 
order (effect).”72 
 
Gurr refers to radicalisation as “…a process in which the group has been mobilized in 
pursuit of a social or political objective but failed to make enough progress toward 
the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify 
their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action and look for 
tactics that will have greater impact.”73 
 
The European Union (EU) when defining radicalisation, acknowledges that there are 
scales or stratum of radicalisation. The EU makes a clear distinction by prefixing 
their definition with the term violent. The EU defines violent radicalisation as “…the 
phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to 
acts of terrorism...”.74 The EU definition acknowledges not all will engage in violence. 
As such, violent extremism is one of multiple outcomes for those who enter the 
radicalisation process.  
  
This is not an extensive review of available definitions, but these definitions indicate 
that radicalisation is typically viewed in negative terms. Historically, radicals are 
viewed with suspicion by society and in many cases; the community has initially 
rejected their ideas. There are many documented cases where radical views in their 
time, become mainstream ideals. Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights movement 
in the 1960s are now considered by most of society, as pioneers of equality. They 
brought about changes in society, which outlaws discrimination. The eco movement 
in the latter half of the twentieth century was considered a “bunch of left wing 
72 Catherine Bott et al., "Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Sorce Literature - Final Report.," 
(Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 2006), p 12. 
73 Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in democracies: Its social and political bases," in Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walther Reich 
(Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Press Centre, 1998), p 87. 
74 EU, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning: Terrorist recruitment: 
addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation," ed. Commission of the European Communities (The European 
Union, 2005), p 11. 
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radicals”, but the mainstream community and its political leaders now accept many 
of their views.  
 
As previously stated, there are inconsistencies in the available definitions of 
radicalisation. The discussions are typically narrow and primarily focused on the 
violent and anti-democratic nature of some radical groups, implying a link with 
radicalisation and extremism. Radicalisation and extremism have been interlinked 
and at times these terms have been incorrectly interchanged. This is not to suggest 
that extremism and radicalism are mutually exclusive, but extremism is a subset of 
the larger radical set.  
 
Other researchers have acknowledged that radicalisation is not a binary process, 
but have delineated radicalisation, establishing there are classes or layers of 
radicalisation. They indicate that only a few, who undergo the radicalisation 
process, end by adopting violent methodologies to achieve their goals. Kilcullen75  
divides radical groups into terrorist cells, subversive networks, extremist political 
movements, supporter and sympathiser networks. 
 
Any definition of radicalisation shall use accepted meanings of words, as described 
within widely used and reputable peer reviewed academic papers. The definition 
shall be structured as such, that it captures the various aspects of the radicalisation 
process. Acknowledging that radicalisation does not result in everyone who entered 
the process becoming a violent extremist, but is a graduated process with multiple 
outcomes. Many are nonviolent, some of whom are willing to provide material and 
moral support to the violent extremist, and some are willing to cheer from the 
sideline, whilst others are sympathetic to the violent extremist but are not willing to 
act. Thus, radicalisation should be seen in its complexity with its multiple layers, not 
all radicals are violent. 
75 David J. Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2007): p 649-59. 
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Defining the scales of Radicalisation 
The United States Army has derived a model, which attempts to define the levels of 
radicalisation as a set of concentric circles.76 The outer level consists of the passive 
supporters, those who are sympathetic to the cause, but are unwilling, for whatever 
reason, to participate in the group’s activities. The next layer consists of active 
supporters, these individuals are willing to assist the group in a support role, but are 
unwilling to participate openly in any direct action. The inner layer consists of the 
militants, those who are willing to participate in the direct action of the group, 
whether that group maintains a violent or non-violent ideology. 
Figure 1 – United States Army radicalisation model 
 
The model used by the United States Army has very broad layers of radicalisation. 
This model lacks the granularity between the supporter level and the violent 
extremists. This new layer needs to illustrate the effects of value homophily and its 
influence on how individuals align and coalesce into groups.  
 
A modified version of the United States Army model will be used in this dissertation. 
Like the United States Army model, radicalisation is defined in layers. Thus, at the 
centre would be the violent extremists. The next layer out would be supporters of 
violent extremism or violent activist, these would be individuals or groups who 
would not necessarily partake in violent acts but would be willing to support the 
group financially, through intelligence etc. The next layer of the model would be 
those who shared the aspiration of the terrorist group, but did not share their belief 
76 U.S. Army, "U.S. Army DCSINT Handbook No. 1 (Version 3.0): A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century ", ed. 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (2005), p 3-2 to 3-3. 
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in violence. This layer may include political activists and those who were willing to 
engage in non-violent direct action to achieve the shared aspiration. The outer layer 
of this group would be their supporters. The next layer would be those who were 
sympathetic to the aspiration but remain uninvolved. The final layer would be those 
who are uncommitted. Thus, the radicalisation process is graduated. The process 
creates subgroups of radicals, defined as sympathisers, supporters, activists, and 
extremists. 
Definitions of Radicalisation and the Scales of Radicalisation 
The following definitions are based on the models utilised by Kilcullen and the 
United States Army, which has been expanded to meet the needs of the ongoing 
discussion.  
 
This dissertation uses the following definitions to identify degrees of radicalisation: 
 
• A radical: is an individual or group who supports fundamental or extreme 
changes in existing views, habits, beliefs, conditions, or institutions. 
• Radicalisation: is the process by which an individual or group undergoes a 
process that allows the individual or group to support fundamental or 
extreme changes in existing views, habits, beliefs, conditions or institutions. 
In extreme cases, radicalisation is part of the process, which leads to the 
formation of terrorist groups. 
  
Part of the premise of this thesis is that radicalisation does not necessarily lead to 
violent extremism. The thesis suggests radicalisation has many outcomes. A review 
of the available literature, suggests many of the terms used to describe scales 
radicalisation, are employed without definition. The definitions below are based on 
general accepted usage of the terms in the terrorism literature: 
 
• Uncommitted: is an individual or group who is unaligned to any ideology, 
belief, group, or cause. 
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• A Sympathiser or Passive Supporter: is a person or an organisation, which 
shares, understands, or identifies with the sentiment of the ideal or cause. 
• Supporter or Active Supporter (Non-Violent): is a person who contributes 
to the fulfilment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose of a non-
violent group or organisation. 
• A Political or Social Activist: is a person who believes strongly in political, 
social, or legal change that they will take action in support of this 
change through non-violent methods. 
• A Non-Violent Activist: is a person who believes strongly in political, social, 
or religious change and will support or use typically non-violent direct and 
noticeable actions to achieve a goal. 
• Extremist Supporters (Violent): is a person who contributes to the fulfilment 
of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose of a violent group or 
organisation. 
• Violent Activists (Extremist): is a person who believes strongly in political, 
social, or religious change and will support or use violent, direct, and 
noticeable actions to achieve a goal. 
Defining Group Typology 
The next variable, which requires definition, is the group’s typology. The group’s 
typology describes the group’s goal(s) or aspiration(s) (in terms of homophily). The 
significance of this variable, based on previous discussions, lays in the 
environmental factors, which led to the group’s emergence and likewise can be 
central to the group’s disengagement from terrorism.  
 
A review of the available literature does not provide a clear definition of the 
typologies of terrorism. Crenshaw subdivides terrorist groups into six categories.77 
77 Revolutionary and sub revolutionary, Nationalist, Minority Separatist Reformist, Anarchists or Millenarians, and Reactionary  
Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): p 379-97. 
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Post et al used a typology defined by Schmid and Jongman78, subdividing the various 
terrorist groups into five categories.79 The now disbanded Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)80 divided groups into eleven categories.81 One 
commonality of these definitions was each of the group’s motivations, but it failed 
to combine multiple goals or aspirations.  
 
Victor Asal et al82 uses a typology based on the groups audience (i.e. supernatural or 
terrestrial) combined with the political and ideological objectives. This typology was 
utilised to determine the group’s lethality and not the structural organisation. It was 
not used in an environmental context, which is central to this thesis. The research 
questions within this thesis do not look at group lethality but emergence, size and 
structure. Thus, it will use a more traditional typology, focusing on the political and 
ideological objectives of the group.      
 
A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century83 takes a differing 
approach from the above. It attempts to address these shortcomings. They 
subdivide terrorist groups into three categories based on government affiliation, 
motivation84, and ideology.85 This approach has greater flexibility as it permits a 
group’s typology to be defined on multiple levels. 
 
78 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, "The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the 
Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25(2002): p 111. 
79 ———, "The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism," p 98. 
80 http://www.mipt.org/. This web site is no longer available and the site content is now maintained by The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. http://www.start.umd.edu/ 
81  Anarchist, Anti-Abortion, Anti-Globalization, Communist/Socialist, Environmental/Animal Rights, Leftist, 
Nationalist/Separatist, Racist, Religious, Right-Wing Conservative and Right-Wing Reactionary 
82 Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The nature of the beast: organizational structures and the lethality of terrorist 
attacks," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): p 438-39. 
83 Army, "U.S. Army DCSINT Handbook No. 1 (Version 3.0): A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century " p 2-1 to 
2-9. 
84 Separatist, Ethnocentric, Nationalistic, and Revolutionary 
85 Political, Religious and Social 
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Within this dissertation, the group classification is a modified version of the 
methodology utilised within A Military Guide to Terrorism. The political and 
ideological goals of the groups form the categorisation methodology. The reasoning 
for adopting this type of method is because it allows the utilisation of the 
homophyllic variables to categorise the groups.  
 
Within this thesis, the political goals of the groups have four sub-categories, which 
include Nationalist/Separatist, Structural/Revolutionary, Reactionary, and 
Agitation/Single Issue groups:  
 
1. Nationalist/Separatist Groups – The MIPT website defines 
Nationalist/Separatist terrorists are those who “…see themselves as the 
representatives of their nation or national group. They commit acts of 
terrorism to defend what they believe to be the interests of their national 
group. Nationalist terrorist groups are often seeking statehood on behalf of a 
minority ethnic or religious group that is currently within a larger state, in 
which case the terrorists are separatists as well as nationalists”.86 
 
2. Structural87/Revolutionary Groups – are ideological or religious groups who 
wish to overturn the existing regime or political system. Geraldine describes, 
revolutionary movements propose a fundamental social structural change 
with force.88 Thus, Structure/Revolutionary groups wish to bring about a 
fundamental change in the existing political order, based on their ideological 
or religious beliefs. 
 
86 http://www.mipt.org/. 
87 Mehdi Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," Cooperation and Conflict 23, no. 2 (1988): p 179-
96. 
88 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change  (Stanford: Stanford University Press,, 1982), p 1. 
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3. Counter Revolutionary/Reactionary Groups – are characterised by reaction 
against progressive or radical political or social change.89 They typically 
support what they perceive as traditional values or previous state (status 
quo ante). Counter-revolutionary groups are examples of reactionary 
groups. It can also include government-sponsored groups involved in 
repression of opposition groups or sections of the community who are 
suspected to be in opposition to the government.  
 
4. Agitation/Single Issue90 Groups – these groups do not wish to seize power 
or replace the governing power, but commit acts of terrorism to influence 
government policy or influence the private sector actions, which are 
considered harmful. These types of groups include environmental, animal 
liberation, and anti-abortions groups. 
 
The ideological objective (goal or aspiration) of the group is subdivided into four 
sub-categories of: left wing, right wing and anarchist, religious and social issues. 
These categories are: 
 
1. Left Wing/Socialist Groups – The MIPT defines left wing Groups as “…all 
groups that are on the liberal end of the political spectrum without being 
explicitly anarchist, communist or socialist. Leftists often see themselves as 
defending the equality, freedom, and well-being of the common citizens of a 
state”. Within this dissertation left wing groups are characterised as being; 
egalitarianism, support for the (organized) working class. Socialist groups 
support egalitarianism, empowerment of the working class, common 
ownerships of production and distribution, planned economic activity 
(abandonment of the free market), abandonment of private ownership and 
89 John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic, Revolution in the Making of the Modern World: Social Identities, Globalization 
and Modernity  (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p 58. 
90Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," p 179-96. 
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abandonment of religious institutions.91 Thus, this definition includes 
communist groups at the extreme end of the leftist spectrum. 
 
2. Right Wing Groups – The MIPT defines two types of Right Wing terrorism - 
Conservative and Reactionary. 
a. “Right-wing conservative terrorists seek to preserve the established 
order, or to return to the traditions of the past. Right-wing 
conservative terrorists support the current government”.  
 
b. “Reactionary terrorists are right-wing groups that seek to overthrow 
the current political order in order to return to a past way of life. The 
Ku Klux Klan, for example, wants the American south to return to its 
pre-Civil War social order. These groups often have an inaccurate 
perception of what life in the past was like”. 
 
3. Anarchist Groups – MIPT defines Anarchists as ones who “…are opposed to 
all forms of government. Anarchists are often allied with Leftist 
groups”. Thus, Anarchist groups are those groups that are opposed to or 
sceptical of all forms of government, as they believe that governments are 
harmful and unnecessary.92 
 
4. Religious Groups – The MIPT defines Religious Terrorists as those who 
“…commit acts of terrorism in order to comply with a religious mandate or to 
force others to follow that mandate”.  
  
91 Huseyin Durmaz, Understanding and Responding to Terrorism  (Washington: IOS Press, 2007), p 354. 
92 Paul McLaughlin, Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism  (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2007), p 20-30. 
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Research Questions 
This thesis examines the factors, which are significant in the emergence of terrorist 
groups and the evolution of their structure over time. This section is a review of the 
literature relating to the emergence of terrorist groups and the current 
understanding of the structure of these types of groups. It also attempts to 
ascertain whether the factors, which lead to the emergence of terrorist groups, are 
also the factors that influence the structure of the group. Thus, this is a lifecycle 
analysis. The intention of this review is to identify the factors involved and derive a 
set of research questions, which the thesis will endeavour to answer within a 
theoretical framework. Therefore, this chapter has two components. This is a 
review of literature relating to emergence, plus a review of literature relating to the 
structure of terrorist groups. 
The Emergence of Terrorist Groups 
The emergence of terrorist groups requires an appreciation of two processes, 
radicalisation, and group formation. This section reviews the literature relating to 
processes. In relation to group formation, this section specifically examines the 
current understanding of the formation of terrorist groups from a sociological and 
network perspective. This section endeavours to establish the relationship of 
sociological and environmental factors involved in both processes. 
State of Current Research on Radicalisation and factors leading to terrorist group 
emergence 
Radicalisation is a central process in the emergence of terrorist groups. Without this 
process and the capacity of these individuals to come together, the group formation 
process would not occur. As such, it is essential to understand the factors driving 
radicalisation, as it is the precursor to the emergence of these types of groups.  
 
Radicalisation is a process that leads individuals to adopt extreme views and leads 
to the formation of groups, which adopt a radical agenda. Borum in the “Psychology 
of Terrorism” shows that there is a consensus amongst researchers that 
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radicalisation is a progressive process, which is initiated by a trigger event or 
events. 93 What the research indicates is that these events are personal and are 
unique to the individual. In the case of groups, the trigger event(s) can be seen as a 
real or perceived failure of the existing leadership, to respond to events in a manner 
considered appropriate by an “in group” or faction.  
 
Psychologists have long understood the effects of the social environment on the 
individual. There have been many models developed to understand the reasoning 
and motivations behind terrorism and its environmental influences. The socio-
political models endeavour to understand terrorism in terms of these 
environmental variables.  
 
Lia and Skjølberg’s94 review of the causes of terrorism indicated a variety of 
theoretical approaches which all have relevance within specific contexts, but none 
universally describe the phenomena. The models described by Lia and Skjølberg 
within their review were the: 
 
1. Relative deprivation and inequality  
2. Contagion theory  
3. Terrorism and mass media  
4. Rapid modernisation  
5. Poverty, weak states, and insurgencies  
6. Democratisation 
7. Political regime and legitimacy  
8. Hegemony in the international system  
9. Economic and cultural globalisation  
10. Proliferation of weak and collapsed states  
 
93 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, p 27. 
94 Brynjar  Lia and Katja Skjølberg, "Cause of Terrorism - An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature," in FFI/RAPPORT-
2004/04307 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004). 
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Each of the theories above suggests environmental factors are significant in the 
formation of terrorist groups and the radicalisation of its members. Apart from the 
Contagion Theory, each theory suggests political, economic, social, and legal factors 
are central to the emergence of terrorist groups. Thus, these theories infer that 
there are environmental mechanisms involved in the emergence of terrorist groups. 
 
Victoroff95 summarises the various psychological models utilised to describe 
terrorism. Victoroff, although providing a comprehensive review of the available 
models, quotes Walter Reich, “...psychological accounts of terrorism with 
explanation that ignore or blur the variety and complexity…a product of loose and 
weak thinking, a disregard for the need for evidence and the habit, unfortunately 
endemic in so many psychological discourse, of having single idea and applying it to 
everything”.96 Victoroff summarises the various models into the broad categories 
listed below:  
 
1. Psychopathological 
2. Rational Choice 
3. Sociological Theories 
a. Social Learning Theory 
b. Frustration Aggression Theory 
c. Relative Deprivation Theory 
d. Oppression Theory 
e. National Cultural Theory 
4. Psychological Theories 
a. Psychoanalytic Psychological Theory 
b. Identity Theory 
c. Narcissism Theory 
95 Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49, no. 3 (2005): p 3-34. 
96 Walter Reich, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychology, Ideology, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, D.C: The Woodrow 
Wilson Centre Press, 1998), p 262. 
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d. Paranoia Theory 
e. Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory 
5. Non Psychoanalytic Psychological Theories 
a. Cognitive Theories 
b. Novelty Seek Theory 
c. Humiliation Revenge Theory 
6. Group Theories 
a. Idiosyncratic Subcultures 
b. In Group Out Group 
c. Collective Identity 
 
The sociological models provided above, suggest environmental factors are involved 
in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups. The Relative Deprivation, 
Oppression, and National Cultural theories insinuate that political, economic, and 
social factors are involved in the creation of terrorist groups. The other models 
suggest a psychological basis for radicalisation and terrorism, although the Rational 
Choice, Humiliation Revenge Theory, Identity, and Group theories do suggest 
external factors are involved in radicalisation and the formation of terrorist groups. 
 
Horn’s discussion on the various models of terrorism acknowledges that there is no 
one consistent model, which describes the phenomena of terrorism. Horn 
summarised these models within a chart, “Models for Conflict and Terrorism – 
Psychology/Sociological”:97 
 
1. Social Psychological Model 
2. Psychological Model 
a. Early Childhood Trauma Model 
b. Psychodynamic Model 
97 Robert E. Horn, "Models for Conflict and Terrorism - Psychological/Sociological," The Global Collaborative - The Nautilus 
Institute, http://www.globalcollab.org/gps/tools/visualisation-tools/#the-struggle. 
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c. Psychoneurodynamic Trauma Model 
d. Personal Esteem Model 
e. Victim Model 
3. Organisational Model 
4. Multi-Generational Trauma Transmission Model 
5. Religious Model 
6. Ideological Model 
7. Political Repression Model 
8. Political Economic Model 
9. Rapid Disruptive Social Change Model 
10. Group Identity Model 
11. Historical Evidence Model 
12. Biopsychological Model 
a. Evolutionary Anthropological model of social groups 
b. In Group Out Group Model 
c. Adventurism and high risk behavioural traits 
d. Bonding in battle 
e. Perceived threat to In Group 
 
The majority of the models listed above, suggest that environmental factors are 
involved in terrorism. Again, these models intimate political, economic, and social 
factors are the environmental influences that precipitate the legitimisation of 
terrorist acts. Thus, the analysis of the various models utilised to describe 
motivations for terrorism, indicate that there is a trend in the various models, which 
suggest terrorism is motivated by a grievance that has its roots in psychology, 
political, economic or social variables. 
 
Crenshaw98 argues that any broad discussion of terrorism must take into account 
political, social and economic conditions. Crenshaw further argues that these 
98 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p 380. 
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factors are not the root cause of terrorism, but these variables must be considered 
in combination with a grievance and context. This grievance has to exist within an 
identifiable group. This group is typically a very small cross section of the broader 
community, who believe they are acting on behalf of the community they profess to 
represent.99 In addition, the group has to perceive that there are no legitimate 
channels available, which would allow the addressing of the grievance. From this 
assessment, they have concluded violence is the only viable option. Crenshaw 
argues this in itself, does not create a terrorist group. There has to be a precipitating 
event(s), which forms the catalyst. Crenshaw states: 
 
“Terrorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option. 
In a material sense, the means are placed at their disposal by the 
environment. Circumstances also provide the terrorists with compelling 
reasons for seeking political change. Finally, an event occurs that snaps the 
terrorists' patience with the regime. Government action is now seen as 
intolerably unjust, and terrorism becomes not only a possible decision but a 
morally acceptable one. The regime has forfeited its status as the standard 
of legitimacy. For the terrorist, the end may now excuse the means.”100 
 
Thus, precipitating or trigger events, such as government actions, cause 
environmental perturbations or disturbances. These actions can change the 
environment, creating a belief that all legitimate mechanisms to bring about change 
are exhausted, and violence is the only mechanism left available. 
 
Crenshaw further indicates that even if the environment exists for the formation of 
a terrorist organisation, very few individuals (within this environment) actually 
engage in terrorist activities. This has been the dilemma for terrorist researchers, as 
it suggests a psychological dimension. Even so, considerable research effort has 
been invested into ascertaining a profile of a potential terrorist, but to date no 
general profile has been obtained that adequately describes the psychology of a 
99 Ibid., p 384. 
100 Ibid., p 385. 
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terrorist. This implies that psychology is not the dominant factor involved in an 
individual’s decision to engage in terrorism, but the catalyst for an individual 
adopting a terrorist persona is rooted in other factors. The review of the various 
terrorism models insinuates that political, economic, and social factors play a role in 
the radicalisation process. 
 
The literature review suggests terrorist groups emerge because of a set of 
environmental factors, where there is a perception; legitimate mechanisms have 
failed to address their grievances. It is assessed violence is the only viable option. 
Emergence is not instantaneous, but a precipitating event or events are required, 
which causes perturbations within the environment, triggering the formation of the 
terrorist group. 
Communications 
A common theme within sociological papers is that the capacity of humans to 
communicate is the glue that binds the various social structures together. Howard  
argues, “Social structures also are continually negotiated and redefined through 
individual action and interaction. The individual and society are mutually 
constitutive.”101 Functionalists argue that structure within social networks is an 
everyday activity, bound in the human species capacity to communicate. These 
concepts are consistent with Dunbar’s contention that communication is a critical 
component of social grooming, which is important in the creation of social 
structures and the building of social cohesion within the group.102 
 
The previous discussion indicates that communications is a predominant feature of 
homophily. Communications allows the exchange of information and ideas 
permitting individuals to assess their homophyllic similarity of their social rulebook. 
Highlighted within the previous section, a lack of homophyllic similarity and 
increasing geographic distance reduces the effectiveness of communications. 
101 Judith A. Howard, "A Social Cognitive Conception of Social Structure," Social Psychology Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1994): p 210. 
102 R.I.M. Dunbar, "Co-Evolution of Neocortex size, group size and language in humans," Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, 
no. 4 (1993): p 2. 
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This suggests, without the processes of exchange of information and comparison, 
facilitated by communications, the process of radicalisation would be hindered. 
Thus, the ability of individuals to communicate freely is a key factor in the 
radicalisation process and group formation, geographic proximity or modern 
communications technologies and social media facilitating this process. 
 
A more detailed discussion of communications will occur later within this 
dissertation, based on environmental limiting factors. 
The role of leadership 
Casson and Giusta argue that the larger the networks grow, the greater the 
advantage of structure.103 They further argue that with emergence of structure, 
there is a need for effective leadership if the group is to be a successful 
organisation.104 The role of the leader or leadership within these types of groups is 
the key to the group’s success. Krebs and Holley observed without “…active leaders 
who take responsibility for building a network, spontaneous connections between 
groups emerge very slowly, or not at all. We call this active leader a network 
weaver. Instead of allowing these fragments to drift in the hope of making a lucky 
connection, network weavers actively create new interactions between them”.105 
 
Casson and Giusta further argued that as the group grows, “A leadership role may 
emerge, occupied by someone who exerts influence over the other members, and 
represents them in negotiations with outside groups. With the emergence of a 
leader, a network may acquire an identity, represented by a collective name, and 
possibly symbolized by a logo, crest or flag…”106 
103 Mark Casson and Marina Della Giusta, "Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact of Social Networks on 
Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective " International Small Business Journal 2007; 25; 220 25(2007): p 
225. 
104 Ibid., p 239. 
105 Krebs and Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving," p 6. 
106 Casson and Giusta, "Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial 
Activity from a Rational Action Perspective " p 225. 
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Terrorist groups require leaders who have the capacity to bind groups in adverse 
conditions. They need to interpret current events within the framework of the 
group’s ideology. The leader requires sufficient charisma so that, as argued by Fiol 
et al, they “…effect frame alignment and mobilise followers to action. They link 
present behaviour to past events by citing historical examples. They articulate an 
ideology clearly, often using labels and slogans”.107 These mechanisms are utilised by 
terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden of Al Qaeda, who refer to the west in 
historical terms and imagery, such as the new Crusaders, making references to the 
clash of civilisations108, and the pious Caliphate.109 This comparison calls upon the 
follower’s historical perceptions to vilify the West.  
 
Fiol et al further argued this style of leader also “…provides a vivid positive image of 
the future. Further they amplify certain values and identities and suggest linkages 
between expected behaviour and their vision of the future.”110 Again, this is observed 
in Al Qaeda’s Salafi ideology, which promises to purify Islam by returning to the 
values of the first four caliphs of Islam, the period known as “Khulafa ar Rashidah” 
(the period of the rightly guided Caliphs).111 Furthermore, Salafi groups strive to 
implement Islamic Sharia law as the only legitimate legal process, claiming this is 
the only solution to the perceived problems experienced within the Middle East at 
this time. 
 
Fiol et al suggested that leaders “...by articulating an ideology vision and recruiting 
a number of followers who share the values of the vision, the charismatic leaders 
provide for the followers sense of identity with a collected sense of efficacy resulting 
107 C. M. Fiol, D. Harris, and R. House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," Leadership Quarterly 
10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): p 6. 
108 James A. Piazza, "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal 
Structure," Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009): p 66. 
109 Angel M. Rabasa, ed. Muslim World after 911 ( Santa Monica, CA Rand Corporation, 2004), p 18. 
110 Fiol, Harris, and House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," p 453. 
111 The first four political and religious leaders of Islam after the death of Mohammad 
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from membership in the collective.”112 Furthermore, Hunt et al observed the leader 
“…creates a new or different world that is both “phenomenological valid” or real to 
the followers and different from the one before.”113 The ideology espoused by 
Salafist groups has resonated with certain disenchanted sections of the Islamic 
community in the west. It has provided these individuals and groups with a sense of 
being part of the Islamic Ummah (community), working towards a greater and 
larger cause. They are assisting in the overthrow of oppressors of “true Muslims”, 
the re-establishment of the Caliphate and guaranteeing their place in “Jannah” 
(Paradise). In addition, they interpret the world within the context of the Salafist 
ideology. Imprisonment and other hardships are seen in the framework of their 
ideological beliefs that “Allah is testing them” to ensure they are worthy of Jannah.  
 
Taarnby has suggested the factors involved in the recruitment process include the 
identifying of individuals, who are isolated, lack an identity, or are confused.114 As 
such, the leader fulfils a valuable role, by providing recruits and existing members 
with a collective sense of identity, by allowing these individuals a membership of a 
group, which has an identifiable history and future manifested within an ideological 
framework.115 Taarnby did see leadership as a top-down process, but as a bottom up 
phenomena.116 He viewed the emergence of terrorist cells in Europe as a self-
organising process.117 Furthermore, the leader only has the capacity to lead, attract 
new recruits and maintain group cohesion, whilst they are successful in their task of 
maintaining the phenomenological validity and reality of this new world. 
 
112 Fiol, Harris, and House, "Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for effecting social change," p 7 - 8. 
113 J.G. Hunt, K.B. Boal, and G.E. Dodge, "The effects of visionary and crisis responsive Charisma on followers: an experimental 
examination of two kinds of Charismatic leadership," Leadership Quarterly 10, no. 3rd Quarter (1999): p 424. 
114 M. Taarnby, "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives," Centre for Cultural Research, 
University of Aarhus (2005): p 38-39. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., p 23. 
117 Ibid. 
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This review of the role of leadership in groups is relevant to the study of leadership 
of terrorist organisations. As Hudson’s review of terrorist groups (large and small) of 
the 1970s and 1980s suggested, “One cannot assume to have a basic understanding 
of the mindset of a terrorist group without having closely studied the group and its 
leader(s).”118 Bokhari’s et al examination of Islamic terrorist cells in Europe 
contended that the leadership of these cells was central to their formation.119 
Bokhari contended that these leaders were important in the roles of recruiting, 
indoctrination and the training process.120 Leaders also acted in the function of 
providing legitimacy and justification for the group’s existence.121 The leader also 
provides the strategic direction of the group based on religious or moral grounds.122 
 
In the last fifteen years or so, a concept referred to as “complex leadership” has 
emerged. The idea of a complex leader is similar to those proposed by Fiol, Casson 
and Giusta, Taarnby, Hudson, Bokhari, and Krebs and Holley. The concept of 
complex leadership does not view leadership as a top-down process. This concept 
has emerged out of the work conducted by Sageman, Taarnby and others who have 
found Al Qaeda does not fit the traditional organisational models. The proponents 
of the complex leadership model, such as Marion and Uhl-Bien, view leadership as 
an emergent property of a complex system. They describe complex leaders as 
network weavers who bring together various parts of the system.  
 
“Rather than directing and controlling, complex leaders help negotiate 
conflicting constraints to create correlational bonds that produce 
aggregation (direct leadership). Creation of these bonds helps them to 
118 R.A. Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," Library of Congress (1999): 
p 65. 
119 Bokhari, "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks.," p 10. 
120 Ibid., p 39. 
121 Ibid., p 31. 
122 Ibid., p 20. 
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emerge as leaders in the system (e.g., leaders “bubble up” and are held up by 
the system; when one falls, another can rise up as a replacement).”123 
 
In a complex leadership model, these leaders empower others. The role of the 
leadership as defined by Marion and Uhl-Bien is to:124 
 
1. Define the goals and aspirations of the organisation 
2. Recruit new members 
3. Promote the organisational actions and activities within the context of the 
group’s mission 
4. Provide resources 
5. Facilitate network connections. 
 
Thus, the role of the leadership cadre is to act as facilitators, rather than top down 
controllers. The leadership gives up direct control of the mission and actions of its 
members.125 This model has been applied to Al Qaeda and appears to give credible 
results in describing the organisational structure of the group. It is likely also to be 
successful in describing the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham organisational 
structure. It is of note that ISIS is a progeny of Al Qaeda and the insurgency in Iraq. 
Even so, this model has not been applied to other types of terrorist groups, such as 
Nationalist/Separatist, single-issue or Revolutionary/Structural groups. 
 
An empirical study conducted by Abrahams and Potter, of militants operating in the 
Middle East, found as the capacity of the leadership to exert top down control over 
the organisation declined, the more likely the lower echelons of the group were to 
resort to terrorism.126 This suggests the strength of the communications channels 
123 Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership," Emergence 5, no. 1 
(2003): p 71. 
124 Ibid., p 73. 
125 Ibid., p 72. 
126 Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics," International 
Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): p 335. 
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weaken due to changes in the environment. Command and control breaks down. 
This results in the leadership of the organisation losing operational control. In this 
situation, the leadership is only able to exercise strategic control of the 
organisation. Without centralised leadership, the tactical and operational decision-
making devolves to the members of the organisation conducting the operations. In 
this instance, the organisation reverts to a complex leadership model. 
 
This raises the question; does the type of leadership model enhance the resilience 
of the group? Johnston, in his study of the effectiveness of decapitating the 
leadership of insurgency groups, found it was an effective strategy in about 25-30% 
of cases.127 Price undertook a similar study and arrived at results, which were similar 
to those found by Johnston. Price determined decapitation worked in about 30% of 
cases.128 They also found it failed to yield any effective results in the remaining 70-
75% of cases. Both claimed, based on the results, it was an effective methodology; 
although Johnston did indicate that, it was not a “silver bullet”.129 Price found no 
correlation with the effectiveness of decapitation and the group’s size, structure or 
ideology.130 Johnston also found in the 30% of cases where decapitation was 
effective, there was not any evidence to suggest group structure guaranteed a 
group’s durability, when the leadership cadre was lost.131 Price132 and Johnston133 
both stated that their findings were not in general agreement with many other 
researchers, who saw decapitation as an ineffective and counterproductive 
methodology. 
127 Patrick B. Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns," International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): p 77. 
128 Bryan C. Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): p 43. 
129 Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns." 
130 Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," p 37. 
131 Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns," p 53. 
132 Price, "Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups," p 9. 
133 Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns," p 47. 
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It is noted; Price and Johnston rest their argument on a 30% success rate as a 
measure of success. Jordan’s work on the decapitation of the leadership cadre in 
terrorist groups, on the other hand, found this to be an ineffective methodology of 
destroying a group and was counter-productive.134 Jordan found this to be true for 
large, older, religious, or separatist groups.135 Jordan suggests the reason 
decapitation does not work in these instances, is that these groups typically have a 
decentralised network structure rather than a hierarchical structure, which makes 
them more resilient136, implying these groups utilise a complex leadership model, 
rather than a top down centralised control model. 
 
Research into the leadership of terrorist groups indicates the role of the leaders is 
to provide the group its mission and aspiration, resources, recruits, weave 
networks, and promote the group. Terrorist leaders arise as part of the process of 
group emergence. The leadership model adopted by the group emerges because of 
the group’s interaction with the environment. The leadership model also provides 
some insight into the structure of the group.  
Summary 
The literature review implies environment, social affinity or homophily, the capacity 
to communicate and the message espoused by the leadership of the group are 
significant in radicalisation and the emergence of terrorist groups. The review 
highlights that political, economic and social grievances are factors in the process 
when there exists a perception redress is not possible through existing mechanisms. 
The review also implies homophily is also a significant factor, as it distinguishes risk 
groups or individuals who may identify with these grievances. Thus, it classifies 
groups based on homophily, who are potentially at risk of radicalisation, noting; 
radicalisation is part of the process involved in the emergence of terrorist groups.  
134 Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies, 18, no. 4 
(2009): p 754. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., p 755. 
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The message framed by the leadership of the group was also important. The 
message has to offer a viable alternative, which addresses the current grievance. 
This message has to attract recruits. Further, the leadership also had an important 
role in network weaving, resource allocation and promotion, which are central to 
the group’s emergence process. The review also found the formation of the 
leadership cadres was also part of the group’s emergence process. 
 
The review highlighted communications as central to the whole process. As such, 
geographic proximity and modern communications technology are crucial to the 
process. Modern communications technology has the ability to overcome the 
limitations of geographic distance, creating a virtual geographic proximity. 
Hypothesis  
From the literature review, the following hypothesis can be drawn: 
 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through 
peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and 
social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of 
terrorist groups. 
 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of 
individuals to communicate and this influence is central to group 
formation. 
Variables 
The literature review suggests the emergence of terrorist groups is a function of: 
 
1. Political, economic and social environmental variables 
2. Homophily 
3. Leadership 
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Influences on the Size of Terrorist Groups 
Any arbitrary review of the size of terrorist groups indicates their size varies from a 
few individuals to cases of tens of thousands of members, with extensive support 
networks. This section is a review of literature, which discusses factors involved in 
the growth of groups and the potential limitations on their size.  
 
Research conducted by Jones and Libricki137 suggest terrorist groups in high-income 
countries tend to be small, whereas those in low-income countries tend to be large. 
They define small groups as those with 100 or less members, medium size groups as 
those between 100 and 1000, large groups as those between 1000 and 10000 
members, and very large groups, those greater than 10000.138 Their research 
indicates the size of the group was negatively correlated to the income level of the 
country.139 They offer two possible reasons for this: 
 
“There are two possible explanations. On the one hand, rich countries tend to 
be democratic and politically stable and therefore avoid having disaffected 
citizens in numbers sufficient to form such large groups. On the other hand, 
small terrorist groups in high-income and media-saturated countries may be 
more likely to show up in the terrorism database (which is built from media 
reports) than would similar groups in countries with less income.”140 
 
They also suggested there was a relationship between the group type and size, but 
suggest this was not a dominant factor.  
 
137 Seth G. Jones and Martin G. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida." (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2008). p 38 - 43 
138 Ibid., p 38. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., p 38 - 39. 
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“Very large groups are likely to be of the left-wing or nationalist type. 
Medium-sized groups, by contrast, are more apt to be religious. Otherwise, 
the differences are modest.”141 
The Logistic Equation and its influence on group size 
Pierre-François Verhulst in 1838 proposed a model for population growth within a 
defined ecosystem. Verhulst used this equation to describe population growth 
within certain ecological environments142, linking the population size to the 
environment in which the population lives. Verhulst related various factors involved 
in population growth into a simple formula known as the logistic equation. The 
logistic equation has also been utilised in economics to describe the limits on the 
growth of markets. The equation has also described the growth of organisations as 
a function of the environment in which they operate. A modified version of the 
logistic equation has also been utilised to explain the sizes of two organisations or 
species that are in competition for the same environmental resources. Thus, the 
logistics equation establishes a link between the size of any entity and the 
corresponding environmental conditions.  
 
The concept of environmental ecology is relevant to the study of terrorist or 
extremist groups. The logistic equation indicates a link and an interrelationship 
between the environmental conditions and the size of a group.143  
 
The logistic equation indicates the environment has a carrying capacity, which limits 
the maximum size of any population. The implications that this equation has on this 
model is that it implies there is a limit on the maximum size a group can obtain. It 
further indicates that this limit is dictated by the environmental factors in which a 
group operates. Previously the suspected environmental variables involved with 
group emergence related to the political, economic, and social environmental 
141 Ibid., p 39. 
142 Jos Kint, Denis Constales, and André Vanderbauwhede, "Pierre-François Verhulst’s Final Triumph," in The Logistic Map and 
the Route to Chaos (Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2006), p 13. 
143 Ibid., p 13-14. 
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variables. Previously, it was found changes in these variables, in combination with 
homophily, can in extreme cases, lead to the emergence of terrorist groups. 
 
The political, economic, and social environmental variables, in combination with 
homophily, are also involved in determining the potential maximum size a terrorist 
group could obtain. It is reasonable and logical to suggest that within an 
environmental space, there are only a limited number of potential recruits. This 
limit, combined with attrition due to arrests, deaths and desertions, sets the 
maximum size of the group and its growth rate. In addition, the equation 
acknowledges that the group size is constrained by the initial environmental 
conditions. Although the equation concedes, the environment is not static, as it can 
vary over time within the changing political, economic, and social environments. 
Therefore, the number of potential recruits may increase or decrease based on the 
prevailing environmental conditions.   
 
Another factor, which can intuitively influence the size of a group, is homophily. The 
greater the affinity a population has with a group, the larger the pool of recruits. 
Based on previous discussions, the level of homophily is influenced by the 
environmental factors. Environmental factors can increase or decrease the social 
affinity with a terrorist group. As previously indicated in the last section, times of 
crisis can enable homophily and bring people together in a common cause. The 
affinity with the group can be enhanced when the goal of the group, as articulated 
by the leadership, appeals with a broad cross section of the community. 
Summary 
The literature review, infers the size of a terrorist group is determined by the 
environmental factors and the homophily the community shares with the group. 
This is consistent with the previous discussion, which implied homophily or social 
affinity was a function of the environmental factors. The review also suggests the 
environment and the population, based on homophily or social affinity, are factors, 
which limit the size of the group. 
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Hypothesis  
From the literature review, the following hypothesis can be drawn: 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
Variables 
The size of terrorist groups is a function of:  
1. Homophily 
2. Political, economic, and social environmental variables. 
Influences on the Structure of Terrorist Groups 
Environment and Network Structure 
Frank, Hooper, and Battin suggest that social structure or complexity is an 
evolutionary process, requiring certain environmental conditions for the 
development of structural complexity.144 They indicated that within stable 
environments, complex structures could evolve. This evolution leads to the 
emergence of specialisation and rules governing the behaviour of the group’s 
members. They have further argued that if the conditions for environmental 
stability change, the organisation will evolve to an organisational structure, which 
achieves group stability under the new environmental conditions. They have 
supported this argument through the work of anthropologists and their study of the 
evolution of social structural stability and how the various social structures (Clique, 
Band, Mega band, Tribe, Village, to the Nation State) creates a level of stability, but 
each step rests on the stability of the prior. As such, if a social environmental 
disturbance occurs and the structural stability of the current level of social 
organisation degenerates, then the social system will seek stability in less complex 
organisational structures. Social structure is a response to the prevailing 
environmental conditions and social structures will influence the social 
environment, creating change within the environment. If the change is 
144 Aaron Frank, Paul Hooper, and James Battin, "The Emergence of Social Complexity," Santa Fe Institute Event Wiki(2007), 
http://www.santafe.edu/events/workshops/index.php/The_Emergence_of_Social_Complexity. 
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advantageous to the group, the group has the opportunity to evolve structurally, in 
a manner, which is beneficial to the group and its goals. 
 
The principles defined within emergence suggest, groups, which maintain territorial 
ascendancy, would evolve an organisational structure of greater complexity than 
those operating without territorial dominance. The principles defined within 
network theory are applicable to the study of the structural choices available to 
groups involved in terrorism. Mishal and Rosenthal indicated that groups operating 
within a stable environment and maintaining a level of territorial dominance, 
operate using a hierarchical organisational structure, with a set of defined rules, 
behaviour and division of roles within the organisation.145 Groups operating in an 
environment with the lack of territorial control, adopt a looser organisational 
network structure, forming alliances with other groups who share similar goals.  
 
An examination and analysis of the structure of terrorist groups and their 
association with their operational environment, tentatively supports the above 
premise. Within Britain, the 07/07/2005 bombers were a small cell consisting of 
four known members. They operated in a hostile environment due to the British 
government’s concerted counterterrorism efforts at that time. Al Fatah maintained 
a small cellular structure in its early gestation, due to the hostility towards 
Palestinian activism within the Middle East in the 1950s.146 Only when the 
environment changed, was Fatah able to exploit rivalries between various Middle 
Eastern governments, allowing it to obtain a state sponsor and a safe haven from 
which it could grow.147 
 
These examples are consistent with sociological research which has observed that 
different social environments will cause organisations to vary their structure and 
145 S. Mishal and M. Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organisations.," 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(2005): p 461-82. 
146 Tony Walker and Andrew Gowers, Arafat - The Biography  (London: Virgin Books, 2003), p 23-24. 
147 Ibid., p 29-31. 
Stuart Groombridge  67 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
behaviour of their members. Any structure adopted by a group imparts both 
organisational advantages and disadvantages. Hence, terrorist group organisational 
structure is a balance between operational effectiveness and the ability to remain 
covert. 
Cognitive limits 
The discussion to this point has highlighted that communications influences the 
organisation of groups. A common point presented in the review of this literature, is 
that communication is the bond that holds social groups together. The human 
ability to communicate is a result of the evolution of the human brain over millions 
of years in the same manner as our eyesight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These 
are all mechanisms that have evolved so that we receive and perceive information 
from the world around us. All these information-gathering mechanisms available to 
us have limitations. We have very limited night vision, our hearing is not as 
developed as that of bats, which can see the world in sound and our sense of smell 
is not as sensitive as that of dogs. All these abilities are limited, but are a result of 
evolutionary forces. These forces have selected our abilities to allow us to survive 
within the physical environment. Likewise, our ability to communicate also allows 
us to compensate for the shortcomings for some of our physical abilities, permitting 
us to operate in coordinated groups, exchange information and pass on historical 
lessons. Even though our ability to communicate is extraordinary, when compared 
to other animals on the planet, it is still finite. Our discussion to this point indicates 
ability to communicate, enables our capacity to create social structures, but this 
ability is finite in nature, which implies that there are limits to how society can 
structure itself. 
 
Our complex communication skills have evolved, not by chance, but to allow us to 
survive. Like other primates, humans are social animals and our ability has evolved 
in this context, in a time when humans lived in small communities and a time when 
the populations were not as dense as they are today. Our ability to communicate 
evolved in a time when human society was based on hunting and gathering, where 
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the family was the basic social form. These family groups were not large (no more 
than 3-5 individuals), but these were the individuals who we dealt with day to day 
on an intimate basis.148 Beyond this was the band, which is the extended family or 
kinship group consisting of between 30-50 individuals.149 The band is a group which 
came together infrequently either to hunt or for some ritual. Beyond this, other 
groupings have been identified by anthropologists, the mega band of around 500 
individuals and the tribe (Linguistic group) of 1000-2000.150 Hunter-gatherer society 
evolved within a homophyllic context, as group size increased there was a 
decreasing level of contact or interaction. Our ability to communicate has evolved 
within this environment. As such, these primeval influences remain with us today. 
This evolutionary process has taken place over tens of thousands of years. For 
modern humans, living in high-density populations is only a recent occurrence. 
Within most societies, high density living is only a few hundred years old. Although 
cities have existed in some societies for around four thousand years, at that time, 
the majority of the population did not live in cities, but in smaller communities. 
Therefore, there has been an insufficient passage of time to allow the evolutionary 
forces to overwrite these prehistoric patterns of social interaction. These patterns 
still seem embedded in modern day society. 
 
As previously discussed, there appears to be sufficient information obtained from 
research that links homophily and communications as the principle forces in bond 
formation within social networks. The examination of the hunter-gatherer societies, 
further suggests a hierarchy in our communications networks, based on the 
frequency of contact. Typically, those we have most contact with, consist of a small 
group of no more than 3-5 individuals.151 As the number of individuals increases, the 
frequency of contact declines. This implies that it is logical to suggest a limit exists 
148 W.-X.  Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 272(2005): p 440. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., p 3. 
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on the number of these links an individual is capable of maintaining and this 
limitation dictates to a degree how society organises itself.  
 
A modern researcher, Robin Dunbar, has carried out work comparing various sizes 
of primate groups to the size of their neo-cortex and found that there was a 
relationship between these two variables. When extrapolated to the size of the 
human neo-cortex, he predicted that the mean limit of human group size was 150 
individuals. He further carried out research into the various sub groups within 
societies, the clique, sympathy group, band, and cognitive group, by investigating 
various social interactions including survivalist groups, anthropological studies, 
Christmas card lists, and data from other sociological studies. The results of these 
investigations identified clustering of relationship data around certain nominal 
values. The results obtained from the survivalist groups study found clusters at 
values of five (support cliques), 12-15 (sympathy groups), 35 (bands), 150 (cognitive 
groups), 500 (mega bands) and 1000-2000 (linguistic groups or tribes).152 Hill and 
Dunbar153, who investigated the size of social networks based on Christmas card 
lists, found that support cliques clustered around a mean value of 4 ± 2, sympathy 
groups around a mean value 11 ± 6, bands around a mean value of 38 ± 17 and 
cognitive groups around a mean value of 148 ± 46. Zhou et al approached the issue 
by utilising prior studies by other sociologists. Zhou’s analysis implied the existence 
of discrete hierarchies within human social groups. The numeric data set used 
within their research project, suggested a power series of 3.5. That is, group sizes 
cluster at 3.5, 12.4, 42.9, 150.1, 525.2, and 1838.3 (3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.54, 3.55…). 
These values are consistent with anthropological work on the sizes of cliques (4), 
sympathy groups (12), bands (43), cognitive groups (150), mega bands (525) and 
linguistic groups or tribes (1838). Zhou also suggested that there are upper and 
lower limits to these values, which infer the values, are not fixed but exist within a 
range. 154 
152 R. A. Hill and R. I. M. Dunbar, "Social Network Size in Humans," Human Nature 14, no. 1 (2003): p 67. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
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Table 2 – Comparison data for size of the various social groupings. 
 Anthropological Dunbar Dunbar 
& Hill 
Zhou Military155 Military Unit Types 
Cliques 5 5 4 4 3-4 Sub section/Fire Team 
Sympathy Group 12 12 11 12 8-13 Section/Squad 
Band 30-50 35 38 43 27-50 Platoon 
Cognitive Group  150 148 150 70-250 Company 
Mega Band 500 -  525 300-1000 Battalion 
Tribe 1000-2000 -  1838 2000-5000 Brigade/Regiment 
 
These results are consistent with sociological papers, which emphasize the 
importance of the triad156 in social networks and its stability.157 Zhou et al compared 
these results with known military hierarchical organisations and found that the 
results were favourable. These results are summarised in the table above however, 
they acknowledge further research is required before arriving at any firm 
conclusions.158 Dunbar acknowledged that these findings are not definitive. Even so, 
the results were consistent with other sociological research. 
 
A similar power series, known as Zipf’s law, is also applicable in various applications 
including social structures159,  
 
“...Zipf’s law accounts remarkably well for the distribution of city sizes... as well as 
firm sizes all over the world,...Recently, Zipf’s law has also been found in Web access 
statistics and Internet traffic characteristics... as well as in bibliometrics, 
informetrics, scientometrics, and library science...”.160 Zhou’s et al findings of a 
power series in social groups is consistent with the results Zipf’s relationship for 
population size of cities and the number of individuals employed by firms or 
155 Derived from a variety of sources, the military units described are predominantly western in origin. 
156 A triad is a group of three individuals. 
157 Hanneman and Riddle, "Introduction to Social Network Methods," p 65. 
158 Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," p 7. 
159A. Saichev, Y. Malevergne, and D. Sornette, "Theory of Zipf’s Law and of General Power Law Distributions with Gibrat’s law 
of Proportional Growth," arXiv.org (2008): p 3. 
160Ibid. 
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companies. By extension, this suggests that these may also be applicable to the size 
and organisational structure of terrorist groups. 
 
A review of Zipf’s law, anthropological research in hunter-gatherer social groupings, 
work carried out by Zhou and Dunbar, and the examination of military structures, 
suggests a consistency of the clustering in human social networks.161 A preliminary 
review of sizes of 178 terrorist groups from the MIPT website and the Military 
Balance 2008 implied that there was clustering of terrorist group sizes at values 1-6, 
10-25, 30-60 100-250, 300-350, 500, 1000-2000, and 3000-5000.162 Although the 
accuracy of the size data of the various terrorist groups is questionable and the 
methodology used to obtain the clustering was a simple histogram, the results 
suggest a clustering at similar values to the social groupings provided in the above 
table. As such, it cannot be discounted that terrorist groups may cluster around 
similar social groupings, indicating that it is worthy of further analysis. 
Emergence of Structure 
The previous section suggests there is an underlying structure, which exists within 
society. It also implies, as the size of social groups increase, so does the structural 
complexity of these groups. This process was described by Krebs and Holley.163 They 
devised a model to depict the evolution of network structures over time. This model 
implied that networks progress through four stages of evolution, each stage 
acquiring greater complexity in its structure. They indicated that the driving force of 
this process was homophily and the efforts of an individual known as a network 
weaver. Their research shows that emergent groups transition through various 
states including:164 
 
1. Scattered network fragments 
2. Single Hub-and-Spoke network 
161 Zhou et al., "Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes," p 8. 
162 "Non-State Groups," in The Military Balance, ed. James Hackett (London: Routledge, 2008), p 461-82. 
163 Krebs and Holley, "Building Smart Communities through Network Weaving." 
164 Ibid. 
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3. Multi-Hub Small-World network 
4. Core/Periphery network 
 
The model proposes that in the initial stage of the network, evolution only consists 
of scattered fragments comprising of very few individuals. Over time, within these 
scattered fragments, a network weaver(s) (leader(s)) emerges. This network weaver 
brings together some of the fragments into a single hub and spoke network. The 
network consists of the network weaver at the centre of the hub. At the centre of 
the network, the network weaver holds the other fragments together. The next 
stage in the development of the network, involves the network weaver bringing 
other hub spoke networks together into a multiple hub small world network.165 The 
final stage of the evolution of the network, which is the ultimate structural goal, is 
to attain the core/periphery network topology. Krebs and Holley also argue this 
topology emerges after many years of network weaving. They further indicate that 
this type of network is stable and has the capacity to link to other networks in other 
geographic regions. The structure of core/periphery networks consists of the core, 
which are the key members of the network. The periphery consists of three groups. 
The first group is new members endeavouring to gain membership of the core. The 
second group consists of bridges to other communities. The third group consists of 
those who have access to resources outside the network. 
 
Network weavers are effectively leaders who bring the scattered fragments 
together, evolving the primitive structures of the single hub and spoke, and multi 
hub small world networks. If these leaders are successful, influence becomes 
concentrated in a core/periphery network. 
 
The model proposed by Krebs and Holley is useful in describing the emergence of 
network structures, but it does not describe the emergence of hierarchies. In 
addition, there also has been a consistent failure of homophily to describe the 
165 Ibid. 
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emergence of hierarchies in social systems. There is a body of research, which has 
indicated that Neolithic, Hutterite and Academic communities seem to maintain 
social cohesion between values of 100 - 200 individuals.166 Beyond these values, the 
communities fracture and splinter. Between these values, there seems to be a 
tipping point. This tipping point appears to occur when the group’s size reaches 
approximately 150 individuals. This value has been statistically related to the 
cognitive limits of the human brain, which restricts the number of other people one 
individual can effectively deal with. Beyond this, human groups become unstable 
without the introduction of a formal structure.   
 
Zhou’s et al power series offers a solution to the maintenance of social cohesion. 
The series suggests a natural organisational hierarchy within human society and 
which offers a solution to how hierarchies emerge. The power series suggests a 
process of stratification, which maintains an individual’s social network within the 
150 limit.167 That is, at the base level of the hierarchy an individual may be part of a 
clique consisting of three other individuals. One person within this clique is 
designated the leader, who also resides in a leadership clique. Within this 
leadership clique, there would be a leader, who also belongs to the leadership 
clique in the next layer in the organisation. The process repeats as you traverse the 
hierarchy upwards (see Figure 2).   
 
Thus, hierarchical structures are a function of size and a solution to a specific 
organisational problem. The problem of managing the limits imposed by the human 
brain restricts the number of communications channels an individual can maintain. 
Hierarchical structures will emerge when the organisation obtains sufficient size. 
Hierarchies emerge to reduce the communication overload within a large 
organisation by breaking that organisation up into smaller manageable 
components, which exploit the cognitive limits of the human brain. In doing so, it 
166 Dunbar, "Co-Evolution of Neocortex size, group size and language in humans," p 7. 
167 Ibid. 
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creates efficiencies in communications and restores stability to the organisational 
structure. 
 
Figure 2 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Structured Hierarchy (Directionally Coupled Network) 
 
The following discussion utilises Jackson’s model.168 Jackson argues: 
 
“Within an organization, the ability of a commander or opinion leader to 
exert different types of authority is defined by the nature of the relationships 
among the members (e.g., how influential is the leader, will he or she be 
“listened to” when orders or suggestions are given?) and the 
communications mechanisms available for the leader to communicate with 
members. Even in organizations with strong and charismatic leaders, limits 
on their ability to communicate with their members reduce their ability to 
exert authority at all three levels. Such limits could arise simply from 
practical constraints on the bandwidth and frequency of their 
communications modes, or from more complex operational security 
concerns. In such cases, isolated components of the group may diverge from 
the intent of the leadership because of the weakness of the connection 
between them, even in the absence of any intentional effort to change 
strategy or tactics.”169 
 
168 B. A. Jackson, "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist 
Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 2 (2006). 
169 Ibid., p 245. 
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Jackson makes no distinction between networks and hierarchies. Jackson views 
hierarchies as a special case of a network. In Jackson’s model, he views hierarchies 
as tightly coupled networks. 
 
“The most frequently cited example of such tightly coupled groups is the 
classic hierarchy which, in addition to specific structural characteristics, have 
clear and stable authority relationships where leadership can exert all three 
forms of control over their subordinates. This control is exerted 
unidirectionally from “higher to lower” within the organization…”170 
 
Jackson emphasises how the capacity for a group to communicate determines the 
strength of the connectivity between the elements of an organisation. In effect, this 
capacity to communicate regulates the structure of the group. Jackson also 
highlighted the strength of these channels were influenced by environmental 
considerations, such as group security. This implies, the greater the risk of 
disruption to these communications channels, the frequency of the channels used 
would decline. Therefore, reducing their bandwidth, that is, the amount of 
information transferred on these channels and as such, the level of control the 
leadership cadre can exert. Thus, the strength of the communications channels 
underscores the structure of the terrorist group. 
 
The density of the coupling of the various components of the network in Figure 2, 
above, would be expected of a group that operated in friendly environments. The 
environment would impose few impediments to communications between the 
various elements of the group. As such, there would be an expectation that an 
element would be able to maintain daily contact with all other elements within the 
group. Therefore, as per Jackson’s model, the leadership would be able to exercise 
strategic, operational, and tactical control over the organisation as a whole. 
 
170 Ibid., p 247. 
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As the harshness of the environmental conditions increases, the coupling of the 
communications networks within the structure weakens or decreases. This would 
lead initially to the loss of tactical control of the lower levels of the group. 
Figure 3, below, illustrates the weakening of this network. 
Figure 3 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Coupled Network 
 
The diagram (Figure 3) above illustrates the weakening of the links between upper and lower levels of the 
organisation. As per Jackson’s model, this relates to the environmental conditions, which increases the risk of 
contact between elements of the organisation, hence decreasing the influence the upper levels have over the 
tactical operations of the group. 
 
As the environmental conditions further degrade, so does the capacity of the group 
to communicate, leading to the uncoupling of the network as shown in the diagram 
below (Figure 4). The ability of the upper levels of the organisation to communicate 
with the lower levels of the organisation without risk diminishes further. The 
reduction in the coupling of the network decreases the ability of the upper levels of 
the organisation to exercise operational, as well as, tactical control. This loss of 
influence leads to an organisation of loosely coupled groups, which are aligned to 
the strategic objectives of the larger organisation, but operate with independent 
tactical and operational objectives. 
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Figure 4 - A Hypothetical Chart of a Clique Uncoupled Network 
 
In this type of group, the elements of the network are not directly linked to the 
organisation that provides the strategic direction. There are a number of 
organisational outcomes in this type of system. The simplest result of this type of 
network is an independent cell operating on its own initiative, but taking the 
strategic direction from another organisation. Another outcome is a large group, 
which is not directly aligned or connected to the organisation, providing the 
strategic direction. This type of system allows for many possible organisational 
outcomes, the two previously discussed are offered as examples. 
Summary 
The literature review indicates, as the size of a group increases, the group’s 
structure also emerges to manage the increasing complexity of the communications 
channels. Work conducted by researchers involved in the analysis of social networks 
and anthropology, suggests structure is evolutionary, and determined by the 
strength or weakness of the communications channels, which connect the 
components of the network. The review also indicated group structure was 
dependent on the environmental factors in which the group operated. This 
indicates there is a direct relationship between the security environment and the 
strength or weakness of the communications channels within the network, which 
tied the organisation together. The review also indicated the geographic distance 
between components of the organisation, further influenced the structure of the 
organisation. At the micro level, researchers like Dunbar have claimed there is a 
maximum limit to the number of communications channels an individual can 
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effectively manage, which would further influence the structural choices available 
to the group. Dunbar argued this limit has an underlying impact on social structures. 
 
Thus, the literature review suggests group size, geographic distance, environment, 
and the cognitive limits of the human brain are all factors, which potentially 
influence a terrorist group’s communications network and therefore its 
organisational structure. It further suggests group structure is evolutionary over 
time. 
Hypothesis  
The literature review allows the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time. 
 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the 
geographic dispersion of the group. 
Variables 
The structure of terrorist groups is a function of: 
 
1. Group size 
2. Political, economic and social environmental variables 
3. Cognitive limits 
4. Geographic distance 
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Chapter 4 – Modelling Terrorist Groups as Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complexity theory and the concept of complex adaptive systems have been applied, 
to a limited extent, to the study of terrorism. Bousquet171, Marion and Uhl-Bien172, 
and Beech173 have all applied complexity theory and the concepts of complex 
adaptive systems to the study of Al Qaeda. These researchers found a good match, 
but their studies focused on one case and they did not look at other terrorist groups 
to ascertain whether these principles could be more generally applied. 
 
This chapter endeavours to derive a model based on the theories of complexity and 
complex adaptive systems to describe the emergence of terrorist groups and their 
structure. This complex adaptive model and the literature review, will be used to 
formulate a set of hypothesises to test this premise and to ascertain whether it can 
be extended to cases beyond the single case studied to date. 
An introductory background to Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory or Chaos theory, as it is also known, grew out of the study of 
systems, which displayed mathematically chaotic natures. These systems could not 
be described by the traditional mathematics of linear systems. These systems were 
described by non-linear equations, which were mathematically impossible to solve. 
It was not until the advent of the digital computer and its ability to carry out 
millions of computations per second, did the dilemma of attempting to solve and 
gain an understanding of how these equations behaved, become possible. The first 
to realise this and attempt to gain insight into the behaviour of these types of 
systems, was a meteorologist named Edward Lorenz. In 1961, Lorenz was studying 
the chaotic nature of weather systems, running simulations on an early computer. 
In an attempt to save time, Lorenz, rather than starting the simulation from the 
beginning using his initial data, started the simulation using data from half way 
171 Antoine Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless 
jihad," Journal of International Relations and Development(2011), www.palgrave-journals.com/jird/. 
172 Marion and Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership." 
173 Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Beech, "Observing Al Qaeda through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for 
National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism" (U.S. Army War College 2004). 
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through his last iteration of the simulation. To his surprise, he discovered that the 
results he received at the end of the run were completely different to the previous 
test. On examining his results, in an attempt to understand what when wrong, 
Lorenz discovered that the computer calculated the results of his equations with 
six-digit accuracy, but the printout of the results was limited to three-digit accuracy. 
Thus, he discovered that very small changes in initial conditions resulted in very 
large changes in output conditions, which provided insight into weather systems. 
This insight suggested that the prediction of weather systems could only be 
guaranteed over a short time period, as the inaccuracy in the measurements would 
lead to prediction and reality significantly diverging as the period of the prediction 
increased. This was due to the interrelationships of the variables and the limited 
accuracy by which they could be measured. This meant that the variables needed 
regular measurement to ensure the ongoing accuracy of any predictions. 
 
Thus, complex systems were found to be sensitive to their initial conditions, due to 
the interaction and feedback between all the variables involved. As such, small 
perturbations or changes in initial conditions could lead to dramatic changes over 
time. 
Terrorist Groups as a Complex Adaptive System 
The concept of complex adaptive systems is a specialised field of complexity theory, 
which grew out of the biological sciences.174 A complex adaptive system is both self-
organizing and learning.175 A complex adaptive system also reflects the complexity of 
their environment.176 Further, they are non-linear, interactive, self-organising, and 
self-reproducing.177 “Systems may be called adaptive if they can adjust to such 
174 Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6.  
175 Kevin J. Dooley, "A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change," Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life 
Sciences 1, no. 1 (1997): p 77. 
176 Jochen Fromm, The Emergence of Complexity  (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004), p 182. 
177 Bertuglia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems: p 296. 
Stuart Groombridge  81 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
changes while keeping their organization as much as possible intact”.178 Bertuglia 
and Vaio describe a complex adaptive system as an “…adaptive complex system is 
an open system, made up of numerous elements that interact with one another in a 
nonlinear way and that constitute a single, organized and dynamic entity, able to 
evolve and adapt to the environment”.179 
 
Bousquet defines a complex adaptive system “…as a dynamic network of many 
agents acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents 
are doing. The control of a complex adaptive system therefore tends to be highly 
dispersed and decentralised. Any coherent behaviour in the system arises from 
competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. It is the accumulation 
of all the individual decisions taken by the multitude of agents that produces the 
overall behaviour of the system, and which can thus be said to be emergent.”180 This 
definition originates from a complexity theorist from the Santa Fe Institute, John 
Holland. The types of systems, which can be described as complex adaptive 
systems, include “living organisms, insect colonies, bird flocks, ecosystems, 
businesses, stock markets and other forms of social and cultural organisation with 
the constituent agents being cells, species, individuals, firms or nations”.181  
 
John Holland described the characteristics of a complex adaptive system as follows: 
 
1. A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel 
and interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these 
interactions.182 
178 Francis Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," (Brussels: Center Leo Apostel, Free University of 
Brussels, Belgium, 2001), p 15. 
179 Bertuglia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems: p 276. 
180 Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Fromm, The Emergence of Complexity: p 183-84. 
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2. Control of a complex adaptive system tends to be distributed across the 
system, but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation 
between the parts of the system.183 
3. A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the 
system acting as building blocks for a higher level.184 
4. A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it 
learns and adapts to changes in the environment.185 
5. A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.186 
 
Intuitively, terrorist groups share all the above characteristics, except point 2. There 
is a trend to consider terrorists as being centrally controlled, with a well-defined 
hierarchy. Since the 911 attack on the twin towers by Al Qaeda, this premise has 
been called into question by a number of researchers. These include the likes of 
Sageman, Gunaratna, Jackson, Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech. There is 
acceptance within the research community that Al Qaeda operates like a franchise 
or a loosely coupled network, which is not centrally controlled. Likewise, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), outside its area of control, operates in a similar 
manner. 
 
The problem with the above model is the concept of decentralised control, which 
could be problematic in the study of terrorist groups. Groups such as the Irish 
Republican Army are considered centralised hierarchical organisations. One of the 
premises in this thesis is, on paper, they appeared to be centralised, but in reality, 
they are not. This premise has some support from other researchers. Marion and 
Uhl-Bien, in their study of Al Qaeda, have argued leaders are not created by the 
system but are emergent products of the system and enhance the fitness of the 
183 Ibid., p 184. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6. 
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system.187 They further argue these types of leaders use indirect leadership.188 They 
are not necessarily embedded in a formal position but permeate the system.189 
These leaders also act as network weavers, coupling the different and diverse parts 
of the system.190 As such, leaders are the product of the evolution of a complex 
adaptive system. Thus, point 2 is consistent with overall premise that a terrorist 
group is potentially a complex adaptive system. 
Emergence and Self-organising 
The following two sections discuss in detail, the concepts of emergence and self-
organising, which are central to complex adaptive systems. From these discussions, 
the key variables involved in the study of terrorist groups as a complex adaptive 
system, are isolated. 
Emergence 
The aim within this section is to define a model based on complexity theory’s 
concept of emergence. There is no intention to derive a quantitative model, but to 
use the principles of emergence to derive a qualitative description when used in 
conjunction with the hypotheses. The goal is to put these factors into context within 
the larger system. 
 
Emergence is a poorly defined concept within complexity theory.191 The concepts of 
emergence and self-organising are often confused and interchanged192, although 
“…emergence and self-organisation each emphasise very different characteristics of 
a system’s behaviour. Both phenomena can exist in isolation and they can co-exist in 
a dynamical system.”193 In most instances, emergence is described as a global 
187 Marion and Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership," p 55. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., p 55-56. 
190 Ibid., p 56. 
191 Tom De Wolf and Tom Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," 
in Engineering Self-Organising Systems (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005), p 1. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
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phenomenon, which results from the interaction of local elements of the system.194 
In the context of this thesis, local elements, emergents, or entities, are the 
individuals or groups involved in the process, which leads to emergence. 
 
Emergence is characterised by the unexpected appearance of properties or 
structures that come into existence, due to the interactions of individuals or groups. 
These interactions do not occur in isolation. 
 
“The components should interact freely with each other and with the 
environment, mutually adapting so as to reach an intrinsically “preferable” 
or “fit” configuration (attractor), thus defining the purpose of the system in 
an “emergent” way.”195 
 
Emergence occurs at the boundary of the system, between the system and the 
external environment.196 The system must reach a point of criticality or “edge of 
chaos”197 where the environment undergoes significant change or perturbation.198 In 
this type of system, the environment is not static, but dynamic. The system draws 
energy from the changes (perturbations) in the environment, which in turn drives 
emergence. In the science of complexity, energy is information, resources, or 
anything that drives change within the emerging system.  
 
Emergence is typically a bottom-up process, “…but is not possible without a top 
down feedback process.”199 As has previously been indicated, it is characterised by 
local interactions. These interactions require an energy (information, resources etc.) 
194 Ibid., p 2.  
195 Carlos Gershenson and Francis Heylighen, "When Can We Call a System Self-Organizing?," in Advances in Artificial Life 
(Berlin Heidelberg: Springer 2003). 
196 Jochen Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence." p 3. 
197 Ibid., p 11. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid., p 2. 
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exchange mechanism (communications conduits) and is a product of positive and 
negative feedback between the macro and micro levels of the system. 
 
The concept of emergence utilised within this thesis, argues the local interaction of 
individuals or groups within a defined set of unstable local environmental 
conditions, which leads to the emergence of new entities. More specifically, Wolf et 
al states:  
 
“A system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the 
macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts 
at the micro-level. Such emergents are novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the 
system.”200 
 
The term “emergents”, as defined by Wolf et al, is “…a general term to denote the 
result of the process of emergence: properties, behaviour, structure, patterns, etc.”201 
Within this thesis, the “emergent” is defined as the group and its structure. Wolf et 
al describe the micro and macro levels of the system as follows: 
 
“The ‘level’ mentioned refers to certain points of view. The macro level 
considers the system as a whole and the micro-level considers the system 
from the point of view of the individual entities that make up the system.”202 
 
The interactions at the micro level are considered to take place within a dynamic 
environment. For these interactions to take place, the parts of the system (or 
entities) must be local to each other, that is, geographically close. 
 
The system and processes we are discussing are the factors, which lead to the 
emergence of terrorist groups. As suggested previously, the environment in which 
200 Wolf and Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," p 3. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
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entities interact is important in the emergence of these types of groups. It is also 
noted, the formation of terrorist groups is an extreme response to these 
environmental factors, and other types of less extreme groups can co-evolve within 
the same environmental system.203  
 
Within this thesis, the PESTELO model is used to define the environment. PESTELO 
is an acronym for political, economic, socio-cultural, legal, ecological, technological, 
and organisational factors that make up the environment. The PESTELO model will 
be discussed in further detail in a later chapter within the thesis. In short, the model 
has an intelligence and business background and is not traditionally applied in 
academic work. Even so, the model does capture all the variables that describe the 
environmental space in question, used by other academic researchers. 
 
Local interactions imply geographic proximity. Technology also plays a role, as it has 
the capacity to create virtual proximity within cyberspace, which means physical 
proximity is no longer an overriding requirement. Modern communications 
technology can create virtual proximity in real time.  
 
When discussing local interactions, the physical environment, as defined by the 
PESTELO model, varies from location to location. As such, it is not uniform over the 
geographic space in question. It can vary, creating areas of relative advantage and 
disadvantage. Thus, the probability of interactions taking place also varies and 
requires context. People in society interact for a variety of reasons, but the 
likelihood of individuals interacting increases when they share common 
backgrounds, interests, and values.204 Hence, social affinity or homophily is a 
significant factor in enabling these interactions. A detailed discussion of homophily 
occurs in a later chapter. 
 
203 Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 658 - 59. 
204 Michele; Frasca Starnini, Mattia; Baronchelli, Andrea, "Emergence of metapopulations and echo chambers in mobile 
agents," Physics and Society(2016). p 8. 
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Thus, emergence occurs because of changes in the environment that drive local 
interactions of entities, which occupy the same physical or virtual local geographic 
space. These local interactions enable information exchange, which is the energy 
that drives the emergent system. The individual or group interpret this information 
in the context of how the environmental changes affect the specific individual or 
group. They also interpret this feedback in terms of how the changes within the 
environment affect their homophyllic group. This interpretation can potentially act 
as a radicalising factor within the group.205 Further, these changes in the 
environment may present an opportunity to address long-standing grievances.206 
Radicalisation does not directly result in the formation of terrorist organisations, 
but is part of the emergence process. Radicalisation is a stage in the emergent 
process. This process and these types of interactions can lead to many outcomes 
and do not always lead to terrorist group formation. Therefore, changes in the 
environmental factors can lead to individuals or sections of the community 
becoming radicalised. In extreme cases, this can lead to the emergence of terrorist 
groups, but this outcome is not certain. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge, not everyone involved in the radicalisation 
process concludes violence is the only viable mechanism that is capable of bringing 
about the required change(s) to the existing system. Radicalisation can lead to the 
creation of non-violent protest movements or political parties, which are willing to 
work within the existing system. The body of research conducted over the last 40 




205 Alex P. Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature 
Review," (Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013), p 4. 
206 Ibid., p 4 - 6. 
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There is another form of emergence called “diachronic”: 
 
“Diachronic emergence refers to a historical sequence of systems or system 
types. In the course of evolution one system is linked to another— the old to 
the new—by emergence; that is, the first one gives rise to the second.”207 
 
In the terms of this thesis, diachronic emergence suggests, at the time of 
emergence, the terrorist groups may inherit the structures of their parent group, 
from which they arose. Thus, it implies these types of groups could build on the 
structure of what has come before. 
 
In summary, the model of emergence used within this thesis, consists of the 
following elements and relationships. 
1. The entities (individuals or groups) must share physical or virtual 
geographic proximity. This proximity enables the exchange of 
information. 
2. The individuals and groups share the PESTELO environment. 
3. The probability of interactions and communications between the 
individuals or groups is more likely when they share similar social 
affinity or homophily 
4. Changes in the environment drives the radicalisation process, where 
individuals or groups could coalesce in response to the 
environmental conditions. As such, radicalisation is part of the 
emergence process. 
5. Groups coalesce and emerge based on a common aspiration and 
belief of how this aspiration can be achieved. Thus, homophily is part 
of the engine, which drives emergence, as it determines the 
207 Cristian Fuchs, "Some Implications of Anthony Giddens’ Works for a Theory of Social Self-Organization," Emergence 4, no. 3 
(2002): p 8. 
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likelihood of interaction. It forms part of the rules of preferential 
attachment. 
6. At the extreme end of this spectrum, terrorist groups emerge based 
on a shared belief that violence is the only method, which will bring 
about their aspiration(s). Other groups may emerge, which share the 
terrorist group’s aspirations but do not share the group’s belief in the 
use of violence as a legitimate tool or as the only method available. 
 
Figure 5 below, illustrates the hierarchy of variables, which are involved in 
radicalisation and emergence. 
 
Figure 5 - Hierarchy of variables involved in Radicalisation and Emergence 
 
 
The outer two green layers define the physical and virtual distance between the 
entities and describes the proximities of the individuals or groups. It illustrates their 
capacity to interact as required in emergence. This level also defines the confines of 
the local environment. The next green layer is the ecological environment, which is 
not a factor, which is studied in this thesis, but is included for completeness, as 
Stuart Groombridge  90 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
ecological factors have been the cause of extremist activity in the past and will likely 
continue to be an area of grievance in the world experiencing climate change.  
 
The next two purple layers specify the factors used to describe the non-physical 
environment. The outer layer consists of the non-physical factors, such as those 
that define the political, economic, and legal variables and can be areas of potential 
conflict in any social system. The inner layer comprises of the organisational and 
socio-cultural environmental variables, which are structural factors.  
 
The orange layers describe the homophyllic variables, which determine the 
likelihood of individuals or groups interacting at the micro level within the emergent 
system. The outer layer is status homophily, which “…includes the major 
sociodemographic dimensions that stratify society—ascribed characteristics like 
race, ethnicity, sex, or age, and acquired characteristics like religion, education, 
occupation...”208 This layer represents how society categorises and divides its 
members and defines how individuals and groups identify. These are effectively 
societies self-organising rules. This is also the layer where changes in the 
environment can create divides and conflicts, which potentially can lead to 
terrorism. This layer is the interface with the environment. 
 
The inner layer is value homophily, which “…includes the wide variety of internal 
states presumed to shape our orientation toward future behavior.”209 This layer 
contains the less tangible aspects of social stratification. It identifies the aspirations 
and beliefs of individuals or groups. Within this model, these are the factors, which 
define the emergence of terrorists groups. These groups have goals (aspirations) 
based on their grievance and as previously mentioned, they may share the same or 
similar aspirations with other groups, but what makes them distinct is their belief 
that violence is required to achieve this aspiration. These individuals or groups are 
208 McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," p 419. 
209 Ibid., p 419. 
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at the extreme end of the radicalisation process. Specifically, their willingness to use 
violence in a selective and planned manner against civilian or non-combatants in 
support of their aspirations, with the intent to draw the public’s attention to their 
cause. The use of violence has the intent of provoking a response from their 
opponents. These aspirations and beliefs may be latent for years, but the 
perturbations in a given set of environmental conditions enable the emergence of 
these groups. 
 
The final component of emergence is radicalisation. This is the mauve inner circle. 
The radicalisation process can result in the emergence of violent extremist or 
terrorist groups, but it can also result in other types of emergent behaviours or 
groups. Individuals or groups can become sympathetic or supportive of the 
aspiration, but reject violence. Others may engage in non-violent activism or create 
political groups to achieve the aspirations to work within the existing system or 
attempt to subvert the system. At the extreme end, others may support the use of 
violence, but are unwilling to engage in violence. These individuals or groups may 
provide logistical, material or financial support to a violent extremist group or 
terrorist organisation. They may also provide intelligence or safe houses to violent 
extremists, violent activists, or members of a terrorist group. At the apex of the 
scale, are the violent extremists. This is not a homogenous group and can be 
delineated into various roles.  
 
The scales of radicalisation utilised within this dissertation, extends on the work 
conducted by Kilcullen.210 Kilcullen broadly divided these scales into the core, cadre, 
members, supporters, and sympathisers.211 Kilcullen also acknowledged extremist 
political organisations, non-violent subversive networks, sympathiser networks, and 
the criminal/terrorist nexus.212 Figure 2 illustrates the enhanced scales of 
radicalisation. 
210 Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 649- 59. 
211 Ibid., p 659. 
212 Ibid., p 650. 
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Radicalisation is also a bidirectional process. An individual can transition up the 
scale or down, depending on their changes in belief or aspiration at any given time. 
An individual can leap a step or steps depending on their individual circumstance. 
As such, the process is not linear. The triangular shape of the diagram illustrates the 
declining numbers of individuals who reside at each level of radicalisation, although 
the triangular shape is illustrative rather than a definitive representation of the 
actual numbers. There is a greater likelihood these numbers follow a non-linear 
relationship and exponentially decay as behaviours become more violent and 
extreme. 
 
Figure 6 – Scales of Radicalisation 
 
 
Within this thesis, violent extremists or terrorists are divided into four categories, 
which may overlap. These categories include the ideologue, the hard-core, the 
followers, and the opportunists. An individual may fit into one or more of the 
categories. The definition of these categories utilise the work in this area conducted 
by Bokhari213, Kilcullen214, Makarenko215, and Mullins.216 This delineation of the 
categories of violent extremists, results from differences in the variables in value 
homophily. Those involved in violent extremism or terrorism, share the same or 
213 Bokhari, "Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalization and Recruitment to Terror Networks.," p 11. 
214 Kilcullen, "Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe," p 649-59. 
215 Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: the emerging nexus," p 1-10. 
216 Sam Mullins, ""Global Jihad": The Canadian Experience," Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 5 (2013): p 742-54. 
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similar aspirations, and believe violence is a legitimate tool, but some have the 
behavioural traits or the aptitude for violence and others may not. Some may 
possess abilities and aptitudes, which predispose them to other roles within a 
terrorist or violent extremism organisation.  
 
Figure 7 – Categories of Violent Extremists 
 
 Figure 3 above, illustrates the overlap of the various categories of violent 
extremists. The ideologues are those who formulate the group’s message and 
provide justification for the group’s actions. In many respects, these are the public 
face of the group. The hard-core members are the core, cadre, and members of the 
organisational machine and include the fighters, bomb builders etc. The 
opportunists, as their title suggests, are those who attach themselves to a group for 
personal gain, whether this gain is political, criminal, financial etc. In some 
instances, they align with the group because they believe they will be on the 
winning side and they see personal advantage in doing so. The last group are the 
followers. In general, followers are defined as members of the groups who are not 
in leadership roles. In this thesis, followers are those who are on the periphery 
group, who are seeking membership of the group. In recent history, some terrorist 
cells, which have operated in the West, have claimed allegiance to groups such as Al 
Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). These groups have carried out 
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attacks or attempted to carry out attacks in these groups’ names, although not 
directly linked to these groups. 
Self-Organising 
The aim within this section is to define a model based on complexity theory’s 
concept of self-organising. There is no intention to derive a quantitative model to 
describe how terrorist groups self-organise. The goal is to use the principles of self-
organising as defined in complexity theory, to derive a qualitative model to describe 
the evolution of the structure and size of terrorist groups. 
 
Self-Organising is defined as“…the spontaneous creation of a globally coherent 
pattern out of local interactions”.217 Self-organising is also, “…a dynamical and 
adaptive process where systems acquire and maintain structure themselves, without 
external control.”218 The theory of self-organising also requires a set of simple rules, 
which describe how the entities in the system are to interact, behave, and 
communicate.219 All entities in the system share these simple rules. In addition, a 
self-organising system, to be sustainable, must be able to maintain and replenish 
itself.220 Meer and Koppen also indicate a self-organising system must be resilient. 
That is, if the system loses an input variable, the system must adapt in response to 
this change.221  
 
Like emergence, self-organising occurs at the boundaries between the environment 
and the system.222 It is at this boundary it draws its energy/information.223 Self-
organising systems are non-linear, involving positive and negative feedback 
between the micro and macro levels of the environment, which determines the 
217 Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 1. 
218 Wolf and Holvoet, "Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined," p 7. 
219 Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 4. 
220 Hermann De Meer and Christian Koppen, "15. Characterization of Self Organization," in Advances in Applied Self -
organizing Systems (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2005), p 237. 
221 Ibid., p 227. 
222 Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence". p 10 
223 Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 14. 
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system’s capacity to transfer information (communicate).224 The environment is the 
medium, which enables the local interactions and hence, the environment mediates 
all communications. This mediation is termed stigmergy.225 There is no external 
direction of the self-organising process and it is an internal response to the 
changing environmental conditions.226 Self-Organising is characterised as a “bottom-
up” process, which results from the “random changes, disequilibrium or something 
else [perturbations]”227, an input of energy from the environment, which creates 
instability (edge of chaos) within the structure(s).228 Without explicit pressure or 
control from outside the organisation229, the instability in the structure, causes the 
organisation to a point of criticality (tipping point), where the organisation is no 
longer stable in its current state (attractor).230 The instability drives emergence and 
the group to seek a new state (attractor), through re-organising (self-organising) its 
structure to attain dynamic equilibrium.231 In effect, the system evolves to meet the 
environmental challenges or does not survive.232 Further, evolution may involve a 
number of intermediary steps, before it arrives at an optional structure.233 It is a 
process where the system endeavours to find a new point of dynamic stability, 
gravitating to an attractor.234 When the system evolves, it also changes the 
environment, because it interacts with the environment as a complex adaptive 
system.235 In addition, the environment does not drive all change. Internal 
interactions can also drive change.236 When discussing systems, such as the structure 
of terrorism groups, these types of groups or systems do not operate under a 
224 Meer and Koppen, "15. Characterization of Self Organization," p 235. 
225 Fromm, "Ten Questions about Emergence". p3 
226 Ibid. p3 
227 Bertuglia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems: p 271. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., p 272. 
230 Ibid., p 277. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 3. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Bertuglia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos and Complexity: The Dynamics of Natural and Social Systems: p 271-72. 
235 Heylighen, "The Science of Self Organizing and Adaptivity," p 4. 
236 Ibid. 
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common environment, which varies from location to location. Thus, in this type of 
system, evolution is a distributed and parallel process, with differing results or 
solutions for differing environment’s problems.237 
 
The problem with self-organising systems is how we define the organisational 
structure of the system under examination. Within this dissertation, the term 
“structure” equates to a network, which self-organises at the time of emergence. 
Self-organising and emergence are utilised to understand how these networks 
evolve in response to environmental changes.  
 
Gershenson et al, indicates the observed structure of a self-organising system is 
dependent on the observer’s perception of what they are attempting to discover.238 
If the observer is examining the system to ascertain the network involved in 
commodity flows and none exists, then the observer will discover disorder or 
entropy.239 To ascertain the nature of the system, the observer must focus their 
attention on the purpose of the system.240 The discussion within this thesis is about 
the command and control structures of the organisation or group. Thus, this thesis 
examines the flow of information. In addition, it examines how the group organises 
to utilise information to achieve its goals or aspirations, without comprising the 
security of the organisation in a given environment. As such, we are examining the 
network, which permits the communication of information throughout the 
network. To ensure there is no misconception, the communications networks 
within terrorist groups are the structures, which are the subject of examination 
within this thesis. 
 
The structure of the terrorist groups emerges from the interaction of local entities, 
which self-organise, based on a set of shared self-organising rules. The capacity of 
237 Ibid. 
238 Gershenson and Heylighen, "When Can We Call a System Self-Organizing?," p 607. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid., p 611. 
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the entities to self-organise and exchange information depends on the ability of the 
group to use the available communications channels through the environment in a 
manner, which does not compromise the groups. Thus, the local environmental 
conditions determine the ability of the group to transfer information. Therefore, the 
structure of the groups will emerge and self-organise to reflect the environmental 
conditions. This suggests the structure of a terrorist group may vary, depending on 
the geographic distribution of the group and on the local environmental conditions, 
from one location to another.  
 
Self-organising further suggests that for a group to remain viable over time, the 
environmental conditions have to be such, so the group can sustain itself. That is, 
the environmental conditions must be such that the group can resource itself 
(financially and materially), sustain recruitment, and maintain support within the 
general population.  
 
Self-organising implies if the environmental factors were to change in such a way 
where the group could no longer justify its existence, the group would have to 
adapt. It would have to evolve to cater for the new conditions. If it did not, it could 
become unstable and potentially cease to exist if it could not find a new 
equilibrium. In terms of terrorist groups, this means they may have to abandon 
violence and evolve into a nonviolent political entity. Otherwise, they may cease to 
exist as a unified entity. 
 
In developing a model to describe the self-organising structure of terrorist groups, it 
is important to identify the key properties. 
1. Environmental factors 
a. The entities (individuals or groups) must share physical or 
virtual geographic proximity. This proximity enables the 
exchange of information/communications. 
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b. The individuals and groups share the PESTELO environment 
and are subject to the same environmental perturbations. 
2. Self-organising rules 
a. Rules of Interaction as defined by homophily or social affinity. 
b. There are cognitive limits to the number of entities another 
entity can connect to. 
Figure 8 below illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the self-organising 
process. 
Figure 8 - Hierarchy of variables involved in the Self-Organising Process 
 
 
Figure 8 above illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the self-organising 
process. The outer layers of the model consist of the physical and virtual geographic 
factors, the environmental and homophyllic variables, which are identical to those 
involved in the processes of radicalisation and emergence. This is consistent with 
complex theory as emergence and self-organising are closely related. A self-
organising system requires a set of simple rules, which instruct the entities how to 
arrange themselves. The inner two circles define these rules. Homophily is the rule 
of preferential attachment, which is a feature of the principles of self-organising. 
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This rule defines the probability of entities interacting and as such, a group 
emerging. The inner circle defines the limits on the number of attachments an 
entity can maintain and consistently service to ensure effective information 
exchange. Robin Dunbar has suggested there is a cognitive limit to the number of 
links or communications channels people can effectively maintain. Typically three to 
four, but it can be as low as one, or as high as seven.  
 
As the system is a complex adaptive system, there are a number of feedback loops 
between each of the layers. The group is part of a greater system where any group, 
entity, or agent has the capacity to change the environment in which they operate. 
The group must reproduce or replenish itself, learn and self-organise (evolve) to 
adapt to the environment as it changes. This model suggests the combination of all 
of these factors will result in the system gravitating to a particular structural 
attractor. It also means, as the environment across the conflict space is not 
homogeneous, the overall structure of the group may be impossible to predict. 
Summary 
From the discussion above, it is important to understand the environment, as any 
complex adaptive system is a part of the environment and interacts with it. Thus, an 
understanding of the environment is important. As we are looking at the terrorist 
groups through the lens of complexity, it is vital to understand the initial 
environmental conditions and the perturbations within this environment to 
understand the interactions, which had driven the emergence of the group. Further, 
complex adaptive systems are self-organising. It is essential to understand the 
environment’s influence on the group’s structure. In addition, it is necessary to 
understand the underlying simple rules of self-organising, which govern and limit 
the structural choices. 
 
Above, contains the fundamental research questions, which require answers to 
extend the work by Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech. These researchers 
have managed to describe Al Qaeda as a complex adaptive system. This thesis 
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intends to attempt to extend this hypothesis by applying the model above to 
further case studies of historical terrorist groups. The model above goes beyond the 
work of Bousquet, Marion and Uhl-Bien, and Beech, as it endeavours to identify the 
key variables involved in the processes of emergence and self-organising. This is an 
attempt to generalise the premise that terrorist groups are complex adaptive 
systems, whose emergence and structure can be described and understood through 
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Chapter 5 - Methodology 
Introduction 
The case studies will be utilised to test the hypothesis outlined in previous chapters. 
This chapter outlines the analytical method, case study section, assumptions, and 
the limitations of the methodology and the dataset. 
Analytical method 
The case study is the analytical methodology used within this dissertation. This 
dissertation uses three case studies, each due to their distinct characteristics. A 
cross case analysis is conducted in an attempt to determine commonalities between 
the cases to test the validity of the hypothesis outlined in the previous chapters. 
Thus, the cross analysis is conducted to ascertain whether any generalities can be 
derived from the cases under study. The case study methodology is well suited to 
this work. By definition, it attempts to conduct: 
 
“…an in-depth inquiry into a specific and complex phenomenon (the ‘case’), 
set within its real-world context. To arrive at a sound understanding of the 
case, a case study should not be limited to the case in isolation but should 
examine the likely interaction between the case and its context.”241 
 
Cross case, analysis is utilised to test the hypotheses. The use of this methodology 
will provide insight into the validity of the findings.242 The methodology utilised is 
explanatory, which will attempt to examine the causal effects relating to each of the 
five hypotheses. The intention is to compare the results of each of the case studies 
to ascertain if the findings can be generalised. As such, each case study documents 
a set of outcomes and attempts to explain these outcomes.243 
 
241 Robert Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," Evaluation 19, no. 3 (2013): p 321. 
242 Ibid., p 322. 
243Ibid. 
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Each of the case studies follows the same structure, as defined by Stake.244 Stake 
indicates each case should address each of the following points: 
 
“Case research seek out both what is common and what is particular about 
the case, but the end product of the research regularly portrays more 
uncommon…, drawing from all at once from 
1. the nature of the case, particularly its activities and functioning; 
2. its historical background; 
3. its physical setting; 
4. other contexts, such as economic political, legal and aesthetic; 
5. other cases through which this case is recognised; and 
6. those informants through whom the case can be known.”245 
Reliability and Validation (Trustworthiness) 
Issues related to qualitative case studies are - they are subject to criticisms of the 
validity and reliability of their findings. To improve the reliability and validity of the 
findings of this study, it uses both theory and triangulation.246 Huberman and Miles 
have suggested there is no consensus on methodology “upon which findings are 
considered plausible or convincing”. 247 Huberman and Miles248 suggest some tenants 
to overcome this issue. This study will adopt Huberman and Miles’ methodology. 
The methodology requires the researcher to shift between cycles of inductive data 
collection, and analysis to deductive cycles of testing and verification.249   
 
Huberman and Miles’ methodology is similar to that used within the intelligence 
profession, where information is collected and tested. The first test is to establish 
the reliability of the sources. The basis of the reliability test is the determination of 
244 Robert E. Stake, "Qualitative Case Studies," in The Sage Hand Book of Qualitative Research Third Edition, ed. Norman K. 
Dean and Yvonna S. Lincoln (California: Sage Publications, 2005). 
245 Ibid., p 445. 
246 Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," p 323-24. 
247 A. M Huberman, and Miles, M.B, Handbook of Qualitative Research  (Sage Publishing, 1994). 
248 Ibid., p 438. 
249 Ibid. 
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the sources historical reliability, that is, whether the source is considered reputable. 
Further, it is also prudent to establish the source’s impartiality. Testing the 
impartiality of the sources is useful in teasing out information, which may distort 
the analytical process. This is particularly relevant in the use of media and 
government reports, evidence provided in court and biographical accounts, where 
the source may have an underlying agenda, which could cloud or distort the facts. 
 
The second test is to establish whether the information is consistent with other 
reputable and reliable independent sources. This methodology is useful as it can 
permit the use of information from sources where the reliability is unknown. If the 
validity of the information is uncertain, it drives another cycle of the information 
collection process, in an attempt to establish its reliability. 
 
The analytical process is also cyclic and involves the collation of the information and 
data in a logical manner so it assists the analytical phase. The analytical process is 
deductive and involves cyclic attempts to create meaning from the available 
information. It attempts to identify information gaps within the data. These gaps 
then initiate another collection phase, which attempt to address these gaps, 
followed by another analytical phase. 
 
The final phase is the documentation of the results and the establishment of 
whether the conclusions are logical and consistent. Further, this review would 
identify any gaps in the analytical process. To address any gaps, an additional cycle 
of analysis or information/data collection may need to be undertaken. 
Case selection 
The three case studies selected, potentially provide some insight into the variables, 
which are significant in this study. The cases were selected because it has 
traditionally been believed they maintain a hierarchical structure, which permits the 
testing of the premise that they are potentially complex adaptive systems. This 
suggests their structure and leadership model is far more flexible and fluid than 
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originally suspected. Secondly, the complex adaptive model has only been applied 
to Al Qaeda, which is a contemporary day religious group. The cases selected are 
historical groups with either a Nationalist/Separatist or a revolutionary agenda. The 
three cases selected were the Weather Underground Organisation (WUO), the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).  
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The five hypothesises formed the selection criteria for the choice of each case 
studies.  
 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through 
peaceful means, perturbations within the political, economic, and 
social environments, could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of 
terrorist groups. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the 
geographic dispersion of the group. 
 
All cases emerged in volatile environmental conditions and used violence in an 
attempt to achieve their goals. As such, the three case studies are suitable to test 
hypothesis H1a. They also emerged under different environmental, homophyllic 
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and geographic conditions, which allows a cross case analysis to test hypothesises 
H1a, H1b and H2. 
 
Further, the sizes of the groups are significantly different and all varied in size over 
time. The WUO was a moderate sized group, with less than 100 members and over 
its lifetime, its membership declined, until it eventually disbanded. The PIRA was a 
medium sized group. At its peak, it maintained a membership of over 1000, which 
later declined to around 700. The KLA was a large group, which grew from a small 
core cadre of four members to over 20,000 members at the end of its life. Thus, 
each group allows an analysis of the potentially homophyllic and environmental 
factors, which potentially influenced the group’s size. Further, the variation size also 
allows the testing of the generalisation of the complex adaptive premise. As such, 
these cases are suitable for a cross case analysis to test hypothesis H2a. 
 
The longevity of the groups was also a reason for their selection. Longevity permits 
an analysis of the changing homophyllic and environmental factors over time, and 
their impact on the size and structure of the groups, under the complex adaptive 
model. The study excluded small groups. The reason for this is all groups are small 
at the time of their emergence. Some thrive and grow; others stagnate, or only exist 
for a brief period and cease to exist for a variety of reasons. The issue of small group 
emergence forms part of the analysis of the three case studies. As each of the 
groups under study, existed for 8 years or more, in different homophyllic and 
environmental contexts, their selection allows the testing of hypothesis H3a. 
 
Each of the three cases had varying levels of structural complexity, but each differed 
in their structural organisation. Each case also operated in differing environmental 
conditions. Therefore, each of the cases allowed a cross case analysis, which 
permitted the possible identification of the factors that led to the organisational 
outcomes. The differing environments and organisational structures enable the 
testing of hypothesis H3b. 
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The level of success of each of the groups was also a factor in their selection. The 
WUO failed in its objective, the PIRA gained concessions and compromise, but did 
not achieve its ultimate goal. The KLA was successful in the long term, in gaining 
independence. The reason for the choice was to ensure factors like success or 
failure did not skew the final findings. 
 
Furthermore, the availability of information written by reputable sources to permit 
a serious study of the groups was also a factor. Though each group is historic, the 
historic nature of each of the groups permitted a life cycle study to be undertaken. 
In addition, there were multiple sources available, which permitted validation of the 
information provided by the authors of these studies. As such, each case study was 
not reliant on the work of a single author, thus mitigating the potential influence of 
bias within the studies. 
 
A possible limitation of the selected cases is they only cover two types of terrorist or 
violent extremist groups. The two larger groups (KLA and PIRA) were 
Nationalist/Separatist groups and the smaller was a Revolutionary/Structural group. 
None of the groups was religiously or single issue motivated. Neither of the groups 
is contemporary. Although, as noted previously, a study of Al Qaeda, a religious 
group, has already been undertaken by a multitude of researchers. As such, these 
findings stand outside of this thesis. At this time, it is not possible to ascertain 
whether exclusion of other types of terrorist groups will be a limitation or have a 
significant impact on the generalisation of the findings. 
Outline of methodology and assumptions 
The selected case studies will attempt to establish the validity of the five 
hypotheses identified, under the complex adaptive model, in the earlier portion of 
this work. This thesis will utilise three case studies, each selected to determine 
common variables, which lead to emergence, growth and the evolution of 
structure. Three case studies are also utilised to improve the validity and 
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generalisation of the findings resultant of the analysis. Each of the case studies are 
framed within the context of the theoretical model for the emergence, size and the 
evolution of structure based on the concepts of emergence and self-organisation to 
further enhance the validity and triangulation of the qualitative findings of the 
research.250 The case studies examine the group over its life cycle from emergence 
to their end.  
 
The concepts of complex adaptive systems, emergence and self-organisation, as 
previously discussed, indicates the evolution of any system is dependent on the 
initial conditions of the system. As such, each group is set within terms of the 
broader background historical context. This description details the environmental 
factors (as defined by the PESTELO model), which led to their emergence. The 
underlying assumption within this approach, is that group emergence is directly 
related to environmental factors within any given conflict space, as suggested by 
the principles of complexity and complex adaptive systems. This assumption has 
foundation, as complexity theory establishes a significant causal relationship 
between the concepts of emergence, self-organising, and the environment. 
 
The study of the effects of the environment, as part of a complex adaptive system, 
will be investigated to ascertain its effects on radicalisation, preferential attachment 
(homophily) and their relationship with the size of a terrorist organisation. In 
addition, the analysis will also endeavour to determine if there is a relationship 
between the environmental factors, homophily and group size. As previously 
indicated, the size of terrorist groups are suspected to be limited by homophily and 
the environment. There are no apparent assumptions within this section of work, as 
each concept is based on already well established theoretical frameworks. 
 
The variables in each case study will also be examined using a cross comparison 
analysis to evaluate whether there is any relationship between the environment 
250 Yin, "Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations," p 323-24. 
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variables, physical geography and the cognitive limits of the human brain on the 
structure of a terrorist group. The analytical assumption is, the bandwidth of the 
communications channels between the elements of the network, determined the 
structure of the group. The previous discussions within this dissertation provide 
some foundation for this assumption, based on the work of Jackson251 and 
Shapiro.252 The concepts of emergence and self-organisation support this 
assumption, as they argue complexity emerges when elements of a system are able 
to exchange energy or information, implying the bandwidth of the communication 
channels is critical in determining structure. 
Limitations 
Brewer argues that the covert nature of terrorist groups limits the collection of 
information on these groups.253 Without access to detailed data on these types of 
groups, this study is reliant on open sources of information, which is limited. This 
study uses redacted government sources. These sources generally provide sufficient 
detail about active members of the groups, but are limited in the information they 
provide on the broader networks related to sympathisers and supporters. Public 
Domain Databases are limited in that they provide information of a general nature, 
and typically draw their information from common sources. The information 
provided regarding the size and structure of the organisation is typically coarse in 
nature and of questionable quality. Furthermore, the information compiled within 
these databases, is as indicated by the MIPT website: 
 
The information contained in this website has been carefully compiled from 
sources believed to be reliable. However, the Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) does not guarantee its completeness, 
accuracy or usefulness. 254 
251 Jackson, "Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist 
Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda." 
252 J.N. Shapiro, "Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations," (2005). 
253 G. Brewer, "Heroes or Villians: The Tupamaros in Uruguay.," War in Peace 1984, p 1212-13. 
254 http://www.tkb.org/TermsOfService.jsp 
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The majority of these types of databases are compiled from open source 
information, much of which comes from the internet. These database compilers 
have limited resources to compile and validate the information. As such, the 
reliability and validity of the information cannot be fully guaranteed. 
 
The uses of court proceedings also have their limitations. Rules of evidence govern 
court proceedings, which will provide some insight into the core group, but it is 
unlikely to provide insight into the larger organisation. Furthermore, agencies that 
bring these individuals before the courts often provide evidence in closed hearings, 
the content of which are not made public. As such, this creates information deficits 
that could have provided further insight for the researcher or provided further 
information to test the research hypothesis.  
 
Libel laws and the protection of sources also limit the completeness of information 
contained in books and media reports, which potentially leads to the omission of 
critical information and insight. When protected sources are used, these sources are 
not known or readily available to the researcher. As such, it is difficult to test the 
credibility of the source. The accuracy of biographical accounts must be tested 
against other sources, to determine if the information is verifiable prior to use. This 
is to overcome problems such as bias and political or other agendas of the author. 
Even though biographical accounts are useful and insightful, they have their 
limitations and are not definitive.255 Likewise, media and government reports may 
be selective in the analysis and reporting of information. These types of reports may 
have an underlying political agenda or purpose. Therefore, they could be selective 
in their analysis and interpretation of data, which also needs to be accounted for 
and acknowledged. There are also issues with academic papers and books 
examining these groups. As previously stated, information regarding these types of 
groups is limited. This creates problems, as authors at times, may be utilising the 
255 Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 46. 
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same sources to conduct their analysis. Hence, this makes the validation of 
information difficult, which will further affect the analytical process. 
 
This thesis uses only three case studies, as space does not permit further cases. 
Therefore, it may create difficulties in generalisation, as it only takes one conflict 
case to undermine any findings. Another potential limitation is all the groups, which 
have emerged from parent organisations. Two of the groups had emerged from 
organisations that had not engaged in violence previously and one group from an 
organisation that had abandoned violence. These groups became separate entities 
from their parent organisations. There are no cases, which address the issue of a 
peaceful group as an organisation becoming violent. Even so, this may not be a 
limitation. Sageman argues that radicalisation takes place in a groups context, 
whether that be through informal networks, family or from within an 
organisation.256 Thus, radicalisation, which is a precursor of terrorist group 
formation, takes place in a group context. Some argue the lone wolf terrorist 
phenomenon undermines this argument. The case of the Unabomber indicates 
even lone wolves are radicalised within a group context. Covill indicates the Earth 
First! Movement inspired the Unabomber, of which he was a member, but acted 
outside the movement and unilaterally.257 As such, even lone wolves can emerge 
from peaceful organisations. Even so, it is acknowledged that there may be 
instances where peaceful organisations can become violent. As such, it is 
recognised as a limitation. 
  
Finally, Krebs identified three limitations with network analysis of covert networks, 
which could govern the research outcomes:258 
 
256 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 
2008), p 84 - 88. 
257 Christopher J. Covill, "Greenpeace, Earth First! and The Earth Liberation Front: The Progression of the Radical 
Environmental Movement in America" (Honours Thesis, University of Rhode Island, 2008), p 65. 
258 Vladis E. Krebs, "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," Connections 24, no. 3 (2002): p 2. 
Stuart Groombridge  111 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
• Incompleteness – the inevitability of missing nodes and links that the 
investigators will not uncover. 
• Fuzzy boundaries – the difficulty in deciding who to include and who not to 
include. 
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Case Study 1 – The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) 
The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO)259 was prominent between 1969 
and 1981 when the organisation ceased to exist. It was part of the New Left, which 
arose out of the student protest movement of the 1960s. The group maintained a 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and taking their inspiration from revolutionaries, such as 
Che Guevara and Fidel Castro.260 The Weather Underground emerged from a faction 
of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) known equally as either the 
Weatherman or Weathermen. At its height, it claimed over 500 members across the 
US.261 It was also the subject of intense Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) focus 
during the course of the late 1960s to its demise. 
Chapter 6 – Historical Background 
Prior to the start of the 1960s, the black Civil Rights movement in the United States 
had been campaigning for equality with white members of American society. The 
activism of this movement inspired young members of the socialist Student League 
for Industrial Democracy (SLID).262 The SLID’s parent organisation, the League for 
Industrial Democracy (LID), by comparison, had achieved very little in its 55-year 
history.263 The SLID abandoned its association with the LID and the old labour 
emphasis of their predecessors. They broadened their focus and changed their 
name to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The first meeting of this group 
occurred in October 1960 and by 1962, the group had drafted its manifesto known 
259 Originally known as the Weatherman, also known as the Weathermen and the Weather Underground. 
Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the 
Sixties and Seventies.  (London: University of California Press, 2004). 
260 Mark Rudd, "Che and Me,"  http://www.markrudd.com/?violence-and-non-violence/che-and-me.html. 
261 Ibid. 
262 The SLID was a socialist student organisation, with a long history of activism on US campuses. It was anti-capitalist, anti-
fascist, and anti-war and did not support militarism on United States campuses. It was a strong supporter of civil liberties and 
academic freedom. It had a long history of organised protest action. 
"Handbook for the Student League for Industrial Democracy - History, Program and Organisational Guide," ed. Student League 
for Industrial Democracy (New York 1935). 
263 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies. 
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as the Port Huron Statement, which was adopted by the group at its first 
convention, in June of the same year.264 
 
The Port Huron Statement outlined the manifesto of the SDS. It was a broad 
document, which laid out the views and thoughts of the new organisation, it called 
for sweeping political, economic, and social change. The content of the document 
denounced imperialism, elitism, poverty, and capitalism.265 It supported peace, 
education, civil rights, disarmament, and health reforms.266 This was a departure 
from the Old Leftist ideology, which maintained a narrow focus on the working 
class. The New Left had a global vision of America’s role in this new world.267 
 
Initially the SDS was active in the Civil Rights movement. In 1963, the SDS issued a 
new document called “America and the New Era”, this document according to 
Harold Jacobs: 
 
 “…criticizes the inadequacy of the Kennedy Administration's New Frontier 
program to solve the problems of disarmament, social justice, and racial 
equality. As an alternative to collaboration with liberal groups, the document 
calls for the independent organization of emerging insurgent forces within 
the civil rights, peace, and student movements.”268 
 
In the same year, the SDS set up the Education Research Action Project (ERAP). The 
project aimed to improve the educational standards of poor white and non-white 
children in ten northern states.269 The program was intended to broaden the appeal 
264 Harold Jacobs, ed. Weatherman (Rampart Press, 1970), p 3. 
265 Tom Hayden and Robert Alan Haber, "Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962," (Students for 
a Democratic Society (SDS) Archives and Resources 1962). 
266 Ibid. 
267 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 131-40. 
268 Jacobs, Weatherman, p 3. 
269 Ibid. 
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of the movement, having theorised that the movement meant little if it were 
isolated within academic communities.270 The program involved members of the 
organisation living and working within poor communities in an attempt to 
disseminate their message. The program failed as it “…had difficulty transcending 
the class barriers separating them from those they sought to help”.271  
 
The SDS was not the only leftist oriented group involved in campus politics at that 
time. Along with other socialist groups on United States campuses including the 
black and third world student groups, the Progressive Labor party (PL) had formed a 
campus student group called the May 2 Movement (M2M). M2M was mostly active 
in the East Coast campuses, organising the first significant protests against the 
Vietnam War, taking place in New York in 1964.272 
 
America’s involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in 1965, with the SDS 
organising its first anti-war protest in April of that year, which drew over 15,000 
participants. The success of this protest led to the rapid expansion of the SDS across 
American University Campuses.273 It also led to the PL disbanding the M2M, and the 
PL integrating with the SDS.274 Through its involvement within the SDS, the PL 
quickly became the largest faction within the SDS. In 1966 the SDS activities 
increased, the SDS “…pushes radical draft resistance as the dominant thrust of its 
political organizing. It also calls on its campus chapters to protest or disrupt 
appearances of representatives of the military-industrial complex.”275 
 
A critical aspect of the SDS’ beliefs was that the working class was a key element of 
their struggle. At this time, the SDS had no defined all-embracing ideological 
270 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies. 
271 Ibid., Kindle Location 343. 
272 David Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed  (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2008), p 146. 
273 Jacobs, Weatherman. 
274 Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed: p 146. 
275 Jacobs, Weatherman, p 3. 
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platform, which encompassed how they would solicit the working class to support 
the SDS’ stances on Civil Rights, the Vietnam War, imperialism and the 
underprivileged.  
 
In 1968, the strong SDS chapter at Columbia University protested the building of a 
new gymnasium by the University of Columbia, which encroached on the black 
suburb of Harlem. The SDS took the position that this gym served no benefit to the 
community. Furthermore, Columbia’s association with the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the type of research the CIA funded at the university, also 
disturbed the Columbia’s SDS Chapter. Initially, the group challenged the 
university’s position through the normal channels. After this method failed to 
achieve any results, a group within Columbia SDS, known as the Action Faction, took 
a more confrontational approach. What followed was the occupation of four 
university buildings and in doing so, the SDS effectively closed the university 
down.276 The protest was broken after about a week, by the conservative 
university’s governing body. The university called in the police, who arrested about 
700 of the protestors.277 The action received national and international media 
coverage, both on television and in print.278 In addition, out of these types of protest 
actions, the leadership cadre of the Weather Underground emerged; one 
prominent member being Mark Rudd.  
 
The SDS benefitted from the prevalence of television within the United States in the 
1960s. Television provided the SDS and its protest actions, a broad audience. This 
audience had not been accessible to groups prior to the1960s, as the previous 
technologies failed to provide the national coverage, the immediacy, and the visual 
impact of television. This exposure led to a dramatic increase in the membership of 
the SDS between 1968 and 1969. It was estimated in 1969, the membership of the 
276  Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 371-77. 
277 Ibid., Kindle Location 385. 
278 Ibid., Kindle Location 384. 
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SDS had risen to 100,000 members.279 The SDS was becoming an umbrella 
organisation for a variety of socialist campus student groups, which led to a rapidly 
increasing membership, but it also led to increasing factionalisation within the SDS. 
Varon describes the atmosphere and debate within the SDS during 1968: 
 
“In America, ideological and strategic debates were carried out most 
strenuously within SDS, where Marxism had become the common coin of 
political discussion. Some SDSers took to Marxism with striking zeal, as if 
they had discovered a previously hidden language that promised to make 
transparent the deep structure of their society. Yet in the rush to tap its 
analytical power, activists often applied Marxism with little sophistication or 
willingness to revise assumptions that squared poorly with contemporary 
realities. This was conspicuously true of those who, like the Progressive Labor 
Party (commonly called PL), clung to the idea that the industrial working 
class was the exclusive agent of revolutionary change.”280 
 
PL had emerged, in the mid-60s as a Maoist group. It possessed considerable 
organisational skills and in a brief time, had become influential in some important 
chapters of the SDS.281 The PL as “… its main initiative, it tried to build "worker-
student alliances" on campuses, while condemning militancy-and violence 
especially-as dangerous expressions of "left-wing adventurism" divorced from "mass 
struggle." “282 In the period 1966 to 1968, the PL organised its supporters on the 
various university campuses into Worker Student Alliances (WSA). The PL brought 
to the SDS its interpretation of Marxism, which to some in the SDS appeared 
dogmatic. Although the PL had emerged as a result of the Civil Rights movement 
and had worked actively to support this movement, its involvement in the riots in 
279 Dan Berger, "The Weather Underground's place in history: A response to Jonah Raskin," Socialism and Democracy 20, no. 2 
(2006): p 145. 
280 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 666-70. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid., Kindle Locations 672-73. 
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Harlem in 1964 had led it to the ideological conclusion that all Nationalism was 
reactionary.283 Based on this ideological platform, the PL “…withdrew support from 
the Black Panthers, the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, and other progressive 
Third World struggles in this period. PL also eschewed the counterculture as 
contradictory to organizing “the working class””.284 The PL was a conservative 
organisation who had framed the struggle and political arguments beyond race and 
the third world. This allowed it to appeal to a greater cross section of the white 
students on American campuses.285  
 
The PL, as a faction, threatened other groups within the SDS, especially the factions 
within the SDS who had been actively building alliances with the Civil Rights 
movement and black nationalists, such as the Black Panthers. The PL attempted to 
create a unifying vision. The PL was an extremely disciplined group with a significant 
capacity to organise its members, which intimidated other factions within the SDS.286 
The PL used its capacity to organise and mobilised its members to be the dominant 
faction at the 1968 SDS national conference. The PL used these numbers to gain the 
passage of the “Fight Racism; Build a Worker-Student Alliance; Smash Imperialism.” 
proposal.287 This proposal stated: 
 
“Nationalism has replaced pacifism as the main ideological weapon of the 
ruling class within the Black Liberation Movement. Nationalism is used to 
divert Third World people from struggle on a class basis and from making 
alliances with white workers and students. Because of the special super-
exploitation of black people, their struggle is national in form and working 
class in content. Thus, at SF State there was a separate TWLF [Third World 
Liberation Front]. Usually a nationalist feeling is the initial conscious impetus 
283 Berger, "The Weather Underground's place in history: A response to Jonah Raskin," p 140. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed: p 147. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid., p 147. 
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towards struggle among black people. But the material basis of this struggle 
is class oppression. Consciousness of this oppression must become the 
predominant ideology for these struggles to win.”288 
 
Many of the mainstream members of the SDS were unhappy with the PL’s proposal, 
as it marginalised and undermined one of the founding tenants. The black Civil 
Rights movement had inspired the founding members of the SDS. The “Fight 
Racism” proposal bundled black Civil Rights and the struggles of the Third World 
into a concept of the international struggle by the working class.289 
 
Mainstream SDS members, who were concerned with the growing influence of the 
PL, came to form a loose group of activists, who were predominantly friends and 
shared similar political beliefs, known as the Radical Youth Movement (RYM). The 
group emerged from activists in the Michigan-Ohio region of the SDS. The group 
initially took control of the Ann Arbor SDS290 and at the December 1968, conference 
presented a written proposal called “Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement”. 
The key element of this document was to decide the direction the SDS, in regards to 
the working class. The document proposed that the SDS should radicalise working 
class youth as they had a lesser stake in the current system, which “…subjected 
them to the draft, few economic opportunities, and harassment by authorities”.291 
The document proposed that the SDS play a revolutionary role, awarding the 
vanguard status of the movement to “…black radicals, and the Black Panthers 
especially, in the movement as a whole. Radicalizing working-class white youth 
therefore meant educating them about racism and the need to accept black 
leadership.”292 
288 Ibid., p 146. 
289 Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS  (Vintage Books, 1973), p 283 - 95. 
290 The SDS chapter within the city of Ann Arbor, included University of Michigan, and other local colleges and universities 
such as, Concordia Lutheran Junior College and Cleary College. 
291 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 693. 
292 Ibid., Kindle Locations 696-97. 
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The RYM proposal differed from the PL’s “Fight Racism” doctrine. The RYM placed 
the black movement at the centre of the revolution, where the PL proposed the 
whites would lead the revolution. The PL argued the resolution of the injustices 
faced by the working class, would also resolve the injustice faced by blacks and the 
third world, as they were all part of one homogeneous working class. The PL and 
RYM disillusioned many of the older members of the SDS and alienated others293, by 
coaching their proposals in Marxist doctrine, espousing a revolutionary ideology, 
and arguing over the correct interpretation of Marxist writings.294 
 
The dynamics of student politics changed dramatically in November 1968, when 
black students at San Francisco State University initiated a strike at the behest of 
English instructor George Mason Murray, who was also a member of the Black 
Panthers. The students demanded a Black Studies department within the university. 
The strike gained the support of the Asian and Latino students from the Third World 
Liberation Front (TWLF). Although initially supporting the strike, the PL based on its 
ideological platform, “Fight Racism”, condemned the strike by the Black students as 
reactionary. 
 
The strike gained significant media coverage, as did the breaking of the strike by the 
police, who were called in, by the university president. The media captured images 
of the police breaking up the strike with batons, and of the bloodied students. The 
advent of satellite communications allowed these images to be broadcast across the 
nation and the world. This incident and the mass arrests of Black Panthers within 
the US, acted as a catalyst, which triggered student strikes across the nation. The 
Vietnam War remained a central issue for student activists, but was temporarily 
pushed aside. At this time, the issues affecting the black and Third World students 
293 Ibid., Kindle Locations 697-700. 
294 Ibid. 
Stuart Groombridge  120 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
became dominant. In strikes at San Francisco State University, the SDS had only a 
supporting role; black and third world students had led the strikes. 
 
The RYM had consisted of three regional groupings of activists, plus a group of non-
aligned RYM members. The first group came from the Chicago National SDS office 
and the regional SDS offices. This group attempted to gain a greater understanding 
of the current events in the context of Marxist theory.295 The second group emerged 
out of the Midwest regional SDS and was referred to as the Jesse James Gang, due 
to their predisposition for confrontational tactics during protests.296 The third group 
consisted of members from New York and Columbia Universities and were known 
as the Action Faction. In the scale of radicalism, they were more radical than the 
Chicago group and more moderate than the Midwest groups.297 The RYM consisted 
of members and factions of the SDS, who had demonstrated they possessed the 
capacity and were willing to engage in a more confrontational approach, to bring 
their grievances to the attention of the public. 
 
The RYM‘s analysis of the student protests on American campuses in 1968, led to 
the group, in June 1969, splitting into two factions, the RYM I and the RYM II. The 
split occurred based on ideological grounds. The RYM I (Weatherman) saw the black 
activists as having leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The Weatherman felt 
that the white working class could not lead this revolution because of their white 
skin privilege.298 The RYM II disagreed; they saw the leading forces in the 
revolutionary struggle as the proletariat.299 They made no distinction based on race, 
but only on class. 
 
295 Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed: p 148. 
296 Ibid., 148. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid., p 175. 
299 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 800-05. 
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The RYM I, in an effort to counter the PL doctrinal dominance of the SDS, drafted its 
own manifesto. 
 
 “"You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows" after 
a lyric from Bob Dylan's "Subterranean Homesick Blues… The statement's 
principal author was J. J. (John Jacobs), a charismatic but notoriously 
domineering Columbia graduate who had defected from PL and now used his 
considerable knowledge of Marxist theory on behalf of a new revolutionary 
model. With the statement, the RYM members sought to limit PL's power in 
SDS by responding to what they felt were PL's heresies: its single-minded 
focus on the industrial working class; its refusal to fully support the Black 
Panthers and Vietnam's National Liberation Front… and its opposition to 
SDS's youth politics”.300 
 
Unlike the PL faction of the SDS, the RYM I saw the black movement as central to 
the struggle and acknowledged the black movement had been at the vanguard of 
the struggle in addressing working class injustices, of which the Vietnam conflict 
was a part. As such, the RYM I repudiated the PL stance and marginalisation of the 
black Civil Rights movement and black militant groups such as the Black Panthers. In 
the case of the Black Panthers, the RYM I acknowledged the leadership role in the 
revolutionary struggle and the cost this role had inflicted on the group in the form 
of government repression and the death of some of its leading members.301   
 
The RYM II defined the black community in the United States in colonial terms; they 
viewed black communities as United States colonies within a white America and as 
such argued for their self-determination and for their status as a free Nation.302 This 
view contradicted that of black activist groups, such as the Black Panthers, who 
300 Ibid., Kindle Locations 711-17. 
301 Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed: p 155. 
302 Ibid., p 162. 
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were in a practical sense, only seeking the control of the institutions within their 
communities.303 
 
The RYM I manifesto was presented at the 9th Annual SDS conference to the 2000 
delegates at the Chicago Coliseum. The manifesto had been authored by an 11 
member committee of the RYM I. To pre-empt a possible takeover of the 
Conference by the PL, a plebiscite was held, which excluded the PL from the rest of 
the conference.304 The RYM I manifesto was passed with a small margin and its 
members were elected to the key leadership roles of the SDS National Office. The 
RYM I Weatherman manifesto was significant and from then on, the group became 
known as the Weatherman. The Weatherman won a pyrrhic victory; their actions 
had splintered the SDS. The PL remained in control of its base in Boston and claimed 
to be the true SDS leadership, many other members and factions of the SDS, 
disillusioned by what had happened, withdrew from the SDS.305 
 
Prior to this conference, the Weatherman had been building support for a protest 
known as National Action. It was “….conceived…as a series of conventional protests 
against the war, racism, and domestic repression”.306 The protest was approved by 
the June 1969 SDS conference. Now the RYM I (Weatherman) had the leadership of 
the SDS, they renamed the protest to the Days of Rage.307 
 
“They left the scenario for Chicago vague but spoke of their intention to "tear 
up pig city" and "kick ass" when fighting the police. Violence was the 
incessant theme of Weathermen promoting the action to student activists 
303 Ibid. 
304 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 721. 
305 Ibid., Kindle Location 727. 
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307 Ibid., Kindle Locations 885-86.308 Ibid., Kindle Locations 888-89. 
Stuart Groombridge  123 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
around the country, and rumours quickly spread that they intended to bring 
guns to Chicago.”308 
 
The intent to ”…tear up pig city” was consistent with the prior behavioural traits of 
the action driven members of the Weatherman, although it was an escalation on 
previous protests organised by these activists. 
 
The Days of Rage were scheduled to be between the 8th and 11th October 1969. The 
Weatherman’s Days of Rage was heavily promoted in schools and in teenager 
hangouts, in an effort to get the working class young involved in the protest.309 The 
Weatherman also engaged in low-level harassment of the police leading up to the 
protest.310 
 
The Weatherman signalled the start of the Days of Rage with its first act of 
terrorism. On 7th October 1969, a small cadre of Weatherman detonated a bomb in 
Chicago destroying a statue that honoured eight police officers who died during the 
Haymarket riots of 1886. The target was selected because it represented a symbol 
of state repression of the working class.311 In 1886, the courts had condemned to 
death, leaders of labour unions involved in what was initially, a peaceful strike 
meeting at the Haymarket square. The History Channel website records the 
incident: 
 
“What begins as a peaceful labor protest in Haymarket Square in Chicago, 
Illinois, turns into a riot, leaving more than 100 wounded and 8 police 
officers dead. After Chicago authorities arrested and detained nearly every 
anarchist and socialist in town, eight men, who were either speakers in or 
organizers of the protest, were charged with murder. 
308 Ibid., Kindle Locations 888-89. 
309 Ibid., Kindle Locations 890-98. 
310 Ibid., Kindle Locations 898-900. 
311 " May 4, 1886: A riot breaks out in Haymarket Square," ed. The History Channel website (The History Channel website). 
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The day before the riot, a couple of people were killed and others were 
wounded in an unprovoked attack by police officers firing into a crowd of 
striking workers at the nearby McCormick Reaper Works. Despite tension the 
following day, the crowd at Haymarket Square was listening quietly to 
speakers advocating a mandatory eight-hour workday for employees. As the 
final speaker was winding the rally down, police officers forced their way 
toward the stage to disperse the crowd, provoking someone to throw a 
bomb into the crowd. 
 
After the explosion, officers began firing wildly in all directions, inciting a riot 
among protestors. About sixty police officers were wounded and eight died. 
Although the public was later led to believe that the deaths resulted from the 
bomb, seven of the eight fatalities and the great majority of the injuries were 
caused by shots fired by fellow officers during the confusion.”312 
 
The intention of the Days of Rage was to protest the United States role in the 
Vietnam War. The Weatherman had promised there would be 25,000 activists on 
the streets of Chicago.313 The black activist groups, such as the Black Panthers, did 
not support the action proposed by the Weatherman. The Panthers feared police 
repression after the Days of Rage protest had ended, when the white protestors 
had all gone home and left them with the consequences of their actions.314 When 
the protest commenced, there were only about 300 participants315, who were 
heavily outnumbered by the police. Many of the protestors were arrested and 
detained by the police. The protests were violent, with the Weatherman destroying 
property and attacking police. The Police control of the protestors was equally 
violent.316 The protests failed in their objective. There was no mass mobilisation of 
312 Ibid. 
313 Barber, Hard Rain Fell : SDS and Why It Failed: p 183. 
314 Ibid., 183. 
315 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
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the white young working class, neither was it supported by the broader 
membership of the SDS. 
 
This is not to suggest that Americans were not interested in ending the Vietnam 
War, as the Moratorium march of 15th October 1969, a few days after the Days of 
Rage, demonstrated. This march was the largest anti-war march of the 1960s, 
attracting an estimated 2000,000 participants nationwide.317 This was an indication 
that very few involved in the anti-war and Civil Rights movement supported the 
escalation of the violence proposed by the Weatherman. It also suggested the 
Weatherman were now moving to the extreme fringe of the anti-war and Civil 
Rights movements and had disconnected from the mainstream members of these 
movements. 
 
Prior to the Days of Rage, the Weatherman had planned for part of the organisation 
to go underground.318 This decision was partly motivated by the FBI’s interest in the 
group. The FBI had maintained an ongoing interest in the SDS and as such the 
Weatherman, as a faction of this group. The FBI had also infiltrated the SDS. These 
infiltrators regularly attended SDS meetings and conferences.319 As part of their 
surveillance of the SDS, the FBI monitored the public statements made by the 
Weatherman.320 
 
The FBI’s interest in the Weatherman escalated after the Days of Rage. The FBI took 
a greater interest in the organisation. The FBI listed the group as a threat to national 
security and the FBI alerted local law enforcement of this assessment.321 Law 
enforcement subjected the group to greater attention, many of its activists were 
harassed, and its offices were raided. In part, these actions by law enforcement 
317 Ibid., p 187. 
318 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 2156-57. 
319 Ibid., Kindle Location 2158. 
320  ibid. 
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created the perception of a hostile legal environment, which made it difficult for the 
group to operate aboveground.322  
 
At this time, the FBI was also heavily committed to disrupting the Black Panthers. 
This process led to the suspicious deaths of three leading members of the Panthers, 
at the hands of law enforcement, and was thought to be state sanctioned 
executions.323 This further aggravated the sense of impending repression by state 
officials if the group continued in the open. The Weatherman concluded that the 
traditional methods of protests had failed. This, combined with the failure of the 
Days of Rage, had led the Weatherman to the decision that the only option left to 
bring about their goals, was with revolutionary violence. At the National 
Conference, held in Flint Michigan, the decision was made for the Weatherman to 
become an underground revolutionary group.324 Furthermore, as the leading faction 
in the SDS, the Weatherman made the decision to disband the SDS as an 
organisation. Even though the SDS had effectively disintegrated after the July 1969 
National Conference, into rival factions, it continued in a number of guises until the 
early 1970s.325  
 
Varon326, Gilbert327, and the FBI COINTROPRO328 records indicate, after the 
Weatherman bomb factory accidentally exploded in New York’s Greenwich Village 
in March 1970, killing 3 Weatherman, there was a split in the leadership of the 
group. This incident resulted in discussions about how best to approach the 
revolutionary struggle. A meeting was held in April 1970 by the group’s leaders to 
322 Ibid., 6Kindle Locations 2166-70. 
323 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2176-206. 
324 Ibid., Kindle Location 2239. 
325 Ibid., Kindle Locations 727-28. 
326 Ibid. 
327 David Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond." (Oakland, CA, USA PM Press, 
2012). 
328 "State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the 
Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States Senate; Ninety Four Congress; 
First Session. January 31, 1975," ed. Committee on the Judiciary (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). 
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assess the consequences of the Greenwich Village incident. The bomb factory was 
in the process of creating shrapnel bombs to be placed at a dance to be held at Fort 
Dix in New Jersey.329 The bombs were anti-personnel device, intended to kill and 
injure. 
 
Serious questions were raised over whether attacks should target people. The 
leadership endeavoured to determine the best approach to be taken by the 
Weatherman. They finally concluded their attacks should not take lives and their 
focus should be on damaging property. Jeff Jones, who was the leader of the New 
York collective in Greenwich Village, was held personally responsible for the 
explosion. Jones was “…sent on indefinite leave, never to rejoin the group”.330 Varon 
further indicates: 
 
“Other Weathermen voluntarily made what Ayers described as an 
"honorable retreat from the craziness" and left the organization, paring it 
down to well below one hundred.”331  
  
329 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 2464. 
330 Ibid., Kindle Location 2574. 
331 Ibid., Kindle Location 2577. 
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Chapter 7 - The Environment – Leading to the emergence of the WUO 
The following is a review of the environmental conditions, based on the PESTELO, 
model in which the Weather Underground emerged. It is acknowledged the SDS 
was not the only activist group operating on American campuses during the 1960s. 
There were many groups, some attempting to achieve similar goals to the SDS. 
There were also right wing and conservative groups operating on the same 
campuses, who opposed the New Left. This chapter is an analysis of the factors, 
which led to the emergence of the WUO. The WUO differed from the other groups 
during this time, which were on average peaceful. As such, this chapter focuses on 
how the violent WUO emerged from its more peaceful parent, the SDS. 
Political 
The 1960s was a time of significant social change within the United States as well as 
other Western Countries, although the factors in each country differed based on 
local conditions. It was within this environment, the SDS and finally the Weather 
Underground emerged. The effectiveness of the Civil Rights movement in the 
United States Southern States had inspired the SDS to break away from its parent 
organisation, the League for Industrial Democracy and broaden its focus on more 
than the plight of the working class. The SDS embraced such issues as imperialism, 
civil rights, and disarmament.  
 
In the beginning, the SDS was a small organisation, which focused its efforts on the 
poor and Civil Rights movement in the US. It had felt the Kennedy administration 
had failed to address the issues of disarmament, social injustice, and civil rights. As 
America’s involvement in the Vietnam War grew, this also became a dominant 
issue, which the SDS also wished addressed. These environmental factors led to the 
rapid expansion in membership of the SDS, which in the long term, precipitated the 
group’s demise and the formation of the Weather Underground. 
 
The expanding role of the United States in Vietnam broadened the appeal of the 
SDS, due to the SDS’ early activism in protesting the United States involvement in 
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the war. It was an issue, which had a direct impact on the student membership of 
the SDS and those students outside the SDS. With America’s expanding role in 
Vietnam, the size of the United States military grew. By 1969, there were about 
550,000 United States servicemen in Vietnam.332 These additional troops were due 
to increased numbers of conscripts.333 Between 1964 and 1966, the annual draft 
increased from 100,000 to 400,000 per year334, about 62% of infantrymen in 
Vietnam were conscripts.335 There was a general dislike of the draft on United States 
campuses. Although students were exempt from the draft until they graduated, 
many did not want to be drafted and fight in Vietnam, which was perceived as an 
unjust war.336 The SDS reached its peak membership in 1969 when President 
Johnson removed the deferments for postgraduate students, in February that 
year.337 The largest protests against the Vietnam War occurred in October 1969, the 
then defunct SDS did not lead them. The protests against the war continued until 
conscription ended in 1973 and were a significant factor in the ending of 
conscription.338 
 
The SDS’ stance and protests over the Vietnam War created an environment, which 
attracted greater numbers of students to its ranks. It also created an environment, 
because of its leadership and growing membership, where rival student 
organisations such as the M2M, which had limited appeal due to its political 
orientation, sought to merge with the growing SDS. This influx of new members 
332 Robert J. McMahon, "The Political, and Geopolitics, of American Troops Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968-1972," The 
Journal of the Society for History of American Foreign Relations: Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (2010): p 471. 
333 George Q. Flynn, "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75," Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 1 
(1998): p 7. 
334 John Whiteclay Chambers, ed. The Oxford Companion of American Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p 180. 
335 "Military Conscription, Recruiting and The Draft,"  (About.com, 2013). 
336 Jessie Kindig, "Vietnam War: Draft Resistance," (Pacific Northwest Labor and Civil Rights Projects, University of Washington 
2008). 
337 Flynn, "Conscription and Equity in Western Democracies, 1940-75," p 7. 
338 Ibid., p 19. 
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created a situation where the group had to contend with a greater diversity of 
political opinion within the organisation. 
 
The SDS also endeavoured to engage with disadvantaged communities and 
supported many of the protest actions of the Civil Rights movement. The SDS also 
formed alliances with militant black groups, such as the Black Panthers. There was 
also considerable debate within the organisation over the role of the SDS. Some 
factions within the organisation, such as the PL, saw themselves and the SDS as the 
vanguard of the revolution.  
 
The SDS was disenchanted with American democracy, liberalism and the failed 
promises of the Democratic Party, which had held office for most of the 1960s: 
 
“…liberalism was the target of relentless attacks by the left from the mid 
1960s on. Partly, enmity toward liberalism grew out of activists' sense that 
so much of what was wrong with America had been perpetrated or was 
presided over by liberals. The Vietnam War, its critics repeatedly said, was a 
"liberal's war," insofar as it had been conceived and then expanded by the 
Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson.”339 
Economic 
The SDS and the Weatherman faction viewed the world of economics through a 
Marxist ideology. As part of the New Left, they viewed the working class as being 
exploited by the capitalist system. They saw the working class as those who 
generated the wealth of American society, but did not reap the benefits of their 
labours. They also concluded that the problems within the Third World were also 
rooted in the exploitation of the many, by the few. The Civil Rights movement was 
viewed in similar terms. Even so, there were varying views on how their struggle 
should be labelled, in the context of Marxism. This dilemma occurred due to the 
339 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 403-05. 
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varying interpretations of Marxism ascribed to by the different factions within the 
SDS. It was generally agreed the black communities were disadvantaged, but how 
this issue could be addressed was a matter of considerable debate. Some factions, 
such as the PL, viewed the black struggle for equality, as part of the greater struggle 
of the working class. Others viewed the black communities’ struggles in colonial 
terms, suggesting this was where the root of their problems resided. The 
Weatherman viewed the black communities as the vanguard of the revolutionary 
struggle. 
Socio-cultural 
The New Left, the SDS, and the Weatherman viewed American society as 
fundamentally flawed. They viewed racism, social disadvantage of the working 
class, nuclear weapons, conscription, and the Vietnam War as social evils, which 
required change. The New Left saw all social injustices and oppression as being 
interconnected.340 They had rationalised all social inequalities originated from a 
single source, which they referred to as “the System”.341 The New Left believed the 
injustices and oppression were perpetrated by Corporate – Government elites and 
the Corporate-Military alliances. 
 
The New Left were intent on bringing about real social and political change by 
changing the system. For most in the SDS, the burning issue was conscription and 
the Vietnam War, for others, these were issues of a greater whole. As the 1960s 
was ending and the traditional methods of protests had not brought about any 
significant change in government policy, some members of the SDS felt that change 
could only be brought about by emulating other revolutionary movements in the 
world. Members of the RYM I (Weatherman) faction viewed, with admiration, the 
success of the Cuban revolution, which had been achieved by a small cadre of 
militants, who inspired a nation to rise up against a repressive Batista government. 
The RYM I members were also inspired by the success of the North Vietnamese 
340 Ibid., Kindle Location 341. 
341 Ibid., Kindle Locations 355-56. 
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against their much stronger military opponent. From these examples, the 
Weatherman concluded that a small group of individuals could bring about a 
revolution and real social change by motivating the working class populace to rise 
up against their oppressors. 
Technology 
Television was the significant and new technology of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
was able to bring into the homes of Americans, events happening within the 
country and around the world. Television played a role in the rising awareness of 
social injustice by bringing to the attention of the public, issues which they may not 
have been aware: 
 
“As television emerged as a dominant visual medium in the 1950s and 1960s, 
it was increasingly vital in documenting the civil rights struggle. Intentionally 
or otherwise, it served the immediate needs of the movement: as a window 
through which millions could witness the black struggle; a means for 
bringing African Americans into private homes where they would never have 
been invited; a way of educating and inspiring black activists around the 
country; and a catalyst for persuading a skeptical nation to face problems it 
had heretofore ignored.” 342 
 
Television played a similar role in raising awareness of the Vietnam War: 
 
“From 1965 to 1975, television played an unprecedented role in shaping 
American perceptions of the Vietnam War. New technology and unlimited 
access to the battlefields of Southeast Asia invested field reporters with the 
ability to broadcast what became known as "bang-bang" coverage. The 
carnage of the war and the consequences for American morale, both on the 
342 "The Documentary role of Television News,"  in For all the World to See: Visual Culture and the Struggle for Civil Rights 
(Center for Art, Design and Visual Culture, University of Maryland, Baltimore County and the Smithsonian National Museum of 
African American History and Culture, Washington, D.C. , 2013). 
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battlefield and at home, led to deep divisions in how Americans viewed the 
role of government, the military, social change, and war itself.”343 
 
The media played a significant role promoting the protest at Columbia in 1967, with 
the university student strike being broken by the police using batons. The video 
images of beaten and bloodied student activists were transmitted nationally and 
internationally.344 These images inspired others and the French students to stage 
their own protests, which nearly toppled the French government.345 Due to the 
visual immediacy of television and the associated satellite technology which 
permitted these images to be viewed anywhere in the world, television had a 
significant impact on public opinion. In addition, it had the capacity to radicalise 
others who were not directly affected by the events displayed on the television 
screen. 
Legal 
The SDS and its factions had been the subject of FBI surveillance for some time. The 
FBI, since 1962, had undertaken surveillance of student organisations with leftist 
leanings. The FBI systematically cultivated informants in these student groups to 
infiltrate the organisations.346 After the death of three student Civil Rights workers in 
the south, the movement became of interest to the FBI and its Counterintelligence 
Program (COINTELPRO) in late 1964.347 COINTELPRO officially started reviewing the 
New Left in 1966.348 COINTELPRO is described by the FBI website as follows: 
 
343 "The Living Room War: Television & Vietnam," The Paley Center for Media, http://www.paleycenter.org/education-class-
living-room-war-television-vietnam/. 
344 Emile de Antonio, Haskell Wexler, and Mary Lampson, "Underground," (United States of America: Sphinx Productions, 
1976). 
345 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 382. 
346 James Kirkpatrick Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement." (Westport: Praeger Publications, 
1997), http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/lib/uow/docDetail.action. 
347 Ibid., p 26. 
348 Ibid., p 32. 
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“…The FBI began COINTELPRO—short for Counterintelligence Program—in 
1956 to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party of the United States. In 
the 1960s, it was expanded to include a number of other domestic groups, 
such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Black Panther 
Party. All COINTELPRO operations were ended in 1971. Although limited in 
scope (about two-tenths of one percent of the FBI’s workload over a 15-year 
period), COINTELPRO was later rightfully criticized by Congress and the 
American people for abridging first amendment rights and for other 
reasons”.349 
 
The aims of COINTELPRO were to disrupt the activities of groups considered 
subversive. The FBI recorded the purpose of the program as follows: 
 
“The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize 
the activities of the various new left organizations, their leadership, and their 
adherents. It is imperative that activities of those groups be followed on a 
continuous basis so that we may take advantage of all opportunities for 
counter intelligence and also inspire action where circumstance warrant. The 
devious maneuver, the duplicity of these activists must be exposed to public 
scrutiny through cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally 
and at the seat of government. We must frustrate every effort of these 
groups and individuals to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or 
youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to 
disrupting organized activity of these groups and no opportunity should be 
missed to capitalize on organizational or personal conflicts of their 
leadership.”350 
 
349 "COINTELPRO," Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://vault.fbi.gov/. 
350 "Counter Intelligence Program: Internal Security: Disruption of the New Left," ed. Federal Bureau Of Investigation, 
COINTELPRO - New Left - Section 1: 100-449698 (Aubany: Federal Bureau Of Investigation, 1968). 
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Under COINTELPRO, the FBI had conducted raids on student groups as early as 
1964. One of these first raids was on the offices of the PL, which seized a Vietcong 
propaganda film.351 The FBI attended meetings of the SDS and other student groups, 
collecting names of the speakers. The FBI used this information internally and 
provided this information to other intelligence agencies.352 As the war escalated, so 
did the FBI surveillance of Leftist groups.353 By 1965, the FBI had advised the United 
States government that the anti-war movement and SDS were effectively under 
Communist control.354 The FBI also engaged in activities, which were intended to 
undermine the credibility of the anti-war movement, and academics who had 
expressed anti-war views.355 Many of the universities worked with the FBI and 
provided them information on antiwar protestors.356 Some universities fired 
academics that held anti-war views.357 During this period, the FBI attended the 
protests and left wing group meetings, watching, listening, and taking photographs 
of activists, recording all the collated information in a central database in 
Washington.358  
 
The effect of the North Vietnamese Tet offensive (3rd January 1968) against United 
States forces in Vietnam, triggered the highest levels of unrest on United States 
campuses. Many students who were uncommitted to the anti-war movement 
flocked to groups such as the SDS.359 
 
Not all university protests focused on national issues, specific issues of a local 
nature triggered many. The protests within the Columbia University were a result of 
conditions specific to that location. In the case of Columbia University, the 
351 ———, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," p 26. 
352 Ibid., p 30. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid., p 32. 
355 Ibid., p 34. 
356 Ibid., p 35. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid., p 36. 
359 Ibid. 
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radicalising factor was the policies of the university’s administration. There was no 
student or faculty involvement in the formalisation of university policy and 
administering of university policy. This power resided in the hands of the 
administrators, who prided themselves on the fact the university was not a 
democracy. 
 
The administration also had become detached from the mostly black community 
adjacent to it. As part of the university’s expansion plans, it had been buying 
properties in the poor black suburb of Harlem. In its role of landlord, it had 
collected rent from the poor community, but had spent very little in return in the 
maintenance of the buildings and over time, had progressively evicted their black 
tenants to facilitate the university’s expansion. Furthermore, the university in 1958 
had gained a 99-year lease on land, which was a public park in Harlem. In 1968, it 
intended to build a gym on this land, which would have very limited benefit to the 
black community and denied this community access to what was previously open to 
the public, in an area where open public places were rare. These practices had 
agitated the black students on the campus.  
 
In addition, the SDS had learnt of Columbia’s involvement in government military 
projects, specifically with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The SDS had 
opposed this association. As part of this opposition, the SDS had staged a minor 
demonstration on campus to convince the Columbia administration to sever its ties 
with the group. Conservative student groups opposed this demonstration. The SDS 
occupied the lower library building. At the end of the protest, the university singled 
out and punished the six leaders of the protest for breaches of the university’s “no 
indoor protest” rule. The rules of the university permitted the university president 
to punish the students, without a public hearing or oversight. The students 
attempted to get the punishment of the six leaders overturned, to no avail. The 
students perceived this application of the punishments handed out to the leaders, 
as a form of political oppression. The actions of the administrators of the university 
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triggered a larger protest and after Spring Break, the students made demands for 
changes to the administration of the university. They demanded the construction of 
the gym in Harlem be stopped, the president of the university resign, the 
disciplinary action on the six leaders be ceased, the ban on indoor demonstrations 
be lifted and the university’s association with IDA end. Further, they demanded all 
hearings on student disciplinary matters be held in the open and in front of a 
student and faculty body, which would apply due process. The university rejected 
the demands and the police broke up the demonstration violently. 
 
In the short term, the student demands were not met, but as a result of the protest, 
the Columbia University president resigned and the new president implemented all 
the student demands.   
 
The Columbia University strike in April 1968, also demonstrated to the student 
activists to what measures the state would go, to break up the protest. The police 
had arrested 711 students, but had used batons to break up the strike, injuring 92 
activists.360 The police actions, which were televised, had the unintended result of 
radicalising large sections of the student community that until this point had 
remained on the sidelines.361 The larger student movement, although triggered by 
local issues, saw the events at Columbia, as being representative of the problems of 
America as a whole. 
 
The New Left and the anti-war activists were not only of interest to the FBI, but also 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).362 The IRS 
proved to be a useful FBI ally. The FBI kept extensive records on leading activists 
and underground organisations. At times, the FBI provided this information to the 
360 Ibid., p 42. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid., p 45. 
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IRS, for targeted audits363, in an attempt to disrupt these individuals and 
organisations, by attacking their financial foundations. The FBI also kept records of 
debts incurred by these organisations, such as unpaid phone bills.364 Again, the FBI 
would work in concert with these service providers. In one instance, the FBI: 
 
“In a confirming memo to Washington, the Chicago office confirmed a pre-
convention contact with the Illinois Bell Telephone company regarding 
National Mobilization's unpaid phone bill of $2,167. Chicago reported that 
direct contact by special agents had disrupted National Mobilization in its 
preparation for demonstrations, "since communication between the Chicago 
office of NMC and NMC offices in other areas of the country were greatly 
restricted."”365 
 
Davis, in the “Assault on the Left”366 provides a detailed description of other FBI 
activities on United States campuses, in their attempts to disrupt the New Left. The 
FBI built an extensive network of informants and undercover agents on United 
States campuses. Through this network, an extensive database of information was 
built up on leading activists, the various anti-war groups, and their members. After 
the Columbia strike, the FBI increased its activities in an attempt to disrupt the anti-
war movement and groups like the SDS. Part of this activity included providing 
information about student activists to university administrators and local law 
enforcement. The FBI claimed that some leading activists were in fact working as 
government informants. The FBI also provided propaganda material to student 
groups, which were opposed to the anti-war movement, again in an effort to 
discredit the movement as a whole. The FBI also provided local police with 
information, which identified illicit drug users amongst the activists, in an effort to 
have these individuals arrested on possession offences. They wrote anonymous 
363 Ibid., p 46, 67, 76, 80, 95, 142, 50. 
364 Ibid., p 77. 
365 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1181-83. 
366 Ibid. 
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letters to the parents of activists, endeavouring to influence the parents in an 
attempt to gain their assistance in mitigating their child’s activities in the protest 
movement. The FBI forwarded anonymous letters to employers, in an attempt to 
have the employment of activists terminated. This again was an effort to diminish 
the financial capacity of activists, to support their activities. They also provided 
information to university administrators, in an attempt to have activists employed 
by the university terminated, activist groups banned from campus and activist 
students expelled or suspended. Further, it was hoped this information would be 
used by universities to exclude these groups from using university facilities to 
conduct their business and hold meetings. Later this policy would extend to include 
high school principals in the hope the information would prevent activists gaining 
access to the high schools and their students.  
 
One of the goals of the FBI was to create disunity amongst the anti-war groups, 
create factional tensions within the SDS, all in an effort to disrupt the movement. 
The FBI saw the factionalisation and splintering of the SDS at the 1969 National 
Conference as vindication of their activities, since 1964. In addition, the FBI 
attempted to disrupt and eliminate the channels of communications available to 
these groups. This was done, firstly, by attempting to restrict the audiences 
available to these types of groups and secondly, by limiting the group’s capacity to 
organise, by denying these groups access to the telephone network. The FBI also 
attacked the ability of these groups and individual members to finance their 
activities. 
Organisation 
The SDS initially started as a student group, which had abandoned the ideology of 
the Old Left and with a goal of supporting the black Civil Rights movement and the 
eradication of social injustice in the early 1960s. As part of this agenda, the group 
became involved in the anti-war movement. As the United States involvement in 
Vietnam expanded, it successfully led one of the first anti-war protests. Due to the 
success in organising this protest and proceeding protests, the group’s membership 
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rapidly expanded and Chapters of the SDS spread across United States campuses. 
The rapid expansion of the SDS led to a diverse number of pre-existing campus 
based Leftist groups merging with, or working under, auspices of the SDS. Each of 
these groups and unaligned members brought their own ideological and political 
viewpoints into the SDS. Under the influence of these groups, the SDS progressively 
adopted a Marxist ideology. It also changed the organisational environment, which 
created tensions within the SDS as the varying ideological factions vied for control 
of the leadership of the group. These varying ideological viewpoints created 
opportunities for the FBI to exploit the differences between the SDS factions. The 
tensions created by the FBI’s interference within the SDS, further factionalised the 
group. The infiltration of the SDS by FBI agents also cultivated an air of mistrust 
between the factions. 
 
Factions of the SDS progressively became radicalised throughout the 1960s, as their 
protest actions failed to change government policy and the government’s response 
to these protests became increasingly violent. The RYM, a faction of the SDS, 
rationalised that the only way real change could be achieved, was by engaging in a 
revolutionary struggle, through the mobilisation of the working class youth and 
working in conjunction with black militants, such as the Black Panther Party. This 
group had moved away from peaceful protest to violent direct action. This faction 
of the RYM became known as the RYM I, or the Weatherman. The Weatherman 
judged violence as a legitimate tool to bring about change.367 This belief led to the 
split in the SDS, as the other leading faction within the SDS, the PL, did not share 
this opinion. The Weatherman also split with other members of the RYM based on a 
difference of interpretation of where the black militants fitted into the 
revolutionary struggle. The Weatherman saw the black militants as the vanguard of 
the struggle, whereas the members of the RYM II regarded black militants as part of 
the greater struggle of the working class. The Senate Committee of Internal Security 
in 1969 reported on the reason for the split as follows: 
367 Antonio, Wexler, and Lampson, "Underground." 
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“On June 22, 1969, SDS broke into two factions near the conclusion of its 
national convention at Chicago. One group, the Maoist-orientated 
Progressive Labor Party (PLP) faction headed by John Pennine, established its 
headquarters in Boston, Mass. The second group the Revolutionary Youth 
Movement (RYM), remained in Chicago and took over the SDS national 
office. The RYM itself divided into two factions, RYM I or Weatherman 
faction headed by National secretary Mark Rudd and RYM II headed by 
former National Secretary Michael Klonsky. RYM II claimed that the 
Weatherman's street fighting tactics would alienate rather than attract the 
masses of supporters needed for the success of any revolutionary movement. 
RYM II advocated recruiting working youth and eventually even older 
workers by a  strategy in which SDS showed an interest in the day-to-day  
grievances of black and white workers and joined with them in “united front” 
demonstrations and strikes to improve their conditions. The PLP faction of 
SDS also advocated patient efforts to recruit worker support, but proposed 
that SDS remain basically a student organization having an "alliance" with 
workers beginning with those employed on college campuses.”368 
 
The FBI, in their campaign of disruption, again exploited these differences. The FBI 
provided misinformation to one faction about another, to reinforce their prejudices. 
Mistrust was also cultivated within each faction, by spreading rumours that 
members, especially about prominent members, whom it was claimed, were 
working for the government. This campaign led to the factional leadership 
becoming more secretive. This secrecy resulted in decisions being made without 
reference to its membership, which undermined the democratic nature of the New 
Left. This resulted in the leadership losing touch with its grass roots members and 
becoming distant from its membership.369 
368 "SDS Plans for America's High Schools: Report by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-
First Congress, First Session.," ed. Committee on Internal Security (washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p 13. 
369 Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," p 131. 
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Radicalisation 
The members of the New Left, SDS and the Weatherman were white, well 
educated, and young, with an average age of 25. They came from middle or upper 
middle class backgrounds or came from families with Marxist sympathies. All had 
been involved in student activism prior to becoming members of the Weatherman: 
 
“Their radicalization had typically entailed years of political education, 
membership in left-wing organizations, interaction with black activists, 
participation in demonstrations, and skirmishes with police.”370 
 
In addition, they were frustrated by the failure of traditional protest tactics to bring 
about any significant change of government policy. As well as their interpretation of 
recent historical events within Cuba, they felt a dedicated cadre of revolutionaries 
could create an environment where the populace would rise up in support of the 
revolution and overthrow a draconian government. They were further inspired by 
the successes of the North Vietnamese in defeating a superpower in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, the state’s use of violence to put down student strike actions and 
protests was also a radicalising factor and was a factor, which led the group to go 
underground.371 The death of the Black Panthers leader “Jake” Winters at the hands 
of local police, created a feeling within the Weatherman, they were operating in a 
“war zone”.372 Furthermore, the Weatherman had been the subject of scrutiny by 
police who had arrested 23 members of the Weatherman, after someone had fired 
shots at a Cambridge police station.373 The FBI COINTELPRO also acted as a 
radicalising factor. Along with the police raids on SDS offices, initiated by 
COINTELPRO, this was another factor, which led to the Weatherman taking the 
decision to go underground.374  
370 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 1118-19. 
371 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2214-15. 
372 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2171-73. 
373 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2166-67. 
374 Ibid. 
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Chapter 8 - Analysis 
Does the WUO meet the criteria to be described as a Terrorist group? 
Raskin, an ex-member of the WUO, argued strongly the WUO was not a terrorist 
group.375 Raskin suggested prior to the Town House explosion, the WUO was 
heading in this direction, but he suggested the explosion led them to rethink their 
goals as an organisation.376 The redefining of the group brought about a 
commitment by the organisation that the WUO would only attack property and 
would give sufficient warning so loss of life could be avoided. On the surface, the 
WUO, throughout its life, appears to have honoured this commitment, although 
there are bombings, which took place in the WUO’s areas of operation, which did 
claim lives, but were never claimed by WUO or any other left wing groups. As such, 
these attacks remain unattributed.  
 
The WUO meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The WUO: 
1. Used violence or the threat of violence - The WUO engaged in an extensive 
bombing campaign between 1969 and 1977. 
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned - All targets selected by the 
WUO had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression within 
the United States and overseas. The targets selected included non-
combatant military instillations, law enforcement, government agencies, 
banks and other businesses, which the WUO claimed, were involved in 
repression of the third world and the working class. 
3. Aims were both political and ideological - The WUO was a revolutionary 
group who wanted to destroy the existing governmental institutions, to 
create a Marx-Leninist state. 
4. Selected targets were civilian, or non-combatants - As previously indicated, 
the group bombed non-combatant military installations (such as ROTCs), 
375 Jonah Raskin, "Looking Backward: Personal Reflections on Language, Gesture and Mythology in the Weather 
Underground," Journal of the Research Group on Socialism and Democracy - Online 20, no. 2 (2006): p 131. 
376 Ibid. 
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law enforcement, government agencies, banks and other businesses which 
the WUO claimed were involved in repression of the third world and the 
working class. 
5. Violence was selected to draw the public’s attention to the group’s cause. 
The targets were chosen because of their significance and association with 
events in the community or events overseas. The bombing of the New York 
Department of Corrections offices in August 1971, was in retaliation for the 
29 prisoners who died in the suppression, by authorities, of the Attica 
prison uprising of that year.377 
6. The intent for the violence was to evoke a reaction. The WUO viewed their 
actions as a form of “armed propaganda”, intended to highlight the 
injustices perpetrated by the United States government home and 
abroad.378   
Category of Terrorist Groups 
The WUO is categorised within this dissertation as a Structural379/Revolutionary 
Group. That is a group who wished to overturn the existing regime or political 
system requiring a fundamental change in the social structure.380 Thus, the WUO 
wished to bring about a fundamental change in the existing political and social 
order based on their ideological beliefs. The WUO emerged from the New Left 
within the SDS. The WUO drew heavily from the teachings of Lenin, Mao, and Che 
Guevara.381 As such, the WUO was a left wing revolutionary terrorist group. 
377 Dan Berger, Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity  (AP Press, 2005), p 330. 
378 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 2146. 
379 Mozaffari, "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies," p 179-96. 
380 Johnson, Revolutionary Change: p 1. 
381 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 794. 
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H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The analysis of the PESTELO variables indicates the Weather Underground 
Organisation (WUO) emerged from the pre-existing civil rights and anti-war 
movement, specifically from members of the SDS. Other groups involved in the 
protest movement of the 1960s shared the political, social, economic, ecological, 
technological, and legal environments. The factor, which was significant, was the 
organisational variable in the PESTELO model. The emergence of the WUO was 
triggered by the perceived failure of traditional tactics used by the protest 
movement to bring about change, combined with the increasing use of violence in 
the state’s response to the protest movement and the counterintelligence activities 
of the state. Thus, the WUO emerged from the SDS, due to diverging beliefs in 
which methodology was best suited to achieve the organisational goal of ending 
United States involvement in Vietnam and social injustice within the nation. The 
WUO was created due to differences in the homophyllic variables. 
 
The homophyllic factors, which led to the emergence of the WUO, are more 
discernible than the PESTELO variables. Homophily is divided, based on two broad 
variables of status homophily and value homophily. Homophily stratifies society 
based on these two variables, groups organise based on the status homophyllic sub-
variables of race and ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, gender, social 
class and network position. Value homophily further suggests that groups also 
accrete based on the value homophyllic sub-variables of behaviour, attitude, 
abilities, beliefs and aspirations. This case study implies the trigger event or 
environmental perturbation, which led to the emergence of the WUO, was the 
debate in the 1960s within the SDS, regarding the most appropriate tactics to 
achieve the common goal of the SDS. Within the SDS, there was a variety of Marxist 
ideologies followed by the various factions. The Weatherman faction, through its 
analysis and interpretation of prior events, believed that revolution was the only 
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action, which could bring about real change. Many of the other factions within the 
SDS did not share this interpretation. Therefore, the WUO could be considered a 
splinter group of the SDS, where other SDS factions did not share the WUO 
interpretation of the events or the environment. 
 
Using the COINTELPRO membership profiles382 and information contained within the 
committee of the Judiciary report to the senate on the WUO membership383, lists 
158 members of the WUO who had come to the attention of the FBI and other 
agencies, because of their above and underground activities. As such, this sample of 
members is considered representative of the hard-core activist in the WUO, but not 
necessarily a complete list of all members. 
 
The following has been gleaned from the COINTELPRO status homophily variables. 
The ethnicity of the documented members of the WUO, were white American. The 
average age of the members who went underground in 1970, was 25 years. It is of 
note there was a difference in the average age of male and females. The average 
age of males in the underground part of the WUO was 25 years but for females was 
24 years. The maximum and minimum age for males was between 17 and 35 years. 
The maximum and minimum age for females was between 17 and 36 years. From 
Figure 9 it can be seen that the majority of male underground members (about 85% 
of male members) were 26 years or younger (40) with only 5 members being 27 
years or older. Figure 9 also shows the age of male members’ peaks at 24 years and 
declines after that age. The distribution of the ages of the female members was 
more evenly distributed, with the age range between 21 and 28 years. With 29 
female members, about 85% of the female members were 27 years old or younger 
and five were 28 years or more. This suggests on the most part, female activists in 
382 "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976," ed. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
1976). 
383 "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate 
the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States 
Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975," ed. Committee of the Judicary (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975). 
Stuart Groombridge  147 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
the underground part of the WUO were on average, older than their male 
counterparts. Although interesting, the data set is small and only encompasses 
members known to the FBI, and as such, is most likely statistically insignificant.  
 
Figure 9 - Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the Underground organisation of the WUO. 
 
In the aboveground component of the WUO, the average age of the males and females was 25 years. The 
maximum and minimum age for males was between 17 and 35 years. The maximum and minimum age for 
females was between 20 and 36 years. From this, it can be seen that the majority of male aboveground 
members were 30 years or below (85% of male members) with only 6 members being 31 years or older.  
Figure 9 also shows the age of male membership, peaks between 21 and 25 years 
and declines significantly after these ages. The distribution of the age of the female 
members peaks between 19 and 28 years (85% of female members). With only five 
female members older than 28 years, for the most part, there were a high 
percentage of older male activists than their female counterparts. The ages of the 
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Figure 10 - Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the aboveground organisation of the 
WUO 
 
Within the leadership cadre of the WUO, the Weather Bureau, these statistics are 
repeated. The ages of the leaders ranged between 23 years and 35 years, the 
average age of the cadre was 26 years. The male members of the cadre were 
younger than the female members with an average age of 26 years, and the females 
27 years. Of the five male members, three were 23 years old, one was 26 years old 
and one 35 years old. All the female members were 25 years old or more. Of the 
five female members, one was 25 years old, two were 27 years old, and two were 
28 years old. On average, the female members of the leadership cadre were older 
than their male counterparts. In addition, there was not the same wide distribution 
in age ranges between the female members’ ages (3 years) than the male members 
(12 years).  
 
Thus, female members of the WUO were typically older than their male 
counterparts and their ages were more densely clustered than the males. Further, 
there were a greater percentage of males within the organisation, who were under 
the age of 25 years (64% of males and 50% of females).  
 
Figure 11 illustrates that there was a greater percentage of female members in the 
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Figure 11 - Commutative Distribution of the ages of male and female members of the WUO 
 
 
Typically, terrorism organisation membership is predominantly male. The WUO and 
other left wing groups stand out because of the high profile involvement of females 
within the groups. Out of the 158 members of the WUO profiled by the FBI, 45 
males were involved in the Underground organisation with 34 being females, which 
equated to 57% and 43% of the membership respectively. In the aboveground part 
of the organisation, there were 41 males and 38 females, 52% and 48% respectively. 
The information collated by the FBI suggests a slightly greater percentage of male 
involvement in the underground organisation than in the aboveground 
organisation. The differences in the numbers of males and females in the 
aboveground organisation are so small, that they are almost equal. In the overall 
organisation, 86 were male and 72 were female, 54% and 46% respectively. As such 
overall, there was almost parity between the two genders. 
 
As a Marxist group, the group members are technically atheist, therefore religion   
should not be a factor. There is no information contained in the FBI profiles, which 
identify the member’s prior religious observance. The prior religious observance is 
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There is no itemised information contained within the FBI profiles of group 
members, which individually list their educational qualifications, although the FBI 
indicated the majority held graduate or postgraduate qualifications. Varon indicates 
the majority of the members of the WUO held university degrees, with many 
holding postgraduate qualifications. As such, the two sources suggest the majority 
of the WUO were well educated, with some members of the aboveground elements 
of the WUO holding legal qualifications and were qualified to practice law.384 
 
There is very little information within the FBI profiles regarding what employment 
members of the WUO undertook. It was noted, a few members were legal 
professionals, and a small number had been academics. Others had held 
employment in the private sector, the nature of their employment was not 
specified. As part of the disruption of the New Left, one of the tactics employed by 
the FBI was to attempt to influence their employers to dismiss them. Many had 
been professional activists and students. The SDS employed some like the core 
leadership group of the WUO and a few others, in an official capacity. Gilbert, Ayers, 
and Raskin claimed during their time underground, they took low paying unskilled 
jobs to cover their living expenses. 
 
The majority of the WUO underground came from well-to-do families and would be 
considered middle or upper middle class. For example, Bill Ayers’ father was the 
CEO and Chairman of Commonwealth Edison, Kathy Boudin’s father was an 
attorney, Mark Rudd’s father was an ex-army officer, though some like Terry 
Robbins came from more humble backgrounds, Robbins’ father worked in a 
garment factory.  
 
384 ———, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies. 
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The core group of individuals who came together to form the WUO were known to 
each other through their work in the SDS and as part of the RYM I. As such, they 
were part of the RYM I/SDS radical network.385 Many had been involved in the Days 
of Rage protests.386 In addition, the FBI profiles of the WUO members, indicates 
some were members of the same family (i.e. brother and sister, brothers or sisters), 
other members were married to each other and others were considered couples 
prior to joining.387 Thus, pre-existing social networks appear to be central to the 
group’s emergence. 
 
Based on the analysis of the profiles of the 158 known WUO members, as previously 
discussed, the members of the Weatherman were white, well educated, and young, 
with an average age of 25. They came from middle or upper middle class 
backgrounds or came from families with Marxist sympathies. There were, on 
balance, similar numbers of males and females. This differs for other extremist 
groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) where 
the membership was predominantly male. Varon offered a possible explanation for 
this difference. Varon suggested the strong presence of females in the group: 
 
“…was evidence of how deeply outrage at the Vietnam War and racism cut 
across gender lines; women and men joined Weatherman for essentially the 
same reasons.”388 
 
It also should be considered that many factions of the SDS maintained a Marxist 
ideology. The writings of Marx and Engels argued for gender equality and, it is 
noteworthy that there had always been a high percentage of female terrorists in 
385 "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976." 
386 Ibid. 
387 Ibid. 
388 ———, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 862-63. 
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left wing groups. The German Red Army Faction (RAF) membership consisted of 
50% females.389 The German Red Zora only recruited women.390 The Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) alleged about 30% of its combatants were 
females391, and also about 50% of the membership of the Shining Path were 
females.392 
 
The value homophyllic variables, based on the available information, appears to be 
significant in determining what roles an individual may undertake within an 
organisation such as the WUO, that is in the above or underground organisation. In 
the broader context, those individuals who are attracted to the WUO share the 
same aspiration393 or goal as those who are attracted to the SDS and broader Peace 
and Civil Rights movement. Both groups of individuals wish to end the war in 
Vietnam and address the social injustices in the US. These two groups shared the 
same belief that action has to be taken to achieve these goals or aspirations. It 
could also be suggested that some form of agitation has to be taken to bring about 
these changes. Where they differ, was the belief in what methods were best suited 
to initiate change. The Peace and Civil Rights movements contained a diverse 
spread of opinion on how best to achieve this aspiration. Some, like those who are 
members of groups, such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, believed this goal 
was best achieved by influencing the political process with peaceful non-violent 
protest. Those who were attracted to the WUO believed non-violent activism or 
protest was futile and the current political process had failed and the only way 
change could be brought about, was through revolution. As such, change could only 
be produced by the use of dramatic, direct action and tactics. These actions would 
involve bombings of public buildings. Thus, these individuals occupy the extreme 
end of the radicalisation spectrum of the Peace and Civil Rights movement. 
389 Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 54. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid., p 53. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Aspiration being a sub-variable of Value Homophily 
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Therefore, the homophyllic variable of belief, combined with how an individual 
arrives at this belief (radicalisation) is a significant factor in the emergence of the 
WUO. The key value homophyllic variable is their belief in which tactics would bring 
about the movements goal. 
 
This extreme end of the Peace and Civil Rights movement is further stratified by 
other value homophyllic variables such as behaviour, attitude, and abilities. 
Although some may believe and support the extreme actions of the WUO, they may 
not engage in extreme action, because their behavioural traits do not predispose 
them to engage in violent exploits. Likewise, they may not have the capacity or the 
ability to engage in these types of activities. These individuals are most likely to 
engage in support roles of the group, where they feel their specific skills are best 
utilised.  
  
A further factor, which must be considered in combination with the behavioural 
traits, is the status homophily variable of network position. Sageman indicated the 
pathway for others may involve friendship or kinship networks which cause 
individuals or groups of individuals to create or gravitate to extremism and seek out 
violent extremist groups.394 Therefore, some individuals who do not necessarily 
believe in violent direct action may become involved due to the expectations placed 
upon them by their social network. The FBI profiles of the WUO indicate that many 
of the members of the WUO were in kinship and friendship networks and joined the 
group as part of this network. 
 
Members of the WUO shared similar status homophyllic characteristics with other 
members of the SDS. Therefore, in terms of age and social background etc. (Status 
Homophily), they were not aberrations within the SDS. Analysis of the events 
leading up to the emergence of the WUO does not indicate it emerged because of a 
single perturbation within the environment. The WUO emerged over time due a 
394 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century: p 66-69. 
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multitude of perturbations. Each perturbation acted as a progressive radicalising 
factor on this small group within the SDS. Over time, although the SDS and WUO 
shared similar aspirations, the WUO diverged based on the analysis of the 
environment, and the belief in how the aspirations could be achieved. The 
information suggests the frustration of not being able to achieve their goals through 
peaceful means, radicalised the group, which led them to adopt the belief, violence 
was the only methodology which would bring about change. This belief and their 
perception of the environment led to the emergence of the WUO. 
 
The environment was not the sole factor, which led to the emergence of the WUO. 
Within this environment, there was a homophyllic group, which had concluded, 
change could not be implemented by peaceful means. They had arrived at this 
conclusion based on their interpretation of the events occurring within the 
environment. The radicalisation of the group did not occur based on a single 
perturbation. The group’s radicalisation occurred over time and was based on a 
multitude of events. There had been a transition from peaceful activism, to direct 
action, to violent direct action and finally to terrorism. The transition occurred 
when each methodology failed to bring about change. Thus, the environment 
created conditions which allowed the extreme fringe of the student protest 
movement to evolve into a terrorist group. It should be noted there were many 
groups within the same environment, which persisted with the non-violent 
approach. 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
In this section, it is intended to determine which factors in the homophyllic and 
PESTELO variables were significant influences in creating an environment which led 
to individuals joining the Weatherman and eventually going underground as part of 
the WUO. This question can only be answered by reviewing the case studies of 
individuals who were part of the organisation. There are limited, individual 
biographies of a broad spectrum of the members. The personal biographies of the 
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leadership cadre are documented quite well in open sources and autobiographies, 
as well as FBI COINTELPRO and other government documents released under 
freedom of information. This information gives sufficient detail of 34 known 
members and associates of the WUO. 
 
Some major points, which can be drawn from the analysis of the limited data set, 
shows the members of the WUO all shared the same PESTEL environmental factors 
as other individuals involved in the protest movement of the 1960s. They shared 
the same opposition to the Vietnam War, conscription and the social injustices 
suffered by the black community in the US. 
 
The following has been compiled from a number of sources, Weather Underground 
Summary395, Jacobs396  and the Congressional report on WUO bombings.397 From a 
homophyllic perspective, 8 of the 34 WUO activists identified previously, came from 
Marxist or left wing activist family backgrounds.398 Thus, out of this same group, 
fewer than 25% held leftist views prior to attending university. Some members had 
come from the Progressive Labour party. The majority came from families where 
one or both parents were professionally qualified. At least two had worked for 
Martin Luther King. All had previous involvement in the Civil Rights or anti-war 
movements. All had prior involvement in other left wing groups or in the SDS before 
becoming part of the WUO and all were involved in previous demonstrations 
organised by the SDS. Out of the 158 known and suspected members of the WUO, 
23 had kinship, marital, personal or friendship bonds with other members of the 
WUO. All shared the belief peaceful protest had failed.  
 
395 "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976." 
396 Ron Jacobs, 1997  (New York: Verso, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground). 
397 "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate 
the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States 
Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975." 
398 Ibid. 
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From information compiled from FBI and other government sources399, there is 
insufficient biographical information to determine where the other members were 
radicalised. Although, considering the radical nature of university campuses at the 
time, if they did not hold radical views prior to entering university, they were most 
likely to have acquired these views whilst on campus. 
 
Figure 12 - The universities where the members of the WUO were radicalised 
 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of the universities where members of the WUO 
were most likely radicalised. The bar chart shows 2 peaks in the number of 
members at Chicago and Columbia, which is not a surprise, as in Chicago, the SDS 
chapter was dominated by the Jesse James Gang and Columbia, by a group known 
as the Action Faction. Both groups had favoured dramatic and direct action. This 
was also the core group, which led to the formation of the RYM. This group had 
emerged out of the Columbia, Chicago, and Mid-West SDS chapters in Ohio and 
Michigan.400 The distribution of the membership of the WUO suggests it was 
399 "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976." 
400 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
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strongest in those states, which are adjacent to the Great Lakes and the Canadian 
border. 
 
It is also of interest that the WUO members mainly came from the North Eastern 
and Mid-Western States of the United States, these members being concentrated in 
the states of New York, Ohio and Illinios. There was a small faction in Washington 
State based in Seattle. The information from the FBI and the other government 
agencies, does not suggest the WUO maintained a strong presence in the Western 
Mountain States, apart from Colorado. According to Gilbert, there was a small WUO 
collective in Denver.401 The government sources and the memoirs of the various 
Weatherman do not record any collectives in the Southern States.  
 
Figure 13 - The Number of WUO members per US Region. 
 
The chart suggests geographic location was a factor in the formation of the 
extremist group. It is of note the WUO appeared to emerge out of the 
environmental factors present in two Universities, Columbia, and Chicago. This 
raises the question, what were the factors, which enabled this emergence? 
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Initially, the SDS emerged as a left wing group, which was primarily concerned with 
Civil Rights, and their initial work was conducted in the community. In the 
beginning, the SDS maintained a non-violent philosophy and attempted to inspire 
the youth.402 The SDS, from its early days, had a strong Mid-West connection, with 
the early leaders coming from the Michigan and Ann Arbor Campuses.403 By 1965 
the SDS successfully mobilised 15,000 activists and staged the first large scale 
protest action against the Vietnam War.404 The success of the 1965 protest allowed 
the Mobilization Committee to end the war in Vietnam to attract nearly 100,000 
activists to protest the Vietnam War, of which 35,000 marched on the Pentagon in 
October 1967.405 The SDS supported the Pentagon protest and it encouraged its 
members to take part, as long as it did not interfere with local and regional 
programs.406 The National Mobilisation committee (MOBE) acted as an umbrella 
group, which oversaw the organisation of demonstrations, inviting other activist 
groups to take part. It did not dictate the form of civil disobedience. The march on 
the Pentagon ended in a melee between some of the rioters and the civil 
authorities. The use of violence by the state against the demonstrators, affirmed in 
their minds, the state’s willingness to use violence against its own citizens. The 
Pentagon march had led to an explosion in the membership of the SDS.407 
 
“Weatherman Scott Braley described how the frustration of making modest 
demands in the mid 1960s fed the more ambitious rebellion of the late 
1960s: "There were very few wins in the sense that you got anything you 
wanted.... We might have fixed some smaller issues, but we didn't want to fix 
402 Robbie Lieberman, Prairie Power : Voices of 1960s Midwestern Student Protest.  (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
2004), p 2. 
403 Caron Gentry, "The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, 
Membership, Ideology and Gender.," Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 2 (2010): p 282. 
404 Max Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," Radical History Review, no. 82 (2002): p 39. 
405 "Pentagon Riot of October 21, 1967,"  (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). 
406Simon Hall, Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p 121. 
407 Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 39. 
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smaller issues. We wanted to fix issues that would change the world. It was 
clear to many people that something much more radical was needed."”408 
 
The increasing use of police violence to suppress the demonstrations and the 
efforts of the university administrators to control the student population, 
radicalised students who were not necessarily interested in the other political 
aspects of the SDS.409 There were differences in the political outlooks of the National 
and Local leadership of the SDS and the grass roots activists. 
 
“…the perspective of national SDS leaders and local activists. The oral 
histories begin with SDS national leaders who were regional organizers in the 
prairies. These are the people who were self-conscious about using the term 
prairie power to differentiate themselves from the old guard. They had 
strong ideas about the direction in which the movement should go, and 
when they took over the national leadership of SDS they carried out their 
own vision of campus organizing.”410 
 
“…organizing people around their own oppression, focusing on students 
dissatisfied with the bureaucratic and authoritarian manner in which 
universities were run and with the irrelevancy of the curriculum, connecting 
student power to broader social issues. They emphasized building the new 
society in the shell of the old, an idea dating back to the Industrial Workers 
of the World, and connecting the personal to the political...”411 
 
408 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 366-68. 
409 Lieberman, Prairie Power : Voices of 1960s Midwestern Student Protest.: p 13. 
410 Ibid., p 21. 
411 Ibid. 
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The local leadership shared some “…of the characteristics of the national prairie 
power leaders…” but were” …less ideological and more focused on student rights 
than the old guard...”412 
 
There was a third group, which consisted of grass roots activists.  
 
“These are students who joined demonstrations on their own campuses but 
did not necessarily identify strongly with either local or national 
organizations. While some of them might not have described themselves as 
New Leftists, much less identified with the term prairie power, they are in 
fact more typical of student protesters than either group of leaders.”413 
 
In 1968, the Columbia SDS and the Chicago regional SDS had been involved in the 
planning of and participation in, the demonstrations of the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention. These two events, along with the 1967 Pentagon protest, 
were the most confrontational protest actions to date. Both actions were 
suppressed with the use of violence by the state. Police used batons to break up the 
protest at Columbia. The Chicago demonstration against the Democratic convention 
was also broken up and supressed by the state’s use of violence. The protestors had 
clashed over 5 days with “… 11,900 Chicago police, 7500 Army troops, 7500 Illinois 
National Guardsmen and 1000 Secret Service agents…”.414 
 
The SDS chapters at Columbia and Chicago regional offices had established 
reputations for direct and confrontational action. As previously discussed, the RYM 
emerged because the SDS’: 
 
“…internal politics were becoming both more influenced by Marxism and 
more factional, due in part to the presence of cadres from the then Maoist 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid., p 22. 
414 "Brief History Of Chicago's 1968 Democratic Convention,"  (All Politics, 1997). 
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Progressive Labor Party (PL) since 1966. SDS leaders opposing PL, unwilling 
to be outflanked on the left, increasingly came to embrace a form of Third 
World Marxism. Contact was established between influential members of 
SDS and Cuban and Vietnamese communists. An alliance was also forged 
between key SDS leaders and the Black Panther Party; Panther support work 
became an integral part of many chapters’ activity and the Panther influence 
on SDS became not just generally ideological but direct and personal.”415 
 
The RYM consisted of three groups from within the SDS. The two more radical 
action driven factions of the RYM, as previously indicated, were the Jesse James 
Gang from the Chicago region of the Mid-West and the Action Faction based at 
Columbia University within New York State. It was these two factions of the RYM, 
who were to form the core of the WUO. Neither faction had a strong representation 
in the Western states of the United States. 
 
The WUO emerged from two specific geographic locations, Chicago and Columbia 
Universities. The information also suggests the leadership and the majority of the 
membership of the WUO originated from these two universities and the outlying 
regions. Government sources indicate the majority of the membership did not 
possess radical ideation prior to attending university. Therefore, it is likely their 
geographic proximity with radical students at their specific university, led to their 
radicalisation. Thus, their geographic proximity and contact with the radical student 
movement were most likely significant factors, which led to them adopting radical 
views.  
 
The FBI sources claimed most of those who formed the WUO were known to each 
other, with some having familial or other close relationships. Therefore, the 
founders of the WUO shared the same networks of associates, which imply network 
415 Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 44. 
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position is also a factor in the radicalisation process, which led to the emergence of 
the WUO. 
 
The Columbia and Chicago chapters of the SDS were similar in homophyllic terms of 
aspirations, beliefs, and behaviours. What brought these two chapters together was 
their shared opposition to the PL. They opposed PL ideologically and opposed any 
leadership of the SDS by the PL. Furthermore, both chapters were frustrated by the 
failure of any of their actions to bring about change. Therefore, the two SDS 
chapters shared similar homophyllic beliefs and aspirations, which played a 
significant role in creating the RYM. The RYM, over time, evolved into the WUO. 
 
It would be unlikely these two chapters would have been able to come together 
without a communications channel, which permitted them to exchange information 
over distance. The telephone system, which had become commonplace in the 
United States by the 1960s, was the medium that permitted distant elements of the 
group to communicate. From FBI reports, the telephone system played a significant 
role in the exchange of information and enhanced the group’s capacity to organise 
the various geographically dispersed elements of the group. The reports further 
indicated the FBI attempted to disrupt the communications channel by soliciting the 
telecommunication service providers to terminate the SDS phone services, which 
reinforced the importance of this mode of communications. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
The WUO emerged out of the SDS in 1969. Between 1960 and the fall of 1968, the 
SDS had experienced an almost exponential growth in membership, as in the graph 
below (see Figure 14). The data in Figure 14 was compiled from Sale’s book “SDS” 
which covers the development of the SDS from 1960 to 1969.416  Sale compiled the 
data from SDS membership records. Sale admits these records were not complete. 
The Chart shows gaps in the data for various periods. Even so, the graph 
416 Sale, SDS: Appendix v-vi. 
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demonstrates an increasing trend in membership, which illustrates a dramatic 
increase in membership after 1965. After June 1968, the SDS stopped keeping 
accurate records and as such, the figures are estimates taken from Sale. The figures 
used for June and November 1968 are mid-range values of the upper and lower 
estimates. 
 
Figure 14 - The Growth of Chapters and membership of the SDS between 1960 and 1968. 
 
 
The SDS, from its early days, had been a highly factionalised organisation.417 The SDS 
grew by incorporating existing groups into its structure, groups such as the PL. The 
SDS also encouraged the local SDS chapters to act independently, set their own 
agendas, and deal with local issues. The SDS prided itself on its inclusive and 
democratic nature, and willingness to encompass all views. The SDS was not a 
hierarchical organisation, although it maintained national, regional, and local 
leadership cadres. All these groups and factions shared the common principles of 
the organisation. They wished, through their actions, to create a better world. They 
shared a common anti-war, civil rights, and social justice agenda, but they differed 
from chapter to chapter on the local issues. On a strategic level, the chapters shared 
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a common national PESTELO environment, but the regional and local PESTELO 
environments differed from region to region and university to university. 
 
The different strata of the organisation had varying organisational goals. These 
goals varied based on the different local PESTELO environments. The National 
leadership had a strong understanding of the direction of the organisation. They 
operated within an ideological framework and maintained a clear strategic vision. 
The strategic view involved the building of relationships beyond the SDS, linking 
local student issues to the greater struggle outside the universities as part of the 
larger effort of achieving social justice within the US. 
 
The local and regional leadership were less ideological than their national 
counterparts were. Unlike the national leadership, the local and regional leadership 
gave greater attention to local issues, which were of concern to the students at 
their specific locations. 
 
The third level and the greater portion of the SDS membership, was the grass roots 
level. This group was not necessarily concerned with matters that influenced the 
leadership of the SDS at all levels. Some may not have even identified as New 
Leftist. They typically joined the SDS due to local issues at the campuses where they 
studied and because of their opposition to the draft and the Vietnam War. 
 
 “Most SDSers did not participate directly in the internal debate over doctrine 
or support any of the main sides. But several thousand—including a large 
percentage of those who were by now devoting nearly all their waking hours 
to politics—were invested in the outcome. And tens of thousands more, 
while repelled by the messiness of factional battle, shared the broad Third 
World Marxist view that seemed to inform all sides.”418 
 
418 Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?," p 44. 
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Thus, the SDS was able to attract a large membership, because its goals were 
sufficiently broad enough and relevant to a wide cross section of the student 
community.  
 
By the end of 1968, two factions, the PL and the RYM, dominated the national 
leadership. Their differences were ideological and methodological. That is, how to 
bring about their goal of social change. The differences resided in the homophyllic 
variables. As previously indicated, within the RYM, there were also factions who 
differed on the implementation of the RYM manifesto. The two RYM factions 
differed in the analysis of which part of the community would be at the vanguard of 
the revolution. The RYM I had concluded the Black activists were at the vanguard, 
marginalising the working class, whereas the RYM II viewed the working class as 
central to the struggle and revolution, viewing the black Civil Rights movement as 
part of the greater working class struggle. 
 
The exponential increase in the size of the SDS mirrored the growth in the United 
States’ involvement in the Vietnam War and the United States Army’s increased 
need for soldiers. The resultant political reverse suffered by the United States Army 
(a consequence of the Tet offensive) further fuelled the growth in membership of 
the SDS. The ever-increasing membership of the SDS did not necessarily mean a 
growing pool of recruits for the WUO. The membership growth was fuelled by 
environmental factors, which were dissimilar to those, which created the WUO. The 
WUO may have shared a common aspiration to end America’s involvement in 
Vietnam with the grass roots members of the SDS. The grass roots members may 
have also aspired to bring about social change and society with greater equality, but 
they did not necessarily share the WUO’s belief that this change was best brought 
about by revolution. In addition, they did not share the view that change could only 
be brought about by violence. The small numbers of protesters who attended the 
Days of Rage protest, which were organised by the WUO, highlights this. This 
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contrasted with the millions who attended the more peaceful Moratorium anti-war 
marches.  
 
Furthermore, the WUO (RYM I) also alienated those within the SDS who shared 
their revolutionary ideation. Many shared the WUO’s left wing political 
revolutionary beliefs. The WUO shared similar value homophyllic beliefs and 
aspirations with other left wing factions within the SDS. The problem for the WUO 
was the Weatherman Statement. This Statement did not engage or unite the 
factionalised leadership of the SDS. The Weatherman Statement did not inspire the 
membership of the SDS as the Huron Statement had, 7 years earlier.419 The language 
within the Weatherman Statement made it difficult to understand, it was 
permeated in the language and rhetoric of the Old Left. It was heavily criticised by 
those members of the SDS who understood Marxist ideology. Its language and 
ideological framework distanced the WUO from the mass membership of the SDS. 
Most of the SDS membership aspired to ending the Vietnam War and addressing 
other social injustices, but did not share the strategic vision of the WUO. 
Furthermore, the WUO marginalised the student movement as agents of change, 
subordinating it to the black Civil Rights movement, as such, distancing the creators 
and supporters of the Weatherman Statement, from the large membership of the 
SDS.420 The Statement failed to appeal to a broad audience, minimising the 
attractiveness of the group to a wider pool of members. The FBI COINTELPRO files 
suggest the activists and supporters of the WUO at most, numbered between 150 
and 200 individuals, which by the early 1970s had declined to less than 50. The 
COINTELPRO files suggest the hard-core membership of the WUO, may have only 
numbered around 30.421 This juxtaposes the peak membership of the SDS of 
between 80,000 and 100,000 members, with a hard-core membership, which 
numbered in the thousands. 
 
419 Sale, SDS: p 391. 
420 Ibid. 
421 "Weather Underground Summary Date: 8/20/1976,"  p 186. 
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In conclusion, the growth of the SDS contrasts the growth of the WUO. The SDS 
grew in size because it was active in student politics and issues in the broader 
community. The SDS was able to attract other like-minded groups to align with it 
because of its perceived success. The SDS goals (aspirations) were general enough 
to be relevant to a wide cross section of the student community across the US. It 
was able to remain relevant across the varying geographic PESTELO environment to 
maintain enough affinity (homophily) with a significant portion of the student 
population. This relevance was applicable at a local, regional, and national level. 
 
The WUO was unable to grow because its goals and aspirations failed to resonate 
with the wider student population. Their message contained Marxist ideology, 
which was complex and not easily understood by the larger audience. Simply, they 
failed to communicate with the masses they had hoped to inspire in terms, which 
were relevant to them. The group failed to establish its relevance across the various 
issues present in the geographic PESTELO environment. The WUO failed to 
demonstrate its relevance and affinity with the section of community it claimed to 
represent and wished to recruit. As such, the perceived lack of shared homophily 
limited the number of recruits who would be inspired by and drawn (flock) to, the 
organisation. This lack of homophily and affinity hindered the creation of links with 
the community, which could have assisted in building the organisation by attracting 
new members. No one wanted to join the WUO. Hence, the WUO failed to grow.  
 
The environment also changed after the ending of the Vietnam War, which further 
reduced the WUO relevance and affinity with the broader community. The group’s 
lack of success led to division within the organisation and failed to inspire any new 
members to join. This resulted in a decline in the membership of the WUO, and 
eventually, the group fractured and disbanded.  
 
It is also of note; there were other actors in the PESTELO environment. These actors 
had greater affinity with the community and were able to mobilise large sections of 
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the community in support of civil rights and the ending of the Vietnam War. These 
groups were able to achieve their goals and aspirations through the existing 
democratic processes and without the use of violence. Thus, the democratic system 
provided a safety valve within the PESTELO environment, which circumvented the 
need to bring about change with violence or terrorism.  
 
Thus, in this case study there is a link between the PESTELO environment, 
homophily and the size of a group. The case study also illustrates within the 
PESTELO environment, the terrorist group competes with other actors for members 
and supporters. Their size and support is dependent on the level of homophily 
between it and the general population. This case study further indicates changes in 
the PESTELO environment can reduce homophily and lead to a decline in the size of 
a group. 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time. 
The SDS was a loose network of various student groups who shared a common 
aspiration to end the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. Beyond this 
common goal, there were scales of divergence, objectives, and aspirations of the 
extensive membership and factions of the SDS. Some groups focused on local issues 
within their communities and universities. Others, like the Weatherman faction, had 
concluded the injustices in the United States and the injustices perpetrated by the 
United States in other countries, such as Vietnam, could only be addressed through 
revolution. The revolution would change the system of government. The 
government model adopted by the Weatherman, was based on the teachings of 
Karl Marx. The group looked to Cuba for inspiration. They were influenced by the 
likes of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara who had taken a small band of 
revolutionaries, which had limited initial support from the general populace and 
created a revolutionary movement that overthrew the American supported, 
Baptista Government. Cuba was to be influential on the Weatherman faction of the 
SDS.  
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A book written by Regis Debray called “Revolution in the Revolution?” published in 
1967 further influenced the WUO. The premise of Debray’s theory was a small 
group of revolutionaries could inspire a population to rise and overthrow the 
current government. This was to be achieved through the formation of foco groups, 
a theory proposed by Che Guevara, which would operate independently of an 
aboveground political entity. The role of the foco groups was to become”… a pole of 
attraction for the whole country”422 through its underground actions. The 
Weatherman faction was inspired by Che Guevara’s focal theory423. Rudd writes: 
 
“Like Che, we believed that U.S. imperialism was in the process of crumbling 
to pieces. The military defeat in Vietnam was the prime indication of its 
weakness, the key to recognition that live-or-die revolution was already 
underway within this country and around the world. And Che Guevara’s foco 
theory, certified by Fidel, was the way to push it along. The revolt of black 
and other third-world people inside the U.S., led by the Black Panther Party, 
demanded white allies.”424 
 
Based on WUO’s analysis of the environmental factors within the United States, the 
WUO incorrectly believed the foco model was the appropriate organisational 
structure for the group. Rudd acknowledges, with hindsight, the WUO’s analysis of 




“To my eternal shame, I was part of the leadership of Weatherman which 
scuttled SDS—the largest radical student organization in the country—in 
422 Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle In Latin America  (London and New York: 
MR Press, 1967), p 45. 
423 Mark Rudd, "Che and Me,"  http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/5_2/Rudd5_2.html. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid. 
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1969 at the height of the war. A small group of less than ten people made 
this suicidal decision believing that with SDS dead we would be free to build 
an underground guerilla army organized into focos around the country. Each 
foco, through its exemplary armed actions, propaganda, and contacts with 
the aboveground mass movement, would attract recruits to expand the 
incipient revolutionary army’s military capabilities…”426 
 
Senior members of the Weatherman faction of the SDS who visited Cuba as part of 
the Venceremos Brigades, saw what they perceived to be the success of the Cuban 
revolution, which had been sparked by a small group of no more than 82 dedicated 
revolutionaries, who had defeated a much larger foe. The WUO wished to emulate 
the Cuban success in the United States.   
 
Whilst still an aboveground and open organisation the WUO established communes 
throughout the US. Within these communes, they formed foco, which were 
intended to inspire and recruit others to join the revolution. The Weatherman had 
embedded these communes within poor communities, in an effort to engage with 
these people, in an attempt to recruit the youth and working class to the revolution, 
from these sections of society.427 The Weatherman was also active on campuses 
throughout the United States, again attempting to build broad support amongst the 
student population. This was consistent with creating a “pole” to attract new 
recruits. The precise number of communes is not clear, although Grathwohl 
reported the Weatherman operated collectives in New York, Buffalo, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Denver, San Francisco, 
426 Ibid. 
427 Frank Reagan Larry Grathwohl, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen 2nd ed. (New York: 
Arlington House Publishers,, 2013), Kindle Locations 1528-32. 
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Oakland, Berkeley, and Seattle.428 The FBI estimated that communes’ sizes were 
between 10 and 30 individuals.429  
 
In January 1970, with the decision to go underground made at Flint, the 
Weatherbureau closed the SDS National Office in Chicago. This action was to 
deprive the WUO of an aboveground presence and would have lasting 
consequences as it detached the WUO from the larger leftist movement within the 
United States and no attempt was made to correct this action until 1974. 
 
As part of its transition underground, the Weatherbureau, the leadership cadre of 
the WUO, engaged in a process of purging the membership. Those who were 
suspected of being police informants and those they thought, not to be totally 
committed to the revolution, were removed from the group.430 These actions 
reduced the size of the WUO, although it is not clear from documented sources, by 
how much. 
 
A war council of 12 members known as the Weatherbureau led the WUO. The 
Weatherman was also organised into three major regional groupings, the West 
Coast, the Midwest, and the East Coast. The WUO consisted of major collectives in 
San Francisco, New York, Chicago, and Detroit.431 Members of the Weatherbureau 
ran each regional group, independently. 
 
“Members of the West Coast collective, headed by Dohrn and Jones, spent 
time in Berkeley and San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury district, but avoided 
public political activities and quietly plotted bombings. The Midwest 
428 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2782-83. 
429 "The Weather Underground: State Department Bombing by the Weatherman Underground: Subcommittee to investigate 
the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: United States 
Senate; Ninety Four Congress; First Session. January 31, 1975,"  p 10. 
430 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 2419-22. 
431 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2437-39. 
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collective, headed by Ayers, built an arms cache and fabricated crude bombs 
with Grathwohl's help. The most dangerous of the bombs, dynamite with a 
burning cigarette as its trigger, was placed outside a Detroit police station, 
putting at risk both police and passersby, but failed to detonate. The New 
York collective was the most militant. Its leaders, J. J. and Terry Robbins, 
thought that whites would move in a revolutionary direction only through 
the prompting of dramatic acts of violence, and they were dead set on 
providing the drama. The collective was headquartered in the fashionable 
Greenwich Village townhouse of Cathy Wilkerson's father, a broadcast 
executive, while he was on vacation in the Caribbean. Though not technically 
underground, members of the collective virtually disappeared from public life 
and built a large stockpile of dynamite, purchased by Weathermen using 
false names from demolition supply companies in New England.”432 
 
The explosion of the Weatherman bomb-making factory in New York in March 1970 
accelerated the Weatherman’s transition to an underground organisation. The 
explosion led to borderline members of the organisation to question their 
involvement in the group. The explosion also led to an exodus of members who 
questioned the WUO’s tactics and direction.   
The FBI reported in April 1970: 
 
 “…the Cincinnati field office reported that the Weathermen were the only 
New Left activists in the area, and that they were limited to two small 
communes. The one in Columbus was staffed by about "seven hard core 
Weathermen." The other, in Cincinnati, was staffed by as many as ten. 
Neither group had been able to mount any significant activity in the area. 
Cincinnati did add that the "underground tactics"" of the group, and rapid 
432 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2439-45. 
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movement from one commune to another, made the obtaining of reliable 
information from undercover informants far more difficult.”433 
 
The FBI reports suggest the collective sizes were not large, having only 7 to 10 
members. It should also be noted these collectives were mobile, not remaining in 
one location for any extended periods. Originally, the collectives were intended to 
be embedded into poor communities in an effort to educate the communities about 
the revolution and solicit recruits. Without the stability of remaining in one location 
for any amount of time, these collectives were unable to grow or engage with the 
communities, which they were intended to educate. Without an aboveground 
organisation, the group was not able to educate the masses and build a support 
base. 
 
By December 1970, the membership of the WUO had been reduced to less than 100 
individuals.434 The remaining members of the WUO were now part of an 
underground organisation. The FBI reported: 
 
“…the Weathermen had become convinced they could accomplish more 
working in small focals, or action groups, in an underground environment 
than they could by being an open movement. In preparation for this phase, 
many Weathermen had to be purged so that a fighting force could be 
organized. Weathermen would now operate in focals of three to six 
individuals within the framework of a collective in target cities. On any 
particular action, each focal would be given only enough information to carry 
out its part of the assignment. This policy would protect other members as 
well as themselves. Collectives in each city would be responsible for selecting 
433 Davis, "Assault on the Left: the FBI and the sixties antiwar movement," Kindle Locations 2125-28. 
434 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Location 2577. 
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and destroying targets. However, if needed, they could call on the national 
Weather Bureau to send in additional help.”435 
 
The FBI reports suggest the focal groups were not large, having only 3-6 members. 
The detail of the report further indicates the group was under intensive FBI 
surveillance, which made the legal environment in which they operated, extremely 
hostile. Furthermore, many members had outstanding court matters for their 
previous involvement in aboveground actions undertaken by the SDS and the 
Weatherman faction in 1968 and 1969. As such, not only was the size and structure 
of the WUO dictated by the legal environmental factors, the organisational 
environmental variables also had a role in dictating the structure and size of the 
group. 
 
The legal environment, in which the collectives operated, meant they had to move 
regularly to avoid detection by law enforcement. The WUO were not without 
aboveground supporters, some provided safe houses for those in the WUO, when 
required. The WUO also had some level of support amongst other leftist groups 
who were able to provide refuge for WUO members in communes. They also had 
the support of the National Lawyers Guild who provided representation in court for 
those members who had been arrested and charged by the police. 
 
The United States’ involvement in the ground war in Vietnam ended in December 
1972 and with this, the draft was effectively discontinued in 1973. The two major 
environmental factors, which had driven the anti-war movement, had gone. There 
were also changes in the economic environment initiated by the energy crisis in 
1973, which created an economic recession in the United States and other parts of 
the world, which in turn, led to high unemployment. These were significant political 
and economic environmental changes within the United States. Along with the 
change in the political and economic environments, came a change in the social 
435 Larry Grathwohl, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen Kindle Locations 2586-91. 
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environment. American youth felt: “they were no longer politically threatened by 
the state as a group unless they chose to be. With the exception of a few radical 
communities and newspapers, the culture assumed a predominantly ultra-liberal 
content which, at best, preached cultural and personal freedom and political 
cynicism.”436 The political, economic, and social changes led to a decline in the 
counterculture rhetoric of the WUO.437   
 
Within this environment, by 1974, the WUO had declined to about fifty members, 
operating in small units, which moved about the country. The WUO realised if it 
were to survive, there was a need for an aboveground entity to represent its goals, 
and its goals needed to be relevant in the current environmental context. In the 
words of the authors of the Prairie Fire, the aboveground organisation role was to 
create a “sea' for the guerrillas to swim in”.438  
 
“In Prairie Fire the WUO leaders instructed their followers to become active 
in support of virtually every revolutionary issue from homosexuality and 
women's rights through backing the PLO and Mrican?, Puerto Rican, 
Chicano, American Indian and black revolutionary and terrorist groups.”439 
 
Prairie Fire acknowledges this American revolution would be a protracted affair, 
requiring both an underground army and an aboveground political group, to spread 
and educate the populace.440 The WUO view of itself had also evolved. No longer did 
the WUO see itself as: “…a foco organization whose role was to commit armed 
actions without any concern for organizing a political movement to support those 
acts.”441 The group now saw itself as “…the beginnings of a revolutionary people's 
436 Ron Jacobs, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground (Verso 1997), p 72. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid., p 78. 
439 Ibid., p 75. 
440 Ibid., p 76. 
441 Ibid. 
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army aligned with the revolutionary movement.”442 The Prairie Fire document 
expressed the view, the WUO needed to build a mass movement, which Rudd 
acknowledged they had abandoned in 1969443, following the group’s disillusionment 
after the Days of Rage.444 The desire for a mass movement had to be contrasted 
against a changing political, economic, and social environment within America, 
which was a society with ever declining numbers of people who were willing to 
engage in revolution. This decline was a result of the changing environmental 
factors, which resulted from: 
 
“…the signing of the Vietnam peace accords, an increasing cynicism among 
youth, a growing awareness of the limitations of a culture based on youth 
and leisure, and the effectiveness of the government's counterinsurgency 
efforts insured that ever smaller numbers of American activists were 
committed to revolution.”445 
 
The ending of the Vietnam War was the significant factor, which diminished the 
potential pool of recruits for groups, such as the WUO. The effects of the war, as an 
environmental factor, cut across all classes within American society and as such, 
acted as a unifying factor for Americans from diverse social backgrounds. The other 
factors, which had inspired the New Left, such as civil rights, imperialism and 
working class disadvantage, were factors, which did not affect the broad majority of 
American society. Thus, did not contain sufficient social gravity (homophily) to 
attract large numbers of new recruits to leftist groups, like the WUO. 
 
The Prairie Fire manifesto led the WUO to create an aboveground organisation 
called the Prairie Fire Organising Committee (PFOC) in 1975. Chapters were set up 
442 Ibid. 
443 Rudd, "Che and Me". 
444 Jacobs, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground p 78. 
445 Ibid., p 80. 
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in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle, and Chicago.446 The 
creation of the PFOC was intended to create a mass movement. In the early part of 
1976, PFOC and the WUO convened the “Hard Times” conference, which was 
designed to develop a unified platform for the Left in the United States. The 
conference failed. As a result, there were recriminations within the WUO over the 
reasons for the failure. 
 
The WUO became divided on political differences within the Organisation. The 
insurgent faction, predominantly based on the East Coast, challenged the long-time 
leadership of the group, who favoured “inversion” or taking the organisation 
aboveground. The debate declined into recrimination. The leadership of the WUO 
were either expelled from the group, or left of their own accord.447 The East Coast 
faction, who had defeated the WUO leadership, took on the WUO mantle. 
 
The legal environment within the United States also changed in 1976. The United 
States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (colloquially referred to as the Church Committee) had found 
intelligence gathering on the New Left by United States government agencies was 
illegal. The legal environment had been changed by the ruling of the Church 
committee which found “...the intelligence community at times violated specific 
statutory prohibitions and infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens.”448 
By 1977, inactive high profile members of the WUO started to hand themselves in 
to law enforcement, a process that continued into the mid-1980s. Jacobs argues 
this process was assisted by the Carter amnesty for “draft dodgers”.449 This process 
was also accelerated, by the light sentences imposed on the many who came out of 
446 Ibid., p 83. 
447 Ibid., p 85. 
448 "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans: Book Ill, Final Report of the 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.," ed. United States Senate 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976). 
449 ———, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground p 87. 
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hiding. Varon explains the process by which the members of the WUO emerged 
from the underground: 
 
“Over the next several years, the great majority of Weathermen turned 
themselves in, prompting local news stories that read like the final obituaries 
of a withered radicalism. After negotiating deals with prosecutors (typically 
probation; some jail time in select cases), they then turned their energy to 
the difficult task of rebuilding old relationships, a sense of political purpose, 
and, for some, a basic sense of self. Soon they reintegrated themselves into 
"normal life," raising families, developing careers, and sustaining their 
activist commitments around the issues, such as fighting racism, imperialism, 
and economic inequality, that had always motivated them. Their 
professional lives, in all cases I have found, have some broad social value, 
whether education, various forms of political advocacy, or service to 
disadvantaged communities.450 
 
What members remained of the WUO, continued its attacks on government targets. 
In 1977, the WUO bombed the Immigration and Naturalisation Service Offices (INS) 
in San Francisco, but the group’s actions no longer attracted significant media 
coverage. Next they plotted to bomb the offices of the” …reactionary and high-
profile California State Senator John Briggs”.451 Five WUO members were arrested in 
late 1977, in relation to the plot.  
 
The INS bombing was the last action conducted by the WUO. Some of those who 
did not hand themselves in, went on to form the May 19 Organisation, along with 
members of the Black Liberation Army. Many of those who handed themselves in to 
the authorities did not recant their radical agendas and many of these still maintain 
their radical ideologies even today. 
450 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 4241-45. 
451 Jacobs, The Way The Wind Blew: A History Of The Weather Underground p 86. 
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In conclusion, as an aboveground entity, the WUO structure reflected that of the 
geographic distribution of its members across the United States. WUO was divided 
into three regions West Coast, Mid-West and the East Coast. The leadership group, 
known as the Weatherbureau, oversaw the regions. Each collective within the 
region was permitted to act on its own recognisance, but would come together to 
carry out coordinated attacks. When the WUO became an underground 
organisation in 1970, clusters of members of the Weatherbureau oversaw each 
region. The group structure of the WUO did not evolve beyond the initial structure 
the group adopted, when it first went underground.  
 
The group did not have an overseeing aboveground political body, which could 
build a mass movement from which the WUO could draw further recruits. Members 
of its leadership cadre acknowledged this as a failing of the group. The leadership 
cadre’s belief that its actions would act as a “pole” to attract new recruits, was 
based on the Debray model, which was a failed theoretic concept even before the 
group went underground. The group was able to sustain itself over a long period 
because it operated in small units, which took advantage of islands of supporters 
within the community, who were willing to provide safe houses and safe locations 
such as communes for members of the group, to hide and to carry out operations.  
 
The WUO was never able to embed itself within the community, in a stable location, 
to educate and recruit from the populace. In fact, the size of the group declined in 
the number of members over the course of its life cycle. The failings of the group’s 
structure were recognised with the changing political, economic, and social 
environment of the mid-1970s. In this period, the group attempted to re-organise 
itself and create an aboveground entity, which could create a mass movement. This 
attempt failed and exposed division within the WUO, which finally led to the 
group’s split and final demise. The legal environment changed within the United 
States, after 1976, due to the Church Committee’s findings into the intelligence 
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collection activities of government agencies within the United States, were illegal. 
This provided those members of the WUO, an opportunity to resurface, without 
serious and long-term legal consequences. This, combined with the other factors 
previously mentioned, led to the demise and structural collapse of the group. 
 
In conclusion, there is no concise information, which gives a detailed account of the 
WUO’s structure. Thus, this assessment of the group’s structure has been inferred 
from the available sources. Before going underground, the Weatherman faction of 
the SDS maintained a number of communes throughout the Northern States of the 
United States. Thus, when the Weatherman made the decision to become an 
underground organisation, the initial group’s structure was based on the existing 
communes, with around 7-30 members. A leadership cadre known as the 
Weatherbureau oversaw these communes. After the Greenwich Bomb factory 
explosion, the WUO created a regional command structure, the leadership of which 
was divided amongst the members of the Weatherbureau. Changing environmental 
conditions, later in the WUO’s life, led to the creation of an aboveground political 
wing, but this act was unable to reverse the decline of the group. 
 
The commune, based on the available information, appears to be the day-to-day 
structure of the group. The group utilised a different operational structure for 
carrying out attacks. The operational component, which could be drawn from a 
single commune, would consist of foci or cells with 3-6 members. These foci 
activities were compartmentalised to ensure security. The Weatherbureau would 
also allocate members to the foci, based on the operational skills required to carry 
out the task. The communes could also undertake their own operations, as long as 
they were consistent with the strategic objectives, which had been outlined by the 
Weatherbureau. 
 
The WUO maintained a flexible cellular operational structure, which provided a 
level of operational independence to the various elements of the WUO. Towards 
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the end of the group’s lifecycle and demise, the information suggests the group’s 
commune structure had ceased to exist, due to declining membership and the 
group becoming fractured on ideological grounds. It further suggests in the 
changing PESTELO environment, the operational capacity of the group had also 
declined. Based on biographical accounts, the formal structure of the group had 
potentially ceased to exist, with the group declining into a network structure. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment's influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
There is no clear information, which provides a detailed understanding of the 
group’s size or structure. The following has been constructed from the memoirs of 
some of the members of the WUO and the files released by United States 
government bodies, such as the FBI and Senate.  
 
There is a common consensus amongst the sources, prior to going underground, the 
Weatherman faction of the SDS had engaged in a process of collectivisation in 
1969.452 Varon suggests, whilst the Weatherman were still an aboveground 
organisation, there were about 500 Weatherman members contained within these 
collectives.453 The FBI files relating to the Weatherman’s Flint War council in late 
1969 claim there were about 400 attendees at this meeting. As such, a membership 
of 500 is feasible. These 500 or so members were distributed across 13 collectives 
throughout the United States.454 Four were located on the West Coast, 6 in the Mid-
West and 3 on the East Coast, all overseen by the Weatherbureau. The location of 
each of the collectives was selected based on the prevalence of a pre-existing anti-
war and anti-racist culture in each of the locations.455 As such, the locations were 
452 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 831-36. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid. 
455 Howard Machtingter, "You Say You Want a Revolution," In these Times, 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/4251/you_say_you_want_a_revolution. 
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selected to embed the collectives in a political and socially friendly environment. 
The Weatherbureau was based in Chicago. 
 
The group was reorganised after the townhouse explosion in March 1970. The 
group was organised as an underground organisation based on the foco theory. As 
part of this reorganisation, some members were selected to work aboveground, 
others were selected to work in the underground organisation, some were to work 
independently of the group, and finally, others were purged, having no further 
involvement in the group.456 With this purge, there was a decline in numbers. 
Government sources suggest the WUO membership declined to about 150.457 This 
included underground members and supporters. The reorganisation involved 
putting in place regional leadership. These leaders came from the Weatherbureau.  
The group structure was based on a centralised democracy.458 The Weatherbureau 
exercised absolute power within the organisation, setting organisational objectives, 
appointing and sacking leaders of collectives, purging members they felt were 
unsuitable and reallocating members to collectives as they saw fit. The regional 
leaders were members of the Weatherbureau and as such, they were able to 
provide direction to the collective under their control. The appointed leaders of the 
collectives were responsible for the day-to-day running of their collective. Apart 
from regional based collectives, at times the WUO formed an all-female collective 
to carry out operations. In 1972, the all women Proud Eagle Tribe of the WUO 
carried out an attack against Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The best 
estimates of size of the WUO membership, are provided in the Senate Committee 
Report into the WUO, which listed 38 active underground members in 1970, with an 
additional 120 aboveground supporters who had come to the FBI’s attention at 
various times. Some of these supporters, over time, became part of the 
456 Larry Grathwohl, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen Kindle Locations 2249-50. 
457 "The Weather Underground - Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act 
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary - United States Senate - Ninety Fourth Congress - First 
Sessions,"  (Washington: United States Senate, 1975), p 46. 
458 Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond," p 164. 
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underground (during the group’s life cycle) and members of the underground, left 
on their own accord or were arrested. Therefore, determining the precise size of 
the WUO based on membership is not possible. 
 
The information collected by law enforcement monitoring the Flint War Council in 
1969, suggests the figure of 120 supporters may be on the low side. The number 
was more likely in the hundreds. It also suggests the figure of 38 in the underground 
organisation, may also be low. Gilbert, Ayers, Raskin, and Rudd all acknowledge that 
beyond the active supporters, there were many in other left wing groups, which 
were sympathetic to the Weatherman cause. Raskin made the point that family and 
friends provided many activists support. Furthermore, they also received support 
from “hippie” communes throughout the country.459 The WUO also obtained 
assistance from the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), which provided legal support to 
members of the Weatherman and the WUO when they were arrested, and 
eventually resurfaced. The NLG had a long history of supporting and acting in a legal 
capacity for Leftist groups, communists, and Cuba. These activities had brought the 
NLG to the attention of the FBI.460  
 
One element the WUO lacked was an aboveground political wing, and this was later 
acknowledged as a failing by the leadership of the group. Without an aboveground 
political wing, the WUO was unable to build a mass movement, which could provide 
the group impetus beyond that of conscription and the Vietnam War. The WUO 
rode on the wave created by the anti-war movement in the United States in the 
1960s and early 1970s. This anti-war movement sustained the group underground. 
Once the United States disengaged from Vietnam and discontinued conscription, 
there was insufficient impetus in the community to sustain and justify the group’s 
activities. The political, economic, and social environments were also changing in 
the United States. Within this changing environment, the WUO endeavoured to 
459 Raskin, "Looking Backward: Personal Reflections on Language, Gesture and Mythology in the Weather Underground," p 
127. 
460 Berger, Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity: p 56-60. 
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maintain its impetus through the creation of the Prairie Fire Organising Committee 
(PFOC). PFOC was an attempt made by the WUO, to create a political wing, which 
could create a mass movement. Within the changing PESTELO environment, the 
support of left wing groups within the United States had declined, so too did the 
membership of the WUO. Gilbert indicates during this time, some of the WUO 
members started to leave the organisation.461 Towards the end of the group’s life 
cycle, its membership had declined to less than 50 members.  
The underground members were organised into foci. As previously indicated, these 
groups consisted of 3-6 members.462 These foco groups were based around the 
remaining collectives. Ayers and Grathwohl, in their respective memoirs of their 
time with the WUO suggest, although the foco were technically attached to the 
collectives, the membership of the foco and the locations of the foco were dynamic. 
Members of a specific group could be reallocated and relocated at the direction of 
the leadership. These documents also suggest the foco and its members were 
mobile, not fixed to a single location, moving regularly around the countryside, 
staying in safe houses and in communes run by sympathetic left groups around the 
country. Foco did not have direct contact with each other, for security reasons.463 
Varon indicates each foco was permitted to act independently in their assigned 
area, but were occasionally brought together to act as one, in major operations.464 
 
Gilbert465, Varon466, Ayers467 and Grathwohl468 indicate communication between foco, 
individual members, the collectives and the Weatherbureau, was conducted either 
461 Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond," p 195. 
462462 Larry Grathwohl, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen Kindle Locations 2585-91. 
463 Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond." 
464 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies. 
465 Gilbert, "Love and Struggle : My Life in SDS, the Weather Underground, and Beyond." 
466 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies. 
467 William Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," In 2009. (Boston, MA, USA Beacon Press ). 
468 Larry Grathwohl and Frank Reagan, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen 2nd ed. (New York: 
Arlington House Publishers,, 2013), p 237. 
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by one on one meetings in designated safe locations or via pay phones. Gilbert 
stated that communication between foco was directed through the 
Weatherbureau. Gilbert indicated the organisation was heavily compartmentalised. 
Pay phone to pay phone contact was the main means of communication between 
the group members, who were spread across the United States.469 
 
Gilbert, Ayers, and Grathwohl within their memoirs, describe an environment 
where they assumed they were constantly under surveillance. They also describe 
how they would acquire and use false identifications to rent safe houses, and buy 
and register cars. They further describe how they would use their contacts within 
the aboveground to assist those who were arrested, or assist those who suspected 
they had been compromised, to escape the risk of capture. The organisation had 
strong links through the National Lawyers Guild who would provide legal assistance 
to those who had been arrested. They also had supporters in likeminded left wing 
and civil rights groups. The WUO maintained an association with the Symbionese 
Liberation Army (SLA)470 and the Black Liberation Army.471 In addition to these 
contacts, the WUO maintained strong links within the community, where it was not 
without supporters. 
 
The environment, in which the WUO operated, was politically and legally hostile to 
the group. There were islands of support for the group, which could provide some 
safe havens for the group’s members in times of need. The active interest in the 
WUO by United States law enforcement meant the members of the group had to be 
constantly on the move. The group believed they were under constant surveillance 
and believed that a small cadre of dedicated revolutionaries could inspire the 
masses to rise up. This environment heavily influenced the organisational structure 
of the group and its size. The WUO was a heavily compartmentalised cell based 
469 Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," p 248. 
470 Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties 
and Seventies.: Kindle Locations 4160-62. 
471 Ayers, "Memoirs of an Anti-War Activist," p 227. 
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organisation. With a core leadership group, this group provided strategic and 
operational objectives for the organisation. The cells were dynamic and the 
leadership group could reallocate membership of the cells. The cells had general 
areas of operation but were mobile. The membership of the group was small. Not 
all members of the New Left agreed with the tactics of the WUO and the WUO did 
not have an aboveground political wing, which could present its message to a wider 
audience. This further limited the pool of recruits for the organisation. The WUO did 
have its supporters and sympathisers within the New Left, but was unable to attract 
large numbers of new members. This issue became further apparent as the 
environmental conditions changed, after the United States disengaged from 
Vietnam. In this period, the membership of the group also declined, as the group 
endeavoured to find new context and relevance.  
 
The geographically dispersed nature of the group also influenced the structure. 
Secure communications were only possible by pay phone or one on one meetings 
with the leadership. The regional structure of the WUO, with the regional 
leadership coming from members of the Weatherbureau, ensured the strategic and 
operational objectives of the organisation were theoretically consistent across the 
nationwide organisation. However, this type of structure meant any disagreements 
amongst the leadership could lead to fragmentation of the organisation. This 
occurred as disagreement arose between the supporters of the PFOC and the old 
leadership cadre of the WUO after the Hard Time conference in 1975. The result of 
this conference was a split in the group and the group’s final demise. 
 
As previously indicated, in hypothesis H2a, the environment in which the WUO 
operated, influenced the group’s size. The WUO was a small group spread over a 
large geographic area. The structure reflected the extended lines of 
communications. The cellular or foco structure of the group reflected the need for 
security within the harsh environmental conditions. The WUO were able to 
maintain a loose hierarchical structure by creating a leadership cadre in each of the 
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regions, which shortened the lines of communication. The structure was also 
flexible. The WUO maintained regional based foco and created ad hoc cells or foco 
to carry out specialised operations. 
 
The foco, the underground elements of the WUO, were small, consisting of around 
3-6 members. Each foco had a leader, who was appointed by the leadership cadre 
of the group, the Weatherbureau. In total, the WUO operated 12 collectives, 
divided into 3 regions. Members of the Weatherbureau oversaw each region. Each 
region had between 2-4 foco. The structure of foco was dynamic and membership 
was allocated in accordance with the Weatherbureau’s needs.  
 
The information regarding the structure of the WUO is incomplete, due to its 
reliance on biographical accounts and government sources. These lack detail, 
although the available information does suggest it is consistent with Dunbar’s 
hypothesis, that the structure of human groups is dependent on the cognitive limits 
of the human brain. It is important to highlight, this structure is also consistent with 
other descriptions and theories of social organisation. 
 
At the lowest level, the foco consisted of 3-6 members, which is consistent with the 
size of the smallest structures within human society, known as the clique. The next 
tier in the organisational structure is also consistent with Dunbar’s hypothesis, with 
2-4 foco being under the command of regional leaders. Further subdivision of the 
WUO into three regions, is also consistent with Dunbar’s hypothesis. It is not clear 
from the available information, how many individuals were in any given region. The 
numbers could have ranged from between 7-27, which includes the regional 
leadership group. As such, the regional sub group of the WUO ranged in size from a 
sympathy group to a band. This is again consistent with Dunbar’s hypothesis, but 
may not be the only explanation of the clustering, as these numbers are also 
consistent with anthropological analysis of groupings within society. Therefore, it is 
not possible to determine whether Dunbar’s hypothesis is the only explanation. 
Stuart Groombridge  188 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
 
The biographical accounts of the WUO suggest the formal structure of the WUO had 
collapsed towards the end of its life, due to the changing environmental conditions. 
The change in environmental conditions had called into question the relevance of 
the WUO, and membership of this group declined. At the time of the split within the 
WUO, many of its remaining members were constantly on the move. Some had 
become inactive. As such, the structure of the WUO towards its demise, would best 
be described as a network. 
 
In the case of the WUO, it can be argued the two primary factors, which dictated 
the structure of the group, were its geographic dispersion and the PESTELO 
environment. The environment was the key factor, which determined the 
operational structure of the group. The group did not control territory and had 
limited support within the community. In this type of environment, historically the 
cell is the safest organisational choice. The group size dictated the number of 
frontline operational units (cells or foco) the WUO could create and determined its 
overall operational capacity. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions  
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The environment was not the sole factor, which led to the emergence of the WUO. 
Within this environment, there was a homophyllic group, which had concluded, 
change could not be brought about by peaceful means. They had arrived at this 
conclusion, based on their interpretation of the events occurring within the 
environment. The radicalisation of the group did not occur based on a single 
perturbation. The group’s radicalisation occurred over time and was based on a 
multitude of events. There had been a transition from peaceful activist, to direct 
action, to violent direct action and finally to terrorism. The transition occurred 
when each methodology failed to bring about change. Thus, the environment 
created conditions, which allowed a group of the student protest movement to 
evolve into a terrorist group. It should be noted, there were many groups within the 
same environment, which persisted with the non-violent approach. Those who 
formed the WUO were no different to other non-violent student activists in terms 
of status homophily. They were similar ages (between 17 and 28), and came from 
comparable social and educational backgrounds. In many respects, they shared 
similar value homophyllic characteristics. The two groups shared the same 
aspirations, but differed in the belief on how best this goal was to be achieved. 
 
This raises the question, what homophyllic variables create these two distinct 
groups within the organisation of violent and non-violent activists. Hudson’s work 
into those who engaged in violence in the form of terrorism indicated that for all 
intents, the majority of extremists are not the subject of any psychological 
dysfunction, which would predispose them to acts of violence.472 Hudson also 
indicated that work conducted by other psychologists, such as Jerrod Post and 
Walter Laqueur, could not identify any unique personality traits which would permit 
472 Hudson, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes terrorists and why?," p 60. 
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the identification of individuals who were at risk of engaging in terrorist acts.473 
Sageman has indicated the pathway to terrorism is based on the individual’s social 
network and their personal history.474 As such, those who engage in violent acts on 
behalf of the WUO are likely to be subject to the same mechanisms described by 
Sageman. This was found in the analysis of the social network of members of the 
SDS. Those who gravitated to the WUO underground had prior associations within 
the context of the SDS. The FBI COINTELPRO indicates that some were involved in 
personal relationships, married, or shared kinship bonds. 
 
Hudson’s research implies it is not possible to identify those who ordained to 
become involved in violent acts of extremism. This case study does suggest an 
analysis of a group aspiration within a given environmental context, combined with 
their capacity to achieve this goal peacefully, has the potential to identify risk 
groups that may be susceptible to radicalisation and violent extremism. This 
conclusion does not contradict Hudson’s research, as it is still not possible to 
identify these individuals. Although, it does imply it may be possible to identify 
individuals or groups at risk. 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
This case study suggests the importance of geographic proximity of individuals in 
the radicalisation process and network formation. Geographic proximity brings 
homophyllic similar individuals and groups into contact with each other, allowing 
the creation of networks. Geographic proximity also enhances the capacity of 
individuals and groups to communicate, as proximity shortens the communications 
channels.  
 
The WUO was formed, by the merging of two geographically dispersed chapters of 
the SDS, who shared similar homophyllic aspirations and beliefs. What permitted 
473 Ibid. 
474 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorism Networks in the Twenty First Century: p 41-70. 
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these two geographically distant groups to come together and communicate? By 
the 1960s, the telephone system pervaded the United States. This system permitted 
immediate communications. This communications technology allowed the various 
elements of the RYM and later the WUO, to communicate and organise. Without 
this communications technology, the WUO would not have been able to emerge as 
a geographically dispersed cohesive group. 
 
In conclusion, homophily was central to the WUO formation. Geographic proximity 
was also important in radicalisation and the formation of local networks. The group 
formation was additionally assisted by telecommunications technology, which 
eliminated the time lag in geographically long communications channels. This 
technology assisted in bringing geographically distant homophyllic groups together 
and allowed them to coalesce into a single entity, known as the WUO. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
In conclusion, the growth of the SDS contrasts the growth of the WUO. The SDS 
grew in size because it was active in student politics and issues in the broader 
community. The SDS was able to attract other like-minded groups to align with it 
because of its perceived success. The SDS goals (aspirations) were general enough 
to be relevant to a wide cross section of the student community across the United 
States. It was able to remain relevant across the varying geographic PESTELO 
environment to maintain enough homophily with a significant portion of the 
student population. This relevance was applicable at a local, regional, and national 
level. 
 
The WUO was unable to grow because its goals and aspirations failed to resonate 
with the wider student population. Their message was couched in Marxist ideology, 
which was complex and was not easily understood by the larger audience. Simply, 
they failed to communicate with the masses they had hoped to inspire, in terms, 
which were relevant to them. The group failed to establish its relevance across the 
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various issues present in the geographic PESTELO environment. The WUO failed to 
create a homophyllic link with the pool of potential recruits. As such, the WUO 
failed to grow in size and as the environment changed, after the ending of the 
Vietnam War, the membership of the WUO actually declined. The group fractured 
and disbanded. 
 
It is also of note; there were other actors in the PESTELO environment. These actors 
were able to mobilise large sections of the community in support of civil rights and 
the ending of the Vietnam War. These groups were able to achieve their goals and 
aspirations through the existing democratic processes and without the use of 
violence. Thus, it could be argued, the democratic system provided a safety valve 
within the PESTELO environment, which circumvented the need to bring about 
change through violence or terrorism.  
 
Hence, in this case study, there is a link between the PESTELO environment, 
homophily and the size of a group. The case study also illustrates within the 
PESTELO environment, the terrorist group competes with other actors for members 
and supporters. Their size and support is dependent on the level of homophily 
between it and the general population. This case study further indicates changes in 
the PESTELO environment can reduce homophily and lead to a decline in the size of 
a group. 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time. 
When the WUO initially went underground, it utilised its pre-existing collective 
organisational structure. The WUO reorganised after the initial purges of the 
members. The collective structure remained in place, but operationally it adopted a 
cellular structure based on the foco. It was intended, each foco would be drawn 
from the collective. Thus, the WUO maintained a due organisational structure, one 
for the day-to-day activities of the group and another that compartmentalised the 
operational aspect of the organisation. 
 
Stuart Groombridge  193 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
It is difficult to ascertain the structure, as the membership declined in the changing 
environment. The available information, suggests it operated more like a loose 
network. The biographical accounts indicate in the later days of its life, many 
members were in hiding, on the run, or had been arrested. Based on these 
accounts, it would suggest any formal structure might have disappeared. 
 
For most of its life, the WUO lacked an aboveground political organisation, which 
could represent it in the aboveground world. The WUO had endeavoured to address 
this organisational deficit in the twilight years of its existence. Due to differences in 
belief about what the objectives should be, this led to the splintering of the group 
and its eventual demise. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
The PESTELO environment and the geographic dispersion of the group, determined 
the structure of the WUO. The formal structure was hierarchical, with a command 
and control structure based on the geographic location of the units. The initial 
structure was an artefact of the group’s pre-existing aboveground collective 
organisation. The regional leadership was implemented to ensure the group, which 
was spread over a vast geographic area, operated within the bounds of the strategic 
objectives outlined by the Weatherbureau. At a local level, the group operated in 
cells, which were drawn from pre-existing collectives. This cellular structure was 
adopted, based on the WUO leadership analysis of the environmental factors and 
their historical review of insurgencies in Cuba and South America. The lack of 
general support for the WUO within the community, and the pressure placed on the 
group by law enforcement, meant the WUO was incapable of mobilising large units. 
Within this environment, their communication channels were vulnerable, so attacks 
using larger units was hazardous, which would have potentially led to the group’s 
compromise. Thus, environment also dictated a cellular structure.  
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At the end of the WUO’s existence, the formal structure seems to have 
disappeared, and was replaced by a network structure. This change in structure 
does not appear to be a conscious choice, but a result of declining membership and 
loss of relevance within the changing PESTELO environment within the United 
States. The available information suggests, the membership declined to a point 
where the group could no longer maintain its formal organisational structure and it 
devolved into a network. 
 
The structure of the group was consistent with Dunbar’s cognitive limits hypothesis. 
The structure was also consistent with other anthropological theories on the 
structure of human society. As such, it is not possible to ascertain whether the 
cognitive hypothesis is relevant in describing the WUO structure. 
 
Thus, size, geography distance, the PESTELO environment, and the security of the 
communications channels, were key factors, which determined the organisational 
structure of the WUO and its structural evolution throughout its life cycle. 
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Case Study 2 - Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
Chapter 10 - Historical Background 
The foundations of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), can be traced to 
before the partition of Ireland in 1921. British involvement in Ireland dates long 
before this, when the first Norman adventurers landed in Ireland in 1166 AD. The 
Norman conquest of Ireland started in 1171 AD, with the conquest of kingdom of 
Leinster, plus the towns of Waterford, Wexford, and Dublin, and part of Meath.475 
The British invaded Ireland to avert Ireland’s becoming a rival Norman state.476 By 
1175 AD, the High King of Ireland accepted the overlordship of the English King, 
although English authority was only secure in the pales.477 
 
In the following years and centuries, there were major revolts in Ireland against 
English overlordship. It was not until the Tudors came to the throne of England, that 
the British seized control of Ireland and created a centralised government. From the 
mid-16th century to the early 17th century, the British colonised Ireland with English 
and Scottish Protestants. The Catholics in Munster, Ulster, Laois, and Offaly were 
dispossessed of their land and replaced by these colonists. Many laws were 
introduced in Ireland to encourage Catholics to convert to Protestantism. 
 
Throughout the Stuart reign of England and the period of the Republic, Ireland was 
decimated by rebellions and for a brief period between 1642 and 1649, England lost 
control of Ireland. In this period, Ireland was a confederation. From 1649 to 1653, 
Oliver Cromwell, for the English Commonwealth, reconquered Ireland. During this 
period, Ireland lost about a third of its population and the majority of the better 
lands within Ireland were handed over to the Protestant settlers, as retribution for 
the uprising.478 Later, the Irish Catholics’ support of James II against parliament led 
475  David Hughes, The British Chronicles, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Heritage Books, Great Britain, 2007), p 313 - 15. 
476 Ibid. 
477Ibid. 
478 Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, Dictionary of Genocide, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008), p 91. 
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to the Irish Catholics being further dispossessed of their land and property. The 
penal law also dispossessed Catholics of many of their civil rights. Between 1739 
and 1741, the Great Frost led to crop failures in Ireland resulting in an estimated 
400,000 deaths.479  
 
After the Great Frost of 1740-41, Ireland experienced an economic and population 
boom. With this boom, there was some relaxation of the restrictions placed on 
Catholics and there were attempts to broaden the franchise to some Catholics. 
Among the reformers, some felt, that the Protestants within the Irish parliament 
were resistant to these reforms and the emancipation of Catholics. The reformers 
were of the opinion that the politicians’ allegiances were with Westminster rather 
than Ireland.  
 
Inspired by the American and French revolutions, the United Irishman rose in revolt 
in 1798, against British rule in Ireland. The British acted quickly and crushed the 
rebellion. Even so, the organisation did not cease to exist, nor did the concept of a 
United Ireland. The rising did demonstrate that Irish unity was fragile, as there had 
been some instances of sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants. 
Furthermore, after the act of union of Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1800, 
William Pitt levelled some of the blame for the 1798 uprising on the sectarian 
policies of the Protestant Parliament in Dublin. Both sides politically exploited the 
sectarian violence of 1798 in later years, although the context of the violence was 
often forgotten. Many Protestants in Ireland were loyal to the British government 
and as such, the uprising by the Catholic United Irishman was perceived as an act of 
disloyalty.  
 
In 1801, the Act of Union was passed in Westminster and Dublin, leading to the 
abolition of the Irish Parliament, which resulted in elected Irish members sitting in 
Westminster. The union of Ireland and Britain also held promise for Irish Catholics 
479 Richard Killeen, A Brief History of Ireland  (London: Constable and Robinson, 2012), Kindle Locations 1728 - 33. 
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that the Penal Law would be appealed and lead to emancipation. Though 
emancipation was resisted and was not passed until 1829 when the then Prime 
Minister the Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington, the hero of Waterloo, used his 
personal prestige to ensure its passage into law. This was also a period of rural 
unrest in Ireland and sectarian violence. Some Catholic Irish politicians, sitting in 
Westminster, who attempted to have the Act of Union repealed, exploited these 
events. 
 
During the period between 1800 and 1846, the Irish population had been 
progressively increasing. By 1846, the population had reached a peak of 8.3 
million480, which was equivalent to 1/3 of the population of the United Kingdom, 
which was about 26 million at the time. The potato famine and immigration 
decimated the population, which had dropped to about 4,000,000 by 1922 and 2.8 
million by 1961.481 
 
There remained an undercurrent of nationalism within Ireland after the 
emancipation, resulting in nationalist uprising in 1848 and 1867. The latter half of 
the 19th century was a period of reform within Ireland. One significant reform 
involved the breaking up of the large estates of the absentee landlords and 
returning ownership to the Irish. The passing of the Local Government (Ireland) Act 
in 1898 broke the control of the landlords, giving control to the elected local 
councils, but the debate over home rule also created divisions between the 
Protestant and Catholic communities.  
 
Nationalists gained hope in 1885, when the British Prime Minister Gladstone, 
announced he was a supporter of Irish home rule. This unsettled the Protestants in 
Ireland and triggered the formation of the first Unionist organisation, which had 
spread to Ulster by 1886. Gladstone’s first attempt to pass a Home Rule bill, failed 
480 "Historical Atlas: Population of the British Isle. ,"  (2013). 
481 Ibid. 
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in the House of Commons in the same year. He attempted again in 1893, but this 
time, it was voted down in the House of Lords. Although these bills did not pass into 
law, they created considerable fear within the Unionist movement, which by 1905, 
had become a well-disciplined and united organisation, representing the Protestant 
interests, united under the Ulster Unionist Council. The issue of home rule in Ireland 
created divisions. 
 
In the intervening years, the issue of home rule simmered, but it was not until 1910, 
home rule became a prominent political issue in Westminster. In 1911, the political 
landscape had changed and it was apparent both Houses of Parliament would pass 
a Home Rule bill. The Protestants engaged in a political campaign to oppose home 
rule and threatened to establish a provisional government in Belfast if the bill was 
passed. They feared that they were going to be abandoned by London and they 
would be a minority within a predominantly Catholic country. Their preference was 
to maintain the union with Britain. In response, Protestants formed the Ulster 
Volunteer Force in 1913, with the intent of opposing home rule and creating a 
provincial government in Ulster. The Nationalists responded with the creation of 
their own militia force to support home rule, the Irish Volunteers. 
 
The Home Rule legislation passed through Parliament in 1914 with an amendment, 
which temporarily excluded Ulster to avoid an Irish Civil war. The outbreak of the 
First World War led to the British government delaying its implementation until the 
war ended. The outbreak of the war created a rift within the Nationalists. The 
majority of the members of the Irish Volunteers joined the British Army, but a small 
minority dissented. This small cadre would form the core of the group, who initiated 
the Easter Uprising in 1916. In the wake of the uprising, there was a shift in Irish 
opinion, primarily brought about by the British response involving the imposition of 
martial law and the execution of 15 of the uprising’s leaders. It also saw a shift in 
the British views on Ireland. 
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After the Easter Uprising, the British government attempted to expedite home rule, 
but were unable to gain broad support. The two attempts in 1917 and 1918 failed. 
The primary sticking points in the negotiations was the status of Ulster and 
Protestants in a united Ireland.  
 
A further stumbling point was the linking of home rule in Ireland with conscription. 
The situation in Ireland was further complicated by the heavy losses suffered by the 
British Army on the Western Front during the 1918 German spring offensive, which 
reignited the debate regarding conscription within Ireland, which was seen as an 
untapped source of manpower. Ireland had been quarantined from conscription, 
which had been implemented in Britain in January 1916. The linking of home rule 
and conscription by the British radicalised moderate Nationalists, increasing support 
for Nationalist groups such as Sinn Fein. This resulted in moderate Nationalists 
losing electoral support to Sinn Fein. In the British general election in December 
1918, Sinn Fein became the dominant party, winning 73 of the 105 Irish seats in 
Westminster. The victors met in Dublin on 21 January 1919, declaring independence 
and forming the first Dáil Éireann. The declaration led to British intervention, 
resulting in the Anglo-Irish war and Irish independence in 1921. Ireland was now 
divided, with Ulster remaining part of the UK. 
 
Within Ulster, a significant Catholic population remained, which included 
republicans and former members of the IRA who had participated in the Anglo-Irish 
war. These people maintained the IRA structures. In the period between 1921 and 
the start of The Troubles, this cadre of the IRA engaged in two major actions, the 
Northern Campaign during World War II and the Border Campaign between 1956 
and 1962. Both campaigns failed to achieve any significant outcomes. 
 
The failure of the Border Campaign led to the IRA reviewing its approach. The new 
leadership of the group moved the organisation away from an armed struggle to a 
political one. The environment within the Northern Irish Catholic community had 
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also evolved. There was a newfound confidence, based on the success of the Civil 
Rights movement in the United States, to challenge the existing political system and 
agitate for change. 
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Chapter 11 - The Environment - Northern Ireland prior to The Troubles 
The following is an assessment of the environmental factors, which led to the 
emergence of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 1969. This assessment 
is conducted as a case study, atomising the case using the PESTELO environmental 
model. The PESTELO model defines that environment in terms of the political, 
economic, socio/cultural, technological, ecological, legal, and organisational 
variables within that environment. The use of this model is intended to derive a set 
of variables, which can be directly linked to the emergence of the PIRA. 
Economic Environment 
In addition, the traditional industries in Northern Ireland of linen and shipbuilding 
were in decline. These industries were the main consumers of Protestant skilled and 
unskilled labour. Unemployment in Northern Ireland was double that of Britain, 
even with attempts to entice replacement industries to the state. 
Social Environment 
Since the end of the Second World War, the Northern Irish, Catholics and 
Protestants alike, benefited from the British welfare state. Catholics and Protestants 
received unemployment benefits, which exceeded those paid to individuals in the 
Irish Republic. In addition, the Northern Irish also had better access to education 
than their southern counterparts. There were no laws barring the marriage of 
Protestants or Catholics. Statistically, Catholics were as equally likely to attend 
university as Protestants. 
 
Thus, under British law, Catholics and Protestants were equals. This was not the 
reality of the situation in Northern Ireland. Protestants were more likely to hold 
positions in the Government service. They were more likely to receive the better 
government controlled housing. They were more likely to hold the high paid skilled 
jobs. In areas of Northern Ireland, such as Londonderry (Derry), preferential 
treatment was given to Protestants, but in instances where councils created new 
housing estates in Catholic areas, some of the local Protestants perceived this as a 
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demonstration that the Catholics were receiving favourable treatment, at the 
detriment of Protestants. 
Political Environment 
When assessing the political environment in Northern Ireland, it is necessary to 
address the environment from the perspective of the main groups involved in The 
Troubles. It is not a simple case of viewing the environment as containing two main 
actors. The situation is far more complex, as the environment contained multiple 
actors. The obvious actors are the Unionists and the Republicans, but beyond these 
two main protagonists, there were other actors who also had a vested interest in 
Northern Ireland, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. 
Beyond these were others, who also were able to influence the political 
environment in various ways. The general Northern Irish population, who were not 
overtly Nationalist or Unionist482, and further afield, were the significant Irish 
Catholic diaspora in North America, who were a significant source of financial 
support. 
Nationalist 
By 1962, the IRA was an organisation in transformation. The failure of the Border 
Campaign (Operation Harvest) had led to recrimination within the IRA. Cathal 
Goulding became the Army Council’s new Chief of Staff. Under his leadership and 
against the opposition of the traditionalists within the IRA, he reshaped the 
organisation, moving the IRA away from armed struggle and instead adopting a 
Marxist ideology and engaging in a political struggle to achieve their goals. Goulding 
was not without support. Many members of the IRA who were incarcerated during 
the period of the Border Campaign, also adopted a Marxist ideology.483 This change 
in direction of the IRA was not without opposition, which predominantly came from 
members of the Belfast Brigade.484 
 
482 Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage  (New York: Harper Colins Publisher, 2009), p 287. 
483 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA  (London: Penguin Books, 2007), Kindle Locations 1414-19. 
484 Ibid. 
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In Derry/Londonderry there was far less opposition to the changes in the IRA 
direction. Derry differed from Belfast, as the Nationalists/Catholics were the 
majority within the city. When the IRA split into the Officials and the Provisionals, 
the Nationalists in Derry/Londonderry supported both organisations.485 
Unionist 
The Unionists had maintained control of the Northern Irish Government since 1921. 
Two thirds of the population of Northern Ireland were Protestant and by virtue of 
these numbers, the founding Stormont Government was able to create a 
gerrymander, which guaranteed their ongoing dominance in the Northern Irish 
Parliament.486 In Nationalist strongholds, such as Derry/Londonderry, where the 
population was predominately Catholic, the Unionist had introduced electoral 
reform, which ensured their political ascendency was not assailed.487 In other 
instances, local government was assumed by Stormont, where the Unionists also 
dominated, disenfranchising the local Catholic population.488 
 
Within the Public Service, only 10% of the public servants were Catholic and none 
occupied senior positions. In the Northern Irish Police Force, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, only 11% were Catholic.489 All the judges were Unionist aligned, that 
is, Protestant. As such, the Unionists maintained a firm grip on power and the 
instruments of power.  
  
There was also a change in the Unionist political leadership in Northern Ireland in 
1963, with Terrence O’Neill, a moderate reformist, taking the reins of power at 
Stormont from the Conservative Unionist Lord Basil Brookeborough.490 
 
485 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1927-29. 
486 Burleigh, Blood and Rage: p 287. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid., p 288. 
490 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1384-86. 
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During this period, there were improving relations between Dublin and Belfast, 
leading, in 1965, to a meeting of the Premier of Northern Ireland Terrance O’Neill 
and the Taoiseach Sean Lemass, of the Irish Republic, for the first time since the 
1920s.491 
 
O’Neill’s primary goal was to guarantee the Union. He had hoped by improving the 
economic conditions of the Catholics, they would support the Union and thus 
undermine the Republican movement. He was also well aware the new Labour 
Government in London could be sympathetic to the Nationalist aspirations, if his 
government was not seen to be addressing the divide between Catholics and 
Protestants. Moloney states: 
 
“O’Neill was also aware that there was now a Labour government in London 
that was more likely to listen sympathetically to nationalist complaints of 
discrimination and human rights abuses.” 492 
 
O’Neill also had to frame his reformist policies in a context, which would be seen as 
beneficial to both Catholics and Protestants. Given the Protestants’ distrust of the 
Catholic community, O’Neill contextualised his reforms in a security framework. 
O’Neill claimed, by improving the lot of the Catholics within Northern Ireland, it 
would in turn, undermine the Republican movement and the Catholic Church. 
  
Moloney illustrates this point by quoting a speech once given by O’Neill: 
  
“On one famous occasion he explained his approach in almost racist terms:  
 
It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman 
Catholics a good job and a good house they will live like Protestants 
491 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1404-07. 
492 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1391-92. 
Stuart Groombridge  205 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets. They 
will refuse to have eighteen children but if a Roman Catholic is jobless 
and lives in the most ghastly hovel he will rear eighteen children on 
national assistance…. If you treat Roman Catholics with due 
consideration and kindness they will live like Protestants, in spite of 
the authoritarian nature of the Church.”493 
The Orange Order 
The Orange Order was a body, which exercised significant influence in Unionist 
politics. Founded in 1795, as described on their website: 
 
“In 1795, following the culmination of attacks on Protestants in County 
Armagh at the Battle of the Diamond, in which Protestants routed those who 
had attacked them and attempted to burn properties, it was decided to form 
an organisation which would protect Protestants. This body, drawing on 
existing Orange Clubs in the neighbourhood, was named the Loyal Orange 
Institution.”494 
 
The website further indicates that goal of the order is seen as 
 
“...defending Protestantism is not so literal as it was in 1795, but it requires 
us to take a stand for truth in an age of secularism and in order to defend our 
culture and traditions.”495 
 
The Orange Order opposed home rule wishing to maintain the union with Britain, as 
they believed that this was the only way they would maintain the religious freedom. 
In the Order’s own words:  
 
493 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1395-400. 
494 "About Us - Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland," Grand Orange Lodge, www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/what-is-the-orange-
order. 
495 Ibid. 
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“Our Civil and Religious Liberties we will maintain”.496 
 
To maintain this liberty, the Orders influence in Unionist politics was significant. 
There were very few members of the Stormont parliament on the Unionist side of 
politics that did not belong to an Orange Lodge. Their website documents: 
 
“The vast majority of Unionist M.Ps. during the 51 year period of the 
Stormont Parliament were members of the Orange Order. Of the 95 who 
never received cabinet rank until 1969, 87 (including one woman) were 
members of the Order. The remaining eight were women and three were 
elected for the first time in 1969. Only three members of the cabinet during 
this period were not Orangemen and three others who were left the 
Institution later. Every Stormont senator during the 1921-68 period was an 
Orangeman, except the one woman senator. And of the 56 members of the 
Westminster parliament in the same period, all but two (both women) were 
lodge members. Every Prime Minister of Northern Ireland during the period 
1921-72 was an Orangeman. An estimated 35 of the 60 Unionist members 
returned to the Northern Ireland Assembly in June 1998 were Orange Order 
members. Most of them in the Ulster Unionist Party with a significant 
number in the DUP.”497 
 
The Orange Order acted as a unifying factor in a diverse Unionist community that 
embraced all classes, geographic locations, and Protestant denominations.498 
 
The Order was highly suspicious of the Catholic minority and fearful that the British 
Government would come to a political accommodation with the Irish Free State, 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
498 David; McVea McKittrick, David, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.  (Penguin UK, 
2009), p 6-8. 
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later the Irish Republic, which would result in the reunification of the North and the 
South of Ireland, where the Protestants would be the minority. 
 
Furthermore, to maintain Unionism within Northern Ireland and its union with 
Britain, the Order encouraged its members to join the Security Forces, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). The Order 
maintained a close association in the 1970s, with the second largest Protestant 
paramilitary group, the Orange Volunteers.499 
British  
The British policy in Ireland since the mid-19th Century was disengagement. Prior to 
the First World War, the British had been working towards Irish Home Rule. This 
policy was not universally supported, especially among the Unionists and hard-core 
Nationalists, but resonated amongst the moderate members of the community.  
 
In reaction to this policy of Home Rule, the Unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) in July 1913, to oppose the change in status of Ireland. The Irish 
Republican Brotherhood formed the Irish Volunteers in response to the UVF. Civil 
War was only averted by the outbreak of the First World War, when home rule was 
placed in abeyance until the cessation of hostilities. In general, there was broad 
support for the war amongst constitutional Nationalists. This created a split in the 
Irish Volunteers. The majority, who supported the British war effort, formed the 
National Volunteers and the minority remained with the Irish Volunteers. In this 
group lay the cadre of the Easter Uprising of 1916.  
 
The British response to the Easter Uprising, created a tipping point. In the aftermath 
of the rising, 90 people were sentenced to death, of which, 15 were eventually 
executed. These executions created a shift in Nationalist opinion. Combined with 
499 "Orange Volunteers," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/oorgan.htm#ov. 
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the conscription crisis in 1918500 many moderate Nationalists shifted their political 
aspirations from home rule to independence.  
 
After partition, although maintaining the right under legislation, the Ireland Act, to 
intervene in Northern Irish politics, Westminster refused to interfere in the 
Stormont Parliament in Belfast, permitting the Unionist Government to rule 
Northern Ireland unhindered. The British Governments had a policy of keeping 
Northern Ireland “...at arm’s length”.501 Throughout the 1920s and beyond, the 
British government was reluctant to interfere in Northern Ireland. When 
approached by Northern Ireland Nationalists with complaints about the 
discriminatory policies of the Unionist Government, the British Government 
maintained its “…arm’s length” approach and would refer the matter back to the 
Unionist control Parliament at Stormont.502 
Legal environment 
The Special Act, also known as the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1922, was one of the key tools, which the Northern Irish Government had 
used against the IRA during the Border Campaign of 1956-1962. It was a harsh piece 
of legislation which: 
 
“...gave the authorities exceptional powers to arrest, detain without trial, 
and suppress political dissent. So severe were its penalties, which included 
the death penalty for some firearms offenses, flogging, and the confiscation 
and destruction of property, that a South African prime minister during the 
500 During the First World War Ireland had been exempt from conscription, service with the British Army had been voluntary 
for Irish Catholics and Protestants. In 1918, the British Army was suffering from a serve shortage of manpower, and 
conscription was one of the elements voted in Westminster to help address this problem. The passing of this act caused 
unrest in both Catholic and Protestant communities in Ireland and became known as the Conscription Crisis.  
Source : Keith Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War  (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 4-7. 
501 McKittrick, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.: p 2. 
502 Ibid., p 6-10. 
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apartheid era once famously remarked that he would swap all his emergency 
laws for one clause of the SPA.”503 
 
The Act was intended for use in times of emergency in Northern Ireland and was 
primarily used as a tool to circumvent the activities of the IRA. It was also used in a 
proactive manner, predominantly against the Republicans/Catholics. In 1951, 
Republican politicians were imprisoned just prior to the Royal visit to Northern 
Ireland504 and it was again used in the “...1967 banning of the Republican Clubs when 
they appeared to have been engaged in legitimate political activities”.505 
 
The Catholics of Northern Ireland also distrusted the Northern Irish judicial system. 
There was a perception the judges and magistrates were political appointments, 
with a significant imbalance between Catholic and Protestants holding these 
positions.506 In addition, this distrust was further reinforced by the property 
requirement for jurors and the restriction on challenging jurors, which meant the 
juries were predominately composed of Protestants.507 
 
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), when it was originally formed in 1921, was 
intended to be non-sectarian and representative of the population of Northern 
Ireland. One third of the positions in the RUC were reserved for Catholics.508 This 
goal was never achieved; at best, only about 20% of the force was ever Catholic, but 
typically, only about 10% of the force was Catholic.509 There were many reasons for 
the under representation of Catholics in the RUC. Firstly, there was the perception 
that the RUC was an instrument of the Stormont Unionist Government, reporting 
503  Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1083-86.         
504 Andrew Hamilton, "'Discrimination and the Administration of Justice' from 'Perspectives on Discrimination and Social Work 




508 McKittrick, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict. 
509 Burleigh, Blood and Rage: p 288. 
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directly to the minister and carrying out the will of the parliament.510 Secondly, the 
RUC, unlike other police forces in the UK, had a paramilitary role. They were 
involved in the suppressing of the IRA and dissenting republicans on behalf of the 
Unionist government, through the enforcement of the Special Powers Act. 511 
Thirdly, the association of the RUC with the Orange Order did not motivate 
Catholics.512 Fourthly, Republican groups also intimidated any potential Catholic 
recruits. All these factors discouraged Catholics from joining the RUC. 
 
In addition, the RUC maintained a reserve force known as the B Specials, which 
were particularly despised by Catholics. The CAIN Website describes the role of the 
B Specials, as being: 
 
“...given the task of combating potential subversion of the state, they were 
recruited as an exclusively Protestant paramilitary force. There were open 
ties between the B Specials the Orange Order and also with illegal Protestant 
paramilitary forces such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Many members 
of the B Specials were also members in the latter forces, and the units of the 
B Specials often used Orange Order lodges for training exercises and practice 
drills... The B Specials engaged in activities such as manning roadblocks and 
protecting selected installations during times of suspected IRA activity. Due 
to the large number of Protestant extremists in their ranks, the B Specials 
gained notoriety for their use of violence in the execution of their duties; 
offences included beatings, harassment, and body searches of Catholics at 
checkpoints. Some of the victims were known to the B Specials as 
neighbours, but were nonetheless subjected to harsh treatments, unlike 
Protestants who were merely waived through... The B Specials came to be 
universally loathed by the Catholic community as a tool of Protestant 
510 McKittrick, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict.: p 11. 
511 Hamilton, "'Discrimination and the Administration of Justice' from 'Perspectives on Discrimination and Social Work in 
Northern Ireland". 
512 Ibid. 
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repression and intimidation as a result of these and other well-published 
incidents.”513 
Other Actors in the environment 
Ian Paisley 
Ian Paisley was a unique actor in Northern Ireland Politics. He was the Moderator of 
the Free Presbyterian Church.514 Paisley held, and continues to maintain, 
fundamentalist Protestant religious views, which include staunch anti-Catholic 
beliefs. These beliefs are stated on Paisley’s website:  
 
“...The Institute is part of the ministry of Martyrs' Memorial Church. Its 
purpose is to expound the Bible and expose the Papacy and to promote, 
defend and maintain Bible Protestantism in Europe and further afield. It will 
assist all who are engaged in the struggle against the Papacy in both the 
religious and the secular worlds; provide courses suitable to all ages in the 
controversy with Rome; and supply information on all aspects of the Papacy 
today...”515 
 
Cain Web services describe Paisley in the 1960s: 
 
“... as a vociferous opponent of the unionist political establishment accusing 
it of seeking to betray the interests of Northern Ireland Protestants by 
seeking to reach an accommodation with Irish nationalism.”516 
  
Paisley was an outspoken sceptic and critic of O’Neill’s attempts to modernise and 
reform Northern Ireland. In particular, he opposed O’Neill’s meeting with the Irish 
513 Landon Hancock, "Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing," University of Ulster, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm. 
514 Brendan Lynn, "Biographies of Prominent People - 'P'," University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/people/biography/ppeople.htm#paisleyi  
515 "About the European Institute of Protestant Studies (EIPS)," European Institute of Protestant Studies, 
http://www.ianpaisley.org/about.asp  
516 ———, "Biographies of Prominent People - 'P'". 
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Republics Taoiseach Sean Lemass. In addition, Paisley also opposed the Civil rights 
marches, organising counter marches, which in most instances, erupted in violence. 
These Counter demonstrations further destabilised Northern Ireland. 
Northern Ireland’s Civil Movement 
The Northern Irish Catholics benefited from the 1947 education reforms, which 
provided greater access to higher education. By the 1960s, these benefits had 
provided Northern Ireland, a pool of well-educated middle class Catholics who were 
willing to challenge the status quo and seek reforms within Northern Ireland, for the 
Catholic minority through the legitimate democratic practices. These individuals 
were further inspired to take civil action when the Conservative Party in 
Westminster, was replaced by a Labour Government of Harold Wilson. They also 
had received further hope that civil action would gain success when they observed 
what gains the Civil rights movement in the United States had achieved.517 
 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) emerged from a group known 
as The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, whose stated goal was: 
 
“The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland was inaugurated on 
17th January, 1964, for the purpose of bringing the light of publicity to bear 
on the discrimination which exists in our community against the Catholic 
section of that community representing more than one-third of the total 
population.”518 
 
In mid-1964, the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee 
engaged in correspondence with the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Sir Alec 
Douglas, and the Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to address religious discrimination 
in Northern Ireland. Their campaign was unsuccessful. Both the Minister and the 
Prime Minister used the same tactic, as many British governments had done since 
517 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations1483-588. 
518 "Northern Ireland - Why justice cannot be done.,"  in Cain Web Services, ed. Northern Ireland The Campaign for Social 
Justice in Northern Ireland (Londonderry: University of Ulster, 1962). 
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1921, by distancing themselves and indicating that the matter was an issue for the 
Stormont Parliament in Northern Ireland. 
 
Thus, in the concluding statement of a pamphlet published by The Campaign for 
Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee, they stated: 
 
“To sum up, therefore, we have established with Sir Alec Douglas Home that: 
 
(1) The Parliament of the United Kingdom has the ultimate responsibility for 
discrimination in Northern Ireland, but the Prime Minister is unwilling to 
ask Parliament to intervene. 
(2) Despite the fact that the British Prime Minister told us that allegations of 
discrimination could be dealt with by law, he is now either unable or 
unwilling to let us know how this can be done. 
 
We are left wondering if Sir Alec spoke in error, or if in fact he has no real 
interest in the problem of the minority and the facts of religious discrimination in 
Northern Ireland.” 519 
  
The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, in a series of pamphlets, 
highlighted the discrimination against Catholics in housing, jobs in the public and, 
private sectors, voting, business and in the law. When The Troubles erupted in 
1969, they continued their work by publishing alleged brutalities committed by the 
British Armed Forces and the RUC. 
 
The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland Committee attempted to bring 
to light the plight of the Catholics through letter writing, publication of pamphlets 
and newsletters. Although they did not have any real success with the politicians, 
they did inspire other groups. One group to emerge out of The Campaign for Social 
519 Ibid. 
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Justice was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed in 1967 in 
Belfast. NICRA was a loose coalition of various groups of middle class Catholics, 
students, and Unionists, Nationalists, moderates, and radicals. For a short time, 
there were a small number of Protestants involved, but most withdrew after the 
street marches became violent in 1968.520 
 
NICRA’s manifesto includes some key reforms or demands:521 
 
(1) One-man one vote, under the current system, a high percentage of Catholics 
had no vote, where some Unionists had up to six votes. 
(2) Scrapping of the Gerrymander system, which gave Unionists control, even 
when there was a majority of Catholics. 
(3) A points list for public housing to ensure a fairer allocation of public housing. 
There were many instances where single Protestants were given public 
housing over Catholic families. 
(4) The disbandment of the RUC’s Ulster Special Constabulary or B Specials. 
(5) Removal from legislation the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern 
Ireland), 1922 
 
NICRA avoided the contentious issue of creating one Ireland.522 
Events leading to The Troubles 
Within this environment in the 1960s, the Catholics of Northern Ireland were now 
more willing to engage in direct action to achieve equality. With this increasing 
willingness, also came escalating violence by the Protestant dominated government 
and other sectarian groups. 
 
520 Aaron Edwards, The Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Banner 1969–2007, Essential Histories (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2011), Kindle Locations 47-50. 
521 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1592 - 97. 
522 Martin Melaugh, "Abstracts on Organisations - 'N'," University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/norgan.htm#nicra. 
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The first of many instances of violence between Republicans and Unionists occurred 
in October 1964. Paisley and Unionist groups marched into the predominantly 
Catholic area of Belfast, to remove an Irish tricolour flag from the headquarters on 
Davis Street, of the Sinn Fein candidate in the up and coming Westminster election. 
To circumvent violence between the Paisleyites and the Republicans of the area, 
the RUC took control of the situation and removed the flag. Their actions resulted in 
2 days of rioting in the Lower Falls Road area of Belfast; neither the Catholic nor the 
Protestant communities in Northern Ireland saw this outcome as positive. 
 
The UVF conducted its first attack in 1966. The plan was to seek out the IRA 
leadership, but resulted in the death of three ordinary Catholics. The UVF had 
feared that the IRA would conduct an operation on the 50th Anniversary of the 1916 
Easter uprising by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. In June 1966, Paisley brought a 
group of supporters, en-route to a protest at the centre of Belfast, to protest 
against ecumenical Protestants. Paisley, in a provocative act, marched his group 
through a Nationalist market area.  
 
By 1966, there was an increasing willingness and confidence within the Catholic 
community, to work with the state to achieve the reforms, to improve the 
conditions for Catholics. There were reservations within the Catholic community 
that O’Neill’s reforms were moving too slowly. In addition, there were also 
reservations among Unionists that O’Neill’s reforms were undermining the 
Protestant community, removing the privileges they had historically enjoyed. The 
formation of the UVF in 1965 was an indicator of the growing protestant concern. 
These concerns were also voiced by Paisley in his speeches, and the Protestant 
community’s direct involvement in street marches. 
 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1968 conducted its first 
protest, staging a sit-in at a council house in county Tyrone, which had been 
allocated to an unmarried protestant female, over a Catholic family. The NICRA's 
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next protest took place in Derry/Londonderry. It was intended to highlight the poor 
housing conditions of Catholics, in a city in which they were the majority, but ruled 
by Unionists. The march was poorly attended, but gained public attention when the 
RUC blocked the protestors and dispersed the crowd, using water cannons and 
batons. The events that unfolded were captured on film and broadcast around the 
world.523 
 
The NICRA attempted a second time, to march into Derry/Londonderry in 
November of the same year. This time the march attracted around 15,000 
protestors, the outnumbered RUC let the protestors proceed. The NICRA’s march 
concerned O’Neill, Paisley and his supporters, and the British Government in 
Westminster. The British Government placed O’Neill under pressure to address the 
Nationalist demands.524 O’Neill asked the NICRA to refrain from further protests, 
which they did, so that he would be given time to address their concerns.  
 
The civil rights movement was not a united or centralised group. It was a loose 
affiliation, of a variety of groups, all with similar and varying agendas. One of these 
groups from Queens University, The People’s Democracy, mistrusted O’Neill and his 
agenda and planned an independent march in early January 1969, between Belfast 
and Derry/Londonderry. The marchers planned a route through predominately-
Unionist areas. Paisley’s supporters met the protestors at the outskirts of 
Derry/Londonderry stoning and fighting them.525 As a result, riots broke out 
between Catholics and the RUC in the Bogside, a Catholic enclave of Derry. 
  
In March 1969, the UVF exploded bombs at a Belfast Electrical Substation, which 
the UVF hoped would be blamed on the IRA. The culminating pressures from Paisley 
who questioned O’Neill’s leadership, the escalating violence in the streets and the 
523 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1611-15. 
524 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1634-36. 
525 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1639-42. 
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resignation of many of O’Neill supporters, left O’Neill with no options and he 
resigned in April 1969. James Chichester-Clark replaced O’Neill on 1st May 1969. 
 
The initial enthusiasm of the early 1960s was replaced by escalating radicalisation of 
both Northern Irish communities, the Republicans and the Unionists. Each blamed 
the other for the current events. The situation deteriorated from this point. In July, 
Protestant vigilante groups were formed in Belfast, to “defend Protestants”. Violent 
clashes between Protestants and Catholics became commonplace, with some 
Catholics being evicted from their homes. 
 
On 12 August in Derry/Londonderry the annual Apprentice Boys Parade, which 
traditionally marched past Catholic areas, triggered rioting in the Bogside, 
Derry/Londonderry between Catholics and Protestants. The RUC attempted to 
disperse the rioters with water cannons and CS gas. The RUC actions triggered two 
days of rioting, which became known as, “The Battle of the Bogside”.526 
 
By 13 August, the Bogside riots in Derry/Londonderry caused rioting in other areas 
of Northern Ireland. The RUC was hard pressed to control the situation and the B 
Specials were mobilised. The Irish Government had been following the situation and 
threatened to intervene in defence of the Nationalists.527 The RUC, in an attempt to 
maintain control, placed armoured vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns, on 
the streets of Belfast.528 By 14th August, the RUC was exhausted and the Stormont 
government was forced, by the deteriorating situation, to request help from the 
British Army. The local British Military forces, in Northern Ireland, were deployed to 
526 Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1969," University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch69.htm. 
527 The invasion of Northern Ireland by the Irish Republic was given serious consideration by the Irish Government. Invasion 
plans were drawn up. In 1969, the Irish did not possess the troops, the equipment, or air support to intervene in Northern 
Ireland. 
Source: "If the Irish army had entered the North in 1969… the difference between an invasion and an incursion," The Cedar 
Lounge Revolution,  
http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/if-the-irish-army-had-entered-the-north-in-1969/. 
528 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1691-94. 
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the streets on the same day. Serious battles continued on 15th August in Belfast, 
between Catholics, the RUC, and Loyalists. Many Catholics, living in predominantly 
Protestant areas, had their houses set either alight, or were forced to leave their 
homes. The British army was forced to erect physical barriers between the two 
communities, known as the peace lines, to keep the two warring factions apart. 
Many Catholics, who left their homes in other parts of Belfast, took refuge in West 
Belfast. A smaller number of Protestants were also displaced by the 2 days of civil 
unrest, finding refuge in protestant dominated areas of Belfast. 
 
The toll of the civil unrest amounted to eight dead (2 Protestants and 6 Catholics) 
and many more injured.529 Between 14 July and the end of 1969, 10 Catholics and 8 
Protestants were killed in Northern Ireland.530 During this period, the depleted 
membership of the IRA was unable to intervene on any large scale. In Belfast, the 
IRA deployed its depleted membership to defend Catholics, but their efforts were 
ineffectual. In Derry/Londonderry, activists and members of the IRA were involved 
in forming and organising the Derry Citizens Defence Association (DCDA), which 
would play a dominant role in the Battle for the Bogside. 
Radicalisation 
Those who founded the PIRA in 1969 had a long personal or family history of 
involvement in the IRA or republicanism. The events of 1968 and 1969 had not 
radicalised these individuals, as they already held radical ideations. The inability of 
the leadership to defend the Catholics of Belfast, led to a loss of confidence in them, 
by leading members of the IRA in Belfast. This loss of confidence, led to them 
establishing a rival leadership cadre, which would emerge as the PIRA. 
 
The events of 1968 and 1969 also acted as a catalyst for the radicalisation of the 
individuals and communities. As previously discussed, radicalisation is not a process 
529 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1695-96. 
530 Malcom Sutton, "Malcolm Suttons An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland " University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1969.html  
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that occurs instantaneously. It occurs over time, based on an accumulation of 
events and personal experience, which each individual interprets differently. The 
events surrounding the Civil Rights Marches in 1968 and early 1969 in 
Derry/Londonderry, had led to the formation of the DCDA in that city.531 The DCDA 
was an organisation with very limited structure532, but had significant public support 
when the Battle for the Bogside started in August 1969. The radicalising factor was 
the perception within the community that they were under siege from the state. As 
such, only they could protect themselves as no one else would. 
 
The radicalising factor in Belfast was the displacement and burning of Catholic 
homes by Protestants in the riots, which engulfed their community, as a result of 
the Battle of the Bogside. Again, like Derry/Londonderry, they felt the state was 
incapable or unwilling to protect them. As such, only they could protect themselves, 
as no one else would. 
 
These events shifted personal perceptions and created a situation where individuals 
shifted on the radicalisation scale. Not everyone was affected the same way as the 
documentary of the Battle of Bogside533 highlighted. This documentary illustrated 
the different roles, members of the community undertook.  
 
1. There were the organisers who coordinated the defence of the Bogside, 
2. The young were typically, but not exclusively, on the frontline fighting the 
RUC,  
3. Others were involved in sourcing supplies, such as stones and petrol bombs,  
4. Others were involved in the manufacture of weapons,  
5. Others built barricades, 
6. Some gave medical and first aid treatment to the injured,  
531 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Location 7594. 
532 Vinny Cunningham, "Battle of the Bogside," (United Kingdom and Republic Ireland: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
Bórd Scannán na hÉireann, Northern Ireland Film and Television Commission See more 2004). 
533 Ibid., Kindle Locations 7592-98. 
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7. Some opened their homes to the rioters, giving them somewhere to sleep,  
8. Others fed the rioters and, 
9. Others just left the community for somewhere safer.  
 
Thus, there was broad scale involvement within the community in its defence. 
Although the Catholic community was radicalised by these events, it was in the 
defence of their communities against the RUC and Protestants, as the IRA was non-
existent at this time. The Catholics of Derry/Londonderry and Belfast welcomed the 
British Army on the streets, as it ended the violence.534 
 
The Catholic community were not radicalised by a failed nationalistic aspiration for 
Irish unity. It was radicalised by the State’s inability or unwillingness to protect them 
against sectarian violence. As such, they had to defend themselves. Not all those 
affected engaged in violent acts, many acted in support and ancillary roles. This 
suggests radicalisation is a graduated scale. The Protestant community was 
radicalised by a fear they were going to lose their privileged position within 
Northern Ireland and would have to share power with Catholics. They further 
feared that if the republicans were to win and achieve the reunification of Ireland, 
they would become a minority in a predominately-Catholic nation. 
Organisational Environment - The Emergence of the Provisional IRA 
As the events of July-August 1969, unfolded and violence swept the two major cities 
in Northern Ireland (Derry/Londonderry and Belfast); the IRA was not in possession 
of the manpower or the equipment to intervene in any significant manner.535 The 
local Catholic communities defended their own streets. They erected barricades to 
prevent Loyalist/Protestant incursions. In the absence of the IRA, they had set up 
their own defence committees to patrol and defend the streets of their 
534 Peter Taylor, "Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein Episode 1," in Provos (United Kingdom: British Broadcasting Commission 
(BBC), 1997). 
535 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1746-50. 
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community.536 Former Belfast IRA men blamed Goulding for depleting the IRA’s 
operational capacity, leaving Catholics defenceless.537 
 
The events of July and August lay bare the divisions within the IRA as Moloney 
wrote:   
 
“Goulding and his allies ignored dangerous signals from Belfast. In late 
August a group of former IRA men, people who had long disagreed with the 
leadership and had either left or been expelled, met in the New Lodge Road 
district of the city to decide what they should do about the Belfast leader 
ship of the IRA then in the control of a Goulding loyalist, Billy McMillen. They 
were angry about McMillen’s failure to organize the August defense and 
they blamed Goulding for the Catholic deaths”538 
 
This meeting resulted in another meeting between former IRA men and the 
leadership of the Belfast Brigade. Moloney again describes the events: 
 
“The old guard resolved to oust McMillen, and in September its opportunity 
came when McMillen called a meeting of IRA commanders in the Lower Falls 
Road area. Armed men led by Billy McKee were sent to demand his 
resignation. McMillen refused, and after heated arguments a compromise 
was hammered out. The Belfast IRA would withdraw from Dublin control for 
three months, McMillen would add some of McKee’s men to his operational 
staff, and weapons would be sought. If Goulding had not abandoned his 
strategy by the three-month deadline, McMillen would be replaced and 
Belfast would be run by a separate Northern Command. Meanwhile the 
536 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1672-75. 
537 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1746-50. 
538 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1751-54. 
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Belfast units would play no part in the coming debate about abstentionism, 
effectively opting out of it.”539 
 
The battle lines were now drawn between the leadership of the IRA and the 
dissenters. Goulding had called an IRA convention for December to ratify his 
political approach and seek approval for the IRA and Sinn Fein to abandon 
abstentionism, which had been a long-standing policy of the IRA since partition. 
Moloney again describes the events: 
 
“An IRA Convention was called for December, and Goulding prepared well for 
it, ensuring that this time a majority of the delegates would be in his camp. 
They were, by a majority of thirty-nine to twelve. The anti-Goulding faction 
walked out and, with MacStiofain as its leader and new chief of staff, elected 
a caretaker IRA Executive and Army Council that would be loyal to the 
traditional principles and doctrines of republicanism 
 
The new dissident IRA bodies were interim and temporary; the Executive and 
Army Council could be ratified only by a General IRA Convention, which was 
not scheduled to meet until September of the following year. But until then 
they would represent the new group. News of the split and the formation of 
the rival IRA was leaked to the press by Goulding’s people in late December 
1969, and in a statement confirming the story the new group claimed that 
already a majority of IRA units had sworn allegiance to the Provisional Army 
Council and Executive of the IRA...”540 
 
The Provisional IRA was born, although at this time, it was predominately a Belfast 
based organisation. 
  
539 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1756-61. 
540 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1777-84. 
Stuart Groombridge  223 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
Chapter 12 - Analysis 
Does the PIRA meet the criteria to be described as a Terrorist group? 
The PIRA meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The PIRA: 
1. Used violence or threat of violence. The PIRA engaged in an extensive 
bombing campaign and killings between 1969 and 1998. 
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned. All targets selected by the 
PIRA had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression by the 
British and Northern Irish governments. The targets selected, included non-
combatants military personnel, law enforcement, government agencies, 
banks and other businesses, which the PIRA claimed, were involved in 
repression of Republicans and Catholics. 
3. Aims were political. The PIRA was a Nationalist/Separatist group who 
aspired to reunify Ireland. 
4. Selected targets, which were civilian, or non-combatants. As previously 
indicated, the group bombed establishments where Protestants gathered, 
such as pubs, law enforcement, government agencies, banks, and other 
businesses. The PIRA also carried out bombing and mortar attacks in the 
United Kingdom. 
5. Violence was selected to draw the public’s attention to the group’s cause.  
6. The PIRA intended for the violence to evoke a reaction. The PIRA’s use of 
violence was designed to intimidate the Protestant opponents and 
persuade the British to depart Northern Ireland.  
Category of Terrorist Group 
The PIRA is categorised within this dissertation as a Nationalist/Separatist group. It 
was a group, who supported the separation of Northern Ireland from the United 
Kingdom and a union with the Irish Republic, which is consistent with the MIPT 
definition.541 The PIRA was a Republican organisation who wanted to reunite the six 
counties of Northern Ireland with Irish Republic. 
541 http://www.mipt.org/. 
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H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The emergence of the PIRA resulted from a number of environmental factors 
described by the PESTELO542 model. Many of these variables are intertwined and 
overlap. For example, political conditions can affect economic conditions and vice 
versa.  
 
Politically, Northern Ireland was a divided community, where political power 
resided with the Protestant majority. It was a state, which has a significant minor 
religion-ethnic group who, were effectively, politically disenfranchised. Since the 
foundation of the province in 1921, the Protestant community felt uncertain of the 
willingness of Westminster to maintain the union. In addition, in Northern Ireland’s 
short history there had been a long-standing enmity between the two communities 
(Nationalist and Unionists), which lived side by side. It was also a climate where the 
British government in Westminster adopted a “hands off” approach, effectively 
allowing the Protestants a free hand in the government of Northern Ireland with 
minimal interference. 
 
One of the perturbations within this environment was the change in political 
leadership in the governing Ulster Unionist Party. This new leader came to the role 
with a reformist agenda. His goal was to ensure the economic and political survival 
of the union, by engaging with the Catholics of Northern Ireland and through a raft 
of proposed reforms; he hoped to create a more inclusive society. Unionists did not 
universally support these reforms, and were opposed by the traditionalists within 
the Unionist community. In addition, Catholics and Nationalists also treated these 
reforms with varying levels of enthusiasm and scepticism alike.  
 
542 PESTELO is a model, which describes the environment in terms of the political, economic, socio-cultural, technology, 
ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables. 
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Politically, Northern Ireland had other actors who exercised significant influence 
over the political environment. Within the Unionist ranks, there was the Orange 
Order, whose members permeated the unionist political parties. The Orange Order 
strongly espoused the dominance of Protestantism and the continuing union with 
Britain. Furthermore, the influential Presbyterian preacher, Ian Paisley built a 
following in the 1960s with his staunch anti-Catholic rhetoric and opposing the 
reunification with the Irish Republic. In the 1960s, Ian Paisley was not part of the 
political unionist establishment, but through his charismatic personality, was able to 
frame his message in such a manner that it resonated with the working class 
Protestants. His message voiced the concerns and reservations of parts of the 
unionist community, to the proposed reforms. Thus, he was able to influence 
events beyond that of an ordinary Protestant. 
 
A third factor in the political environment was the shift by the IRA away from force 
of arms as their primary method to achieve their goal of reunification, substituting 
armed struggle with political agitation. In conjunction with this shift by the IRA, 
there was a growing Catholic and Nationalist Civil Rights movement within Northern 
Ireland, which were inspired by the successes of the Civil Rights movement in North 
America. This growing movement in Northern Ireland was a mix of various groups 
who shared similar agendas and goals. The improving education standards of 
Catholics, since the Second World War, had created a stratum in the Catholic 
community, which was confident in their ability to take action and create change, 
through “direct action”. 
 
In the 1960s, Northern Ireland was declining economically, traditional industries 
were closing, and the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was twice that of 
Britain. The new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland was attempting to counteract 
this decline, by attracting new industries and part of the strategy involved, was the 
reform of the social environment, attempting to create a more inclusive society by 
engaging the Catholics. The effects of the decline in the economic situation in 
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Northern Ireland did not only affect the Catholic community, but also the Protestant 
community, who also formed part of the ranks of the unemployed. 
 
Socio-culturally, there had been a long history of discrimination against the 
Catholics, in education, employment, housing, and within the legal system. 
Protestants received preferential treatment in the allocation of housing. The skilled 
jobs and civil service jobs were more likely to be occupied by Protestants. The 
statistics of who occupied these jobs, did not equate to the demographics of the 
two cultural groups.  
 
Within the legal institutions, the Catholic community was under- represented in the 
Police Force and the legal system as judges, magistrates, and jurors. In addition, the 
Catholic/Nationalist community, perceived the Special Powers Act as a method used 
by the Protestants to limit the political descent of the Catholic community. 
 
The organisational environment of the IRA was in a state of flux. Recriminations 
from the failed Border Campaign, led to a change in leadership within the IRA and a 
new direction for the group that was not universally supported by a significant 
portion of its membership. Goulding was only able to push through his agenda by 
purging his opponents from the IRA and replacing traditionalists with his 
supporters.543 Many, who were purged, were later to have a role in the formation of 
the PIRA. The result of this process was the IRA adopting a Marxist political ideology 
and preferring political agitation, rather than armed struggle. The leadership of the 
IRA chose this change at a time when political agitation had reaped benefits for the 
Civil Rights Movement in the United States.  
 
The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland, although it was inspired by the 
successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the promises of 
reform by the new leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party at Stormont, was 
543 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1525-31. 
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operating in a different environmental context. Northern Ireland was not the United 
States. The United States was a democratic society with two competing political 
parties, who could create balance within the society. They acted as safety valves for 
the various social, economic, and political stresses of the society. That is, one party 
could be removed from power by the electorate and replaced by the other, if they 
were perceived by the electorate not to be meeting the needs of the society as a 
whole. The Civil Rights Movement and Civil Rights Bill that were passed in 1964 in 
the United States had broad support within both political parties and the majority 
of voters in the Northern States. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement did 
not engender this level of support within the Protestant majority, or their political 
representatives. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there was only one ruling elite, the Ulster Unionist Party, which 
had held power since the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921. The dominance of 
this party in government was the political weakness of the state. The party 
represented all Unionists, whether Conservative/Traditionalist or Liberal/Reformist. 
The party was all encompassing representing the Protestant elite, workers, the 
poor, and a small minority of Catholic Unionists. Northern Ireland was a democratic 
state in name only. The Unionists effectively disenfranchised a third of the potential 
voters. As such, it was effectively a one party semi democratic state. 
 
There was no effective opposition, no alternative government, which could 
represent alternative views. The British Government’s disinterest in Northern 
Ireland also contributed to the problem, by closing off a potential conduit by which 
grievances could be addressed. There was no political safety valve, where the 
people of Northern Ireland could express their displeasure with the current ruling 
party.  
 
The violence of August 1969 and the failure of the RUC to act impartially and 
restore order, led to a radicalisation of the two communities, with each community 
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engaging in retaliation reprisals against each other. Catholics were dispossessed of 
their homes in predominantly Protestant areas and likewise Protestants in Catholic 
areas. In Northern Ireland, places like Belfast became polarised communities, 
because the state had failed to protect them. The communities organised their own 
defences. In this environment, the IRA was not to be seen on the streets, which 
vindicated the traditionalist view that the armed struggle was the only legitimate 
course of action and reinforced their belief that the political approach had nothing 
to offer. 
 
By 1969, the IRA was a divided organisation. Under Goulding’s leadership, the IRA 
had moved to the left and had abandoned the armed struggle, adopting a broad 
political approach to achieve its goals. These changes had emerged from the failure 
of the Border Campaign (1956-1962) and the lack of support the IRA received from 
its Catholic constituents. Moloney indicated as the events of 1969 unfolded, rather 
than preparing for the defence of Catholic enclaves in Belfast and elsewhere, the 
leadership was devoting its resources into the up and coming battle with the 
traditionalists at the December IRA Convention.544 As the sectarian violence 
increased, and the new guard in the IRA failed to act, the rift between the 
traditionalists and the new guard widened and deepened. The Belfast Brigade 
members were the most outspoken opponents of Goulding’s reforms. Goulding’s 
failure to recognise the changing environment and the deterioration of events, 
especially in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry and adapt his tactics, created a 
situation where traditionalists within the IRA, felt they were forced to act. Thus, at 
the December conference, they walked out and by the end of the year the majority 
of companies in the Belfast Brigade, had aligned themselves with the Provisional 
IRA.545 The new organisation did not view itself as a splinter group, it perceived itself 
as a continuation of the IRA. The dissenters viewed the organisation as provisional 
544 Ibid., p 50. 
545 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1777-80. 
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and their role as caretakers of the IRA traditions until they could obtain ratification 
by the General IRA Convention scheduled for September 1970.546 
 
Thus, the provisional IRA emerged from perturbations in the political, economic, 
and social environments of the PESTELO model. These perturbations were a result 
of increasing sectarian violence between 1966 and 1969. These factors had 
significant influence on the organisational variable of the PESTELO model. The IRA 
had always viewed itself as the defenders of the Catholic communities within 
Northern Ireland. The events of August 1969 in Belfast created tension within the 
IRA. With Goulding’s abandonment of the armed struggle for a political struggle 
based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the IRA no longer possessed the weapons to 
undertake the defence of Catholic communities within Northern Ireland.   
 
Although, in homophyllic terms, the two factions within the IRA shared the same 
aspiration of a united Ireland, they differed, in homophyllic terms, as to the best 
mechanism to achieve this goal. The Belfast faction had concluded, based on the 
recent outbreak of sectarian violence, the political approach had been discredited. 
They had concluded the armed struggle was the only legitimate mechanism, which 
would allow the IRA to achieve its goal or aspiration. The perturbations in the 
political, economic, and social environments, especially those in Belfast, discredited 
the political approach. Many of the members of the Belfast faction had never 
viewed the political approach as a viable option. They felt the current events had 
vindicated their stance. 
 
Thus, the split in the IRA was heavily influenced by the events (perturbations) in the 
PESTELO environment. The origins of the split resided in the differing beliefs on how 
the organisational aspirations could best be achieved. These aspirations included 
the defence of Catholic communities in the current environment of sectarian 
violence and a united Ireland. In addition, there were fundamental issues, regarding 
546 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1781-82. 
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Goulding’s leadership of the IRA, that caused discontent, which included “…his 
recognition of the Irish and British parliaments; the move to embrace extreme 
socialism; illegal internal disciplinary methods; the failure to defend Belfast; and the 
policy of defending the Northern parliament at Stormont.”547 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
Throughout most of the history of the IRA, the members of the Irish Republic 
dominated the Army Council. This did not change after the failed Border Campaign. 
The new leader of the Army Council, Goulding, a southerner, had set out to evolve 
the IRA into a revolutionary movement, which would engage in constitutional 
politics, subordinating the armed struggle. Moloney also noted  
 
“Goulding and his allies resorted increasingly to the tactic of purging their 
enemies. Senior Northern IRA figures were forced out or left in disgust at the 
tactics being used against their friends. Among them were men who would 
play key roles in the formation of the rival Provisional IRA a few years later, 
characters like Jimmy Steele, who had spent twenty years in jail for IRA 
activity, and Sean Keenan from Derry, a republican stalwart for years. With 
other Belfast men who had left or were eased out during this period—people 
like Joe Cahill, Jimmy Drumm, Billy McKee, the Kellys of North Belfast, the 
Hannaways, and Seamus Twomey—they were to form the core of a bitter 
opposition just biding their time to strike back at Goulding.”548 
 
The situation deteriorated in Northern Ireland, especially Belfast in August 1969. 
Other leading members of the IRA Army Council, such as Sean MacStiofain, Ruairi O 
Bradaigh, John Joe McGirl, and one other opposed Goulding.549 Not only did 
MacStiofain opposed these fundamental changes to the IRA ideology; he also 
547 Ibid., Kindle Location 1906. 
548 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1538-43. 
549 Ibid., Kindle Location 1776. 
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cultivated support within the leadership of Belfast IRA, who were on the frontline in 
the upsurge of sectarian violence. They were not only opposed to the abandonment 
of the armed struggle, but they also opposed other features of Goulding’s reform of 
the IRA. They were also very uncomfortable with the “extreme socialism” being 
adopted by the Goulding camp, as they believed the goal was to create a Marxist 
dictatorship, which would not benefit the Irish Nationalist cause.550 To the men who 
were to form the PIRA, they had joined the IRA to fight British oppression by force 
of arms, not to fight class oppression through revolution.551 In the case of the IRA 
men in Belfast, the political ideology was the least of their concerns. The events of 
August had demonstrated the IRA had failed in its key role, to defend the Catholic 
population in the city, and they laid the blame for this soundly at the feet of the 
Army Council. The IRA in Northern Ireland at this time was a denuded organisation; 
it had few volunteers and very few arms to conduct any reasonable defence of the 
Catholic population. The Northerners blamed the Southerners for being out of step 
with the unfolding events in the North and as such, saw the Southern based General 
Headquarters (GHQ) as irrelevant.552 
 
The geographic proximity of the PIRA’s creators to the changing PESTELO 
environment heavily influenced the PIRA emergence. Although civil unrest had 
engulfed Northern Ireland, places such as Derry/Londonderry had demonstrated 
that the Catholic population, which was in the demographic majority, was more 
than capable of defending itself against Unionist incursions, as exemplified by the 
battle of the Bogside. Belfast in contrast, was a city where the Unionists had the 
demographic advantage; it was also the city, which experienced some of the worst 
sectarian violence. Furthermore, it was the location where the PIRA was born with 
the first IRA units defecting to the new PIRA. Some units within Belfast delayed, but 
550 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1843-46. 
551 J. Bowyer Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence), Cass Series on Political Violence 
(London: Taylor and Francis, 2013), Kindle Locations 1969-71. 
552 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2018-25. 
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by early 1970, 9 out of the 13 joined the new incarnation of the IRA.553 At the time of 
the split, the PIRA only consisted of about 40-50 members.554 
 
Outside of Belfast, the existing units of the PIRA were not very strong and at times 
operated in conjunction with the Officials. Derry/Londonderry was a strongly 
Nationalist community. When the IRA split, the PIRA had to start from scratch.555 
Therefore, the PIRA was practically non-existent within Derry/Londonderry and due 
to this, the British Army considered the city to be safe for off duty soldiers.556 This 
lasted until mid-1971.557 Between 1969 and mid-1971, the PIRA within 
Derry/Londonderry was small with no more than 15 members, which was 
decimated when most of its members were interned in July 1971.558 From this point, 
the membership of the Derry Brigade grew, but did not rival the Official Irish 
Republican Army (OIRA), who remained the larger and dominant Republican 
organisation. In addition, there was not the hostility between the OIRA and the PIRA 
within Derry/Londonderry, which was present within Belfast.     
 
In the country areas, it was common for the PIRA and the OIRA to conduct 
operations together. Again, there was not the bitterness, which pervaded their 
relationship within Belfast. This was most likely a reflection of differing experiences 
with the leadership of the IRA, prior to the split. Unlike Derry/Londonderry and 
Belfast, the country areas were not subject to the same levels of sectarian violence. 
 
The two micro case studies highlights that emergence cannot be generalised, local 
PESTELO conditions play a significant role in the process. The environmental 
conditions in 1969, within Belfast, created the impetus for the emergence of the 
553 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional I.R.A.  (Corgi Books, 1988), p 141. 
554 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): Kindle Location 2028. 
555 J Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA. Revised Third Edition  (Transaction Publishers, 2008), p 374. 
556 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 7635-38. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid., Kindle Locations 7651-56. 
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PIRA. Although the PIRA emerged in Northern Ireland’s second largest city, it 
remained small as the PESTELO environmental variables differed in the two 
locations. 
 
Those who joined the IRA, prior to the split in 1969 typically had a long family 
association with the IRA. Gerry Adams was born into a family, with extensive 
Republican credentials extending back into the 19th Century.559 These credentials 
existed on both his mother and father’s side. Goulding also had a family heritage of 
involvement in republicanism, dating back to the 19th Century.560 These two 
examples were common. Those who did not have an extensive or immediate family 
involvement in the IRA, were influenced by members of their extended family, who 
were associated with the organisation. Sean MacStiofain, the Chief of Staff of the 
PIRA, was born in the UK and was heavily influenced by his Irish mother who 
maintained strong Irish Nationalist sympathies.561 Due to the tightly knit Republican 
community in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, those who wanted to join the 
IRA, had to be sponsored by those already in the organisation. As such, new 
members of the IRA, prior to 1969, were already well known within the Republican 
circles. 
 
This changed after 1969. The new PIRA recruits joined, not because of a belief in 
republicanism, they joined because they sought arms to defend their communities 
against incursion by the loyalists. The new members who came to the PIRA were 
volunteers, typically with no prior involvement in republicanism and saw the PIRA 
as defending them against the loyalists.562  
 
Thus, the homophyllic variables from the recruits prior to 1969 and after 1969 
varied significantly. Prior to 1969, the recruits aspired to a united Ireland and 
559 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1715-19. 
560 Ibid., Kindle Location 1352. 
561 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1825-29. 
562 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p 78-80. 
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believed in Republicanism. The traditional recruits believed violence through the 
force of arms would bring about this goal. They also believed they were the 
defenders of the Catholic community within Northern Ireland and they were willing 
to use violence to achieve this goal, although by 1969 they lacked the means and 
ability to do so.  
 
The new recruits after 1969 typically did not aspire for a united Ireland or hold 
Republican aspirations. What they shared with the PIRA, especially in Belfast, was 
the aspiration of defending their communities and belief by joining the PIRA and the 
OIRA, they would acquire the weapons to do so. These individuals did not travel to 
Dublin to join the IRA. They sought out their local units through locally known IRA 
men. Moloney wrote: 
 
“The IRA before August 1969 was an organization kept going by family 
tradition. Membership was passed from father to son, mother to daughter, 
but the recruits who flocked to the ranks of the Provisionals were a new 
breed, motivated by an atavistic fear of loyalist violence and an 
overwhelming need to strike back. Known as Sixty-niners, they joined the IRA 
literally to defend their own streets, were resolved that the near-pogroms of 
August 1969 would never be repeated, and were ready, if the opportunity 
arose, to retaliate. They joined the Provos because the Officials had failed to 
defend their communities in the way that was expected, and they 
automatically associated the Officials’ obsession with politics with military 
weakness and betrayal.”563  
 
Thus, geographic proximity played a central role to the emergence and growth of 
the PIRA. The new recruits joined units of the PIRA, which were within their own 
communities. They did this by communicating with known IRA men. Those who 
563 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1939-44. 
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joined the PIRA after 1969 did not join the PIRA motivated by a Republican belief 
system or aspiration, neither were they motivated by an aspiration for a united 
Ireland. They joined because they believed the PIRA was capable of defending their 
communities against the Loyalists. They also believed the only way to defend their 
communities was through violence and the PIRA would provide them with the tools 
(firearms) to facilitate this defence. They joined for survival. Even though in 
homophyllic terms this was a ambiguous match, in the extreme environment of late 
1969 and 1970, it was sufficient for the PIRA in Belfast to grow from about 40 or 50 
members564 in 1969, to about 1000 in 1971. 
 
From a status homophyllic perspective, Bell describes the newly created PIRA 
recruits in the following terms: 
 
“These recruits from outside the movement were not unlike those who had 
been attracted during the previous generation: young men and now women 
of limited formal education, without property or profession, eager, 
enthusiastic, determined to serve, to act for the greater good. These recruits 
were mostly in their late teens or early twenties. A few were older but these 
were seldom. Those younger, if used at all, were incorporated in youth 
organizations like Fianna Éireann or told to wait. Few attracted to the 
Provisional had formal training or great skills, in part because few 
nationalists, i.e. Catholics, did in Northern Ireland, and in part because those 
with training and skills were elsewhere employed, at work at the university, 
in a law office, or in front of a class. Many of the working class in the six-
counties did not work and so were available for assignment. The Provisional 
were thus largely composed of underutilized young people, parochial, 
marginal, badly educated but often capable of far more than society had on 
offer. In a sense the Provisional offered everything — a vocation”.565 
564 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p 77. 
565 Ibid., p 82. 
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Gills and Horgan survey of 1240 PIRA recruits, found it was a predominately-male 
(95.1 %) organisation.566 They also found the organisation progressively aged over its 
30 years life. Between 1969-1976 the average age was 22.25 years, 1977-1980 
25.22, years, 1981-1989 26 years, 26.5 years, 1990-1994 28.13 years and 1994-1998 
32.67 years.567 They also found 41.6% were married at the time of recruitment or 
during their services.568 In terms of occupation, they found it was highly likely the 
recruits came from a working class background, with very few having a profession. 
They found the highest categories of occupations of recruits were; 35.7% came 
from a construction background, 27.7% worked in service/industrial industries, and 
11.4% unemployed.569 Students (2.8%) and professionals (3.5%) had very low levels 
of participation in the IRA.570 Furthermore, the majority of the recruits were born in 
the 6 counties in Northern Ireland (82.7%), with 13.9% born in the Irish Republic, 
with very small percentages born in the diasporas in countries such as the UK and 
the United States (3.4% combined).571 
  
Thus, the status homophyllic variable of age, gender, education occupation, social 
class and ethnic background indicates the new recruits were male, working class, in 
their very early 20s, born in Northern Ireland, had an average education and was 
working in a skilled or non-skilled job, although there was a portion of the recruits 
who were unemployed. Those with a higher education and working in a 
professional career were unlikely to be an overt member of the PIRA. 
566 Paul Gill and John Horgan, "Who Were the Volunteers? The Shifting Sociological and Operational Profile of 1240 Provisional 
Irish Republican Army Members," Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 3 (2013): p 443. 
567 Ibid., p 440. 
568 Ibid., p 450. 
569 Ibid., p 451. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Ibid., p 444. 
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H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
Determining the size of any covert organisation is always difficult. There is a 
tendency for the covert organisation to overstate the number of members. In the 
case of government organisations, who collect intelligence relating to a covert 
organisation, no matter how good or reliable this information, will tend to either 
overestimate or underestimate the size of the group, due to the uncertainties in 
validating the sample. Furthermore, government agencies also have to contend 
with the ambiguous boundaries and the dynamic nature of these types of groups, 
which can create errors in estimates. Thus, making it difficult at times to ascertain 
who the active members of the group are and who were supporters or 
sympathisers. Furthermore, in the case of the PIRA, which also maintained a 
political wing that was a legitimate aboveground organisation, it can be difficult to 
ascertain where the boundaries of the illicit organisation and the legitimate 
organisation begin and end. In the case of the PIRA, there are strong arguments, 
especially in the later years of The Troubles, that it and Sinn Fein shared members, 
especially at the senior level of the organisation. 
 
At the time of the split with the OIRA, the PIRA was a Belfast based organisation and 
illustrated the influence of the environmental factors on the size of the group. In 
late 1969 and early 1970, the PIRA was estimated to have about 40-60 members.572 
The PIRA’s Belfast Brigade at the start of 1970 had an estimated membership of just 
over a dozen members.573  
 
The Catholic ”no go” areas established in 1969 to separate the two warring 
communities, had by 1970 become de-facto states within a state, administered by 
the PIRA in Belfast and the OIRA in Derry/Londonderry. The unrest persisted and 
escalated in 1970. Within Belfast, there was a continuation of communal violence 
572 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Location 2089. 
573 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p 371. 
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and the initial friendly relationship between Catholics and the British Army 
deteriorated. The deaths of OIRA and PIRA members killed by the British Army in 
gun battles, led to a further decline in the relationship between the Catholic 
community and the Army.574 Within this uncertain environment, the Belfast PIRA 
membership had expanded from about 60 members at the time of the split to a few 
hundred members by the end of 1970.575 This was a dramatic increase in a very brief 
period. 
 
In January 1971, in the ”no go” areas under its control, the PIRA started to 
administer punishments for criminal acts within Belfast. The PIRA also took on the 
role of a police force in areas under its protection. The rioting, communal violence, 
searches by the British Army, and gun battles between the British Army and the 
PIRA, created instability in the PESTELO environment. In this environment, the 
membership of the PIRA’s Belfast Brigade, in early 1971, grew. Estimates suggest it 
exceeded a thousand members.576 Bowyer indicates the new recruits joined the 
PIRA not as Republicans, but as defenders of their communities.577 A desire for Irish 
unification did not drive the PIRA’s growth. The growth of the PIRA membership 
was a response to the instability in the environmental conditions, created by the 
failure of the political system, through the military and the police, to restore order. 
It was not for a desire for Irish unification. In addition, the invasive searches 
conducted by the British Army in Catholic areas, further alienated the Army from 
the Catholic population, which originally welcomed them as saviours.  
 
The situation further deteriorated in August 1971, when the Stormont Government, 
backed by the British Army, introduced internment and the imprisonment of 342 
people, most of whom were Catholics. During the period between 9 August 1971 to 
574 Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1970," University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch70.htm. 
575 Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA. Revised Third Edition: p 371. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p. 80. 
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5 December 1975, 1981 people were interned. Of these, only 107 were Protestants, 
the remainder were Catholic.578 As such, the internment was perceived as an anti-
Catholic measure, which was perpetrated by the Westminster and Stormont 
Governments and enacted by the British Army.  
 
“Internment had been proposed by Unionist politicians as the solution to the 
security situation in Northern Ireland but was to lead to a very high level of 
violence over the next few years and to increased support for the IRA.”579 
 
The violence in Northern Ireland escalated throughout 1971.   
 
Increased support for the militant Republican groups in Northern Ireland occurred 
after the killing of 14 marchers in Derry/Londonderry in 1972 on Bloody Sunday by 
the First Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 Para) of the British Army.580 The 
relationship between the British Army and Northern Ireland Catholics had 
progressively deteriorated since 1970, but the Bloody Sunday events did more to 
radicalise the community than previous events had. 
 
“In the days afterward young men and women literally queued up to join the 
Provisionals, while the remaining moral qualms about the use of violence 
against the British vanished.”581 
 
The year 1972 was the worst year of violence for the whole period of The Troubles.  
 
“In a sense until mid-1972, the situation did not change for as the number of 
convinced and dedicated Republicans increased so did the number of 
578 Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1971," University of Ulster, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch71.htm. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 7677-80. 
581 Ibid., Kindle Locations 7680-82. 
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recruits. With the growth in size, the IRA increased the intensity of the 
campaign and so the need for more recruits than could be easily Republican-
ized. This was true not only in Belfast, the core of the Provisionals for much 
of the armed struggle, but in Dublin and Derry and to a degree even in the 
country. Some recruits had all but to create their own units.”582 
 
Throughout this period, the PIRA suffered a severe shortage of arms and was not 
able to offer all the new recruits the opportunity to serve. The security forces in 
Northern Ireland were also learning from the operational experience. 
 
The year 1972 was the high tide mark of the growth of the membership of the PIRA, 
a peak that it would retreat from, for operational reasons. 
 
“The influx of volunteers peaked in 1972. In Northern Ireland British coercion 
began to narrow the battle arena, deny operational opportunities to the 
many, require the formal IRA structure to be adjusted and downsized. There 
were fewer opportunities to serve and so fewer recruits: the secret army 
became more secret, more skilled, less open to volunteers too young to have 
served in the first influx.”583 
  
Further, 1972 was also a turning point in British strategic thinking. On 9 February 
1972, Westminster abolished the Stormont Parliament and implemented direct 
rule. On 31st July, the British launched operation Motorman, which was intended to 
take back the “no go” areas “…of the Creggan, Brandywell and Bogside in 
Londonderry (now officially called Derry City) and barricaded districts of Belfast”.584 It 
was the largest military operation conducted by the British since World War II, 
582 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p. 81. 
583 Ibid., p. 84-85. 
584 M. L. R. Smith and Peter R. Neumann, "Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland," 
Contemporary British History 19, no. 4 (2005): p 413-14. 
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involving some 30,000 military personnel.585 The rationale of the operation was to 
deny the paramilitary groups, such as the PIRA, safe havens in which to operate.  
 
“Using their footholds in the ‘no go’ areas the IRA ‘shifted to an offensive 
campaign of resistance in all parts of the occupied area’ in October 1970. In 
1971 the level of violence rose gradually, with 1756 and 1515 shooting and 
bombing incidents respectively, resulting in 174 deaths. The scale of the 
violence escalated dramatically the following year with 10,628 shootings and 
1853 bombings. The death toll for 1972 was 467 dead, 208 of whom were 
the result of known Provisional IRA actions.”586 
 
The goal of Operation Motorman was to deny these groups, like the PIRA, their 
operational safe havens.587  
 
“The loss of the no-go areas broke up the hard core of IRA operatives in 
Belfast and Londonderry and severely eroded the organisation’s operational 
capacity. These areas were the IRA’s most vital military asset. They provided 
safe havens from where it could plan attacks while remaining effectively 
immune from the security forces. Further, these districts were also used by 
the Provisionals to foment a constant level of rioting and sniping that did 
much to keep urban areas in a state of disorder.”588 
 
Motorman also put the PIRA under severe operational pressure. They were no 
longer able to operate with impunity. 
 
“Within weeks military forts were constructed right on the IRA’s doorsteps, 
and the organization’s freedom of movement was severely curtailed. Now 
585 Ibid., p 414. 
586 Ibid., p 419. 
587 Ibid. 
588 Ibid., p 426. 
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able to put the IRA under close surveillance in both cities and to screen 
thousands of civilians for IRA sympathies, British army intelligence on the IRA 
improved markedly. Within two years the British grip on areas like West 
Belfast was so tight that the Belfast Brigade was forced to move its 
operational headquarters to the southern outskirts of the city, to the affluent 
Malone area.”589 
 
Motorman was successful as there was a dramatic decline in the violence in 1973 
and significant improvement in intelligence collection capabilities, which is a key 
factor in a counter insurgency conflict. 
 
In 1973, the PIRA reduced its size, although Bowyer claimed it was due to a change 
in operational priorities. As previously stated, it was a consequence of the loss of 
the “no go” areas. 
 
“The only great difference, when the period of provocation faded into a 
conventional campaign, was that more of the structure became covert — 
and the numbers were larger. Everyone no longer knew everyone for the first 
time since the 1930s. Specialization had occurred by 1972– 73, for the army 
was too large for each to be involved in everything. Then as the impetus 
shifted from defence to offence the security forces escalated pressure again 
transforming the Northern Ireland arena. At this point in 1973, the active 
army began to be reduced in size by circumstances…”590 
 
After Motorman, the operational environment further changed for the PIRA, the 
OIRA disengaged and declared a cease-fire in mid-1972, which it maintained until 
the end of The Troubles. This saw a further influx of hard-core OIRA members to the 
589 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 2682-86. 
590 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p. 131-32. 
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PIRA. The British Army improved its intelligence gathering capacity in Northern 
Ireland and improved the training of the soldiers deployed in the six counties.   
 
By 1975, the British security forces and the RUC had effectively contained The 
Troubles and the PIRA evolved from an urban guerrilla force into a terrorist 
organisation.591 The cease-fire in 1975 also saw a change in strategy by both sides. 
The British had demonstrated its unwillingness to withdraw from Northern Ireland. 
The British adopted a long-term strategy, which was to deny the PIRA the capacity 
to continue the struggle, encouraging them to enter settlement discussions.592 Part 
of this strategy involved the Security Forces, but also included a revamping of the 
criminal justice system, which criminalised paramilitary activities.593 Subjected to 
these changing environmental forces, the PIRA adopted the long war strategy. This 
strategy required a strong political wing to build a sound political base for the 
paramilitaries.594 
 
From 1975 onwards, British Intelligence gathering became more sophisticated and 
over time, computer systems managed the large amounts of information 
collected.595 In 1976, the RUC took over the role of patrolling the streets from the 
Army. The Army provided support to the RUC as required. There was also increased 
undercover surveillance conducted by the Army, which included the deployment to 
Northern Ireland of specialised forces, such as the Military Reconnaissance Force 
(MRF), 22nd Special Air Services Regiment (22 SAS), 14 Intelligence Company (Det) 
and later, the Force Research Unit (FRU).596 The RUC also created its own specialised 
covert unit called the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU). From the late 
1970s through to the 1990s, the conflict in Northern Ireland became an intelligence 
591 David Chandler, G  and I Beckett, The Oxford History of the British Army  (Oxford University Press, 2003), p 361. 




595 Chandler and Beckett, The Oxford History of the British Army: p 351. 
596 Ibid. 
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war. The intelligence campaign was effective in containing the PIRA and bringing 
them to the negotiation table. These changes in tactics by the security forces placed 
the PIRA and other paramilitaries within a hostile security environment.  
 
Furthermore, with the massive influx of volunteers in 1969 to 1972, it was not 
possible to vet all those who joined. This left the PIRA with a legacy of having 
informants or members turned by the likes of MI5 embedded within the 
organisation.597 Some of these informants, over time, obtained quite influential and 
senior positions within the organisation, where they were able to provide the 
security forces with valuable information.598 This environment did not permit the 
large-scale operations, similar to those undertaken by the PIRA, prior to 1973. Thus, 
there was not the need for the large number of volunteers. The PIRA downsized its 
membership to about 400 members and these members developed greater levels 
of specialisation.599 The PIRA maintained this size for the remainder of The Troubles 
until the peace process had run its course.  
 
Even within this hostile environment, the PIRA was able to forge links with Libyan 
leader Muammar Gaddafi, who at various times from the mid-1970s provided the 
group with an estimated 120 tonnes of weapons, explosives, and ammunition.600 In 
addition, it is alleged, he also provided the PIRA with financial support.601 Thus, 
although contained, PIRA possessed the resources to continue the struggle, which 
they did throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Thus, the size of the PIRA was dependent on the environmental factors. The failure 
of the political and legal environments to protect the Catholic communities within 
Belfast created an environmental context, which led to the split in the IRA. The IRA 
597 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Location 9024. 
598 Ibid., Kindle Location 907. 
599 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p. 132. 
600 "The 38-year connection between Irish republicans and Gaddafi," BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-
12539372  
601 Clive Maltby, "Exposure: Gaddafi and the IRA," (United Kingdom: ITV, 2011). 
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(in Belfast) failed to protect Catholics in the August 1969 riots, which tarnished its 
reputation. The PIRA, untarnished by these events, attracted a significant influx of 
members between 1970 and 1972. This new membership came as defenders of 
their Catholic communities. The “no go” areas created in 1969 permitted the PIRA 
to grow. These were areas where the RUC and the British Army maintained no 
permanent presence. As such, the role of law enforcement and protection of the 
community fell upon groups such as the PIRA and the even smaller OIRA. Within 
these safe havens, the PIRA was able to recruit, train, and launch attacks with 
minimal hindrance from the state. In this environment, the PIRA in Belfast was able 
to grow in size with a peak membership in excess of a thousand volunteers in 1972. 
Operation Motorman changed the environmental landscape in mid-1972. Operation 
Motorman re-established government control and authority over the ”no go” areas. 
Thus, removing the safe havens in which the PIRA had operated, with a resultant 
drop in PIRA attacks. A consequence of Motorman was the reduction in the 
membership of the PIRA, because in this new environment, the PIRA could not 
covertly maintain a group that size, without compromising the security of the 
organisation. 
 
The PIRA membership suffered two further blows in the preceding years. In 1986, 
with the vote to drop abstentionism and allow elected Sinn Fein members to take 
their seats in the Dáil, led to a small group splitting from the PIRA. These dissidents 
formed the Continuity IRA (CIRA), which maintained the IRA’s traditional 
abstentionist stance. Again, the PIRA split in 1997, when some members of the 
PIRA, opposed to the 1997 ceasefire and the PIRA’s involvement in the Northern 
Ireland peace process, walked out of the General Army Convention. Those who 
opposed the new direction, in which the PIRA was moving, along with other 
disaffected members, formed the Óglaigh na hÉireann (Army of Ireland), which 
became known as the Real IRA (RIRA). 
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The environmental conditions within the Derry/Londonderry differed to those 
within Belfast. Demographically Derry/Londonderry differed to Belfast. In Belfast, 
the Catholics were in the minority, representing only about a third of the city’s 
population. In Derry/Londonderry, the Catholics were the majority, representing 
about two thirds of the city’s population. Furthermore, the Catholics in 
Derry/Londonderry had not experienced the pogroms at the hands of the 
Protestant community, which had occurred in Belfast. In Derry/Londonderry, the 
OIRA defended the Catholic community, unlike their counterparts in Belfast. The 
OIRA had also been active during the battle of the Bogside. As such, the Catholic 
community’s perception of the OIRA differed to that of their counterparts in Belfast. 
In Derry/Londonderry, the PIRA was small and the OIRA was the dominant 
Republican paramilitary group in the City.  
 
Likewise, in country areas, for similar reasons, the OIRA also remained dominant, 
although there may have been small cadres of the PIRA present in those locations. 
The rural areas of Northern Ireland, where the IRA had a presence, were 
overwhelmingly conservative and maintained a traditional Catholic outlook.602 After 
the split in the IRA in 1969, the country units of the old IRA did not instantly align 
themselves with the new organisation. The ideological differences meant little in 
areas such as Tyrone.603 In some areas, the PIRA created new units from scratch, but 
the PIRA in the country areas remained small.604 This situation was to change in mid-
1971 with the introduction of internment and the Army’s role in cratering the roads 
in the border regions, which joined Northern Ireland to the Republic. The cratering 
of these roads caused rioting in rural areas, which had been moderately peaceful up 
until this event. The situation in the rural areas further deteriorated when the 
British Army, at a checkpoint, killed two OIRA men, in 1972. The commanders of the 
OIRA failed to avenge the killings.605 Thus, the commanders of the OIRA lost 
602 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 1420-22. 
603 Ibid., Kindle Locations 6631-32. 
604 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2375-78. 
605 Ibid. 
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credibility among rural OIRA units. Matters in the rural areas further declined when 
the OIRA declared a ceasefire, in 1972, in response to opposition, from Catholics in 
Derry/Londonderry to the murder of William Best by the OIRA.606 Best lived in 
Derry/Londonderry and was a serving member of the British Army on leave at the 
time of his murder. Best was a member of the Royal Irish Rangers a Northern Irish 
Regiment, which was excluded from serving in Northern Ireland due to its close 
connection to the six counties and the potential of split loyalties.607 The OIRA 
maintained the ceasefire for the remainder of The Troubles. Thus, those who 
wished to fight the British in the rural areas had little option but to join the PIRA. 
Thus, in 1972 many of the rural OIRA units aligned themselves with the PIRA. In 
addition, within this changed environment, the PIRA was able to expand existing 
units and form new ones to absorb the influx of volunteers.608 
 
Therefore, the capacity of an emergent terrorist group to grow in size is dependent 
on their location in the conflict space and the effects of the perturbations (events) 
experienced in this location. Northern Ireland indicates the environmental 
perturbations vary across the space. By way of example, in Belfast the impact of the 
events of August 1969 was more significant than in the country areas or in Derry/ 
Londonderry. The emergence of the PIRA indicates the PESTELO variables are not 
constant across the geography of the conflict space. Furthermore, there has to be 
sufficient homophily between the group and the local population for the group to 
grow. There needs to be a shared value homophily of belief or aspiration between 
the two entities, the group, and the potential recruits. Furthermore, there has to be 
a belief by the potential recruits the group can achieve its goal. The IRA had always 
portrayed itself as the defenders of the minority Catholics. The events of August 
1969 demonstrated to the founding members of the PIRA in Belfast, that the 
leadership of the IRA had failed to keep this covenant. These failures re-affirmed 
their belief the political approach of the leadership of the IRA was flawed. It also 
606 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2556-61. 
607 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2557-61. 
608 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2375-78. 
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confirmed the belief military action was the only viable option to achieve their 
goals. Thus, the founders of the PIRA split from the IRA based on differences in the 
value homophyllic variable of belief. The two groups shared the same Republican 
aspirations. The membership of the PIRA grew because there was sufficient 
similarity in the aspirations of the PIRA and its new volunteers. Not all the 
volunteers shared the PIRA’s aspiration of a unified Ireland, but they shared the 
belief one of the roles of the PIRA was to defend the Catholic community and many 
of the recruits in the early days of the PIRA aspired to do so. 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time  
The PIRA inherited the organisational structure, which had been the mainstay of the 
IRA since the 1919-1921 War of Independence. PIRA inherited a traditional military 
structure, consisting of brigades, battalions, and companies. It was a vestige of the 
times of British rule.609 In many respects, these formations were not the equivalent 
of those in the British Army. A British Army brigade would have an order of battle of 
3-4 battalions, each battalion would consist of 3-4 companies, and a company 
would consist of 3-4 platoons. Each platoon would consist of 30-50 men, a company 
would have an establishment of around 200 men, a battalion comprised 800-1000 
men, and finally a brigade consisted of 3000-4000 men. The PIRA never achieved 
this level of establishment. Thus, the unit naming convention should be considered 
as an indicator of where the unit existed within the command and control structure, 
and not a reflection of the unit’s military or operational capacity. 
 
At the time of the split, the PIRA consisted of the Belfast Brigade, which comprised a 
single battalion with 16 companies and an estimated establishment for the whole 
brigade at 50-60 men.610 Of the 16 companies, 15 had defected to the PIRA by April 
1970; the other company remained with the OIRA.611  
 
609 Ibid., Kindle Locations 3441-42. 
610 Ibid., Kindle Location 2089. 
611 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1815-17. 
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The volatile PESTELO environment in Belfast and the isolation of the Catholic 
communities within “no go” areas, between 1970 and 1972, led to an explosion in 
the membership of the PIRA in Belfast. At its peak, the Belfast Brigade had in excess 
of 1000 members.  
 
“With their ranks swollen by new recruits, the IRA expanded from one Belfast 
battalion to three, each with its own complement of companies. The First 
Battalion was based in Andersonstown and the Upper Falls Road area. The 
Second Battalion encompassed Ballymurphy and the Lower Falls Road area. 
The Third Battalion took in the rest of Catholic Belfast, principally the 
isolated and often besieged ghettos of Ardoyne in North Belfast, the Short 
Strand in East.”612 
 
Beyond these standard units, the Belfast Brigade, under the command of Gerry 
Adams, created two Special Operations Cells referred to as “the Unknowns”.613 The 
cells were formed some time in 1972.614 The cells initially consisted of three 
members, later expanded to four.615 They were independent to the rest of the 
Belfast Brigade, “they carried out their own intelligence work and acted on it 
themselves…”616 
 
The Derry/Londonderry PIRA was small; at best, it had a dozen individuals. The unit 
possessed a limited number of weapons and it was a new unknown organisation 
with no history. The OIRA was larger and better established and as such, attracted 
the bulk of the recruits. The PIRA maintained little strength in the rural areas of 
Northern Ireland, which remained aligned to the OIRA up until 1972. 
 
612 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2083-86. 
613 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-91. 
614 Ibid., Kindle Locations 3438-39. 
615 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-91. 
616 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2788-90. 
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Operation Motorman and the OIRA ceasefire in 1972 changed the operational 
environment. Within this environment, the organisational structure of the PIRA 
evolved. The organisation was able to expand in Derry/Londonderry, where it had 
been very small and under the shadow of the OIRA. It was also able to expand in the 
rural areas, where its presence had been small. The PIRA expanded by absorbing 
disaffected OIRA units or by the creation of new units. 
 
The OIRA ceasefire also led to divisions within the OIRA. In December 1974, these 
divisions created a split in the OIRA, with the dissenting members creating the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).617 These 
organisations emerged from the OIRA with the assistance of other activists in the 
socialist community in Northern Ireland.618 Thus, the changing PESTELO environment 
can lead to the emergence of new organisations from existing ones. The 
organisation emerged due to differences in the value homophyllic variable of belief. 
The senior members of the OIRA believed a political approach would better achieve 
their goals, whereas those who split felt the only way to achieve their goal, was 
through violence. There was insufficient homophily between them and the PIRA, to 
merge with the PIRA. As such, they formed their own group as it best suited their 
needs. 
 
The changing operational environment after Motorman onwards, led to the 
devolution of the structure of the PIRA, the harsher security environment imposed 
on the PIRA led to units becoming isolated.619 According to Moloney, Adams drafted 
a new organisational structure for the PIRA at the request of the Army Council.620 
The structure proposed by Adams was based on a cellular model. The smallest unit 
was a cell known as an Active Service Unit (ASU), consisting of four members. Each 
ASU would specialise in specific tasks such as snipping, bombing, and intelligence 
617 "Irish Republican Socialist Movement Twenty Years of Struggle," Irish Socialist Republican Movement (IRSM). 
618 Ibid. 
619 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p. 132. 
620 Ibid., Kindle Locations 3445-47. 
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work. According to Moloney, the ASU were given a “…roving commission and could 
operate anywhere in the IRA’s war zone so that the British would find it more 
difficult to identify which ASU had been active where.”621 The cellular structure 
ensured the security of the PIRA as an organisation. With the intention to hinder 
the efforts of the security forces to infiltrate the group, it allowed the PIRA to purge 
those members who were not considered fully committed to the Republican cause. 
 
The ASU were the operational component of the PIRA. The ASU was a component 
of a large non-operational component. The supreme governing authority of the 
PIRA was the General Army Convention (GAC), which was a body of 100-200 
delegates. Delegates came from the: 
 
“…currently active Volunteers, prisoner 'representatives' (i.e. those 
representing the views of imprisoned PIRA members), Brigade staffs (i.e. 
regional 'commanders' such as the O/C (Officer Commanding or Officer 
Commandeering)), General Headquarters members and usually all members 
of the Army Council (this includes the Chief of Staff, Adjutant General and 
Quartermaster General…).”622 
 
The GAC was supposed to meet every two years, but throughout the course of The 
Troubles, it only met three times in 1969, 1986 and 1996.623 It is of note, at each of 
these meetings, the IRA and its progenitors split. In 1969 the PIRA emerged, in 1986 
the CIRA emerged and in 1996 the RIRA emerged. 
 
Below the GAC, the next level of the organisation was the Army Executive, 
consisting of 12 members, selected by the GAC and was supposed to meet every 6 
months, but the frequency of these meetings depended on the security situation at 
621 Ibid., Kindle Locations 3448-49. 
622 John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," Terrorism and 
Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): p 4. 
623 Ibid., p 5. 
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the time.624 It consisted of senior and experienced members of the PIRA, who 
elected the seven member Army Council. 
 
The Army Council was the operational command of the PIRA. The Army Council 
allegedly met about once a month and it had the authority to make peace or war, 
but these decisions required ratification from the GAC.625 Many members of the 
senior level of the organisation and non-combatant arms of the PIRA were part-
time.626 The Army Council elected a Chief of Staff, who then appoints the members 
of the GHQ. 
 
• IRA Quartermaster General 
• IRA Director of Finance 
• IRA Director of Engineering 
• IRA Director of Training 
• IRA Director of Intelligence 
• IRA Director of Publicity 
• IRA Director of Operations 
• IRA Director of Security 
 
The PIRA inherited this structure from the OIRA at the time of the split in 1969. In 
the late 1970s, the structure was refined to reflect the increasingly hostile 
operational environment. The PIRA created two commands. This was a departure 
from the traditional operational structure of the IRA. The PIRA divided into 
Northern and Southern Commands. Northern command consisted of the six 
counties of Northern Ireland and the five bordering counties, which was effectively 
the war zone. The Southern Command consisted of the remaining counties in the 




626 James Dingley, The IRA: The Irish Republican Army  (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), p 160. 
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Northern Command was divided into brigades, each brigade consisted of 3-4 ASUs, 
and each ASU had about four members.627 It was estimated that a third of the 
strength of the PIRA came under the command of the Belfast brigade. By the mid to 
late 1970s, the organisation of the PIRA had grown from a single brigade in Belfast 
to five brigades throughout Northern Ireland. The new membership led to an 
expansion of the number of battalions in Belfast to three. Similarly, the events, such 
as Bloody Sunday, had led to an enlargement, by an influx of new members of the 
PIRA units in Derry/Londonderry. Originally, the PIRA units in Derry/Londonderry 
were organised as the Derry Battalion under the command of the South Derry 
Brigade. The South Derry Brigade originally consisted of two battalions, the Derry 
Battalion, and another in Donegal. The increasing size of the membership of Derry 
based PIRA units, led to the Derry Battalion becoming detached from the South 
Derry Brigade and being redesignated the Derry Brigade, consisting of two 
battalions. Other brigades existed in Donegal, Armagh, that consisted of three 
battalions and one in Northern Armagh and two in South Armagh and a further 
brigade in Tyrone/Monaghan, which was also known as the East Tyrone Brigade. 
Smaller unassigned units existed in Fermanagh, South Down, and North Antrim. 
 
In 1978, the PIRA adjusted their organisational structure further by adding an 
internal security unit to investigate, interrogate, and punish suspected informers 
within the PIRA.628 The creation of this unit was a result of the changing environment 
in which the PIRA was operating and a fear of infiltrators working for the security 
forces.  
 
The traditional structure of battalions and companies existed in parallel with the 
new structure. These structures acted in a support role and were responsible for 
policing in Nationalist areas, safe houses, gathering of intelligence, and hiding of 
weapons.629  
627 Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," p 5. 
628 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Location 14879. 
629 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p 131. 
Stuart Groombridge  254 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
 
Southern Command’s structure shared similarities with its Northern counterpart. It 
consisted of brigades and ASUs. Horgan estimated there was about 70-85 members 
of the command in ASUs.630 Southern Command’s role differed to the Northern 
Command. Southern Command was responsible for logistics, provision of weapons 
dumps and safe houses.631 The Janes Intelligence Review632 reported there were a 
number of ASUs spread throughout the Southern Command, with a small number 
of members throughout the countryside. The Janes Review highlighted the lack of 
information, which made it difficult to predict the number of members within 
Southern Command. 
 
The hunger strikes between 1980 and 1981 politicised the Republican struggle, 
which created a further shift in PIRA tactics. The leader of the PIRA hunger strikers, 
Bobby Sands, was elected as the MP for Fermanagh in South Tyrone. The hunger 
strikes demonstrated that in the right environment, the political approach could 
reap benefits. When the hunger strikes ended with the deaths of ten PIRA hunger 
strikers, the Republican movement, as embodied by the PIRA and Sinn Fein, saw the 
benefits of a dual strategy of the “Armalite and the Ballot box”.633 This strategy was 
adopted and endorsed by the Army Council. From this point on, the PIRA was both a 
paramilitary and political organisation, which had the capacity to exploit the 
environmental conditions using a combination of approaches. This approach 
created conflicting priorities within the organisation. Before the adoption of this 
new strategy, the PIRA was a loosely controlled entity. Many of the units operated 
independently of central control, with upper echelons of the organisation approving 
or endorsing their actions after the event.634 This type of command and control 
structure was not well suited to the now dual strategy. As such, through the 1980s 
630 Horgan and Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," p 9. 
631 Ibid., p 8. 
632 Sean Boyne, "Uncovering the IRA," http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html  
633 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 14918-20. 
634 Bell, The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army (Political Violence): p 141-42. 
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the Northern Command, under the leadership of Martin McGuinness, started to 
assert greater control over the paramilitary organisation. Northern Command took 
responsibility for the appointment of brigade and ASU commanders and the 
approval of operations.635 Under this command and control structure, the PIRA 
adopted a policy of only attacking British military personnel and it laid down strict 
policies, in regards to the attacks on Loyalists.636 Later, this would lead to bans on 
the bombing of commercial targets. Although not always effective, the command 
and control structure did permit those involved in the peace process (from 1994 
onwards) to negotiate with a certain level of confidence, that independent actions 
by the PIRA would not undermine their position at the negotiating table. 
 
Thus, the structure of the PIRA emerged over time, initially adopting the structure, 
which it traditionally knew and understood. At first, the PIRA was a small 
organisation mostly concentrated in Belfast, with its command and control 
structures safely housed in the Irish Republic. As the environmental conditions 
within Northern Ireland deteriorated, growing numbers of disaffected Catholics 
flocked to join the PIRA. The organisation expanded its traditional structures adding 
more battalions and companies. In areas, such as Derry/Londonderry where the 
OIRA’s reputation was untarnished by the events of 1969, it remained the dominant 
organisation. It was not until the OIRA’s ceasefire in the mid-1970s, which saw a 
significant expansion of the PIRA in these areas. Again, the expansion of the 
organisation used the traditional structures of brigades, battalions, and companies. 
Prior to 1972, the PIRA, along with other paramilitary groups, were able to operate 
unencumbered by the security forces, in the “no go” areas in locations such as the 
Catholic and Protestant dominated enclaves in Belfast. This situational and 
environmental advantage significantly changed in mid-1972 with Operation 
Motorman, which removed the paramilitaries ’safe havens. Operation Motorman 
was a turning point in the security forces intelligence war against the PIRA. The new 
635 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Location 679. 
636 Ibid., Kindle Locations 15040-48. 
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intelligence environment hindered the PIRA’s ability to operate unconstrained. This 
hostile environment led to the PIRA adopting a cellular structure based on the ASU 
in the latter part of the 1970s. Bell indicates the reorganisation was just an official 
acknowledgement of the structure, which had evolved out of the hostile security 
environment after Motorman. Furthermore, the size of the organisation shrunk, 
due to the hostile operational environment, which limited the operational 
opportunities of the PIRA and as such, reduced the need for a larger organisation. 
The reduction of the size of the PIRA and adoption of the cellular structure, 
improved the security of the organisation in an environment where the intelligence 
services of the security forces were taking a more prominent role. 
 
The command and control structure, up until the mid-1980s was loose, with 
Northern Command and the Army Council setting the strategic goals of the 
organisation and the brigades, companies, and later the ASUs, planning, and 
implementing their own operations. The commanders were appointed at a local 
level, with the core leadership group certifying operations once they had been 
completed. The command structure became more centralised in the mid-1980s 
onward and the PIRA adopted a dual strategy involving armed forces and political 
engagement. Both had to complement each other. A formal command and 
controlled structure was required to ensure the armed wing of the movement did 
not undermine the political process. The political process relied heavily on the 
support of the broader community, which was significantly influenced by the events 
in the countryside and the streets of Belfast and Derry/Londonderry.  
 
The structure of the PIRA was influenced by the environmental conditions in which 
it operated. Changes in the environmental conditions brought about changes in the 
size and structure of the organisation. The departure from a purely military 
approach to a combined political and military strategy influenced the structure. It 
also influenced the command and control mechanisms. The PIRA evolved from a 
loosely controlled organisation, to a group where control was exercised over the 
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organisation by the leadership, so the military wing did not hamper the political 
efforts of the organisation. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
As previously indicated in hypothesis H2a, the environment in which the PIRA 
operated, influenced the group’s size. The geography in which the group operated 
also influenced the group structure. The PIRA was a group, which was throughout 
Northern Ireland. The group maintained an extensive network of brigades, 
companies, and ASU in locations from which the group drew its support. 
 
Initially, the PIRA operated on a traditional military structure of brigades, battalions, 
and companies, which it had inherited from the OIRA, from which it split. At the 
time of emergence, the membership of the PIRA was small, about 50 members, 
primarily concentrated in Belfast. Thus, the inherited structure was sufficient. As 
the environmental conditions within Belfast deteriorated and the number of 
members of the PIRA grew, the existing structure was sufficiently flexible to absorb 
the increasing membership. The structure allowed the creation of new units to 
absorb the growing members.  
 
The Belfast Brigade of the PIRA was dispersed geographically throughout the 
Catholic enclaves. At its peak, the 1000 members of the brigade were dispersed into 
three battalions. As previously indicated, the First Battalion held responsibility for 
the areas of Andersonstown and the Upper Falls Road. The Second Battalion took 
responsibility for the areas of Ballymurphy and the Lower Falls Road. The third took 
responsibility for “…the rest of Catholic Belfast, principally the isolated and often 
besieged ghettos of Ardoyne in North Belfast, the Short Strand in East Belfast, and 
the Markets district in South-central Belfast.”637 Thus, geography influenced the 
637 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2085-86. 
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structure of the PIRA with various units taking responsibility for specific geographic 
locations; also, these units were located in environmentally friendly locations. 
 
Each battalion within Belfast had around 200 - 300 members.638 Each company had 
between 20 - 60 members.639 Each unit operated in its own area and the 
membership was predominantly male, from a working class background.640 In 
reality, the battalion of the PIRA equated to the size of a company within the 
traditional military organisation and the company was equivalent to that of a 
platoon or oversized platoon at best. Thus, the brigade was only equivalent to an 
undersized battalion within the British Army. The companies operated 
independently of each other, identifying their own operations and only operated 
within their battalion’s zone of responsibility. 
 
From 1972 onwards with the harshening environmental conditions within Northern 
Ireland and the OIRA ceasefire, the PIRA attracted many disaffected OIRA units and 
members. In addition, the PIRA also received new members due to incidents such as 
Bloody Sunday. By the mid-1970s, the structure of the PIRA significantly expanded, 
with the inclusion of units from Derry/Londonderry and the rural areas of Northern 
Ireland. Thus, the PIRA created regional brigades to administer the units. The use of 
regional structures was an acknowledgement, as an organisation, the PIRA could 
not be administered from a centralised location, due to the unique environmental 
conditions, which existed in each location. The establishment, in 1976, of Southern 
and Northern Commands, acknowledged the different environmental conditions in 
each region. Northern Command oversaw the war zone and Southern Command 
was a peaceful safe haven well suited for training and logistics. Northern Command 
consisted of the six counties of Northern Ireland and the five border counties of the 
republic. These counties were considered the war zone. The role of the units based 
under Northern Command was to fight the British Army and the Northern Ireland 
638 Dingley, The IRA: The Irish Republican Army: p 155. 
639 Ibid., p 155-56. 
640 Ibid. 
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security forces. The Southern Command consisted of the remaining twenty-one 
counties of the republic and it was to act as the logistical arm of the PIRA. It was a 
safe haven for training, manufacturing explosives and storing the PIRA arsenal. 
 
Northern Command heralded “…a significant switch in the internal balance of 
power. The IRA’s principal business was to fight a war against British forces in 
Northern Ireland, and those who controlled how that war was conducted—and 
those who appointed them—would inevitably wield the greatest influence in the 
organization. The Northern Command would have its own staff, which would 
shadow that in GHQ, which promptly lost its responsibility for conducting operations 
in the North and was thus weakened. Thereafter GHQ’s direct military role was 
confined to the IRA’s international activities, principally in Britain and Europe. The 
construction of a Northern Command would make the position of Northern 
commander one of the most important positions in the organization.”641 This 
structure acknowledged the differing environmental factors over the geographic 
space, in which the group operated. 
 
The changes in the environment in which the PIRA operated, also led to a 
contraction of the organisational structure and the adoption of the cell as the basic 
building block of the organisation. This reorganisation was intended to increase the 
organisational security. A cell, referred to by the PIRA, as an ASU consisted of 5-8 
individuals.642 Active Service Units (ASU) also ranged in size from 4-6 members and 
in the country areas, the ASU could reach sizes of 12-14 members.643 Within areas 
where the PIRA was strongly supported by the community, the traditional brigade, 
battalion and company structure remained unchanged. By the 1990s, the ASU of 
the PIRA had become specialised, focusing on specific tasks, such as robberies, 
training, bombings, intelligence etc.644 
641 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: Kindle Locations 3484-89. 
642 Sean Boyse, 1996, Uncovering the Irish Republican Army, Jane’s Intelligence Review 
643 Dingley, The IRA: The Irish Republican Army: p 158. 
644 Shapiro, "Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organizations," p 14. 
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The command and control structure of the ASU organisation involved each cell 
being independent of the other with no interconnection. The leader of the cell, who 
was the only member having any contact with any other part of the organisation, 
reported to the brigade commander within their regional area.645 Each of the 
battalion commanders was in charge of 3-4 ASUs. 
 
According to Boyne646 in the early to mid-1990s, there were around 100 members in 
Belfast; 70-80 members in Derry and North Donegal, South Armagh, and North Loth 
operated two large ASUs, with up to 20 members. South Armagh/North Louth, 
West Fermanagh/Donegal, South Fermanagh, Coslisland area South Derry, North 
Armagh, Down and Castlewellan, are believed to have had a single ASU in their 
areas of operation. In Southern Command, it was suspected there was a single ASU 
in Dublin, with other cells spread across the Irish Republic.647 
 
Thus, the structure of the PIRA was dependent on the geographic distribution of its 
units across the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, with brigades and battalions 
having specific geographic responsibilities and based in areas where there was 
significant support for the PIRA. Likewise, the old companies and later the ASUs also 
recruited and were based in areas friendly to the PIRA. In areas such as Belfast, 
Derry/Londonderry, and South Armagh, the local environmental factors permitted 
the PIRA to grow to a significant size, which required a more complex structure to 
administer its members. Environmentally, these were socio-cultural friendly areas. 
As such, the risk of a large organisational structure was reduced. Belfast and 
Derry/Londonderry were also areas where the security forces had a substantial 
presence, thus at the tactical level of the organisation, the cell or ASU provided the 
PIRA with the greatest level of operational security. South Armagh was, for the 
security forces, a hostile environment, which was commonly referred to by the 
645  Dingley, The IRA: The Irish Republican Army: p 158. 
646 Boyne, "Uncovering the IRA". 
647 Ibid. 
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media, as Bandit Country. South Armagh was strongly Republican648, which made it 
difficult for the security forces to operate. Due to the support within the local 
community, South Armagh did not adopt the ASU structure, but continued to 
maintain the traditional battalion structure. Within South Armagh, there were two 
battalions with 40 members.649 Throughout the rest of Northern Command, the ASU 
structure was dominant. Southern Command took on the role of maintaining 
weapons dumps and stores. This was the logical location, as this placed the 
weapons out of reach of the well-equipped British Army and the Northern Ireland 
security forces. 
 
There is insufficient information to assess whether the structure of the PIRA was 
consistent with the cognitive limits as proposed by Dunbar. The size of the ASU 
whether it is 3-5 or 5-8 members, is consistent with these limits. Likewise, if 
Dingley’s assessment that 3-4 ASUs reported to a battalion commander is correct, it 
is consistent with Dunbar. The number of battalions reporting to each brigade was 
between one and three; again, this is consistent with the cognitive limits. Various 
sources report the PIRA operated five brigades (Armagh, Belfast, Derry, Donegal, 
and Tyrone/Monaghan).650 If this is also correct, the number of brigades reporting to 
Northern Command is also consistent and within the cognitive limits defined by 
Dunbar, although there are other possible anthropological explanations for this 
structure. 
 
The senior levels of the organisation are also consistent with Dunbar’s limits. The 
Army Council consisted of seven members and GHQ consisted of 6-7 members. All 
these figures are consistent with Dunbar and other anthropological models. Thus, it 
is not possible to clearly state Dunbar’s limits were significant in determining this 
structure as there are other possible anthropological explanations. 
 
648 O'Brien, The Long War: The IRA & Sinn Féin from Armed Struggle to Peace Talks  (Dublin: Press Ltd, 1993), p 161. 
649 Ibid., p 206. 
650  ibid., p 158. 
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Therefore, the structure of the PIRA was dependent on the geographic dispersion of 
the group. The size and structure of the group was also dependent on the local 
environmental factors, which varied across the geographic space of Northern 
Ireland. Both the geographic and environmental factors influenced the size 
(bandwidth) of the communications channels. As such, the structure of the 
organisation was determined by the length and risk to these channels. The available 
information suggests the group’s structure is consistent with Dunbar’s limits, 
although these structural connections are also consistent with other 
anthropological models. 
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Chapter 13 - Conclusion 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The PIRA emerged as a direct result of the worsening PESTELO environmental 
conditions in Northern Ireland, in the late 1960s. The PIRA was a Belfast 
phenomenon, where the Catholic community was in the minority, and by 1969, was 
subject to increasing levels of sectarian violence from the Protestant community. It 
was also an environment where this minority community was unable to receive 
protection from the Northern Irish or British governments. Further, it was an 
environment where the IRA, the perceived traditional defenders of the Catholic 
community, was unwilling or incapable of taking on this role.  
 
From an organisational perspective, these environmental factors created divisions 
within the IRA as an organisation. Current and prior members of the IRA from 
Belfast interpreted the escalating violence as an indictment of the current IRA 
leadership’s policies for a non-violent political approach to achieve the 
organisational goals. Thus, though the two factions shared the same goals or 
aspirations, they differed on methodology. The local environmental conditions had 
led one faction to view violence as the only legitimate approach to counter the 
sectarian conflict unfolding on the streets of Belfast. The two factions also differed 
in the belief in whether the non-violent or violent approach had the greatest merit. 
Therefore, they diverged in homophyllic terms. 
 
The PIRA formed due to specific local perturbations in the PESTELO environmental 
factors within Belfast. Another factor was the IRA’s organisational environment, 
whose leadership wished to persist with the non-violent approach. The IRA 
leadership was unwilling to accommodate any differing views and the leadership 
would expel any dissenters. When these factors combined, they resulted in a split in 
the organisation and the emergence of the PIRA. As such, the PIRA, like the WUO, 
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emerged from a pre-existing organisation where factions had arisen based on 
disagreements on organisational strategy. 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
Those who formed the PIRA were responding to local conditions, which were not 
necessarily the same across the whole of Northern Ireland. The majority of the 
founding members of the PIRA came from Belfast and were known to each other. 
The first units of the IRA to come across to the PIRA were also from Belfast. The 
influx of new members into the PIRA came from this city. The environmental factors 
in isolation were not sufficient to create the PIRA. It was this environment and the 
perturbations created by the escalating sectarian violence, which triggered the 
group’s formation. 
 
The history of the creation of the PIRA highlights the meetings and communications 
between the dissenting members and former members of the Belfast Brigade. It 
highlights their concerns about what was happening in Belfast and their shared 
belief that the current direction of the IRA had failed the Catholics in that city. Thus, 
the ability of these individuals to communicate and their beliefs, were central to the 
creation of the PIRA. Likewise, the Belfast units who defected to the PIRA also 
shared the common experiences of the events of 1969 with those who formed the 
PIRA. Although not documented in the histories used within this thesis, it is 
probable they also shared the belief the old IRA had failed the Catholics of Belfast.  
 
The environment, combined with homophily and geographic proximity, played a 
significant role in the creation of the PIRA. Geographic proximity facilitated their 
ability to communicate. The violence gave cause for those who opposed Goulding’s 
political strategy for the organisation to argue the approach was flawed. This 
argument found support in Belfast because those in Belfast shared the same 
experience and based on this experience drew the same conclusions. They had 
come to the belief, the only effective strategy to defend the Catholics of their 
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community, was to counter violence with violence. Those who formed the PIRA in 
Belfast, as previously stated, were known to each other, and had a long history with 
the IRA. In the current environment of increasing violence, this group defined 
themselves not initially as Republicans but as the defenders of their community. 
This simple definition created greater social affinity or homophily with those in the 
Catholic enclaves in Belfast, who also wished to defend and protect their families. 
As Wilhelmsen has argued, war or crisis has the capacity to radicalise a community 
and draw it together.651 The failure of the Northern Irish and British governments to 
protect this community left a vacuum, which the PIRA, in the absence of any other 
viable group, was able to fill. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
Membership of the PIRA, at the time of the split with the IRA, was only small with 
around 50 members. The membership of the group grew, especially in Belfast, 
behind the barriers of the “no go” areas, which had created safe havens for the 
OIRA and PIRA. The membership of the organisation peaked around 1500, by 1972. 
The increasing levels of violence in Northern Ireland also saw an increase in the 
membership of the PIRA. The PIRA membership did not increase as rapidly in 
Derry/Londonderry or in the conservative rural areas. Due to the perception among 
Catholics, that the IRA had failed them in August 1969 there was greater affinity or 
homophily towards the PIRA in Belfast. The IRA’s support of the protestors during 
the Battle of the Bogside, had created greater affinity or homophily with the 
organisation than existed in Belfast. The two cities had differing perceptions of the 
IRA. As such, the OIRA attracted the greater number of recruits in that city, than the 
PIRA. In Derry/Londonderry, the OIRA was the dominant Republican organisation. 
The conservatism of the rural areas of Northern Ireland resulted in most of the old 
IRA aligning with the OIRA in this period. Thus, the environmental conditions had 
created greater affinity or homophily between the Catholic community with the 
Republican movement. This affinity had led to an increase in membership. The 
651  Wilhelmsen, "When Separatists become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya," p 10. 
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affinity or homophily with the two Republican organisations, the PIRA or OIRA, was 
dependent on the environmental conditions at the specific geographic location. It 
was determined there was a direct relationship between environment and 
homophily, the greater the homophily, the greater the number of recruits. 
The environmental conditions changed within Northern Ireland in mid-1972. 
Operation Motorman denied the Northern Irish paramilitaries of their safe havens, 
internment ended, and the OIRA declared a ceasefire, which it effectively 
maintained until the end of The Troubles. This resulted in the PIRA expanding into 
areas previously loyal to the OIRA. The PIRA were able to establish substantial units 
in areas previously dominated by the OIRA. This occurred because those who 
wished to continue the Republican struggle had few options left. The PIRA was the 
larger and the more successful of the remaining Republican groups. 
 
After 1972, the British changed tactics, defining the counter terrorism effort in law 
enforcement terms and successfully increased their intelligence collection efforts. 
The British had also been able to infiltrate the PIRA because the vetting of the new 
members, prior to 1972, had been poor. In this environment, it became hazardous 
for the PIRA to maintain a large number of members. Furthermore, in the 1980s 
they also adopted a dual strategy of an armed struggle combined with a political 
approach. In response to the changes in their operational environment, the PIRA 
reduced its membership to around 700 members. This membership level remained 
constant until the end of The Troubles in the late 1990s. Therefore, adverse changes 
in the environment in which the PIRA operated restricted the size of the 
organisation, not due to a lack of homophily with the Catholic community, but due 
to the hazards of maintaining a large organisation. This again reinforces the 
relationship between the size of the organisational structure and the environment 
in which it operates. 
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To conclude, in this case, there was a relationship between homophily, the PESTELO 
environment and the size of the group. Furthermore, in this case the PESTELO 
environment was a limiting factor on group size. 
H3a The structure of any group emerges over time. 
When the PIRA first emerged, in late 1969, it utilised the structure it had inherited 
from the IRA. The structure evolved to accommodate the increasing membership. 
This evolution involved creating new units to accommodate the increasing 
membership. These units were added to the existing organisational structure. This 
structure was based on areas of regional control, with the brigades and battalions 
being given areas of regional responsibility. When elements of the OIRA defected to 
the PIRA, they were absorbed into the existing structure. When new areas aligned 
with the PIRA, which had no pre-existing presence, the PIRA created new units and 
defined their area of responsibility. 
 
The structure of the PIRA also evolved to accommodate the changing 
environmental conditions, but this evolution was within the existing structure. This 
evolution occurred at the tactical level of the organisation, with the tactical 
elements adopting a cellular structure, abandoning the traditional military unit 
organisation it started with. These cells or ASUs were assigned to the various 
brigades or battalions. 
 
When the PIRA split from the IRA, it maintained the existing organisational structure 
of the Belfast Brigade. As the size of the organisation grew, new units were added 
to the existing structure. In response to changes in the PESTELO environment, the 
structure of the group adapted, by adopting a cellular organisation at the tactical 
level of the group, but continued to maintain the brigades and battalions, which 
oversaw the activities of the lower levels of the organisation. 
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H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
The PIRA maintained a traditional military organisational structure throughout The 
Troubles. The organisation was overseen by the General Army Council, which met 
infrequently, but set the strategic direction of the organisation. It had a General 
Headquarters, which was responsible for the operational aspects of the group, such 
as financing, engineering, logistics, training, security etc. The PIRA also divided 
Ireland into two commands Northern and Southern. Northern Command was 
responsible for the management of the conflict zone defined by the six counties of 
Northern Ireland and the adjoining counties in the Irish Republic. The Southern 
Command was responsible for the remainder of the Irish Republic. Southern 
Command acted in a support role for Northern Command, housing weapons dumps 
and being a safe area for training. The division of the PIRA into commands was an 
acknowledgement of the differing environmental conditions in each location. This 
structure permitted the PIRA to exploit these conditions to its advantage. 
 
The PIRA used a regional based structure in which it defined the areas of 
responsibility of the brigades and battalions. This structure provided two 
advantages. Firstly, the brigades were responsible for a city or county and a level of 
operational independence. This meant the brigades could exploit the unique 
PESTELO environmental conditions to their advantage. The only constraint was that 
they operated within the strategic framework of the group. Secondly, the PIRA 
avoided using technologies like the telephone system for communications and 
relied heavily on one on one communications. This was out of fear of these 
channels being unsecure and thus compromised. The regional structure shortened 
its lines of communications, allowing information to flow quickly and securely in 
person.  
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The brigades were the regional administrative unit. Each brigade had between 1-3 
battalions under it. Each battalion managed a number of companies and later ASUs. 
Each battalion was allocated and operated in a part of the brigade’s area of 
responsibility. The units, which formed part of the battalion, planned and 
conducted their own operations. These types of activities required a significant level 
of communications between the elements involved in the operation, to plan and 
undertake. Thus, at the lower levels of the organisation, the structure considerably 
reduced the length of the lines of communications. These shorter lines of 
communications were more secure and permitted the exchange of larger amounts 
of information.  
 
At this time, the “no go” areas provided the PIRA with safe havens. These safe 
havens provided members of the PIRA the freedom to move unhindered, which 
ensured the security of the communications channels. Once these “no go” areas 
were removed by the British in 1972, the environment in which communications 
took place, had changed. Communications between the various low level elements 
of the group became more difficult. It was in this time the PIRA, at the tactical level, 
devolved into a cellular organisation, based on the ASU. Some have suggested this 
was a planned reorganisation. Others have suggested this change was a result of 
the changes in the PESTELO environment, which had reduced the security and 
bandwidth of these channels. The reduction of the bandwidth had isolated the 
lower levels of the organisation from the core of the group, the brigades, and 
battalions, effectively turning them into cells. South Armagh Brigade was the 
exception, as it was the only group to maintain the previous organisational 
structure. This argument has some credence as the South Armagh Brigade 
maintained its battalions and companies; it did not adopt the ASU. The South 
Armagh Brigade was unaffected by Operation Motorman. It operated in an area, 
which had strong Republican sympathies, and the security forces were hesitant to 
enter or operate. Thus, the South Armagh Brigade operated in a safe haven. Its 
communications channels were not threatened in the same manner as those 
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operating in Belfast or Derry/Londonderry. Therefore, it was able to maintain its 
centralised command and control structure. 
 
The prior discussions highlighted, in the case of the PIRA, there was a relationship 
between the PESTELO environment and homophily. Likewise, the high levels of 
homophily increased the PIRA’s pool of recruits. As the size of the PIRA increased, 
the increase was accommodated within the existing structure through either 
absorbing the new members into existing units or creating new ones. The loss of the 
PIRA’s safe havens in 1972 resulted in a decline in the membership of the PIRA. The 
loss of the safe havens created a harsher environment in which the PIRA had to 
operate. In this environment, it was more difficult to sustain secure lines of 
communications. This change in the environment made it more hazardous to 
maintain a complex organisational structure with a large number of members. It 
adapted by decentralising the tactical elements of the group. The organisational 
environment also changed when the PIRA abandoned a purely military approach for 
a dual political and military strategy. Thus, the size and structure of the PIRA 
adapted to the changing PESTELO environment.  
 
There is insufficient data to permit an analysis to determine whether the cognitive 
limits of the human brain, as proposed by Dunbar, was a factor, which influenced 
the structure of the group. In addition, one case study would not provide definitive 
findings for a generalisation. 
 
At the time of emergence, the PIRA utilised the pre-existing structure within the 
IRA. The structure of the PIRA evolved to meet the challenges of the PESTELO 
environment over its life. This structure reflected the geographic dispersion of the 
group to manage the information exchange over extended lines of communications. 
In the initial environmental conditions, the safe havens created by the “no go” 
areas, protected the operational and tactical lines of communications, permitting 
the PIRA to maintain a hierarchical structure. The harshening of the PESTELO 
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environment, in 1972 after Operation Motorman, reduced the capacity of the 
tactical elements of the PIRA to communicate, devolving the tactical elements of 
the group into a cellular organisation. The environmental conditions varied across 
Northern Ireland, and the PIRA structure varied with the PESTELO environment. The 
environment had a significant influence on group structure. The environment also 
created a pool of recruits and limited the group’s capacity to absorb these potential 
members safely. As such, not all those who wanted to join, could. 
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Case Study 3 – The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
Chapter 14 - Historical Background 
The area of the Balkans known today as Kosovo has a long history. It dates from 
classical antiquity, as a province within the Roman Empire. After the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire, the Kosovo region was absorbed into the remaining 
Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium.652 As the power of the Byzantine Empire 
declined, the Kosovo region was incorporated into the Medieval Serbian Empire, 
where it became a central part of Serbian social identity and religious culture.653 
Kosovo was seen by Serbs as the “…cradle of the Serb nation”.654 It was the home of 
the Medieval Serbian Orthodox Church with the “See” established at Pec in 1297.655 
In 1389, the expanding Ottoman Empire defeated the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo 
and took control of the area. By 1455, the Ottomans had completed their conquest 
of Serbia and Kosovo, laying the foundation for the events in the 1990s. 
 
The ethnic mix of Kosovo, prior to the area coming under Ottoman control, is 
unknown and open to debate.656 Under Ottoman rule, Albanian speakers became 
the dominant ethnic group within Kosovo. The Habsburgs briefly controlled this 
region between 1686 and 1690. With their withdrawal from the region, many Serbs 
left the area. Tens of thousands of Serbs departed Kosovo leading to a decline in the 
Serbian population.657 The Serbs knew this period as the Great Migration, which 
obtained mythological importance in the Serbian cultural identity. The Albanians 
occupied the vacated Serbian lands within Kosovo.658 
652 Benedict Weiss, Collapse Theory: Yugoslavia, state according to needs  (Portal Dpmovinski rat, 2011), p 30 - 31. 
653 Ibid. 
654 Robert Bideleux, "History Today: Kosovo Conflict," History Today Ltd, http://www.historytoday.com/robert-
bideleux/kosovos-conflict  
655 Ibid. 
656 Paul A Cohen, History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis  (New York: Columbia Universty Press, 
2014), p 8. 
657 Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide  (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p 70. 
658 Cohen, History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis: p 8. 
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Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Serbs rose up in revolt against Ottoman 
rule, at times supported by the Austrians or the Russians. By 1817, the Serbs had 
won a degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule.659 In 1830, the Ottomans granted 
Serbia full autonomy as a principality.660 The Napoleonic Wars had changed the 
political landscape in Europe and in the Balkans. By 1844, there existed a movement 
to recreate Serbia with its old medieval borders.661 This new Serbian state would 
include Kosovo and Bosnia, which remained under Ottoman rule. Serbian 
independence was recognised in the 1878 treaty of San Stefano, which concluded 
the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.662 The treaty of San Stefano rewrote the borders 
of the Balkans. Many European powers were dissatisfied by the treaty, which was 
amended by the treaty of Berlin in mid-1878. Under the treaty, the Ottomans ceded 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austrians.663 This treaty also stifled the growth of 
nationalism within the Balkans, especially Serbian desires to recover territory, which 
they perceived to be part of a Greater Serbia, which included Kosovo.664 
 
In the early part of the 20th Century, relations between Austria and Serbia were in a 
state of decline. Austria’s annexation of Bosnia in 1908, did not improve the 
relations between the two nations.665 The recovery of Kosovo, by the Serbs, had 
become a national mission.666 In 1912-13, Serbia engaged in the two Balkan wars, 
which saw the Ottomans driven from Europe. One result of these wars was, Serbia’s 
recovery of Kosovo, but this deepened the rift between Serbia and the Austrians. 
Austria forced the Serbs to give up its conquest of Albania.667 The Austrians who 
were once allies of Serbia were now rivals. The Austrians saw the Serbs as an 
659 "Timeline: Serbia,"  (2012). 
660 Ferdinand Schevill, History of the Balkans  (Ozymandias Press, 2016), Kindle Locations 4837 - 38. 
661Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski, eds., Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p 16., p 16 
662 Schevill, History of the Balkans: Kindle Locations 6036 - 54. 
663 Ibid., Kindle Locations 6915 - 23. 
664 Bieber and Daskalovski, Understanding the War in Kosovo, p 14. 
665 Schevill, History of the Balkans: Kindle Locations 6936 - 43. 
666 Bieber and Daskalovski, Understanding the War in Kosovo, p 17., p 17 
667 Schevill, History of the Balkans: Kindle Locations 7140 - 225. 
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obstacle to their expansion in the east. This rivalry was one of the factors, which 
caused the First World War, triggered by the assassination of Austrian Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, by the Serbian Black Hand, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. 
In the First World War, the Serbians achieved some initial successes in the first 
battles of the war, although the combined forces of Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria 
overwhelmed Serbia, in late 1915. The remnants of the Serbian Army retreated, on 
27 November 1915, to the Adriatic Sea and evacuated to Corfu by the Italian and 
French Navies. 
 
Serbia lost approximately 627,000 soldiers and civilians in the First World War from 
a pre-war population of 5 million.668 As a part of the treaty of Versailles, Kosovo 
became part of the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and the Slovenes, which was 
renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. Between 1918 and 1920, the Serbs 
forced thousands of Kosovars off their land in Kosovo, most of who went to Turkey. 
The Serbs colonised the vacated land with Serbian colonists, although the Serbs 
remained in the minority. There were further plans, just prior to the Second World 
War, to force hundreds of thousands of Kosovars to migrate to Turkey. The Yugoslav 
government had successfully completed negotiations with Turkey to accept these 
people, but the war intervened and nothing came of the plan. 
 
In 1939, Italy invaded Albania and in 1941, the Germans invaded Yugoslavia. As part 
of the administration of the new territory, the Germans ceded the southern two 
thirds of Kosovo to Italy. Italy administered Kosovo as part of a united Albania. 
Some Kosovars saw the Axis powers as liberators, not as oppressors.669 It freed 
Kosovo from the control and oppression of Belgrade and Belgrade’s pre-war plan to 
colonise Kosovo with Serbs. As such, there was little support within Kosovo for 
groups with the goal of liberating Kosovo. In addition, the main opposition groups 
to the Axis occupation were predominately Serb. This was problematic for those 
668 John Ellis and Michael Cox, The World War I Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for all Combatants  (London: Aurum 
Press Ltd, 2001), p 269. 
669 Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War  (London: University of California Press, 1999), p 287. 
Stuart Groombridge  275 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
Kosovars wishing to oppose the Axis powers. Clark illustrated this point, he stated 
that the “…major obstacle to the growth of a resistance movement in Kosovo was 
the prevalent anti-Serb feeling.”670 
 
The Kosovars exploited this early period of the occupation, by displacing the Serbian 
colonists of the 1920s and 1930s.671 The enthusiasm with which the Kosovars 
engaged in this activity alarmed both the Italians and Germans.672 From 1941 to the 
liberation of Yugoslavia, Kosovars periodically engaged in attacks on the Serbian 
inhabitants of Kosovo driving many Serbs out of the province. Estimates of the 
number of Serbs driven out of Kosovo in this period are unclear; the figures vary 
between a few tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.673 
 
Opposition to the occupation of Albania and Kosovo did not catalyse until 1942. The 
Balli Kombtëtar (BK) or the National Front was an Albanian organisation. An 
organisation created to resist Axis occupation of the combined state of Albania and 
Kosovo. Its goal was to drive out the Italians, but maintain the union of the two 
entities. The second group, also founded in 1942, was Lëvizja Nacional Çlirimtare 
(LNÇ) or the National Liberation Front. Unlike the BK, which was a Nationalist group 
with moderately leftist ideology674, the LNÇ was a group that embraced a communist 
ideology. The LNÇ did not share the BK’s goal of a greater Albania, which included 
Kosovo. The Yugoslav communists’ (who controlled the LNÇ) goal was to reinstate 
Yugoslavia, within its original boundaries. Although the groups originally maintain a 
fragile alliance, this was broken in 1943 when the LNÇ, acted on instructions to 
destroy the BK. The destruction of the BK was justified by suggesting the group 
possessed fascist leanings. 
 
670 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo  (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p 29. 
671 Tim Judah, Kosovo: What everyone needs to know  (New York: Oxford  University Press, 2008), p 44. 
672 Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo: p 29. 
673 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War: p 287. 
674 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A short History  (London: Pan Books, 2002). 
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With the Italian Collapse in 1943, the Germans quickly moved to occupy the Italian 
Balkan territories. The German occupation did not differ from that of the Italians. At 
times, the Germans attempted to raise local forces for territorial protection, 
releasing their troops for deployment elsewhere, but these efforts met with limited 
success. Those forces raised by the Germans did not attract large numbers of 
recruits, and those recruits it did attract, progressively deserted as the war 
progressed. 
 
The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) also cultivated Kosovars in the 
struggle against the Germans and they were initially successful. When the British 
Government decided to support Tito’s Communist Partisans675, the British 
abandoned the small number of Kosovar recruits, which Tito’s Partisans later 
eliminated. Tito not only fought the Axis powers, but also rival groups who could 
potentially challenge Tito for power at the war’s conclusion. There was also little 
support for Tito’s Partisans in Kosovo, very few Kosovars joined his organisation. 
Most Kosovars saw Tito’s Partisans as being a predominantly Serbian organisation676 
and were reluctant to fight with their perceived historical oppressors. 
 
As the Axis powers retreated from Kosovo, Tito’s Yugoslav partisans occupied 
Kosovo and Kosovars rose up in opposition. Tito’s partisans quashed the uprising 
with military force and Albanian sources claimed they executed 36,000 Kosovars for 
their involvement.677 At the end of the Second World War, there was a general 
mistrust of Kosovars because of the perception, among the victorious communists, 
of Kosovo’s support for the Axis powers. Kosovar communists had argued for 
Kosovo independence based on self-determination, one of the principles of 
international communism, these appeals were ignored. Yugoslavia integrated 
Kosovo into the state, not as an independent republic, but as a province within the 
Republic of Serbia. 
675 Ibid. 
676 Ibid. 
677 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War: p 287. 
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In 1948, Yugoslavia split with the Soviet Union. The split occurred for many reasons; 
the Soviets’ discomfort regarding Yugoslavia’s expansionist policies in the Balkans, 
the proposed placement of Yugoslav troops in Albania to protect against a possible 
Greek incursion, the support of Greek communists, the perception the Yugoslavs 
were following a nationalist form of socialism, which aligned with the Soviets’ 
internationalist agenda. The Yugoslav split with the Soviet Union did have benefits; 
it provided Yugoslavia with access to the Marshall Plan and United States financial 
support.  
The end of the war was not a positive outcome for the Kosovars, due to the mistrust 
of Kosovars because of their alignment with the Axis powers during the war. This 
resulted in a period of repression, which was to lay the seeds of events in the 1990s.  
 
The split with Stalin also created a split with Albania, creating a mistrust of Kosovars 
who were seen as fifth columnists, who could potentially undermine the integrity of 
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The Interior Minister of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar 
Ranković of Serbian birth, engaged in a policy of repression in Kosovo. During this 
time, the local communist party was dominated by Serbs. Various aspects of the 
Muslim faith were suppressed, these included Mosque Schools, Sharia Law and the 
wearing of the veil. There was no significant federal investment in Kosovo until 
1957. The worst period of oppression in Kosovo occurred in the period 1953-1956, 
in which Ranković678 encouraged 200,000 Kosovars to immigrate to Turkey. As part 
of the planned repatriation, Serbian and Montenegrin colonists replaced the 
departing Kosovars.679 During Ranković’s time in Kosovo, Kosovars were 
systematically persecuted, many being “...arrested and tried for political offences 
and other alleged crimes”.680 
 
678 Ranković was a senior member of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Serbian by birth, and was First Minister of the Interior. 
679 Klejda Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 
12 (2008): p 1105. 
680 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War: p 289. 
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Ranković was removed from office in 1966. With his removal, there were calls for a 
Kosovar Republic, which was supported by student protests in 1968 (Mulaj 2008).681 
Tito visited Kosovo in 1967 and admitted that mistakes had been made, 
acknowledging the Serbs had received preferential treatment in employment. The 
Kosovo provincial government was given more autonomy. Secondary schools were 
set up and Albanian, which had been banned as a teaching language, was given 
equality with Serbian, which had been the only language used in schools up to this 
time. By 1968, Kosovars also became the majority ethnic group within the provincial 
communist party. These changes were positive for the Kosovar community, but 
were not universally embraced by the Serbian community within Kosovo. 
 
In 1969 and 1971, constitutional reforms recognised Kosovo as a territorial entity.682 
In 1974, further constitutional reform created Kosovo as an autonomous province 
within the Republic of Serbia. Part of these reforms was that, the presidency of 
Yugoslavia rotated between the various republics and autonomous provinces. This 
was a significant change. Though Kosovo was not recognised as a republic, it had all 
the rights of a republic, excluding the right to secede. Like previous reforms, these 
changes undermined the Kosovo’s Serbian population’s sense of confidence and 
security in Kosovo or Serbia.  
 
Yugoslavia, throughout the cold war era, received financial support from the 
Western allies and the Soviets. Yugoslavia, unlike other communist countries, 
permitted its citizens to travel freely outside the country. The freedom of travel 
created positive benefits for Yugoslavia. A result of this policy was a growing 
Kosovar diaspora in Germany and Switzerland. The growing diaspora sent money 
home to support families in Yugoslavia. The influx of foreign currency bolstered the 
Yugoslav economy.  
 
681 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1105. 
682 Besnik Pula, "The emergence of the Kosovo “parallel state,” 1988–1992," Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism 
and Ethnicity 32, no. 4 (2004): p 801. 
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The constitutional reforms to education, of the 1960s and 1970s, created 
educational opportunities within Kosovar, which previously had not existed. The 
founding of the University of Pristina led to the emergence of a new educated class 
amongst the Kosovars, which was previously non-existent. This educated class was 
to take a leading role in oppositions to Milošević in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Many of the reforms in Kosovo were positive, although the reforms failed to 
alleviate the underlying ethnic and economic issues within Kosovo. The oil price 
shocks of the 1970s placed great stress on the Yugoslav economy, causing conflict 
between the republics, such as Croatia and Slovenia, who had well developed 
economies, and other parts of Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo, whose economic 
development was funded by these successes.683 
 
Tito was the personification of Yugoslav unity. After he passed away in May 1980, 
there was no figure or heir apparent within the Yugoslav political system to fill the 
political vacuum. In his place, the republics and autonomous provinces 
administered Yugoslavia. They shared the rotating presidency of the nation. 
Yugoslavia, with the death of Tito, lost the one person who could mediate the 
disputes that arose between the republics or could remove individuals who 
hindered change. The various republics and autonomous provinces bickered 
amongst themselves and in many instances, these representatives worked solely for 
the benefit of their own republic or autonomous province, not for Yugoslavia as a 
whole. Serbia saw the passing of Tito as an opportunity to redress its grievances 
with the 1974 constitution. Many Serbians saw Tito’s changes to the constitution, 
which gave Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy, as part of Tito’s plan to reduce 
Serbian influence within Yugoslavia.  
 
In this political environment, a minor demonstration (in 1981) initiated by a dispute 
over the quality of the food served at the University of Prishtina in Kosovo, grew 
beyond the initial catalyst. Many in Prishtina joined the student protest. The result 
683 Ibid., p 801 - 02. 
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was that and other grievances became intertwined. Some elements involved in the 
protest called for republic status for Kosovo and others called for Kosovo unification 
with Albania.684 The Yugoslav government’s heavy-handed response to the protest 
did not defuse the situation. The protests were supressed with force, resulting in 
2000 arrests and 1200 convictions leading to substantial sentences.685 Furthermore, 
there were also recriminations within the communist party with some 500 
members losing their membership.686 The protest unsettled many Serbs. The heavy-
handed suppression of the protest, the mass arrest, and harsh sentences handed 
down by the courts, radicalised many Kosovars. 
 
In 1982, many of those arrested and sentenced for their involvement in the riots of 
1981, were released from custody. A significant portion preferred exile in Germany, 
Switzerland, and other countries, rather than staying in Yugoslavia. These activists 
formed the embryonic beginnings of the groups, which would eventually bring 
about Kosovo’s independence. 
 
The protest had unsettled the Yugoslav leadership. The Provincial Secretary of 
Internal Affairs claimed that there were 30 large radical Kosovar groups operating in 
Kosovo.687 He further claimed that some of these groups were supported by Albania. 
Political leaders in Serbia feared matters were getting out of control and attempted, 
with little success, to have the 1974 Constitutional reforms reviewed.  
 
Matters between Serbs and Kosovars declined further during the 1980s. Kosovo 
Serbs made claims of human rights violations by the Kosovars, including assaults 
and rape. Many of the claims made, regarding crimes committed by Kosovars 
against the Kosovo Serbs, are not supported by the criminal statistics collected at 
the time. In fact, the rates of murder and rape within Kosovo were less than in other 
684 Malcolm, Kosovo: A short History. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. 
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parts of Yugoslavia.688 Irrespective of the reliability of the claims made by Kosovo 
Serbs, nationalist Serbian political leaders seized upon these claims, as these 
allegations suited their nationalistic agenda. It reinforced their view Kosovo Serbs 
were being persecuted by Kosovars and the only solution to this issue was for 
Kosovo’s autonomy to be stripped and for Kosovo to once again come under the 
administration of Belgrade. 
 
In 1986, a group of Serbian academics presented a petition to the governments of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia demanding actions on the alleged atrocities committed on 
Serbs by Kosovars in Kosovo. The petition contained some 215 signatures.689 Later 
that year, the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts published a Memorandum690, 
known as the Cosic Memorandum: 
 
The Cosic memorandum demanded that Kosovo’s autonomy be revoked. 
Cosic viewed autonomy as a pit-stop on the path to independence. The 
memorandum demanded protection for the 40 percent of Serbs living outside 
of Serbia proper—in Kosovo, Croatia’s Krajina, and Eastern Bosnia. Echoing 
demands of the Serbian Orthodox Church, it called for the protection of 
Serbia’s Orthodox heritage in “Old Serbia.” Cosic made the case for Serbia’s 
domination of Yugoslavia, equating nationalism with Serbian dignity.691 
 
Slobodan Milošević , who at the time, was a fairly minor Serbian Communist Party 
official, utilised the content of the Memorandum for his own political benefit. 
Milošević, at a rally in early 1987, called for a reduction in Kosovo’s autonomy. By 
688 Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo. 
689 David L Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention  (NBC Publishing. Kindle Edition., 2012), Kindle 
Locations 637-41. 
690 Commonly referred to as the Ćosić Memorandum, although Dobrica Ćosić was not one of the authors.  
"Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum," Roy Rosenzweig Center for History & New Media, 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/674. 
691 ———, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Locations 645-49. 
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the end of 1987, Milošević had become president of the Serbia League of 
Communists.692  
 
Milošević, in 1988, proposed a number of reforms to reduce the autonomy of 
Kosovo, which were passed by the Serbian National Assembly. Following these 
reforms, Milošević was able to obtain the dismissal of two leading Kosovars in the 
Communist Party, who were opposed to Kosovo’s reintegration into Serbia. These 
two political figures were replaced with others who were willing to assist Milošević 
in the removal of Kosovo’s autonomy. In 1989, Milošević revoked Kosovo’s 
autonomy.693 This action resulted in protests within Kosovo. The miners from Trepča 
marched on Priština and with the support of local students, stayed outside the local 
party headquarters. Within Serbia, a counter protest was arranged. At this protest, 
Milošević spoke to the protestors, reinforcing Serbia’s claims over Kosovo. Milošević 
exploited the protest by the Serbs for his own political advantage.   
 
The loss of Kosovo’s autonomy was followed by a policy of serbianising the 
government institutions of Kosovo, including the education system.694 This action 
provoked mass protests within Kosovo, which resulted in a state of emergency 
being declared, allowing Yugoslav troops to enter Kosovo to quell the protests and 
arrest those involved. The protests continued into 1990 with the state of emergency 
only being lifted in April. At this time, many Kosovar school children were admitted 
to hospital with stomach pains, although the cause was never conclusively 
determined, Kosovars believed their children had been poisoned by Serbs. This 
triggered revenge attacks on the homes of Kosovo Serbs. Belgrade sent 25,000 
Serbian police to Kosovo to re-establish order. 
 
Belgrade also introduced the “Programme for the Realization of Peace and 
Prosperity in Kosovo”. Under this program, Serbian money was used to build new 
692 Malcolm, Kosovo: A short History. 
693 Ibid.  
694 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1105. 
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homes for previously displaced Kosovo Serbs. Kosovars were encouraged to seek 
work outside of Kosovo, family planning was introduced for Kosovars who were not 
permitted to buy or sell property without the approval of the state. In mid-1990, 
further measures were introduced which included the banning of Albanian language 
newspapers, the closing of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Science, and the mass 
dismissal of Kosovar state employees who would not take the Oath of Allegiance to 
Serbia. Limits were also placed on the number of Kosovars who could undertake 
Higher Education695, and the Serbian Security Forces replaced the Kosovar Police 
force. Finally, in July, the Kosovar Provincial Government was permanently 
dissolved by Belgrade. In September, Serbia adopted a new constitution, which 
enshrined Kosovo as an indivisible part of Serbia. A state of emergency was 
declared in Kosovo and the Serbs deployed 80,000 military and paramilitary troops 
to Kosovo. These forces engaged in a policy of repression through harassment, the 
conduct of house searches, arbitrary arrests, and detention. 
 
The Kosovars opposed the imposition of Serbian rule. In 1991, under the shadow of 
the military intervention in the province, an unofficial referendum was held in 
Kosovo where Kosovars voted to leave the Yugoslav Republic. The referendum 
resulted in overwhelming support for independence, with a 99% voter turnout and 
87% in favour. In October, Kosovo declared its independence from Yugoslavia and 
Serbia. Government elections followed in 1992, Kosovars voted for the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK)), under the leadership of 
Ibrahim Rugova.696 Thus, a parallel system of government was set up in Kosovo, with 
its own administrative, education and medical systems. The LDK maintained its own 
tax system to finance the parallel bodies, 3% was levied on local Kosovar businesses 
and the government in exile, levied 3% on 500,000 Kosovars who worked abroad.697 
Rugova engaged in a policy of passive resistance, seeing armed struggle as futile. 
695 The intake of Kosovars into university was reduced from 40,000 to 18,000. 
Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. 
696 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1106. 
697  Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Locations 1188-89. 
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The LDK set up parallel governmental organisations and sought international 
support.698 The Kosovar government received limited support from Western 
governments; few viewed its independence as a viable option. Concurrent with the 
demands for Kosovar independence, the Western democracies were also 
contending with issues surrounding the war in Bosnia. As such, the international 
community did not consider Kosovo a high foreign policy priority.699 
  
698 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1107. 
699 Ibid. 
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Chapter 15 - The Environment – Kosovo Prior to the Uprising 
Political 
Since the end of the Second World War, there had been a consistent view amongst 
Kosovars, that either Kosovo should be permitted to unify with Albania, or Kosovo 
should be a republic within Yugoslavia. During the period from the end of the war, 
to the mid-1950s, there had been an ongoing policy, within elements of the 
Yugoslav government, to encourage the Kosovars to leave Kosovo and immigrate to 
Turkey. During this period, various organisations arose to work towards the goal of 
unification with Albania. The majority of these Kosovar organisations were 
underground movements and purposely so, due to Yugoslav laws, which prohibited 
any discussion of secession. Kosovar nationalist disenchantment with the status of 
Kosovo culminated in 1968 with demonstrations within Kosovo, which called for 
either greater autonomy within Yugoslavia or unification with Albania. 
 
In 1974, Kosovo was granted greater autonomy, not as a republic, but as an 
autonomous province within Serbia. Kosovo was not the only benefactor of the 
reforms of 1974. There had been increasing pressure within the republics to 
mitigate the perception of Serbian influence within the nation. To appease the 
various nationalities, Tito gave autonomy to the various republics and the provinces 
of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which formed part of Serbia. Although appeasing the 
Croats and Slovenes, the granting of autonomy by the Yugoslav leadership to 
Kosovo, fell short of republic status within Yugoslavia. Republic status would have 
been recognition of Kosovo as a nation of people on par with the other republics 
within Yugoslavia.700  
 
The new constitution did not please the Serbs, who had a historical connection to 
Kosovo, and viewed the granting of autonomy as diluting their historical right to the 
province. The reforms of 1974 were to lay the foundation of the disintegration of 
700 A.R. Bekaj, "The K.L.A. and the Kosovo War: From Intra State Conflict to Independent Country," (Berlin: Berghof Conflict 
Research, 2010), p 10. 
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Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As part of the constitutional reforms, many senior positions 
within the government rotated between the various republic and autonomous 
provinces, when disagreements arose they were mediated by Tito.701 With the 
passing away of Tito, the presidency of Yugoslavia was managed in a similar 
manner. The presidency rotated between the various republics and autonomous 
provinces, but with Tito gone, it lacked a body to mediate any disputes. 
Tito 
Since the end of the Second World War, Tito had been a stabilising influence within 
Yugoslavia. He suppressed the nationalist aspirations of the various republics. His 
death in 1980 left a political vacuum. It was also a time in which other European 
nationalists, under Soviet rule, were attempting to assert their national identities.702 
With Tito now gone, major decisions had to be reached via consensus between the 
leaders of the republics.703 The leadership of Yugoslavia was shared between the 
republics, through a rotational process, where each republic assumed the 
presidential role for a period time. Within the various republics, there was a rising 
tide of nationalism, which was fanned by the local leaders. In this environment, 
consensus was difficult to achieve, and those decisions made by the leadership of 
Yugoslavia, were almost impossible to impose at a regional level. 
Milošević 
Milošević was a populist leader who exploited the latent nationalism of the Serbs 
and the historical myths of the importance of Kosovo to the Serbs as people, which 
had been suppressed by the Communist Party and Tito. He came to power in a time 
of significant political and economic change within Serbia and Yugoslavia as a 
whole. The majority of Serbs had been born and grown up within and under the 
socialist regime of Tito, which brought with it a level of economic certainty. 
Nationalists were also suppressed under the Tito regime, in an attempt to create a 
701"Yugoslav Government,"  http://www.countriesquest.com/europe/yugoslavia/government.htm  
702 Jr. Perritt, Henry H., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtissaari Plan  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p 25. 
703 "Yugoslav Government". 
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unified country out of people with differing cultural and religious backgrounds. 
Milošević acquired power when these certainties were evaporating under the 
transition to a free market economy, which was an attempt by the Federal 
Government to revitalise the Yugoslav economy. Milošević also resisted the move 
by the other republics to turn Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of states. He 
saw Yugoslavia as a nation, where Serbia was politically dominant. As part of this 
goal, he also espoused the reintegration of the independent provinces of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina, back under Serbian control. The New York Times describes Milošević 
as a skilful politician who exploited the Kosovo myth for his own political ends. 
 
“In private conversations with foreign visitors, Milosevic was prone to 
dismiss Serbia's ancient obsession as "bullshit," yet he cleverly moulded it to 
his political purposes. His propaganda cultivated a popular sense of 
victimization at the hands of foreigners. That was the source of his strength, 
apart from his consummate capacity for lying, intrigue, and secrecy.”704 
 
The integration of these two previously independent provinces back into Serbia, 
created serious concerns for the other Yugoslavian republics, which had significant 
minority Serbian populations within their borders. Along with Serbian resistance to 
the reform of Yugoslavia politically and economically, the act of reintegrating 
Kosovo and Vojvodina into the Serbian republic, directly led to the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the three wars that ensued in the 1990s.705 Milošević maintained his 
grip on power in Serbia throughout the 1990s, by controlling the media, suppressing 
political opposition, and forming strategic alliances with other political parties. Once 
Yugoslavia started to disintegrate and his popularity waned, Milošević maintained 
control over the Serb population through force.   
 
704Louis Branson and Dusko Doder, "Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant " New York Times on the Web: Books(1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/b/branson-milosevic.html. 
705 Nicholas Miller, Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture, ed. Richard Frucht (Santa Barbara: ABC-
CIO Inc, 2005), p 529-82. 
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“…by 1990, men of talent and substance began issuing warnings that 
Milosevic was leading the whole of Yugoslavia into disaster. His popularity 
had plunged; a huge crowd of demonstrators burned a large photograph of 
Milosevic in central Belgrade on June 13, 1990, shouting: "Red Bandits" and 
"Out with the Communists." And the man who had promised the Serbs three 
years earlier that "No one will ever dare beat you again!" now sent 
thousands of police with truncheons and tear gas against them…”706 
Economic 
Within Kosovo from the end of the Second World War, the majority of the Kosovar 
population was bound to the land either as peasant labourers, or as part of the 
working class. Throughout the recorded history of Kosovo, the Kosovar economy 
has relied on two industries, agriculture and mining. Under the Ottomans, Kosovo 
was a source of timber, cereals, and meat for the empire. In the interwar years, 
Kosovo was seen as a cheap source of raw materials, which sold outside of Kosovo. 
There was little effort on the part of the Yugoslav government to develop industries 
which could value add to these products by turning them into goods that could be 
sold on to other parts of Yugoslavia. 
 
Under the rule of Tito’s communists, some efforts were made to develop the 
Kosovo economy. Over the years, investments were made in a tyre plant, battery 
plant, a smelter, and the generation of electricity. Most of these developments did 
not directly benefit the people of Kosovo, as the production was utilised outside the 
province. During this period, the average incomes of Kosovars declined significantly 
from the levels just after the Second World War. Although they had improved by 
the 1980s, they had not recovered to the previous levels and were still lower than 
those throughout the rest of Yugoslavia.707 
 
706 Branson and Doder, "Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant ". 
707 James Pettifer, "Kosovo Economy and Society After 1945: Some Observations," (Camberly: Conflicts Study Research Centre, 
Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2002), p 4. 
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Prior to Tito’s socialist government, the majority of the Kosovars were engaged in 
agriculture. Historically, farms were operated by family units or to a lesser extent, 
were organised into cooperatives708, the communist government continued with the 
practice. The traditional timber industry in Kosovo, which was over exploited by the 
Yugoslav Communist government, was in decline. Furthermore, the Communist 
government, under Tito, prohibited the trade of traditional goods over the 
Albanian/Kosovar border. This policy hindered the economic development of the 
region. 
 
Under the Tito government, Kosovo’s infrastructure was also, seriously neglected. 
The telecommunications network was well developed in the major towns. Beyond 
these towns, the network ceased to exist. Furthermore, there was a separate phone 
system for Party officials and the Military. In addition, the road system was not built 
for the benefit of the local communities, but to benefit the military and Yugoslavia 
as a whole. These limitations on Kosovo’s infrastructure limited Kosovo’s economic 
development and the development of local business.709 
 
The Albanian diaspora was a significant economic factor within Kosovo. There have 
been three principle phases of immigration of Kosovars. The first phase was 
between 1960 and 1988. In this phase, many Kosovars took up residence principally 
in Germany and Switzerland, as low skilled foreign workers, sending money back to 
family in Kosovars.710 The migration and the change of Kosovo status within the 
Yugoslav Constitution, which was given autonomy in 1974, meant that by the 1980s, 
Kosovo was not economically dependent on Belgrade.711 
 
The second phase was between 1989 and 1997. This phase consisted of two waves, 
the first in 1989 with the mass dismissal of Kosovars from the civil service, after 
708 Ibid., p 5. 
709 Ibid., p 6. 
710 Muhamet Mustafa et al., "Diaspora and Migration Policies," (Prishtina: Forum 2015, 2007), p 27. 
711 Pettifer, "Kosovo Economy and Society After 1945: Some Observations," p 7. 
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Belgrade revoked Kosovo’s autonomous status. The second wave occurred between 
1991 and 1995 during the Balkan Wars of Independence. In this period, many skilled 
Kosovars fled Yugoslavia to avoid service in the Serb dominated Yugoslav military.712 
Socio/Cultural Environment 
In the rural areas of Kosovo, Kosovar society was clan based. The Albanian clan 
system was extensively studied in the 1930s.713 The clan system was a central 
feature of Kosovar rural society, in pre-communist Yugoslavia. The clan was based 
on familial relationships, with a prominent male being the leader of the group. The 
leader held the position due to either being elected by the elders of the clan, or 
inheriting from a family member. The clans were intermixed and interlinked by 
marriage and assumed blood ties. The role of the leader was to ensure the 
equitable distribution of clan property, such as land. When the communists took 
power in Yugoslavia, they introduced a collectivist farming system, dispossessing 
pre-existing landholders, but in the case of the Kosovars, they left the pre-existing 
clan system in place, as it was consistent with their concepts of collectivism. The 
clan system also created high levels of social cohesion, with well-developed 
mechanisms and rules for conflict resolution. Part of this system was the Honour 
system, where a man, as a clan member, was held accountable for their actions and 
words. The Honour system also required that the men of the clan were responsible 
for the defence of its honour. Violence was one of the tools available to address any 
perceived attack on the clan or its honour.  
 
The leadership of the clan was either an elected older male, based on his knowledge 
and experience, or an inherited position. The clan leader or master, would make 
decisions, divide labour, and mediate disputes in accordance with clan customs and 
norms. The clan leader was also responsible for the provision of firearms to young 
male members of the clan when they came of age, to partake in blood feuds. A clan 
712 Mustafa et al., "Diaspora and Migration Policies," p 27. 
713 Georgi Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2002): p 3. 
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typically consisted of 40-50, family members. The clan leader had a high level of 
freedom in his decision-making process, but his decisions were expected to be 
consistent with, and within the bounds of, customary law or Kunun. One of the 
significant elements of the Kunun is the honour of the clan. Any transgression of 
this honour code required the transgression be addressed immediately. If blood was 
drawn, then the transgression would have to be avenged in blood, which could 
result in blood feuds. 
Technology 
As previously discussed, Kosovo lagged behind other parts of Yugoslavia in terms of 
infrastructure and technology. The roads and communication system were poorly 
serviced within Kosovo. During the war in Kosovo, many used the internet to 
contact those outside Kosovo and provide insight into what was happening within 
the province. 
Legal 
The loss of Kosovo’s autonomy, also involved the loss of the majority of its legal 
privileges in 1989. From this date, Belgrade administered Kosovo. Serbian police 
replaced the local police and the Albanian language newspapers were closed.714 
Belgrade also instituted a regime of oppression and human rights abuses, arresting 
and imprisoning dissenters and engaging in a policy of harassment of the Albanian 
population, by curtailing employment and educational opportunities, suppressing 
freedom of speech, and limiting the Kosovars rights to buy and sell property.715  
Radicalisation 
Radicalisation is a unique individualistic process. It is a path, which has many routes, 
not everyone travels the same road, and not everyone arrives at the same 
conclusion about the correct approach to achieve the goals of the radical agenda. 
The emergence of the independence movement, of which the KLA was a part, 
within Kosovo, highlights this point. The LDK’s non-violent passive approach 
714 Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Location 581.    
715 Ibid., Kindle Location 830.      
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acknowledged the fact, that unlike Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo did not have the 
weapons or the militia to take up arms in a struggle for Kosovo independence. The 
LDK’s approach relied heavily on the international community intervening on the 
Kosovar’s behalf. This approach found significant support amongst the Kosovars 
within Kosovo, although the LDK was not the only Kosovar political organisation, 
which sought Kosovo’s independence.  
 
Outside Kosovo, in the diaspora communities emerged two other groups in the 
1980s, the National Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja për Çlirimin Kombëtar të Kosovës 
(MNLK)) and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (Lëvizja për 
Republikën e Shqipërisë në Jugosllavi (LRSHJ)).716 The founders of these groups were 
the exiles and political prisoners of the protests in the 1980s, who, through their 
own experience and their assessment of the situation in Croatia and Bosnia, viewed 
armed resistance as the only viable option.717 
 
The LRSHJ by the 1990s had become the Popular Movement for the Republic of 
Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (LPRK)).718 Neither group viewed 
Rugova’s non-violent resistance as a viable approach. Both organisations considered 
armed resistance as the only practical method of gaining Kosovo independence. The 
LPRK at the time of its creation adopted a Marxist ideology. By 1993, some of its 
leaders felt that this ideology could damage their cause and sought to change the 
group name. In addition, there was disagreement over the methodology of 
achieving the goal of Kosovo’s independence. The LPRK split into two new 
organisations, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja 
Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (LKÇK)) who favoured an intifada719 and the 
716 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108. 
717 Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency  (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinious 
Press, 2008), p 23-24. 
718 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108. 
719 Ibid. 
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Popular Movement for Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (LPK)) who favoured 
guerrilla warfare.720 
 
The LPRK by 1990 had created a network of activists within Kosovo. The group 
engaged in a number of attacks in Kosovo targeting military and police 
establishments.721 By 1992, 100 of its activist had received military training in 
Albania. When they attempted to return to Kosovo, most were captured or killed.722 
 
On its formation, the LPK created a special branch within their organisation, of four 
men, to investigate the establishment of an armed wing to carry the fight to the 
Serbs. Out of their deliberations emerged the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1993.723 Athough the KLA had undertaken 
limited operations after its formation, it was a clandestine organisation living in the 
shadows. Rugavo discredited these operations as acts of violence undertaken by the 
Serbian security forces to discredit the peaceful approach advocated by the LDK.724 
 
The sucess of the KLA, depended on the support of the people of Kosovo and in this 
early period of its formation this was not present. Perritt wrote : 
 
“Revolution does not succeed without popular support ”Without a political 
goal” said Mao Tse tung, “guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political 
objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their 
sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained.” Che Guevara 
agreed “The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This 
is an indispensable condition.””725 
 
720 Ibid. 
721 Ibid., p 1109. 
722 Ibid., p 1108. 
723 Ibid., p 1108-09. 
724 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 47-50. 
725 Ibid., p 42. 
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Perritt indicated 
 
“In the early nineties, the KLA was still tiny, fragmented mostly rural 
organization whose existence was denied by the Peaceful Path 
Institutionalists. The outcome of the struggle for the hearts and minds of 
Kosovar Albanians remained in doubt”.726 
 
Furthermore, Perritt stated 
 
“…support for the KLA was never strong in Prishtina, in such municipalities in 
the South and East as Gijilan and Ferizaj, or among urban elites in other 
cities such as Prizren and Mitrovica. The efforts to win the hearts and minds 
of the Kosovar Population involved three competing visions. The KLA thought 
the best way to win over the population was to start fighting to show that it 
was possible. Other groups, such as Murati’s LKÇK (National Movement for 
the Liberation of Kosovo), thought fighting should be deferred until after the 
population had been conditioned to accept violence. The Peaceful Path 
Institutionalists thought Kosovar Albanians goals could be achieved without 
fighting.”727 
 
The KLA and LPK were unable to overcome the popularity of the LDK and Rugova’s 
pacifist approach, until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, at the 
end of the war in Bosnia. This single event discredited Rugova’s passive resistance 
approach. The Dayton Peace Agreement excluded Kosovo. Phillips records in his 
book, “Liberating Kosovo”: 
 
“According to Albin Kurti, head of the Kosovo Students Union, “We thought 
that the LDK was too passive. It relied too much on international factors. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. 
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Rugova created the illusion that the international community would resolve 
the crisis and that independence would come as gift.”… For Rugova, 
“internationalization was a goal, not a means to an end… Kosovo Albanians 
were losing faith in the international community. An increasing number 
became radicalized as social and economic conditions deteriorated, human 
rights conditions degenerated, and the prospect dimmed of realizing their 




“Dayton was a game-changer. Kurti maintained, “Freedom starts with the 
mind’s liberation. We thought the VJ [Yugoslavia Armed Forces] was 
omnipotent, but the VJ’s defeat in Croatia and Bosnia showed that they 
could be beaten. The myth of the Yugoslav Army was burst.”] The Code of 
Lek required Albanians to avenge their oppressor. Kurti continued, “Even 
Montenegro was talking about fighting Serbia. Every Slavic republic had 
challenged Milosevic, but the Albanians had not.” A leader from the Drenica 
Valley, always a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, affirmed, ‘’we have learned 
from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia that the outside world cannot solve our 
problems for us. We must fight for our own freedom.’’729 
 
Dayton proved to be a significant turning or trigger point in the Kosovars struggle 
for independence. 
 
Later, a senior KLA figure implied that Kosovo was excluded so that an agreement 
could be brokered with the Serbs regarding Bosnia.730 Dayton also demonstrated, 
armed conflict was a tool that could be used to defeat the Serbs through the 
application of international pressure and force. 
728 Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: kindle Location 1968. 
729 Ibid., Kindle Location 1987. 
730Ibid., Kindle Location 1848. 
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Another key event was the failure of the Albanian state, triggered by the collapse of 
various pyramid investments schemes in 1997, which threw Albania into chaos. This 
instability led to the ransacking of the Albanian military armouries, creating a 
situation where the country was awash with arms. This produced an opportunity for 
the KLA, allowing it to acquire large quantities of weapons cheaply731, thus making 
an armed struggle a viable option. 
 
Up until 1998, some members of the U.S. Government considered the KLA a 
terrorist organisation.732 This perception was encouraged by the Serbian 
Government, who later attempted to destroy the organisation using the Yugoslav 
Army (Vojska Jugoslavie (VJ)) and Ministry of Interior Affairs forces (Ministarstvo 
Unutrasnjih Poslava (MUP)) in military operations described as counter terrorist 
operations. 
  
731 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1110. 
732 Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Location 2436. 
Stuart Groombridge  297 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
Chapter 16 - Analysis of the environmental factors 
The emergence of the KLA resulted from a number of environmental factors 
described by the PESTELO733 model. Many of these variables are intertwined and 
overlap. For example, political conditions can affect economic conditions and vice 
versa.  
 
Historically, the province of Kosovo held a special place in Serbian cultural and 
historical mythology, which ignored the changing religious and cultural demography 
of the region. Tito maintained Yugoslavia’s unity by suppressing the nationalist 
aspirations of the various ethnic groups and republics. Tito’s death led to the rise of 
nationalism amongst the various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, which was 
exploited by Milošević in Serbia. Milošević cultivated popular support within the 
republic for the reintegration of Kosovo, “the lost province” back into a Greater 
Serbia.  
 
At the time the KLA emerged, Kosovo was politically a divided community. Serbia 
had reintegrated the once autonomous province, back into the greater Serbia. 
Many of the rights won under Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia were lost. The majority 
of the Kosovar population had been politically disenfranchised, under Milošević’s 
leadership of Serbia. In response to Milošević’s reduction of previous cultural, 
religious, and political freedoms held by the Kosovars, the Kosovars set up their own 
shadow government and government agencies, under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Rugova. Not wishing Kosovars to be subjected to bloodshed experienced by the 
Bosnians, Rugova’s LDK government adopted a policy of passive resistance. The 
majority of Kosovars supported this policy. Whilst other independence groups in 
Kosovo did not share this view, the LPK on its formation in 1993, created a four-man 
cell to look into the formation of a guerrilla force to fight for Kosovo’s 
independence. From the deliberation of this group, emerged the KLA, although 
733 PESTELO is a mode, which describes the environment in terms of the political, economic, socio-cultural, technology, 
ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables. 
Stuart Groombridge  298 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
initially it did not receive significant support from the majority of the Kosovar 
population. 
 
The KLA framed its struggle in terms of nationalism; even the majority of the 
province’s Kosovar population followed the Islamic faith. In addition, many Kosovars 
were supportive of Rugova’s passive defiance of the Serbian regime, so at this time 
the KLA remained small, with most of its leadership in exile in Germany and 
Switzerland. 
 
“The KLA organizers not only had to overcome the perception that defeat 
was certain. They also had to persuade the mass of Kosovar Albanians that 
the KLA was the right agency to lead the rebellion and, that the potential for 
the KLA and its predecessors was greater than that for Ibrahim Rugova’s 
passive resistance. Such an effort to change public opinion among Kosovar 
Albanians manifestly did not succeed in the first half of the 1990s.734 
 
The emergence of the KLA was facilitated by two trigger events. The first was the 
exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton agreement, which led to the discrediting of 
Rugova’s peaceful approach in the eyes of the majority of Kosovars. Dayton 
suggested violence was the only mechanism, which would focus the international 
community’s attention. The second was the failure of the Albanian state, which 
created a ready supply of weapons, which were required for any violent uprising by 
the Kosovars, against the Serbian state. 
 
  
734 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 47. 
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Chapter 17 - Analysis 
Does the KLA meet the criteria, to be described as a Terrorist group? 
The KLA meets the criteria of a terrorist group. The KLA: 
1. Used violence or the threat of violence. The KLA engaged in an extensive 
campaign and killings to suspected collaborators and attacks on Serbian 
security forces in the 1990s. 
2. Used violence, which was selective and planned. All targets selected by the 
KLA had been chosen because of their perceived link to repression by the 
Serbian governments. The targets selected included non-combatants, 
military personnel, law enforcement, and government agencies. Individuals 
were also killed, if they were suspected of collaborating with the Serbs to 
dissuade others. 
3. Aims were political. The KLA was a Nationalist/Separatist group who aspired 
to gain Kosovo’s independence. 
4. Targeted civilian, or non-combatants. As previously indicated civilians were 
targeted, who were suspected of collaborating with the Serbs to dissuade 
others. 
5. Violence was selected to draw the public’s attention to the group’s cause. 
The attacks on the security forces within Kosovo were intended to attract 
public attention to highlight initially, the differing approaches of the LDK 
and the KLA. It was also intended to draw the attention of the international 
community and solicit their support in achieving the aspiration of Kosovo’s 
independence. 
6. Violence was intended to evoke a reaction. The KLA’s use of violence was 
designed to provoke the Serbs and alter the environment so the LDK’s 
peaceful approach would be discredited. It was also intended to provoke 
the international community’s intervention, which would assist in achieving 
the KLA’s goal. 
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As such, the KLA initially, was considered a terrorist group. With its success in the 
initial stages, it was considered one by the United States and the international 
community up until their intervention.735 
Category of Terrorist Group 
The KLA is categorised within this dissertation, as a Nationalist/Separatist group, 
which is a group that supports the separation of an ethnic or religious group from 
a larger population. The KLA was an organisation, which sought the independence 
of Kosovo and the ethnic Kosovars from Serbian rule. As such, it meets the criteria 
of a Nationalist/Separatist group. 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The KLA emerged from the PESTELO environment in Yugoslavia of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Within Kosovo, there was significant disparity in the political, 
economic, social, and legal macro variables between the Kosovar and Serbian 
communities in the Greater Serbia. There was also a significant divide within the 
Kosovar independence movements in the homophyllic variable of belief in the 
correct methodology to achieve the goal of the organisation. As such, the 
organisational variable within the PESTELO model was also a factor, but these 
variables alone did not create the KLA. These variables have to be considered in the 
context of the events, or the energy, which was being expended by other actors in 
this PESTELO environment. The events of the 1980s and early 1990s led to the 
creation of competing nationalist movements within Kosovo. Initially, the majority 
of the population supported the pacifist approach of the LDK to achieve 
independence. The cornerstone of this approach was a belief the international 
community would intervene on behalf of the Kosovars. The exclusion of Kosovo 
from the Dayton agreement discredited the LDK’s approach, suggesting that armed 
struggle was the only legitimate approach to achieve the goal of independence and 
735 Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Locations 1293-306. 
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bring the plight of the people of Kosovo to the attention of the international 
community. The disintegration of the Albanian republic provided the KLA with 
resources (weapons) to fight the Serbian security forces, which it had lacked 
previously. The escalating use of violence by the Serbian security forces also 
assisted the KLA along with the displacement of Kosovars from the communities. 
This suggests that a single perturbation will not necessarily lead to a formation of a 
group, it requires an accumulation of energy over time before a tipping point is 
reached, which triggers the formation process. 
 
It is also noteworthy; the KLA was initially the creation of members of the Kosovar 
diaspora, not a creation of those who resided in Kosovo and initially only had 
support in the western rural areas, which had a tradition of resisting authoritarian 
regimes. This further suggests the variance of the local geographic PESTELO 
variables, were significant in its formation. The competing nationalist movement 
the LDK, for the first half of the 1990s, maintained significant support within the 
urban centres within Kosovo, up until Dayton. This further suggests the PESTELO 
environment is not contiguous across the geographic space. 
 
Thus, when considering the PESTELO environment, the environmental variables 
vary from geographic location to location. Therefore, it would be imprudent to 
generalise the environmental model across a complete geographic space.  
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity, influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
The KLA emerged from the PESTELO environment in Yugoslavia of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Within Kosovo, there was significant disparity in the political, 
economic, social, and legal macro variables between the Kosovar and Serbian 
communities in the Greater Serbia. There was also a significant divide within the 
Kosovar independence movements in the homophyllic variable of belief in the 
correct methodology to achieve the goal of the organisation. As such, the 
organisational variable within the PESTELO model was also a factor, but these 
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variables alone did not create the KLA. These variables have to be considered in the 
context of the events or the energy, which was being expended by other actors in 
this PESTELO environment. The events of the 1980s and early 1990s led to the 
creation of competing nationalist movements within Kosovo. Initially, the majority 
of the population supported the pacifist approach of the LDK to achieve 
independence. The cornerstone of this approach was a belief the international 
community would intervene on behalf of the Kosovars. The exclusion of Kosovo 
from the Dayton accord in 1996 discredited the LDK’s approach, suggesting that 
armed struggle was the only legitimate approach to achieve the intervention of the 
international community. The disintegration of the Albanian republic in 1997 
provided the KLA with resources (weapons) to fight the Serbian security forces, 
which it had lacked previously. The Jashari family massacre in March 1998, by 
Serbian forces was the final trigger event. This suggests that a single perturbation 
will not necessary lead to the formation of a group, it requires an accumulation of 
energy/events over time, before a tipping point is reached, which triggers the 
formation process. 
 
It is also noteworthy; the KLA was initially the creation of members of the Kosovar 
diaspora, not a creation of those who resided in Kosovo, and initially only had 
support in the western rural areas. It emerged from those who viewed the pacifist 
approach of LDK as flawed. There were always small bodies of individuals who held 
the view; the use of arms was the only way Kosovo would get its independence. 
Even within the pacifist LDK, there were those who believed an armed struggle was 
the only method, which was going to achieve Kosovo’s independence. Dr. Bujar 
Bukoshi, the Kosovo Prime minister in exile, formed the Armed Force of the 
Republic of Kosovo (Forcave Armatosure ë Republikes ë Kosoves - FARK) as part of 
the parallel government created under Rugova’s leadership of the LDK.  
 
“During 1991 and 1992 a hundred recruits from Bukoshi's LDK-branch [FARK] 
and the Popular Movement trained at Labinot, Albania, the same place 
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where the Jasharis trained a few years before. Yet both sides suspected the 
other of attempting to get control over most weapons and funds. Many 
trained LDK- and LPRK-members were captured in Kosovo. The Serb 
authorities tried more than a hundred of them, accusing them in September 
1993 of belonging to the Popular Movement or Bukoshi's 'Ministry of 
Defence and General Staff of the Republic of Kosova'. Bukoshi's shadow 
police force in Kosovo ceased to function by the end of 1994 due to 
numerous arrests.”736 
 
FARK formed as a professional force, which recruited ex-conscripts from the 
Yugoslav Army and Albanians who had fought with the Croats and Bosnians against 
the Serbs.  
 
Resistance to Serbian rule initially started on a small scale:  
 
“The KLA's predecessors kept operating openly in Switzerland and secretly in 
Kosovo, engaging in small-scale violence, sabotage and vandalism. The LPRK 
approached the militant clan of the Jasharis in the village of Donji Prekaz in 
Kosovo's central Drenica region during late 1989 and early 1990. Adem 
Jashari was the clan's leader; his brother Hamza and their father Shaban 
were deputies. They and a few friends like Sami Lushtaku went to Albania at 
a secret location to train for war.”737 
 
Thus, the initial struggle for the independence of Kosovo emerged on a small scale. 
The group utilised existing social structures, such as friendship and kinship 
networks. In the rural areas, it exploited a traditional social structure, the clan. 
 
736 Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis and Caspar Ten Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the 
Bulkans," East European Quarterly XLII, no. 2 (2008): p 165. 
737 Ibid., p 164. 
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From these small beginnings, the KLA emerged and came into existence from 
discussions in August 1993, between members of the LPRK and around 100 local 
leaders in the province of Drenica.738 Again, the LPRK utilised existing social 
networks. It is also of note; the KLA emerged from the rural areas of Kosovo, not the 
cities. This further suggests the variance of the local geographic PESTELO variables 
were significant in its formation. The urban areas of Kosovo were keen supporters 
of Rugova and the LDK’s pacifist approach in the early part of the 1990s. The LDK 
maintained significant support within the urban centres of Kosovo, up until the 
1995 Dayton Accord, which excluded Kosovo. After Dayton, the Serbs increased 
their oppression within Kosovo.739 There was a shift in support away from the LDK, 
to groups such as the KLA, who promoted the armed struggle as the only legitimate 
tactic to achieve the goal of Kosovo independence. Dayton Accord changed the 
political environment in Kosovo. 
 
The KLA, for the first half of the 1990s, remained small and most Kosovars 
considered it a shadow organisation. In this period, the KLA only had a few hundred 
members and undertook the occasional attack.740 
 
Thus, when considering the PESTELO environment, the environmental variables 
change from geographic location to location. Therefore, it would be unreasonable 
to generalise the environmental model across a complete geographic space.  
 
The majority of the KLA fighters were younger than 25 years old and came initially 
from rural areas so were physically fit due to the manual nature of farm work.741 
They came from families who were targeted by the Serbian regime.742 Later, many 
came from the Kosovar Diaspora.743 The majority came from within Kosovo with 
738 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108. 
739 Ibid., p 1109. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 57-58. 
742 Ibid. 
743 Ibid. 
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about a fifth coming from overseas.744 The KLA recruits were volunteers who were 
free to come and go. Typically, they were recruited and fought in the areas in which 
they lived and grew up. Thus, they had intimate knowledge of the area in which 
they fought and knew the people in the communities.745 
 
The geographic proximity and local social networks were central to the initial 
formation of the KLA. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
The KLA was the creation of a small 4-man committee within the LPRK, based in 
Switzerland in 1990.746 Before the 1990s, the LPK had operated smalls groups of 
activists in Kosovo, who engaged “…in small-scale violence, sabotage and 
vandalism.”747 
 
Between 1990 and 1991, the LPRK had a small network of activists within Kosovo, 
who carried out their first attacks on the Serbian Police.748 By 1992, it had trained 
around 100 activists, many of whom were either killed or arrested whilst returning 
to Kosovo.749 Those who were left, carried out periodic attacks against the Serbian 
Police, the army, and intelligence services.750 During this period, there was little 
support for an armed struggle against the Serbs as Rugova’s LDK had the support of 
the majority of Kosovars. The KLA faced serious problems of funding and arming 




745 Ibid., p 57-59. 
746 Tim Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," Perception September - November(2000): p 66. 
747 Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 164. 
748 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1108. 
749 Ibid. 
750 Ibid. 
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 “The LPK, on the other hand, favored a guerrilla war. It was LPK who 
appointed a four-man “Special Branch”—KadriVeseli, Hashim Thaci, Xhavit 
Haliti, and Ali Ahmeti—to work on the preparation of armed forces.”751 
 
By 1993, the LPRK met with about 100 local leaders in the Drenica region, to solicit 
support. By this time, there were divisions within the LPRK and they split on 
ideological grounds. Those who formed the LPK favoured a guerrilla form of 
warfare, where the others favoured an intifada.752 In December 1993, out of the 
deliberations of this group, the KLA formed. The KLA lacked money, recruits, and 
arms. The KLA was still a fringe organisation within Kosovo. The Kosovar media was 
controlled by the LDK and the LDK denied the existence of the KLA753 at the time, 
claiming it was a creation of the Serbian Police.754 
 
The KLA appeared publically for the first time in June 1996. At this time, the group 
had around 300-500 members, but was not a unified organisation with any central 
command structure.755 The LPK created the KLA, but KLA was not subordinated to a 
political party.756 From this period onwards, the KLA slowly gained the support of the 
public. 
 
“Gradually the KLA began to gather public support among the major Kosovo 
clans, who had traditionally had small, armed units for the protection of their 
clan compounds. The recruitment program of the rising KLA was also 
structured in accordance with the traditional forms of Albanian social 
organization. While individual members were recruited all the time, the 
ranks of the army were also enlarged by the joining of entire units.”757 
 




755 Larry Wentz, ed. Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (CCPR, 2002), p 17. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 8. 
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The KLA ideology also created support: 
 
“The encompassing ideology of the insurgency was ethnonationalism in a 
peculiar combination of Marxism and tribalism.”758 
 
The ideological framework appealed to the patriarchs of the rural villages and clan 
based society.759 KLA’s exploitation of these social structures further made the group 
difficult to infiltrate by the Serbian security forces.760 The KLA was able to broaden 
its support in the rural areas of Kosovo because its political and social ideology 
resonated with the rural population. This was not the case in urban areas, where 
Rugova drew the majority of his support. The rural areas had a history of rising up 
against perceived repression, which had its foundation in the tradition of the 
Albanian Kacak.761 
 
Dayton, as previously discussed, was another trigger point. It was an event, which 
discredited Rugova’s premise that Kosovo would achieve independence through the 
intervention of the international community. It was at this point, where the LDK’s 
approach within the Kosovar community, gained acceptance and Rugova’s strategy 
was seen to have failed. Dayton had demonstrated, the use of violence focused the 
international community’s attention, and their intervention was the only way 
Kosovo would achieve independence. Dayton radicalised the Kosovar community.762 
Even so, at this time, the KLA had neither the funds nor the access to the weapons 
to equip a larger force. This issue was resolved in 1997, when the Albanian civil 
government broke down, due to an uprising within the country and the ransacking 
of the military armouries throughout the country. Firearms cost, within Albania, as 
little as $5.763 The cheap and ready source of arms meant the KLA could recruit more 
758 Ibid., p 9. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 70. 
762 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1109. 
763 Ibid., p 1110. 
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members, inexpensively. By 1997, the attendance at the funerals of KLA members, 
killed by the Serbs, was in the tens of thousands.764 Even so, in 1997, although the 
size of the KLA was estimated to be 300-500 members, the number of active 
members was estimated to be around 150.765 The growth of the organisation was 
limited. The: 
 
“…probability of success of the KLA in its early existence was low, while 
participation costs were high. This disadvantage was reinforced by the 
general belief that the Serbian army was very strong and ready—as Rugova 
put it—to “wipe the Kosovar Albanians out.” Therefore, KLA’s ability to solicit 
popular support was hampered by the fact that the prospects of its victory in 
the early stages of the fighting were quite poor, and correspondingly the 
expected net returns to membership were quite low. In other words, KLA’s 
prospects of success were a function of its base of popular support.”766 
 
From October 1997, there was an escalation in violence in Kosovo as the Serbian 
force attempted to rout the KLA, but the KLA responded in kind:  
 
“In the first half of 1997 KLA undertook on average ten attacks per month on 
Serbian military. That average reached thirteen by September of that 
year.”767 
 
By February 1998, the Serbian Police had effectively withdrawn from Drenica, due 
to KLA actions in the region, targeting police and suspected collaborators.768 
Collaborators were defined in general by the KLA, as those Kosovars who had joined 
764 Ibid. 
765 Ibid., p 1111. 
766 Ibid. 
767 Ibid., p 1112. 
768 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, IT-
04-84bis-T, p 222 (2012). 
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the Serbian security forces or assisted the Serbian authorities.769 On 28 February, the 
Serbian force in Drenica, in revenge attacks, killed 26 Kosovars. On 4 March, the 
Serbian force assaulted the family compound of the KLA leader in the region Adam 
Jashari, killing 56 family members.770 The death of Jashari and many of his family was 
a turning point. On the same day, the Serbian forces also attacked two other family 
compounds.771 Serbian forces and the KLA progressively intensified their military 
actions throughout the summer of 1998. 
 
“The 'Drenica offensive' lasted until late March and killed eighty Albanians, 
mostly unarmed civilians. More 'anti-terrorist' campaigns followed: between 
28 Feb. and 28 Sep. Serb forces killed at least 1,270 Albanians, mostly old 
men, women and children. Albanians felt their lives in danger; they turned to 
the KLA to protect them. New recruits flooded the rebel army.”772 
 
This demonstrates a direct link between the worsening environment and the 
increasing membership of the KLA. As the Serbian forces oppressed and killed 
Kosovars, so the ranks of the KLA swelled. 
 
The violence in Kosovo only subsided when the United Nations negotiated a 
ceasefire in late October 1998, which led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces in 
large numbers. 
 
This escalation in violence drew greater media attention and increased the level of 
funds coming to the KLA from the Kosovar diaspora via the Homeland Calling 
Fund.773 Up until 1998, the KLA had around 300 members.  
769 Ibid., p 228. 
770 Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 69. 
771 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
56. 
772 Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 169. 
773 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1112. 
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 In July 1998, the Serbs started a counter-offensive, which swept through Kosovo. 
The KLA was ill equipped and organised to resist, and withdrew to the mountains. 
The Serbian forces burnt villages as they moved forward, creating a humanitarian 
crisis, displacing 200,000 people.774 The Serbian actions within Kosovo forced many 
Kosovars to flee to the hills.  
 
In April 1998, there were probably around 400-500 hard-core KLA members, with 
another 3500-4500 members in training at various locations throughout Kosovo and 
Albania.775 Serbian military estimates provide much higher membership numbers, 
but are generally not accepted as valid estimates. 776 During this period, due to the 
VJ attacks on villages, villages throughout Kosovo started to organise their own 
defences, acquiring weapons, digging trenches and setting armed watches. These 
defences were local arrangements, created out of a fear of Serbian attacks. 
Sometimes these local defence groups were created in consultation with the KLA 
and at other times they were created based on local initiative.777 Although not 
formally part of the KLA, many villages looked to the KLA for assistance and some 
involved in the defence of their villages, wore uniforms, which mimicked that of the 
KLA and others donned KLA badges to identify their allegiance to the KLA.778 As such, 
if these facts are accounted for, the Serbian estimates may be more reliable. 
Although not part of the KLA, these village defence groups were affiliated with the 
KLA, which from a military intelligence perspective would make them 
indistinguishable from the KLA. The Serbs had estimated the KLA strength to be 
around 5,000 by mid-1998, with 15,000 Kosovars issued with weapons.779 Again, a 
774 Judah, "Kosovo Liberation Army," p 71. 
775 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
8. 
776 Ibid. 
777 Ibid., p 15 - 19. 
778 Ibid. 
779 Ibid., p 8. 
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further deterioration of the environment led to an increase in the size of the KLA. 
The KLA were perceived as the defenders of the Kosovar population, this perception 
attracted recruits. 
 
By mid-1998, estimates suggest, the KLA was in control of about 40% of Kosovo.780 
The deteriorating situation gained international recognition in 1998. 
 
“The cruelty of Serbian reprisals in Kosovo shaped both the perception of the 
international community about the relationship between human rights 
abuses in the province and Kosovo Albanians’ demand for self-governance, 
and also the necessity of doing something to halt human rights 
infringements.67 Concomitant with the increasing level of violence in Kosovo, 
the UN Security Council issued a number of resolutions which called for an 
immediate cessation of hostilities (Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998), and 
declared the situation in Kosovo to be a threat to international peace and 
security and laid the responsibility for the situation on Serbian military forces 
in the province (Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998). The international 
community was now willing to consider policy responses that were ruled out 
earlier in that decade when Kosovo was considered an internal matter of 
Serbia.”781 
 
The KLA during this time was active in promoting its cause: 
 
“The KLA adopted a basic but effective communications strategy, using 
mobile phones to contact journalists and tell them what was happening in 
the field. This “CNN factor” also played a significant role in raising 
international awareness. Europe had been flooded by Bosnian refugees in 
the early 1990s, and European countries were loath to see another exodus of 
780 Mulaj, "Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army," p 1113. 
781 Ibid. 
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victims knocking at their doors. NATO conducted a multilateral exercise on 
Serbia’s border to signal its concern and readiness.”782 
 
Rugova met with Milošević in mid May 1998 and engaged in negotiations, under the 
patronage of the United States.783 Rugova’s influence was waning in Kosovo, even 
among the LDK. In June, the United States initiated contact with the KLA.784 The KLA 
promoted a meeting with the United States using the new and emerging technology 
of the Internet, posting photos of their meeting, which “…went viral…”785 
 
There was also a fear within the United States and other members of the United 
Nations, of a humanitarian crisis, if a ceasefire was not concluded before the onset 
of winter.786 Negotiations continued between the United States and the Serbs. The 
United States pushed Milošević for a ceasefire, backing their negotiating position 
with the threat of NATO airpower.787 Milošević “…agreed to a ceasefire and a partial 
pullback of Serbian forces. He would allow NATO access to Serbian airspace, entry 
by humanitarian agencies, and the return of displaced persons to their homes. He 
also agreed to political negotiations on enhanced autonomy for Kosovo. Holbrooke 
insisted that Milosevic be judged by his actions, not by his words. He had seen 
Milosevic’s rope-a-dope routine before. The ACTORD was extended to October 27, 
which served as the deadline for Milosevic to fulfil his commitments.”788 
 
On October 27, the Serbs withdrew thousands of their troops based in Kosovo and 
many of the displaced Kosovars returned. During the ceasefire, the KLA publicly 
demonstrated its strength, by wearing their uniforms on the streets.789 They also 
782 Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention: Kindle Locations 2496-500. 
783 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2588-89. 
784 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2582-87. 
785 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2587-88. 
786 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2594-601. 
787 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2626-28. 
788 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2633-37. 
789 Ibid., Kindle Locations 2684-88. 
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took the opportunity to reorganise. The KLA centralised its command structure and 
divided Kosovo into five regions with its own commander. During the period of the 
ceasefire, the KLA membership grew further in size. By March 1999, estimates 
suggest the KLA membership was around 17,000 members.790   
 
“These included activists from Kosovo and emigrés from Switzerland and 
Germany; about 300 ex-JNA personnel who had served in two Croatian Army 
battalions in the Croatian Homeland War; and a large number of part-time 
auxiliaries, all supported by funds from Albanian emigrés in the West.”791 
 
In addition, in late 1998, the KLA increased its size by absorbing the LDK’s rival, the 
Saudi funded force, known as FARK.792 The increased media attention also attracted 
a number of overseas recruits. 
 
“Five Islamic groups served in the UÇK: the ABiH Black Swans; the 400-strong 
Albanian-American Atlantic Bde under Gami Shehu; a 120-man Iranian unit 
at Donji Prekaz; a Bosnian-Albanian unit led by an Egyptian, Abu Ismail; and 
Mujahedin from Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan. The UÇK was trained by CIA and British SAS instructors at camps at 
Kukës, Tropojë and Bajram Curri in NE Albania and Labinot near Tirana.”793 
 
Between October 1998 and March 1999, there was a heightened diplomatic effort 
to resolve the dispute peacefully, but the United States and NATO also planned for 
military action against Serbia if the talks failed. Part of this diplomatic effort was the 
Rambouillet accord, which was intended to bring peace to Kosovo. The KLA was 
willing to make concessions, but the Serbian Government was not. In March 1999, 
790 Nigel; K Mikulan  Thomas, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001, ed. Martin Windrow, No. 2 
(Elite 146) (Oxford: Osprey Publishing., 2006), Kindle Location 762. 
791 Ibid., Kindle Locations 762-64. 
792 Ibid., Kindle Locations 766-68. 
793 Ibid., Kindle Locations 776-79. 
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the Serbs started to amass its armed forces on the border of Kosovo for a renewed 
offensive. This action initiated a United States led NATO intervention. Airstrikes 
against Serbia and Serbian forces in Kosovo, were initiated and continued until the 
Serb withdrawal on 20 June 1999.794 
 
Thus, the size of the KLA was dependent on the homophyllic variables as well as the 
political, economic, and social conditions within Kosovo. When the LDK initiated the 
formation of the KLA, there was very little support for armed action against the 
Serbs to achieve Kosovo’s independence. The majority of the population supported 
the LDK’s peaceful approach of soliciting international help to gain independence. 
Thus, there were two groups, which shared the same homophyllic aspiration of 
Kosovar independence, but differed in homophyllic belief as the most appropriate 
method to achieve their goal (aspiration). At the time the KLA emerged, the political 
and social environments within Kosovo were such that few were willing to gravitate 
to the KLA. Also early in the life of the KLA, it was not named and its membership 
was very small, less than 100 members. It was not until 1993 the KLA was given its 
name and became active in recruiting. The denial of the group’s existence by its 
political rivals, who controlled the media outlets, also hindered the group’s growth. 
The lack of resources and money prevented it from expanding its membership. 
Thus, the economic and political environmental variables played a prominent role in 
limiting the size of the KLA prior to 1995. It was not until the LDK’s strategy of 
international intervention was discredited by the Dayton Accord, did the political 
situation start to favour the KLA. Other factors in the KLA’s favour were the clan 
based social structures within the Kosovar rural communities, which had a history of 
resisting oppression. The clans within Kosovo also maintained small, armed groups 
and when they decided to support the KLA, this aided their rapid expansion. The 
failure of the Albanian Government in 1997 allowed the KLA to acquire large 
quantities of small arms at relatively cheap prices. Furthermore, the discrediting of 
794 "A Kosovo Chronology," Public Broadcasting Services, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html. 
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Rugova’s political approach, after Dayton, saw an influx of money from the Kosovar 
diaspora, which had previously gone to the LDK. Thus, the changes in the political 
and economic environments favoured the KLA. 
 
A key success of the KLA was how it framed the conflict in Kosovo between the 
Serbs and the Kosovars. It was not identified as a conflict regarding politics or 
religion. It was not defined as a Marxist or Islamic struggle against the oppression of 
the non-believers, as had been the case in the past and is today. It was framed in an 
all-embracing ethno-nationalistic context. This context, in terms of homophily, 
superseded these other, more exclusive attributes. Defining the conflict in Kosovo 
as ethno-nationalist also appeased fears in the West, of Islamic revivalism and its 
historical distrust of leftist leaning nationalistic separatist groups.  
 
After 1995, even though the group only had around 300 members, it was able to 
undertake a large number of offensive operations against the Serbian forces 
positioned within Kosovo. These attacks spurred the Serbian forces to retaliate. The 
consequence of their counter-attacks on the KLA was the increased involvement of 
more Kosovars in the conflict. As the Serbs attempted to force the KLA out of their 
suspected strongholds in the various family compounds of rural Kosovo, they not 
only killed KLA members, but also their families (the elderly, women and children). 
The effect was to shift the Kosovar’s support away from the LDK to the KLA and 
consequently increased the number of recruits to the KLA cause. The events of 1997 
and 1998 also resulted in the internationalising of the conflict. Thus, these attacks 
changed the political environment.  
 
The KLA, through its actions, had created a political environment where Serbs felt 
forced to act. In acting, the Serbs also changed the political and social environments 
and created a ground swell of support for the KLA. The Serbs’ actions also changed 
the political environment internationally; those Kosovars fleeing the violence drew 
international attention to the conflict. The changes in the political environment 
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created a change in the homophyllic variable of belief among the Kosovar 
population. The membership of the KLA increased due to an acceptance by those 
outside the KLA, the non-violent approach espoused by Rugova and the LDK, had 
failed. This change in belief and acceptance of violence legitimised the KLA’s 
approach of armed confrontation and self-defence.  
 
The KLA was not strong or well-equipped enough to defeat the Serbian armed 
forces alone, international intervention was the only way the KLA was going to 
succeed. The KLA’s success in internationalising the conflict in Kosovo was to reap 
benefits of funding from the Middle East. In addition, the apparent success of the 
KLA created an influx of recruits from the Middle East, the United States and from 
the Kosovar diaspora. When the conflict resumed after the October 1998 ceasefire 
in March 1999, the KLA had about 17,000 members.  
 
The estimated membership by the end of the conflict in June 1999 was about 
20,000.795 The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) documented and 
verified those who alleged service with the KLA.796 The IOM identified 25,000 
veterans who had validated service with the KLA.797 The IOM also identified the 
length of service with the KLA. From these findings, they determined only 400 of the 
25,000 had served with the KLA prior to 1998.798 Only 10,000 joined prior to the 
second half of 1998.799 A further 11,000 joined between June 1998 and March 1999, 
with 4000 joining after March 1999.800 These figures indicate the growth in the 
membership of the KLA, suggests a link to the changing PESTELO environment, and 
the rapidly and dynamically changing political and social environments. There were 
795 Michael Mayerhofer, "From Combatants to Cops: The Integration of Kosovo Liberation Army Veterans into the Kosovo 





800 Ibid., p 16. 
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no significant rivals to the KLA. As such, it attracted the majority of Kosovars who 
wanted to expel the Serbian forces within Kosovo.801 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time  
The structure of the KLA emerged over time. They exploited the existing clan 
structure of the rural Kosovars. The clans within Kosovo traditionally maintained 
small bands of armed men.802 The KLA not only accepted individual recruits but also 
incorporated whole units from clans, which aligned with the KLA.803 The KLA utilised 
existing social structures to enlarge its organisation. From the beginning, the KLA 
was a loosely structured organisation, although the senior leadership of the group 
was a “…closely knitted group…”804 and all were "…former commissioned and non-
commissioned officers of the regular and reserve units of the JNA and territorial 
defence units."'805 
 
As the situation within Kosovo deteriorated from 1997 onwards, the KLA became a 
loose confederation of various groups, all with varying political and social agendas. 
Many of these groups had gravitated to the KLA due to its success, and became a 
part of the organisation, where others adopted the name and the iconography of 
the group. Koktsidis identified at least six factions within the KLA. To quote 
Koktsidis, the KLA consisted of the following factions: 
 
1. The LPK. 
2. The LKÇK, which in 1998 had temporarily become KLA's propaganda 
mouthpiece and auxiliary force as many of its members fought alongside or 
joined the Liberation Army. 
3. Hashim Thaçi (b. 1968) who with other student activists "joined forces 
with...the LPK to found the armed movement." 
801 Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 168. 
802 Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 8. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Koktsidis and Dam, " A success Story?: Analysing Albainian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Bulkans," p 166. 
805 Ibid., p 166 - 67. 
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4. Bujar Bukoshi, of the LDK-led exile government who tried and failed to join 
forces with the LPRK but whose supporters infiltrated the KLA. 
5. Adem Demaçi, the 'Yugoslav Mandela' who had many admirers within the 
KLA and was its spokesman from August '98 till May '99 when he resigned in 
protest against the Rambouillet peace accord. 
6. The Jasharis, who deflected with LPRK-helped a Serb police attack in 1990 
on Donji Prekaz, but perished in a much larger assault in 1998…806 
 
By 1998, the general staff consisted of around 10 members; these members were 
spread across Albania, Kosovo, and Europe.807 By this stage, not all members knew 
each other and not all communicated.808 The KLA was a decentralised organisation, 
so the level of control the general staff exercised over the organisation, was 
limited.809 
 
Due to the increasing size of the KLA and the number of villages aligning themselves 
with the KLA, a structure started to emerge. Kosovo was divided into Operational 
Zones of which there were seven.810 The zone represented geographic regions of 
Kosovo, the 1st Operational Zone Drenica, 2nd Operational Zone Dukagjin, 3rd 
Operational zone Z Llap, 4th Operational Zone Shala, 5th Operational Zone Pashtrik, 
6th Operational Zone Nerodinle and the 7th Operational Zone Karadak.811 Each 
Operational Zone was assigned its own commander and each Operational Zone was 
sub-divided into sub-zones. The level of organisation varied between the zones. 
Drenica and Dukagjin were the most organised, due to their early confrontations 
806 Ibid., p 166. 
807 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
6. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Ibid., p 7. 
810 Ibid., p 9. 
811 Ibid. 
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with the Serbian security forces.812 The others were less organised, but had started 
to develop an organisational strategy by autumn 1998.813 
 
The KLA had created the Homeland Calling Fund to finance its activities in 1995.814 It 
also received financial support from the Bukoshi Fund up until 1998815, when it was 
frozen by the Germans.816 Some sources allege the KLA also sourced additional funds 
to finance its activities from the illicit drug trade. 
 
“After the fund accounts in Germany and Switzerland were frozen in 1998, 
and that measure failed to cut the KLA's funding, it became clear that other 
channels existed. The origin of these funds is believed to be connected with 
large scale trafficking in drugs carried out by Albanian groups along the 
Balkan route into western Europe; these funds amounted to one half of all 
the insurgency money.” 817 
 
The KLA also maintained a training infrastructure, initially in Albania, but as 
numbers increased, in Kosovo. 
 
The structure of the KLA emerged over time to manage the increasing size of the 
organisation. The KLA also created a special unit referred to as the Black Eagles. This 
unit formed between April and May 1998.818 The unit ceased to exist by September 
1998.819 The Black Eagles was an independent unit intended to operate anywhere 
812 Ibid. 
813 Ibid., p 10. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Ibid. 
816 Tsekov, "Sons of the Eagle: Clan Warfare, organized crime and state disintegration in the Western Balkans," p 11. 
817 Ibid. 
818 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
40. 
819 Ibid. 
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within the Dukagjin Operational Zone.820 It consisted of 20-30 members.821 The Black 
Eagles was a rapid deployment force, which would deploy 3-5 members to villages 
under attack from the Serbs.822 The role of the Black Eagles was to intimidate the 
Serbian forces and provide protection to the KLA’s strategic supply routes.823 
 
The KLA in the Dukagjin Operational Zone, also created a Military Police Force 
around July 1998, to enforce discipline within the KLA units within that Operational 
Zone, and investigate any breaches of that discipline.824 The size of this unit is 
unclear, but could have been platoon size.825 The Military Police had a responsibility 
to report to the General Staff of the Dukagjin Operational Zone.826 It is unclear, 
based on the available information, whether Military Police units operated outside 
the Dukagjin Operational Zone, although there is some suggestion it was a KLA wide 
group supported by Senior KLA leaders.827 The available information also suggests it 
was a disorganised unit.828 Around the same time a Military Police Unit formed, the 
KLA in the Dukagjin Operational Zone also created an Intelligence Unit. 
 
In May 1999, Agim Çeku was appointed the commander of the KLA. Çeku was an ex 
Yugoslavian officer who had served with the Croatian Army in the early to late 
1990s.829 During this time, he acquired experience leading his troops against the 
Serbs during the Croatian war.830 Çeku proceeded to reorganise the KLA along 
traditional Military lines.831 Çeku built on the existing Operational Zone, but 
820 Ibid., p 41. 
821 Ibid., p 42. 
822 Ibid., p 43. 
823 Ibid., p 43 - 44. 
824 Ibid., p 44 - 47. 
825 Ibid. 
826 Ibid. 
827 Ibid., p 48 - 49. 
828 Ibid., p 48. 
829 Paul C. Forage, "The battle for mount Pastrik: A preliminary study," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 4 (2001): p 
60. 
830 "Who's who in Kosovo,"  (Prishtinë/Pristina: International Crisis Group, 1999), p 12. 
831 Thomas, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001: Kindle Locations 767-68. 
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organised the KLA troops within each Operational Zone into brigades. The KLA was 
organised regionally and the table below lists their areas of responsibility:832 
 
Table 4 – Organisation of the KLA 
OZ Location Region Brigades Assigned 
No 
Brigades 
GHQ Kukës North Eastern  Albania  Training Units   
1 Drenica North  Central Kosovo 111-114 4 
2 Llap North Eastern  Kosovo 121-125 5 
3 Rrafshi i Dukagjinit Western  Kosovo 131-134 and 136 -137 6 
4 Shala ë Bajgores Northern  Kosovo 141-143 3 
5 Pashtricku South Central Kosovo 151-153 3 
6 Nerodime Eastern Kosovo 161-163 3 
7 Kara Dagh Southern Kosovo 171-173 3 
Total Number of Brigades 27 
Note: OZ= Operational Zone 
 
Each Operational Zone would have between 1-6 Brigades.833 The KLA, as part of the 
restructure, attempted to adopt NATO force structures and operational procedures 
as its benchmark.834 The intention was, each brigade would have four battalions, 
each battalion would have three to four companies, and each company would have 
three to four platoons of about 30 men.835 Typically, the size of the brigades and the 
units were never achieved and as such, it remained an idealised structure.836 The 
village defence units were organised into local militia, which had the role of staying 
close to home and defending that location.837 The capacity of the Operational Zone 
command to exercise control was limited. The units within the Operational Zones 
remained in the most part, autonomous for the remainder of the war. In reality, the 
832 Ibid., Kindle Locations 782 - 803. 
833 Ibid., Kindle Locations 768-69. 
834 Bekaj, "The K.L.A. and the Kosovo War: From Intra State Conflict to Independent Country," p 22. 
835 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 101. 
836 Thomas, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001: Kindle Locations 768-70. 
837 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 101. 
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GHQ and Operational Zone commanders exercised limited control over the regional 
units.838  
 
Due to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and the Serbian attacks on rural 
villages, local villagers started to create village defence units. In many instances, 
these village defence units were created without any assistance from the KLA, but 
in other instances, the villages were created in concert with the KLA. Irrespective of 
how these units came into existence, they were perceived by the Serbian forces to 
be KLA.839 Many of the village defence units aligned with the KLA or took guidance 
from the KLA.840 To administer the village defence units, the KLA created subzones 
within the Operational Zone. The subzone had a commander, who was either 
elected or appointed by the KLA.841 These commanders were responsible for a 
number of villages in close geographic proximity and were responsible for reporting 
to the commander of the Operational Zone.842 The subzones, although reporting to 
the Operational Zone commander, were not necessarily bound by any of the 
decisions or instructions issued by the commander.843 The structure of the subzones 
was very loose, but the villages were aligned to the KLA’s overall goal of Kosovo’s 
independence.  
 
Towards the end of the war, the KLA adopted a traditional Military structure based 
on brigades, battalions, companies, and platoons. This structure was never fully 
adopted, it was an acknowledgement due to its size; it was no longer a traditional 
guerrilla army. The KLA’s structure identifies there were two aspects of the KLA, a 
field force and a local defence force and these two aspects of the KLA had differing 
838 Thomas, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992– 2001: Kindle Locations 775-76. 
839 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 7 
- 8. 
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roles. The field force role was to confront the Serbian forces and the local defence 
force to protect the villages against attack from either the Serbian Security forces or 
the local Serbian Militias. This new structure utilised a centralised control 
arrangement of a traditional army. At the end of the war, the KLA remained a 
decentralised organisation with each regional commander having a high degree of 
autonomy. Furthermore, these commanders were not able to exercise complete 
control over the units under their command, as these subordinate commanders also 
had a high degree of independence. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
The organisational structure of the KLA was dependent on the environmental 
conditions within the area in which it operated.  
 
When the KLA first emerged, the number of members was small and the political 
and social environments were hostile. In this environment, the KLA utilised existing 
social structures. The KLA used a cellular structure. They referred to these cells as 
points and a point consisted of 2-3 individuals.844 The original members of the KLA 
came from the same location and from the same clan. As such, they were known to 
each other. In an environment where the KLA was not well known among the 
broader Kosovar community and had no major sponsor overseas, a tightly knit 
group ensured the group’s survival. Within this type of structure, the channels of 
communications are short. The communications with the higher levels of the 
organisation involved one on one meetings with the leadership group or its 
representatives. These meetings discussed the group’s overall strategy and 
objectives. In addition, the cells acted independently of each other, but shared a 
common goal, Kosovo’s independence. Thus, there was no need for dense or broad 
bandwidth channels of communications. As previously discussed, these types of 
communications channels did not exist within Kosovo, which was poorly served by 
844 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 112 - 13. 
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most forms of telecommunications. Operational planning was conducted locally and 
amongst the members of the local group. Those who were to undertake the 
operation lived in close geographic proximity, thus the geographic length of these 
communications channels was short. Typically, the cell members were from the 
same clan and the exchange of information could be carried out at a personal level. 
The original operations, conducted by the KLA, were small and did not require a 
sophisticated command and control communications network to coordinate. 
 
The available information suggests the cellular type of structure was maintained by 
the KLA for the majority of its existence. The structure of the group evolved as the 
size of the group increased from 1997 onwards. After 1997, the environmental 
factors within Kosovo changed with the large-scale intervention by Serbian forces 
within Kosovo. The targeting of rural communities within Kosovo, led to an increase 
in the membership of the KLA. The KLA’s membership increased from around 300 to 
nearly 10,000 by 1998. Some insight into how the KLA’s structure emerged during 
this period of transition was found in the United Nations report with respect to Case 
IT-04-84bis-T. Case IT-04-84bis-T, dealt with the suspected Human Rights violations 
by KLA commanders Ramush Hardinaj, Idiriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, which was 
heard by the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The report provides a detailed description of the 
KLA structure and its evolution in the Dukagjin province in Kosovo. Drenica and the 
Dukagjin were the first two regions in Kosovo where the Operational Zone structure 
first emerged. This emerged due to the region’s early involvement in fighting with 
the Serbian forces.845 Prior to this, KLA groups within these regions, operated 
independently and the villages, for self-protection, had created their own, armed 
groups. The Operational Zone structure had emerged so the activities of all the 
groups within a region could be coordinated in the defence of the region and its 
845 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
9. 
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villages. Therefore, groups had emerged within multiple geographic locations and in 
a response to the environmental factors at these locations. Although Drenica and 
Dukagjin were the first Operational zones to emerge, by the autumn of 1998, five 
other Operational Zones had come into existence.846 
 
Drenica and Dukagjin, of all the Operational Zones within Kosovo, were the most 
developed. By way of example, Dukagjin by June 1998 had developed a subzone 
structure within its Operational Zone. Initially there was no operational commander 
or staff structure to oversee the activities of the Operational Zones.847 KLA units had 
emerged, built on family or clan power bases. There were three dominant clans in 
the Dukagjin area.848 The initial efforts to organise the KLA into a structured 
organisation within the Dukagjin regions, was a consultative process between the 
village representatives, who discussed and created the subzones based on a process 
of negotiation and consultation.849 Through the process of consensus, the 
commander of the Operational Zone was appointed and the subzone leaders were 
elected.850 The regional staff were also appointed. The command structure within 
the Operational Zone was not vertical, but horizontal. The commander of the 
Operational Zone acted as a coordinator, rather than providing orders which had to 
be mandatorily followed by lower levels of the organisation.851 The commander’s 
role was to facilitate cooperation between the subzones during attacks by the 
Serbs.852 In addition, the commander was also responsible for chairing the weekly 
meeting between the commanders of the subzones at his headquarters.853 Thus, at 
this point of the KLA’s evolution, the commander was a consensus leader, not a 
traditional military leader, due to the fluid nature of the organisation structure, 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid., p 23 - 26. 
848 Ibid., p 15. 
849 Ibid., P 21. 
850 Ibid., p 21. 
851 Ibid., p 23 - 26. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Ibid., p 26. 
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which merged a diverse variety of groups. The structure of the group was mediated 
via one on one communications between individuals. It was also dependent on the 
interpersonal relationships between these individuals and their ability to negotiate 
constructively. 
 
The lack of a technologically based communications network between the various 
KLA elements hindered the formation of hierarchical command and control 
structures within the KLA. Communications were carried out either via mobile 
phone (cell phone) or one on one.854 The nature of the communications used by the 
KLA was slow and as such, could not react to immediate threats, which could 
emerge in a dynamically evolving combat space. Due to this limitation, the KLA 
relied on the initiative of the commanders on the ground.  
 
As part of the process of consensus, some locations within Dukagjin remained 
independent of this structure.855 The Jabllanicë village operated outside and was 
independent of the Dukagjin Operational Zone command structure, although it had 
about 200 trained KLA soldiers located within its area of operation.856 The Jabllanicë 
KLA came under the control of the Dukagjin Operational Zone command structure 
in July 1998.857  
 
In July, the KLA also started to adopt a formal military structure, with the formation 
of brigades and the appointment of their commanders.858 The first three brigades 
were formed in July and were assigned specific areas of responsibility.859 In July in 
the Dukagjin region, the FARK860 and the KLA had merged and the FARK officers 
854 ———, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 113 - 14. 
855 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj. 
856 Ibid., p 27. 
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid., p 32. 
859 Ibid., p 34 - 35. 
860 FARK (Forca e armatosura të Republikës së Kosovës) were created as the Military wing of the LDK 
Stuart Groombridge  327 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
                                                     
were spread throughout the brigades,861 but this merger was short lived after FARK 
deserted the battle when the Serbian offensive started in August. By September 
and October, although the KLA in Dukagjin had formed battalions and companies, it 
remained an army in the process of organising.862 The battalion was a name given in 
most instances to a unit, which was typically only about 100 men and the company 
being much smaller.863 In June, the Dukagjin region had around 10,000 men under 
arms. After the Serbian offensive, many had faded away and there were about 56 
members remaining, who were mostly relatives of the commander of the region.864 
 
The process of reorganising the KLA was conducted in an environment of ongoing 
conflict with the Serbs, but the process was given impetus by the Serbian offensive 
in August.865 During this transition period, the KLA in the Dukagjin region also 
created a training centre for the training of new recruits.866 The process of 
reorganisation was carried out within the environmental context of each region. 
 
The structure of the KLA within the Dukagjin region implies the KLA consisted of 
clan and village based groups, who identified as KLA or were affiliated with the KLA, 
but operated independently. They shared the common goal of the defence of their 
people against Serbian attack. It is not clear from the available information whether 
they all shared the aspiration of an independent Kosovo, but Serbian aggression, 
within their region, was sufficient to bring these groups together under the banner 
of the KLA, to cooperate in their mutual defence. Within this structure, the 
Thomas, Nigel; K Mikulan (2013-02-22). The Yugoslav Wars (2): No. 2 (Elite 146) (Kindle Locations 766-767). Osprey Publishing. 
Kindle Edition. 
861 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
35. 
862 Ibid., p 34. 
863 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 113. 
864 Ibid., p 109. 
865 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, p 
34. 
866 Ibid., p 32. 
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commander acted as a coordinator. He had no authority to issue orders. As each 
village sourced their own weapons and funded their own activities, they were not 
dependent on the KLA for resources. Hence, they were able to act independently of 
the KLA command structure and could ignore directions from the KLA, as they were 
not dependent on the KLA for resources. 
 
In the autumn of 1998, the leadership of the KLA abroad, attempted to assert some 
control over the KLA within Kosovo by ordering the formation of brigades and 
battalions.867 This group was known as the General Staff.868 The rate, at which these 
units were formed, varied from region to region. These orders were conveyed to 
each of the regions verbally, by a member of the General Staff, who travel Kosovo 
making contact with each of the KLA Commanders.869 The level of conformance with 
the General Staff’s orders depended on the personal relationship between the 
commanders and the General Staff and the capacity of the units to be self-sufficient 
in weapons and material.870 Some regions, due to their geographic location, had 
created their own arms supply and funding networks, which permitted them a level 
of independence from the General Staff, where other geographic locations were 
dependent on the General Staff for financial and material support.871  
 
Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the environment’s 
influence on the channels of communications and the geographic dispersion of the 
group. 
 
Therefore, the structure of the KLA was determined by the geographic dispersion of 
the group, as reflected in the Operational Zones and sub zones. The need for 
structure was driven by the increasing size of the group. Although the group 
867 ———, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency: p 113. 
868 Ibid. 
869 Ibid., p 113 - 14. 
870 Ibid. 
871 Ibid., p 114. 
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mimicked a military organisation, its structure was effectively a loose network. This 
structure emerged due to the environmental factors, which limited the size of the 
communications channels. The groups also lacked technological solutions to 
mitigate the environmental influences on the size of the communications channels. 
There is insufficient information relating to the group’s structure to ascertain 
whether Dunbar’s cognitive limits had significant influence on the structural 
outcome of the group. Thus, the significant factors, which influence structure, were 
size, geographic dispersion and the limited size (bandwidth) of the communications 
channels. 
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Chapter 18 – Conclusion 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The KLA emerged due to perturbations in the political, economic, social, and legal 
environments, where Serbia stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and their political, 
economic, social, and legal rights. The emergence of the KLA indicates the 
environmental conditions varied across Kosovo. Initially, the KLA emerged and 
gained its support in the rural areas of Kosovo. The reason for this appears to be 
due to social factors. Those in the urban areas placed their faith in the LDK and its 
passive resistance, whereas in the rural areas, there had been a long tradition of 
armed resistance against oppressive governments.   
 
This situation did not change in the urban areas, until the Dayton Accord failed to 
address the issues surrounding Kosovo in its settlement. This failure discredited the 
LDK’s approach. The Dayton Accord was a trigger event, which brought Kosovars to 
the realisation the international community would not act on their behalf. The 
support for the KLA grew, in other areas, when the Serbs, from 1995 onwards, 
engaged in ever increasing violent oppression of the Kosovars throughout the 
province. Thus, perturbations within the PETSTELO environment triggered the 
formation of the KLA. 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
Kosovar political dissidents outside of Kosovo, created the KLA. These dissidents did 
not share the belief that passive resistance would yield the aspiration of Kosovo’s 
independence. The group emerged because of discussions between members of the 
LPRK and the meetings with clan leaders in rural Kosovo. The limited 
communications technology within Kosovo meant all communications had to be 
conducted in one on one meetings. The clan leaders formed their own units or cells. 
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Hence, there were strong social connections within each of the cells. Members of 
these cells came from the same clan. As such, they were geographically close and 
possessed strong homophily, sharing a common clan culture and common social 
rulebook. 
 
As Kosovo lacked significant communications technology, geographic proximity was 
critical to the formation of the group. Likewise, homophily was central to the 
group’s formation. The clans shared the aspiration of the group’s founders, the 
LPRK. The clans who formed the original cells of the KLA, unlike the urban 
counterparts, shared the belief that violence was a legitimate tool to oppose the 
Serbs. The KLA was weak at the time of its emergence in urban areas. The urban 
areas of Kosovo shared the aspiration of an independent Kosovo, but differed in 
how best to achieve this goal. The urban Kosovars shared greater affinity with the 
approach of passive resistance, as espoused by the LDK. The changes made to the 
political, economic, and legal environments by the Serbs were consistent 
throughout Kosovo, but there were significant variances in the socio-cultural 
environmental factors. These differences enhanced or limited the affinity 
(homophily) between the KLA and the Kosovar population. 
 
Therefore, environment, the ability to communicate and homophily, were 
significant factors in the group’s formation. It is also noted, the variances in the 
environmental conditions across Kosovo influenced the level of affinity, or 
homophily individuals shared with the group. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
In the initial phases of the conflict in Kosovo, the KLA was small. The main areas of 
support for the KLA was within the rural areas of Kosovo, where the clans shared 
the goals of the KLA, but also the belief the only way these goals could be achieved 
was through violence. The majority of the Kosovar population shared the aspiration 
of Kosovo’s independence, but did not believe violence would bring this about. 
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Urban and rural areas differed because of differences in geographic environmental 
factors. The urban areas supported and believed the passive resistance approach, 
championed by the LDK, combined with international intervention would bring 
about their goal or aspiration. Although the KLA and the LDK shared the same 
aspiration, they differed in their belief in which method would be the most 
effective. Therefore, the KLA had its greatest homophily within the smaller rural 
communities within Kosovo. This limited support meant the group was small with 
no more than two hundred active members. 
 
The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton Agreement discredited the LDK's 
approach, which led to a greater number of Kosovars concluding independence 
could only be achieved through violence. This, combined with the increasing use of 
violence by the Serbian security forces to suppress dissent, further assisted the KLA. 
This created an environment where the potential pool of recruits increased 
dramatically. The KLA membership increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. 
The size of the KLA was limited by the level of homophily it shared with the 
community. This case study indicates, within a given environmental context, the 
majority will attempt to achieve their goal or aspiration using peaceful methods, 
whilst they believe this approach has a chance of success. When there is a 
perception there is no mechanism within the existing power structures to have their 
grievances addressed, there will be greater levels of support for violence. The level 
of support for violence further increases, when the state uses its power in an 
indiscriminate manner against its citizens, or fails to protect a community from 
violence perpetrated by others. This led to Kosovars either gravitating to the KLA or 
creating independent institutions to defend their communities. This environment 
led to the rapid growth in size of the KLA. The crisis increased the level of homophily 
between the Kosovar community and the KLA. As such, the size of the KLA was a 
function of the level of homophily or affinity between the group and the Kosovar 
population. The magnitude of the homophily between the KLA and the Kosovar 
community was influenced by the varying environmental factors across Kosovo. 
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H3a The structure of any group emerges over time. 
At the time of emergence, the KLA utilised the pre-existing clan structure within the 
rural Kosovo. These clans formed the basis of the early cells of the organisation. This 
structure was well suited for the environment in which they operated. It was a 
hostile environment where the KLA had limited support amongst the Kosovar 
population. The KLA had a central command, which operated abroad, but the 
control of the cells within Kosovo was limited. The command of the KLA set the 
strategic goals of the organisation. The cells operated within this context. Thus, the 
KLA was a network of cells. 
 
As the KLA grew, the cell evolved into larger units. With its increasing size, the KLA 
started to adopt a formal military structure. In the rural areas, village defence units 
emerged independently, but over time, they aligned themselves with the KLA. To 
manage this growing organisation, regional commands were created and the 
various elements of the KLA were organised into brigades and battalions. The level 
of control exercised by every level of the KLA relied heavily on the interpersonal 
relationships between the various commanders. Thus, the KLA, throughout its life, 
remained a network organisation with its channels of communications becoming 
more formalised. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
There was insufficient detailed information relating to the lower levels of the 
structural organisation of the KLA to determine whether the cognitive limits were a 
significant factor in the structure of the KLA. 
 
The initial covert cellular structure of the KLA was a reflection of the environment in 
which it operated and the pre-existing social structures in rural Kosovo. The KLA was 
geographically dispersed across the rural areas of Kosovo, with the leadership cadre 
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outside the country. Communications, due to the limited telecommunications 
network within Kosovo, were primarily carried out through one on one meetings. 
The cells operated within the strategic framework as defined by the leadership, but 
were operationally and tactically independent. 
 
Dayton changed the environment in Kosovo. After Dayton, there was an increased 
level of sectarian violence. The Serbian security forces increased their operations to 
regain control of Kosovo and supress the KLA. This led to increasing levels of 
international support for the KLA. In the environmental context, the KLA’s size 
increased dramatically. Although larger units were formed such as brigades and 
battalions, communications remained rudimentary. The command cadre remained 
outside Kosovo and was only able to set the strategic goals of the organisation. 
Command and control relied heavily on the reputation, trustworthiness, and 
interpersonal skills of the various commanders at all levels of the organisation. In an 
attempt to manage the communications overhead across Kosovo, regional 
command structures were formed, within each region; brigades and battalions were 
created. In addition to the military structured units, there were independent forces 
and village defence units, which had aligned themselves with the KLA. The increased 
size allowed for the formation of specialised units. On paper, the KLA was evolving 
into a traditional military force, but in reality, it was a core periphery network 
where each of its elements worked within a strategic framework towards a 
common goal. 
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Chapter 19 – Cross Case Analysis and Conclusions 
The three case studies indicate complexity theory and the principles of complex 
adaptive systems provide a useful model in which to analyse the factors that lead to 
the emergence of terrorist and extremist groups. Complexity theory describes the 
emergence of order within an environmental context, based on a set of simple self-
organising rules. This thesis examines the emergence of these types of groups based 
on the political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, ecological, legal, and 
organisational (PESTELO) environment, plus the influences of physical distance, 
within a geographic space. The emergence uses a simple set of self-organising rules, 
as defined by homophily and the cognitive limits of social connections. Within the 
context of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems, the environmental and 
homophyllic factors determine the size of the group. Homophily being the primary 
self-organising rule. The changing environment affecting the homophily between 
the group and the larger population, also influences the group’s size. When there is 
more than one entity within a system, they will optimise their communications 
networks to ensure secure communications between each of the entities. Thus, 
how a group organises its communications channels to operate effectively as a 
cohesive entity over a geographic space and within a varying environment, defines 
the group’s structure. 
H1a:  When a group has failed to have its grievances addressed through peaceful 
means, perturbations within the political, economic, and social environments, 
could trigger, in extreme cases, the emergence of terrorist groups. 
The three case studies highlight the importance of the environmental factors in the 
emergence of terrorist groups and their growth. The environmental factors are also 
significant in the demise of these groups. 
 
Thus, an analysis and understanding of the political, economic, socio-cultural 
technological, ecological, legal, and organisational environmental variables is 
essential when examining the emergence of terrorist groups. The three case studies 
indicate that within a society, there needs to be a perception of political, economic, 
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socio-cultural, and legal equity. The case studies indicated, when there are 
disparities in the environmental variables it creates divisions within society, which 
permits the emergence of terrorist groups. 
 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was a nationalist group, whose goal 
was the unification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic to create an Irish 
nation, ending the state’s partition. It operated within an environment where, 
about a third of the population was Catholic, but not all Catholics were Nationalists. 
The PIRA emerged from the IRA, which after the Border Campaign had abandoned 
the armed struggle, adopting a political approach to address its grievances. The 
events of 1969, in Belfast, had discredited the existing leadership of the IRA. From 
the melees on the street in Belfast, the PIRA emerged. In Derry/Londonderry and 
the conservative rural areas of Northern Ireland, the IRA, now known as the Official 
Irish Republican Army, maintained its support amongst the Republican 
communities. In these areas, the PIRA only emerged as small cadres. It was not able 
to create a larger organisational base until the OIRA, in 1972, ceased hostile actions, 
and declared a ceasefire. This left the PIRA as the only viable alternative for those 
who harboured Nationalist aspirations. There were other Nationalist groups, such 
as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which were never to grow in size to 
rival the PIRA. Thus, the PIRA emergence was resultant of local geographic variances 
in the organisational factors in the PESTELO environmental variables.  
 
Though the PIRA emerged from differences in the organisational variable within the 
IRA, this is not sufficient to explain the creation of the PIRA. There must be further 
examination of this variable in the context of the complete PESTELO model. In 
Northern Ireland, the Catholic community was politically, economically, legally, and 
socio-culturally disadvantaged and discriminated against. The PIRA emerged in a 
society, which was dominated by the majority Protestant community. In addition, 
the Westminster government, in London, had failed to act against the sectarian 
nature of the administration of Northern Ireland. From about 1966, there had been 
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a growing non-violent protest movement within Northern Ireland, which was 
agitating for political reform. Further, Protestant reactionary groups had emerged, 
which engaged in confrontational tactics with these activists and protesters. One 
reactionary movement led by Ian Parsley, fuelled sectarianism and undermined the 
reformist policies of a progressive Northern Ireland government. The violent 
suppression of the protest movement by the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the lack 
of a legitimate political mechanism, which permitted the addressing of these 
grievances, fuelled further communal violence and the organisational tensions 
within the IRA. This violence culminated in 1969 in Belfast, and led to the 
displacement of Catholics and Protestants from their homes. This situation only 
ended with the intervention of the British Army. These events were trigger or 
tipping points, where the system had lost stability and the emergence of the PIRA 
was a response to the chaos. 
 
The events in Belfast triggered the initial creation of the PIRA; the reasons for this 
were purely environmental. The IRAs’ inability to respond to the unfolding events in 
Belfast discredited the IRA. As the sectarian violence increased, Belfast Catholics 
flocked to join the PIRA. The PIRA rapidly increased in size from about 50 to many 
hundreds. The environmental factors were different in Derry/Londonderry. The 
majority of the city’s population was Catholic and during the events of the Battle of 
the Bogside, the IRA had maintained a positive image within the Catholic 
community. Thus, when the IRA split, the PIRA was only able to establish a small 
cadre within the city, whereas the OIRA was able to grow its structure. Within the 
conservative Catholic rural areas, the OIRA maintained its support. It was not until 
after the OIRA ceasefire in 1972, the PIRA was able to create cadres within these 
locations. Hence, the PIRA emergence was a response to the instability within the 
local environmental factors in Belfast. 
 
Thus, the key factors to the emergence of the PIRA was due to environmental 
variables, which adversely disadvantaged a section of the Northern Irish community 
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that had no legitimate mechanism for these issues to be addressed. The 
governments of Northern Ireland and Westminster failed to resolve these issues. 
Large sections of the Protestant community acquiesced and preferred to maintain 
the status quo at the disadvantage of the Catholic community. The RUC failed to 
bring the escalating levels of violence, within the community, under control. In 
addition, the RUC was far from impartial. It favoured one section of the community 
over another. As such, the PIRA did not emerge due to a single trigger event. The 
PIRA emerged due to an accumulation of factors, which were not consistent across 
Northern Ireland as a whole. The PIRA emerged from the disaffected IRA units in 
Belfast. It emerged due to an accumulation of environmental factors, which were 
specific to Belfast in 1969, and the perception the existing IRA organisation had 
failed to defend the Catholic communities within Belfast. 
 
The KLA was also a National/Separatist group, which emerged from a political 
organisation who viewed armed struggle against the Serbs as the only method by 
which to bring about Kosovo’s independence. The KLA emerged in an environment, 
with many other competing political organisations, holding differing views on how 
best to create an independent Kosovo. They also held differing political ideological 
models with which they interpreted the environmental factors and they differed on 
the best methodology to achieve independence. Rugova’s approach of peaceful 
resistance within a shadow government maintained pre-eminence among the 
majority of the Kosovars for the first half of the 1990s. The Rugova government 
believed Kosovo’s independence would come as part of the international 
community’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina. The 1995, Dayton 
Accord discredited the Rugova government. This combined with a climate of 
escalating violence and repression from the Serbian state, which was in part, fuelled 
by the escalating attacks on Serbian security forces by the KLA, led to an increase in 
support for the KLA’s approach. 
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The KLA emerged out of a pre-existing political organisation, who believed the 
peaceful approach would not gain Western intervention and would not bring about 
the independence of Kosovo. Thus, they created the embryonic KLA as a response 
to this belief. 
 
The KLA emerged in an environment where Serbian President Milošević had 
removed most of the Kosovars political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal rights. 
Unlike Northern Ireland, Kosovo was not subjected to the levels of sectarian 
violence, which led to the emergence of the PIRA in Belfast. In addition, within 
Kosovo there was also a viable political alternative, which was absent in Northern 
Ireland. Furthermore, unlike Catholics within Northern Ireland, Kosovars in Kosovo 
represented the bulk of the population. Geographic and socio-cultural factors were 
also significant in the emergence of the group. The KLA initially lacked support in 
the urban areas, but was able to gain some support in the rural regions of Kosovo 
where there had been a long tradition of opposing repressive regimes. The KLA 
remained small and embryonic, whilst the vast majority of the Kosovar population 
supported Rugova’s non-violent political approach. The complete emergence of the 
KLA and other groups did not occur until the Dayton Accord discredited the LDK’s 
non-violent approach in 1995. 
 
Thus, the KLA was a response to the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal 
disadvantage experienced by Kosovars in the 1990s. Its emergence was also due to 
the international community’s failure to address these issues in their attempts to 
resolve the problems, which beset the failing Yugoslav Republic in the 1990s. Thus, 
there were two PESTELO environments acting on the microenvironment in which 
the KLA emerged. The first was the environment created by the Serbian 
government within Yugoslavia. The Serbian government disenfranchised the 
Kosovar people politically, economically, socially, and legally, to fulfil their political 
agenda. The Serbs ignored the current and historical demographic realities of 
Kosovo in an attempt to recreate a greater Serbia. The second factor was the 
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external international environment, whose leading actors failed to respond 
appropriately to address the problems, which beset the failing Yugoslav Republic. 
The international community’s failure to act discredited the supporters of the 
peaceful approach. The inaction of the international community suggested to the 
Serbian government they could act unhindered in Kosovo. As such, they 
implemented a harsher and repressive regime in Kosovo, to ensure it remained a 
part of the Greater Serbia. The International community’s inaction and the Serbian 
repression, led to the emergence of the KLA as a viable alternative for those who 
wished to achieve Kosovo’s independence, or for those who just wanted to defend 
their communities against Serbian aggression. 
 
The Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) emerged from the student protest 
movement of the 1960s. The WUO emerged from the highly factionalised university 
based SDS, which had originally emerged and supported the Civil Rights movement, 
in the 1960s. As the Vietnam War escalated, the membership of the SDS grew 
exponentially. The SDS opposed the Vietnam War and the perceived social injustice 
within the United States. The organisation was also highly successful in organising 
large protests. The SDS comprised of many leftist factions who at times, vied for 
control of the organisation and its members. As the organisation became larger and 
more successful, its leading members drew the attention of law enforcement 
agencies. They feared the socialist ideology of the group, and its potential alignment 
with its Cold War adversaries. There was a diversity of leftist thinking within the 
SDS. WUO was one of these factions who had hoped they could inspire the working 
class masses to rise up against their oppressors. They viewed themselves as the 
cadre or vanguard of a revolutionary army. The WUO believed their struggle would 
inspire the working classes to join them.  
 
Thus, the WUO shared the same PESTELO environment as the SDS, but differed in 
homophily with the majority of the SDS members. The WUO believed peaceful 
protests had failed. Therefore, the WUO emerged due to homophyllic differences in 
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the organisational variable of the PESTELO environmental model. The emergence of 
the WUO occurred because of a variation of a belief, in the best methodology to 
achieve the organisational goals. The WUO emerged as a small organisation 
because the large majority of the SDS membership did not share its views and 
philosophies. Therefore, the differences in the organisational variables were 
significant in the emergence of the WUO. 
 
At a micro level, the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal variables were 
significant. Inherently, the WUO shared the same political, economic, socio-cultural, 
and legal grievances as the SDS, as a whole. They both wished to create an 
American society with greater equality for all. The members of the WUO and SDS 
came from the same economic and socio-cultural backgrounds.  
 
All three case studies indicate the PESTELO environmental model can be utilised to 
describe the emergence of terrorist groups. The case studies reveal, for the group’s 
understudy, the political, economic, socio-cultural, legal, and organisational 
variables are significant in the formation of these groups. In each of the cases, there 
was significant deviance in the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal variables 
between sections of the communities. There was significant social distance 
between the terrorist groups and the group, which held power or government. The 
organisational variable is also significant, in each of the case studies. Each terrorist 
group emerged from a pre-existing organisation, which shared the goals and 
aspirations of the terrorist group, but differed on the best methodology to bring 
about the goal. In all three cases, the parent organisation of the terrorist group was 
involved in political defiance to highlight the plight of the section of the community 
they represented, or aspired to represent. In each case, a faction of the political 
movement concluded the non-violent approach had not generated the required 
outcome. This group concluded the required change could only be brought about by 
violence.  
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The emergence of the terrorist group is not only contingent on favourable PESTELO 
variables. There also needs to be an event or events, which will discredit the 
political approach, giving legitimacy to violence as a methodology for bringing about 
the required change. The use of violence by the group, gains further credence if 
their opponents use violence against those, who the group claims to represent, but 
are not necessarily involved with the group. 
 
The ecological and technological variables, in the PESTELO model, were not 
discussed within this dissertation, as factors, which have led to the formation of 
terrorist groups. Even so, there are examples where these factors are important in 
the emergence of these types of groups. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an 
example of an ecological extremist group, which emerged due to a concern for the 
eco-system or ecological environment and its degradation through economic 
exploitation. Likewise, the technological variable has been a factor in the formation 
of groups who have been opposed to the introduction of technology because it has 
disadvantaged them economically. The Luddites in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries are examples. In terms of terrorist groups of the 20th and 21st centuries, 
technology has become an enabler. It has been a medium by which issues, in the 
broader community, can be brought to the attention of a wider audience. As 
discussed in the chapters dealing with the WUO, the nightly images of the Vietnam 
War, allowed the peace movement to mobilise vast numbers of Americans in 
protest marches against the war, and demand the withdrawal of Unites States 
troops from the country. Television also permitted the Civil Rights movement to 
bring to the attention of the American people, the relative deprivation, and 
discrimination, experienced by black Americans to a wider audience. This forced 
American politicians to act and pass sweeping Civil Rights legislation in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The two events received significant coverage on American television. 
These reports and images acted as radicalisers for some sections of the American 
community. Technology, through television and public availability of telephones, 
circumvented the tyranny of distance, which has historically created time lags in 
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communications channels. The four-dimensional world of length, width, height and 
time, now had a fifth dimension. This fifth dimension nullified the effects of 
geographic distance. It compressed the previous time lags in the communications 
channels, in some instances, compressing this lag to effectively zero. In the three 
case studies, technology allowed the groups to access a broader audience, which in 
the past had not been available. It permitted them to reach beyond those in their 
immediate geographic audience. Technology also permitted these groups to strike 
fear in their opponents through visual impact of their acts on television. It further 
allowed them to solicit new recruits and supporters on a global scale. It also had its 
disadvantages; it allowed their opponents to portray the groups negatively, which 
could undermine the group’s support base. Even so, technology in these three case 
studies, demonstrated the potential of technology as an enabler. 
 
Therefore, terrorist groups emerge where a group perceives there are adverse 
political, economic, socio-cultural, ecological, and legal environments, which 
disadvantage the community they purport to represent. These prevailing conditions 
do not necessarily lead to the instantaneous emergence of a terrorist group. In all 
three case studies, there was a need for a trigger event or multiple trigger events, 
which acted as radicalisers within the affected community. Within each of the case 
studies, not all members of the affected community were radicalised. In all three 
cases, few adopted violence to achieve their goals, but many were supportive or 
sympathetic to the goals of the terrorist organisation. Those who were sympathetic 
did not necessarily become directly involved. Those who were supportive may have 
engaged in non-violent direct action, such as protests. Some would engage in the 
political process. Others may have provided financial or material support. Further, 
others may have become involved in the group in ancillary roles, such as the 
gathering of intelligence, providing safe houses, hiding weapons etc. Very few 
actually engaged in violent acts. 
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The case studies support the premise in Chapter 2, that radicalisation is an integral 
part of the emergence of terrorist groups, but it results in the formation of other 
non-violent groups. Radicalisation is a process, as supported by the case studies, 
which has scales and can have many outcomes, many of which are not negative. In 
terms of complex adaptive systems, radicalisation is a response to changes in the 
environmental conditions. These changes create perturbations or trigger events. 
The case studies highlight, there can be a multitude of outcomes. In the cases 
selected, the radicalisation of the affected community only resulted in the 
emergence of terrorist groups in extreme cases. In each of the case studies, other 
non-violent groups also emerged and typically had greater support within the 
community than the violent extremist groups. Thus, the emergence of terrorist 
groups is a complex process and dependent on a multitude of variables, 
summarised in Figure 15. 
 
The figure below illustrates the complexity of the radicalisation process:  
 
Figure 15 –Hierarchy of Variables 
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The above figure illustrates the hierarchy of variables involved in the radicalisation 
process, which leads to the emergence of terrorist and other groups. It also 
illustrates the complexity of the interrelations between the variables involved in 
radicalisation and emergence. These interrelationships indicate this system and its 
behaviour is typical of a complex adaptive system. 
 
The figure above is a development of the model provided in Figure 15, based on the 
knowledge acquired from the analysis of the three case studies. The outer circle 
consists of the environmental variables, which assist or hinder communications. In 
complex adaptive systems, the exchange of information or communications is 
critical. This layer includes the physical enablers or inhibitors to information 
exchange. That is, the geographic distances between the entities and the availability 
of technology, which can create a virtual space or fifth dimension where entities can 
communicate. Ecology can also be an inhibitor or enabler communications. The 
physical ecology can constrain the placement of communications technology. In 
doing so, it can hamper the use of communications technology. Geographic 
proximity technology and ecology are enablers or inhibitors of communications, 
which are mediated through the next two environmental layers, in which 
perturbations and grievances originate. Ecology is an environmental variable, which 
can also be a factor in the environment, which leads to emergence. In terms of 
complex adaptive systems, changes in the ecology872, political, economic, and legal 
environmental layers can trigger emergence and self-organising. 
 
872 The outer circle is the ecological variable and is included as an acknowledgement the ecological environment, in the future, 
will be a potential source of conflict and generator of violent extremism (terrorism). It is a variable, which will have a direct 
impact on the next layer, which includes the political, economic, and legal environmental variables. The socio-cultural and 
organisational variables are excluded from the environmental layer of the PESTELO model. The case studies indicated these 
variables were best included in the homophyllic layer of the model. In effect the socio-cultural and organisation variable are 
homophyllic variables as they describe how people organise themselves in a social context and are better described in this 
layer of the model. 
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 In the next section of the model, the outer layer, consists of status homophily 
factors, which consist of gender, religion, class, ethnicity, education etc. These 
variables define how individuals generally describe themselves. The middle layer of 
the homophyllic section of the model describes how individuals interact; that is 
through organisations or networks. The inner layer of this section of the model is 
age. The three case studies highlighted age as a central factor in the emergence of 
terrorist or violent extremist groups. The case studies underscored the significance 
of age in homophily (social affinity), and in the radicalisation and emergence 
processes. The ideologues and the leaders were typically over the age of 30. Those 
who engaged in violent acts were mostly in their twenties. On average, those who 
engaged in violent acts were under the age of 28, but most were older than 20, with 
the average age being around 25. 
 
The final two layers consist of the value homophily variables, which further refine 
the definition of entities that are more likely to form or become involved in violent 
extremism. The outer layer defines the grievance or aspiration. It also defines the 
belief. The case studies highlighted, individuals or groups have to believe all other 
legitimate mechanisms have failed and violence is the only option left, if they are to 
achieve their aspiration. The inner layer defines where on the radicalisation scale an 
individual resides. It suggests aptitude, abilities, and behaviours are factors, which 
lead to individuals gravitating to violent extremism. These factors also suggest, 
those who do not necessarily possess the right aptitude, abilities or behaviour to 
become a violent extremist, may still join a group but take on another role in 
support of the group’s activities. Consequently, implying a scale of radicalisation as 
highlighted in Figure 16. 
 
The case studies also highlight democracy acts a safety valve. It does not prevent 
the emergence of violent extremist groups but does provide a mechanism to 
address grievances and limits the size of the groups. Where there is no such 
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mechanism, these groups can grow to be quite large, and a resolution can only be 
achieved, by the defeat of one side or the other. 
 
The homophyllic layers are effectively the self-organising rules of the complex 
adaptive system, which is the violent extremist or terrorism group. It defines, based 
on the environmental factors, those who are more likely to interact and form links, 
within a specific physical or virtual geographic space. Within the context of a 
complex adaptive system, interaction is central to emergence and self-organising. 
 
Thus, radicalisation cannot be viewed as a binary process, which is, you are 
radicalised, or not radicalised. Radicalisation is an analogue process, with many 
varying levels with no distinct transition between one level and another. It is 
suspected where an individual resides on the radicalisation scale, is related to their 
value homophily. An individual may share the aspiration(s) of the group; believe 
violence is the only method, which will bring about the aspiration(s), but lack, in 
terms of value homophily, the behavioural traits, or ability, to engage in violence. 
Among those who believe in violence as a legitimate methodology and share similar 
aspirations, the specifics of the aspiration may vary. That is, what form of 
government should be created? For example, whether this government should be 
secular or religious, or whether it is a democratic state or dictatorship. These 
differences can lead to the emergence of a variety of groups, within the same 
PESTELO environment, attempting to achieve similar aspirations. 
 
In addition, another group may share the aspirations of the terrorist group and have 
been radicalised by the same events within the PESTELO environment, but diverge 
in value homophily, in the belief that violence is a legitimate tool. Those in this 
group, believe change should take place within the existing political system, and 
engage in the political process and/or take non-violent direct action. Thus, within a 
PESTELO environment, the radicalisation process may produce a multitude of 
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different groups aspiring to achieve similar goals using differing methodologies. The 
figure below illustrates the radicalisation process and the scales of radicalisation:  
Figure 16 – Scales of Radicalisation 
 
Note on the left hand side of the figure, the reducing numbers who occupy the 
various levels of radicalisation. The figure also illustrates there are various entry 
points on the radicalisation scale. Some radicalise quickly, for others it takes 
multiple trigger events within a harshening environment. Very few become violent 
extremists. Some may support violent extremist groups by becoming involved in an 
indirect support role: funding, logistics, intelligence collection etc. Others may 
engage in direct political action, such as non-violent protests or political activism. 
Even more may just support the goals of the group, but not wish to become 
involved and finally, others may be just sympathetic. Note, the figure also suggests 
when the environmental factors change and the need for violence subsides, those 
involved in violent extremism are not necessarily de-radicalised, but disengage to a 
lower level on the radicalisation scale. 
 
Thus, the case studies demonstrated that a failure of peaceful means to address 
political, economic, and social grievances has the potential to result in the 
emergence of violent extremist or terrorist groups. This is especially valid in a 
volatile environment where the state or other actors, use violence to suppress or 
marginalise those with grievances. The case studies indicate radicalisation is part of 
the emergence process and violent extremism is not the only potential outcome of 
this process. The case studies demonstrated radicalisation has a multitude of 
outcomes, many of which are peaceful. In the three case studies in this thesis, the 
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emergence of terrorist groups can be described in terms of complex adaptive 
systems. 
H1b:  Homophyllic and geographic proximity influences the ability of individuals 
to communicate and this influence is central to group formation. 
The results of the analysis of the geographic factors of the three case studies 
indicate, geographic proximity was an important variable in the emergence of all 
three groups, and was central to the formation of the groups. The results indicate 
the PESTELO variables were important in the formation of these groups. As noted 
previously, the PESTELO environment is not contiguous and does vary across the 
geographic space. 
 
The WUO emerged predominately from two groups, which operated out of 
Columbia University and the University of Chicago. Both these campuses and their 
chapters of the SDS had built reputations for confrontational direct actions, focusing 
on national issues. The actions undertaken by these two campuses, at times, had 
brought them into violent confrontation with national and state authorities. Other 
chapters on other campuses focused more on local and regional matters and did 
not necessarily become involved in the larger issues, which the national leadership 
attempted to address. Hence, they did not necessarily experience the same levels of 
confrontation with the state. The factors, which radicalised these two factions, were 
not only local issues, but also issues in the national environment. The geographic 
proximity of individuals, enhanced their capacity to communicate, which allowed 
those who share homophyllic similarity, to come together more readily. The varying 
influences of each of the PESTELO environmental variables from geographic location 
to location, combined with the national issues, were factors in Columbia University 
and the University of Chicago being the centres of emergence of the WUO. 
Therefore, the geographic proximity of individuals sharing the same PESTELO 
environment, which enhanced their capacity to communicate, facilitated the 
emergence of the WUO. 
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The PIRA emerged from a set of PESTELO environmental variables, which were very 
specific to Belfast. Members of the Belfast IRA created the PIRA because they had 
become disillusioned with the direction the IRA was adopting politically and the lack 
of response from those who led the IRA to the escalating violence within their city. 
The escalating violence in Belfast brought together those within Belfast who 
opposed the current leadership. In terms of the homophyllic variables, the Belfast 
dissidents shared the leadership’s aspiration of a united Ireland, but differed in their 
belief in how this goal would be achieved. After the failed Border Campaign, the 
abandonment of the armed struggle for a political approach gained support. By the 
end of 1969, about 18 months of violence and specifically the events of August in 
Belfast had discredited this approach within Belfast. These men from Belfast, who 
had a long association with the IRA (some of these associations were generational), 
split with the leadership of the IRA, not with the intent of creating a new 
organisation, but with the goal of replacing the leadership. The PIRA emergence was 
influenced by the geographic proximity of the creators, to the changing PESTELO 
environment specific to Belfast. Although civil unrest had been felt across Northern 
Ireland, places such as Derry/Londonderry had demonstrated that the Catholic 
population, which was in the demographic majority, was more than capable of 
defending itself against Unionist incursions. This was exemplified by the Battle of 
the Bogside. The rural areas in Northern Ireland were conservative and spared 
much of the sectarian violence in 1969. Therefore, the PESTELO environment was 
not conducive to a split with the IRA and the majority of the rural areas remained 
loyal to the IRA until it declared a ceasefire in 1972. Belfast, in contrast, was a city 
where the Unionists had the demographic advantage. It was also the city, which 
experienced some of the worst sectarian violence. Thus, the environmental factors, 
which led to the emergence of the PIRA, were not contiguous geographically, across 
Northern Ireland. Even within Belfast, not all units of the IRA defected to the PIRA; a 
few units remained loyal to the established leadership of the IRA.  
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Thus, the creation of the PIRA was effectively the creation of a rival IRA leadership. 
It emerged geographically in one location, due to a set of distinct PESTELO variables 
within that location and proximity. This shared experience of the environment 
created communications channels, with minor lag, where individuals could share 
and plan. Because of the homophyllic affinity, Belfast units created, through shared 
experiences, the rival leadership for the IRA. This leadership emerged and was able 
to assimilate disaffected elements of the IRA. This disaffection did not occur in 
Derry/Londonderry and the majority of the rural areas, until the OIRA declared a 
ceasefire in 1972. By this time, the PIRA had defined itself as the leaders in the 
struggle. The OIRA ceasefire also left limited alternatives to those who wished to 
join the struggle. As there was significant homophily between the OIRA and the 
PIRA, those who wished to continue the struggle, aligned themselves with the PIRA 
leadership. 
 
There were many political organisations within Kosovo, many of which had been 
pre-existing, and others emerging after Kosovo lost its autonomy and Kosovars 
were disenfranchised by the Serbs in 1989. The peaceful non-violent approach 
initially appealed to most Kosovars, though this view was not universally accepted. 
Many of those in exile, who were central to the formation of the KLA, had been 
involved in the Protest movement in the 1980s. From this experience, they had 
adopted the view; violent confrontation was the only method, which would achieve 
independence. The KLA emerged from a political group, the LPK, in 1993. Although 
the LDK and LPK shared the same goal of Kosovo’s independence, they differed in 
value homophily, in the belief, of the best method to achieve this goal. The LDK 
believed it could be achieved through peaceful methods with international support. 
The LPK believed the international community would only act if the violent 
approach were adopted. At the time of its emergence, the KLA could only engender 
support from the rural areas of Kosovo; whose clan based social structure had a 
tradition of KaÇak, resisting oppressive and colonialist governments. The KLA did not 
resonate with the urban population or the intellectuals of Kosovo. Up until 1995-6, 
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the KLA remained an embryonic organisation, relying on the support of clan leaders 
and their clans within the rural areas. Thus, the original members of the KLA 
consisted of two groups. The leaders in exile came together, based on a common 
belief in violence as the only methodology, which would bring about Kosovo’s 
independence. They aligned themselves with clan based rural communities, which 
had traditionally used violence to resist central authority, who also aspired to an 
independent Kosovo. 
  
Geography played a central role in the emergence of the KLA. The Leadership 
Abroad shared geographic proximity and the clans, which initially aligned 
themselves with the KLA, shared the benefits of geographic proximity. The shared 
homophily and geographic proximity of the group, which would form the leadership 
of the KLA, enhanced their capacity to communicate and was central to the 
formation of the group. As the leaders were not resident within Kosovo, homophily 
was central to the creation of the KLA. The communications channels between the 
leadership and the KLA aligned clans were long and inefficient. Within the KLA’s 
aligned clans, the communications channels were short, due to the very close 
geographic proximity of its members. Typically, they lived within the same 
compound or adjoining compounds. The clans also had very strong homophyllic 
ties. The family ties created a strong status homophily between clan members. A 
shared clan history, a shared experience of the PESTELO environment, a shared 
upbringing, and a common social rulebook, created strong value homophyllic links 
within the local group. 
 
The geographic distance between the clan based groups and the leadership, even 
though they shared strong homophyllic attachment, meant the communication 
channels were long. Thus, the leadership cadre had to travel to Kosovo and actively 
seek out those who would be willing to join or align with the group. For the group to 
emerge, the leadership had to be proactive in the creation of the KLA, seeking out 
like-minded individuals. There was a large physical geographic distance between the 
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cells involved in direct action and the leadership. As such, the KLA was initially a 
loosely connected network of cells. The large geographic distance created narrow 
bandwidth communications channels. Technically, although not a leaderless 
resistance group, it operated within that context. Each cell was tactically and 
operationally independent, working within a common strategic framework.  
 
Thus, these three case studies indicate geographic proximity of homophyllic similar 
individuals is central to group formation. Geographic proximity increases the 
probability that homophyllic similar individuals or groups will meet. Further, 
geographic proximity increases the bandwidth of the communications channels, 
permitting a greater exchange of information. The greater exchange of information 
can reinforce the homophyllic similarities, permitting the formation of a tightly knit 
group. All three case studies indicate it is still possible for a group to emerge, when 
geographically dispersed. In this environment, the network connections are looser. 
Even so, the group can still be effective if there is a well-defined strategic goal and 
sufficient homophily to unite the group. 
H2a:  The size of a terrorist group is limited by homophily and the political, 
economic, and social environment in which the group operates. 
The three case studies indicate homophily and the environmental factors limit the 
size of terrorist groups. Each case study highlighted the factors involved in the size 
each of the groups was able to obtain.  
 
The WUO emerged from an organisation, which had nearly 100,000 members. The 
SDS achieved a large membership because it was able to appeal to a significant 
portion of the student population in the 1960s. It was predominantly a white, 
middle class organisation, but it championed a wide range of issues, which appealed 
to its diverse membership. It was active on issues relating to civil rights, it opposed 
the Vietnam War and it campaigned on local university issues. The driving force 
behind its exponentially growing membership was America’s deepening 
involvement in the Vietnam War and the increasing demands by the military for 
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conscripts. These two factors directly affected the young student population at that 
time. The SDS’ leadership in the protest movement, combined with the successes in 
staging large protests, led to those who wanted change, to gravitate to the SDS, 
thus dramatically increasing its membership. The SDS maintained broad goals and 
through direct action, attempted to change American society. These broad goals 
and its success attracted other homophyllic similar groups, to align themselves with 
the organisation. In essence, success breeds success. The SDS became an umbrella 
organisation for a multitude of similar thinking groups. The embryonic beginnings of 
the WUO were a part of this organisation.  
 
The original members of the WUO initially shared the goals of the many other 
groups who formed the SDS. These members, over time, became disillusioned with 
the effectiveness of the peaceful direct action tactics of the SDS. They formulated 
the view that violence and revolution were required to bring about these changes. 
This group managed to gain the leadership of the SDS, with the intent of turning the 
organisation into a revolutionary movement. When the group called for the Days of 
Rage, the turnout was small and poor. Although the SDS and the WUO faction of the 
SDS existed within the same environment, sharing similar status homophyllic 
variables, they differed in terms of value homophily. Both groups shared an 
aspiration to change American society, but differed on how best to bring this about.  
 
The SDS, at the time of the split, had nearly 100,000 members. The WUO estimated 
membership, at the time of the split, was between 150 and 200 active members 
and supporters, which was no more than 0.20% of the total membership of the SDS. 
As such, the WUO was a small portion of a broader movement. The WUO would 
decline in size from this point up until its demise. The decline resulted from the 
changes in the PESTELO environment created by the United States’ withdrawal from 
Vietnam and the passing of Civil Rights legislation. The Oil Shock of 1973 also 
altered the environment, leading to a period of economic decline in the United 
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States. In this period, the membership of the WUO declined to about 50 and may 
have been as low as 30.  
 
The WUO also failed to mobilise support within the community. In addition, the 
working class were disinterested in groups, such as the WUO. The WUO failed to 
create an aboveground political organisation, which could represent it in the 
community. By the time the WUO created a political organisation, it had become 
irrelevant within the changed environment. 
 
 The environmental factors which created the WUO, and by which the WUO had 
defined its struggle, were no longer issues or relevant to the broader American 
population. There was never a significant level of support to bring about change 
through revolution and violence within the Student Movement and their supporters 
in the community. The democratic system of the United States meant the system 
had a safety valve. The democratic process allowed political change, without the 
use of violence. It was also a society, which permitted political descent, which if 
ignored by the political elite, would lead to electoral defeat. These factors cannot 
be ignored, as revolution was not required to bring about change. This environment 
was not conducive to the growth of extremist groups, like the WUO. As such, this 
environment led to the declining size of the membership of the WUO and the 
eventual demise of the group. 
 
In 1969, the PIRA membership was between 40- 60 members. The increasing levels 
of sectarian violence and a failure of the RUC to act impartially and decisively, led to 
Catholic and Protestant communities, in cities such as Belfast and 
Derry/Londonderry, creating ”no go” areas for protection. The Catholics initially 
welcomed the intervention of the British Army to assist in maintaining law and 
order.  
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 As the British Army was under the command of the Northern Irish Government at 
Stormont, the enthusiasm for the British Army dissipated. The British Army’s 
intervention in the Catholic enclaves on the instructions of the Protestant 
dominated Northern Irish Government, called into question its impartiality. The 
PIRA was able politically, to capitalise on these interventions, portraying the Army 
as a tool of Protestant repression. The PIRA created a perception of a community 
under siege from the British Army and the Protestants alike, which permitted the 
PIRA to depict itself as the defenders of Catholics.  
 
The “no go” areas also created safe havens from which to plan, organise and 
recruit. The “no go” areas made it difficult for the RUC and the British Army to 
operate. In effect, these areas were outside governmental control. The vacuum was 
filled by the OIRA and PIRA, who effectively protected, governed, and policed these 
areas. In this environment of uncertainty for Catholics, the ranks of the PIRA’s 
Belfast Brigade grew from a few dozen at the beginning of 1970, to a few hundred 
at the end of that year. By the end of 1971, it was estimated the Belfast Brigade had 
over a thousand members.   
 
Due to the policy of internment in 1971 and Bloody Sunday at the start of 1972, the 
British Army had lost most of its credibility with the Catholic population. Bloody 
Sunday in Derry/Londonderry, triggered an influx of new members of the PIRA. The 
OIRA’s unilateral ceasefire in the same year also assisted. The increased 
membership also saw increased PIRA activity, which gave the organisation greater 
credibility as an effective defender of Catholic communities, which also enhanced 
their capacity to recruit.  
 
Furthermore, unlike the OIRA, that had adopted a Marxist ideology, which did not 
appeal to traditional Catholics, the ideological framework of the PIRA was more 
broadly acceptable. The group was leftist but not Marxist; it promoted the defence 
of Catholic communities with the ultimate goal of a reunified Ireland. Thus, those 
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who joined between 1970 and 1972 did not need to be hard-core Republicans. They 
predominantly joined to defend their families and communities, as they believed 
the existing political and legal institutions in London and Stormont had failed to do 
so.  
 
The year 1972 was the high tide mark for the PIRA; there were significant changes in 
the environment from 1972 onwards. The Stormont government was disbanded, 
with Northern Ireland being ruled directly from Westminster. Operation Motorman 
denied the PIRA and other paramilitary groups their safe havens and the British 
Army took on a more supporting role, giving the RUC the lead role in countering the 
paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. The British, over the next 25 years, 
enhanced their intelligence capabilities within Northern Ireland and ensured the 
“no go” areas did not re-emerge, thus, denying the PIRA its safe havens in the cities 
of Belfast and Derry/Londonderry. In this environment, the PIRA could not maintain 
the large membership. As a large organisation, the PIRA was more susceptible to 
infiltration by the security forces. In adapting to the new environment, the size of 
the PIRA shrank to about a third of its original establishment. For the remainder of 
The Troubles, the PIRA’s membership was static. 
 
The emergence of the KLA and its growth was linked to the changing environment 
within Kosovo, throughout the 1990s. In the early part of the 1990s, the LPK and its 
predecessor LPRK maintained a small network of activists within Kosovo. It drew the 
majority of its support from the rural areas, with most of the urban population 
supporting the LDK’s passive resistance approach. At this time, in terms of 
homophily, the LPK and LDK shared the same aspiration, the independence of 
Kosovo. The KLA had been an underground organisation leading up to 1996, when it 
surfaced. Another factor, which favoured the KLA, was the breakdown of law and 
order in Albania, which provided cheap and ready access to weapons in 1997. By 
1997, the KLA had grown to an organisation with 300-500 members, of which about 
150 were active. In reality, it was still a small organisation and the participation cost 
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of being a member of the group was high, with a low probability of the group 
achieving its goal/aspiration. However, this small cadre was actively attacking 
Serbian targets, which led to the Serbs imposing a more oppressive regime within 
the province. The escalation in the level of violence increased the number of civilian 
displacements, casualties, and deaths. Within this environment, the Kosovar 
community felt greater homophily with the KLA, which resulted in an increase in the 
number of recruits.  
 
The two organisations differed in homophily on how to achieve the goal. The LPK 
believed the violent resistance of Serbian rule was the only method, which would 
bring about the group’s aspiration. Whereas, the LDK and the majority of the 
Kosovar population, were of the belief peaceful resistance and international 
intervention could bring it about. This belief and the support for the LDK dominated 
the Kosovar’s political environment up until the Dayton Agreement in November 
1995, which discredited the LDK’s approach. Dayton had demonstrated that 
violence focused the international communities’ attention. Dayton, along with the 
escalating use of violence by Serbian security forces, radicalised the Kosovar 
community. This led to a homophyllic shift in the belief and acceptance in the use of 
violence, primarily for defence against the Serbs, but secondly to bring about the 
independence of Kosovo. 
 
By mid-1998, the KLA had an estimated 7000 members, active or in training. The 
increasing levels of violence also attracted international attention. The threats of air 
strikes by the international community, led to a Serbian withdrawal from the 
province, in October 1998. Correspondingly, there was also an increase in the size of 
the KLA, which reached around 17,000, by March 1999. During this time, villages 
had formed defence militias to protect themselves against Serbian attacks. The KLA 
had kept their goals general, the independence of Kosovo. Their success and access 
to weapons also broadened their appeal to a wide cross section of the Kosovar 
community. Many of the village militias aligned themselves with the KLA and took 
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on KLA iconography. The KLA was also able to attract recruits from the Kosovar 
diaspora. It further attracted recruits from other Muslim countries, who came to 
defend fellow Muslims. KLA managed to engender broad appeal by defining their 
struggle in simple nationalistic terms with a simple goal, independence. This 
definition also permitted the KLA to appeal for, and solicit, international support. 
 
In summary, initially the KLA’s growth was hindered by the environmental factors 
within Kosovo and was only able to establish itself in areas where there was a 
tradition of taking up arms to resist the governing authorities. The majority of the 
population, though sharing many homophyllic similarities with the KLA, such as an 
aspiration for independence, did not share the belief violence was the only tool 
available to achieve the goal (aspiration).They preferred the LDK’s approach of 
peaceful resistance. The KLA only started to grow when the Dayton Agreement 
changed the political environment. Dayton, in the minds of ordinary Kosovars 
discredited the LDK’s peaceful approach. The increasing use of violence by the Serbs 
to suppress the independence movement also created an environment conducive 
to the KLA’s growth. 
 
 In this political environment, the homophyllic factors, within Kosovo, shifted to the 
KLA’s advantage and its membership rapidly expanded. The environmental factors 
were significant in radicalising Kosovars and bringing about the acceptance of 
violence as the only way Kosovars were going to achieve their dream of 
independence. The political support of the international community further altered 
the PESTELO environment, which increased the chance of success of the KLA. 
Individuals and groups tend to gravitate to organisations, which appear to be 
successful. 
 
The three case studies establish a relationship between the size of a terrorist group 
and the PESTELO environment. To grow in size, a group requires a favourable 
PESTELO environment. A hostile PESTELO environment will cause a reduction in the 
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size of the group. As previously discussed, in terms of emergence of the groups, the 
PESTELO variables are not contiguous over the entire geographic space. The 
PESTELO variables can change from location to location and from population to 
population. The organisational variable was a significant determining factor in the 
size of the group. The amount of homophily the organisation shared with the 
community, was also significant in determining the size of the group. The greater 
the homophily, the larger the group could grow. Two value homophyllic variables 
were important. Those who align themselves with the group shared the group’s 
aspiration (goal) and the belief violence was a legitimate methodology to achieve 
their goal. Thus, to appeal to the greatest cross section of their homophyllic group, 
it was important to keep this goal broad and not couch it in a political ideology, 
which would limit its attraction within their target audience. There also has to be a 
belief, among potential recruits, the group had the ability to achieve the aspiration. 
The group had to demonstrate it had the ability to succeed. 
 
From an environmental context, the population has to have the perception the 
existing political structure has disengaged with their homophyllic group. That is, 
they are acting in the interests of another homophyllic group within the community. 
As such, the existing political system fails to maintain the perception of equity 
between the homophyllic groups, which make up society. The KLA and the PIRA are 
both examples of such political systems, where the governing bodies had 
neutralised the dissenting voice in the legitimate political process, removing a 
legitimate avenue to vent political, economic, social, and legal grievances. There 
was no political safety valve to relieve social pressures or to address grievances. The 
political system was driven by sectarian self-interest.  
 
Both groups are examples of where increasing levels of sectarian violence led to a 
corresponding increase in the size of the group. Neither of these groups were 
passive actors within this environment. Both, through their actions, were able to 
manipulate the environment, both were successful and in their success, attracted 
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more recruits. In addition, they both highlighted the importance of physical safe 
havens. A physical safe haven allows the group to increase their size, because it 
provides the group security by limiting the capacity of their opponents to operate, 
gather intelligence, and disrupt their activities. The PIRA illustrates the point where 
the loss of a safe haven affects the size of the group. The loss of safe havens in 1972 
led to a decrease in the size of the membership of the PIRA, although not 
necessarily a loss of support from within the community. 
 
The WUO is an example of a group with very limited support for its violent acts 
within the community or its goal (aspiration) of revolutionary change. It existed in 
an environment where the governing bodies, through the democratic process, were 
willing to engage in political and social change. Thus, the environmental safety valve 
was able to relieve the environmental pressures. In this environment, the group 
was unable to increase its size. As the government started to address the issues, 
which created the group in the first instance, the size of the group decreased. In this 
case, it used violence in an environment where political and social change could be 
brought about peacefully through the weight of public opinion. This further 
diminished the relevance of the WUO and distanced it from the homophyllic group 
they purported to represent. 
H3a: The structure of any group emerges over time  
The three case studies demonstrated structure emerges over time. They further 
indicated structure is dependent on the size of the group and the environment in 
which it operates. The WUO and the KLA case studies suggest emerging groups 
initially start with a cellular structure. All groups had a command structure to 
oversee the group and cells. The PIRA differs from the WUO and the KLA, initially 
inheriting the command and control structure of the old IRA. This suggests, when 
groups emerge, they utilise the existing social structures as their initial 
organisational model. This is also supported by the WUO and KLA case studies. Both 
organisations utilised pre-existing social structures already in existence at the time 
of emergence. The initial structure of the WUO used the pre-existing communes 
Stuart Groombridge  362 22/02/2017 
Student Number: 8505097 
University of Wollongong  
School of Law  
 
aligned with the WUO. The KLA utilised the pre-existing clan structure of the rural 
Kosovar communities who had aligned themselves to the KLA. 
 
The PIRA grew within the structure it inherited from the old IRA. As the number of 
members, increased, new units were added to the old structure. The old structure 
of top down command and control relied on unhindered lines of communication. As 
the environment became more hostile and the safe havens of the “no go” areas 
were lost, these lines of communication became susceptible to disruption. The 
lower levels of the organisation devolved into a cellular structure, although the 
upper level of the command and control remained intact. The most likely reason for 
this was, the upper echelons of the organisation met infrequently, but during these 
meetings, they set the long-term strategic objectives of the organisation. The 
brigades were responsible for the day-to-day operational and tactical aspects of the 
organisation. This type of control required denser lines of communication, which 
are possible in an environment, which is not hostile to the organisation and permits 
a centralised command within a formalised structure. The loss of the “no go” areas 
created a hostile environment where communications channels were more readily 
disrupted. In this environment, the PIRA devolved into a cellular structure. In this 
environment, the operational and tactical responsibilities filtered down to the cell 
level of the organisation. The brigade was now responsible for setting the strategic 
objectives for units within their area of operation.  
 
The PIRA was dispersed geographically, with varying degrees of support in different 
locations. Each area was administered by a brigade, with differing numbers of cells 
under their control. It is of note, South Armagh did not adopt a cellular structure, 
and the area in which it operated remained a “no go” area for the security force, 
which commonly referred to it as “Bandit Country”. Thus, South Armagh remained a 
safe haven for the brigade, which was able to maintain its lines of communications, 
therefore its structure. Hence, structure was dictated by geography and the 
environmental factors within each geographic location. Thus, the structure of the 
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PIRA emerged within the environmental context and the geographic dispersion of 
elements. The structure of the group evolved to meet demands placed on the 
organisation’s communications channels by geography and environment. 
 
It is also noteworthy, the WUO and KLA, although adopting a cellular structure 
initially, based these cells on pre-existing social structures. The WUO created its 
cells around its pre-existing communes spread across the United States.  
 
The WUO structure did not evolve beyond that of the cell. The WUO failed to 
connect in terms of homophily with the community it claimed to represent. The 
WUO command control structure did evolve over the life of the group. The cells, 
which spread across the United States, were difficult to control under a centralised 
command in one location. The command structure evolved a regional command 
organisation between the Weatherbureau (the central leadership) and the cells, to 
more effectively control the cells. Like the PIRA, the structure of the group evolved 
to meet demands placed on the organisation’s communications channels by 
geography and environment. 
 
The organisation of the KLA’s original cells in the rural areas was based on the 
traditional clan and village social structures of rural Kosovo. Like the PIRA, both the 
WUO and the KLA co-opted consciously or unconsciously, the existing social 
structures as the initial building blocks of their organisation. The deteriorating 
environment within Kosovo led to an increase in the number of recruits. Combined 
with its control of territory (safe havens), the KLA was able to adopt a more 
traditional military structure. The Kosovo was divided into operational zones. Each 
operational zone had a defined geographic area of operation. Each operational zone 
contained brigades. Each brigade contained battalions. The number of brigades and 
battalions varied from operational to operational zone. Along with brigades and 
battalions, village defence units also aligned themselves to the KLA. On paper, the 
KLA appeared to be highly structured, but in reality, it remained a loosely connected 
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organisation relying on consensus and personal contacts within the command and 
control structure, to conduct operations. Like the PIRA and WUO, the structure of 
the group evolved to meet demands placed on the organisation’s communications 
channels by geography and environment. 
 
The structure of the three groups emerged and evolved over time. All three case 
studies initially utilised existing social structures when they emerged. Over time, the 
structure evolved to manage the communications channels within the organisation. 
The geography and environment in which the group operated, dictated the group’s 
structure. Groups operating over large geographic areas were divided into regional 
command structures to reduce the overhead in the communications channels. 
Groups operating in environmentally hostile geographic locations typically utilised a 
cellular structure, where the cell determined its own operational and tactical 
imperatives. The senior group leadership, in the upper echelons of the organisation, 
determined the strategic agenda of the group. This structure gave the cells a high 
level of operational independence. Groups operating within a friendlier 
environment typically utilised a traditional military organisation, employing a 
centralised command and control structure. If the environment became hostile, 
then the structure devolved into a cellular organisation, as the lines of 
communication became more vulnerable to disruption. Therefore, the length of the 
communications channels (geographic distance) and the security of the 
communications channels (risk of disruption) determined group structure. 
H3b:  Group structure is dependent on group size, cognitive limits, the 
environment’s influence on the channels of communications and the geographic 
dispersion of the group. 
As the previous section highlighted, structure emerges and evolves in an effort to 
manage the growing size of a group. The three case studies suggest structure in 
these groups emerged to permit greater efficiency in command and control of the 
organisation. Even within the smallest elements of a group, a cell, there is a leader. 
This leader may emerge or be appointed. The leader is a communication hub who 
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sets the goals of the group and coordinates the activities of the group, whether this 
be the WUO, which was a small group with a dozen cells or foci, or large group like 
the KLA or PIRA, which were regionally divided, utilising a military command and 
control structure, based on brigades, battalions etc.  
 
Each group had an overseeing leadership body. In the case of the WUO, it was 
called the Weatherbureau, the PIRA was overseen by the Army Council and the KLA 
by a group, referred to as, the Leadership Abroad. The role of this group was very 
specific. It was responsible for setting the strategic vision of the group and typically 
ensuring the actions conducted by the operational and tactically oriented elements 
of the group were consistent with this vision.  
 
The larger groups, such as the PIRA and KLA, had specialised units, such as 
financing, intelligence policing, internal security, logistics training etc. In addition, 
there was an aboveground political arm, which represented the group in the overt 
world. Whereas, in the smaller groups, such as the WUO, there were no specialised 
units, they were typically self-sufficient. When a cell lacked a specific skill, someone 
was assigned from within the organisation, to the cell that possessed that skill, 
either to train the cell members or become part of the cell or foci. Although, the 7/7 
London bombers of 2005 were not one of the case studies, within this thesis, their 
activities are sufficiently well documented by others, to draw a comparison. The 
group who carried out the 7/7 bombings was a cell consisting of four members, who 
are generally considered not to be part of a larger organisation.873 They were 
inspired by the Al Qaeda ideology and strategic manifesto.874 They had a leader, the 
oldest member of the group; they were self-sufficient in respects to financing. They 
were also self-sufficient in terms of logistics, they sourced all the materials required 
to manufacture the explosives. They also were technically independent. They taught 
873 Aidan Kirby, "The London Bombers as "Self Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of 
Autonomous Cliques," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30(2007): p 416. 
874 Ibid., p 420. 
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themselves how to manufacture the explosives.875 Thus, the larger the group, the 
more likely the structure of the group will incorporate specialised units, with 
specific skill sets. The smaller the group, the more self-reliant the individual cells will 
be. 
 
All three groups initially used structures, which were pre-existing. The WUO based 
its initial organisational structure on the commune and the foci. The PIRA utilised 
the pre-existing structure it inherited from the IRA, of brigades, battalions, and 
companies, although at the time of its emergence, they had very few members. The 
KLA exploited the existing social networks within Kosovo. The original structure was 
cellular and based around the clan. Thus, in the instance of these three case studies, 
at the time of emergence, the groups initially exploited existing social structures 
and their pre-existing established communications networks. In the case of the 7/7 
London Bombers, the members of the group belonged to a pre-existing social 
network.876 
 
The three cases also indicated the structure of the groups was influenced by the 
geographic distribution of the group. All three case studies, during their life cycle, 
were, or became, geographically dispersed. The WUO maintained communes/foci 
east to west across the northern half of the United States. This created extended 
lines of communication, to ensure each collective carried out acts, which were 
consistent with the Weatherbureau manifesto. The collectives were divided into 
three geographic regions, and one or more members of the Weatherbureau were 
assigned to each region, to shorten the lines of communication and to act as overall 
commander.  
 
The PIRA continued the practice of its predecessor, the IRA. It maintained the 
regional based brigades, which had the responsibility for operations and recruiting 
875 Ibid., p 421. 
876 Ibid., p 418. 
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within each specific geographic region. Due to the large numbers of recruits, in the 
initial phases of The Troubles, the brigade areas were further subdivided 
geographically into battalions and companies. The PIRA’s command and control of 
operational units was limited. In many instances, the units would carry out 
operations and the leadership would retrospectively approve the operation after it 
was completed. Thus, the PIRA was a loosely controlled organisation. As the PIRA 
matured as an organisation, it adopted a combined approach with the political and 
military wings working together towards the organisational goals. The PIRA 
attempted to exert greater control over the operational units. The General Staff 
approved individuals appointed to leadership roles and the Quartermaster retained 
control over the materials of war. The quartermaster only allocated arms and other 
materials when operations were approved. The need for greater control became 
important as the peace process in the mid-1990s started to take shape, as ill-
conceived operations could undermine the PIRA position in this process. 
 
The KLA initially emerged in the rural areas of Kosovo. The rural areas of Kosovo still 
maintained a clan based social structure. It was within this context the KLA found its 
initial recruits and its structure emerged. It was a cellular organisation, with the 
cells being created from members of specific clans. 
 
As the leadership of the KLA resided outside Kosovo, the lines of communications 
were extended and narrow in bandwidth, which only permitted the leadership to 
provide a strategic framework for the group. Therefore, the decisions regarding 
operations and tactical aspects of the group’s activities were made at the cell/clan 
level of the organisation. These decisions were made within the context of the 
strategic goals of the organisation. The cellular organisation was decided at the clan 
level, the clan appointing the leaders and supplying the cell members. As the clan is 
a family based social structure, there were strong homophyllic links between the 
cell members, which made infiltration of the cell almost impossible. 
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As the size of the KLA grew, Kosovo was divided into Operational Zones. Each 
Operational Zone raised brigades and battalions, adopting a traditional military 
structure. This change in organisational structure was a direct result of the 
increased number of recruits, the safe havens in Albania and parts of Kosovo, and 
the KLA’s ready access to material, such as weapons. It is also of note, like the PIRA, 
a KLA brigade or battalion was not equivalent to similarly named units within the 
traditional military. They were much smaller in size and did not share the same 
fighting capacity. Typically, a KLA brigade was much smaller than a traditional 
battalion used in a traditional army. A KLA battalion operated at the strength of an 
undersized company, of around 100 men.  
 
In the latter half of the KLA’s life cycle, when the group started to adopt a formal 
military structure, the leadership of the KLA, known as the General Staff, appointed 
the leaders of the Operational Zones. Each of these zones operated independently 
of each other. The lines of communications between the General Staff and the 
operational units within Kosovo remained extended and narrow in bandwidth. 
Communication with commanders in the field had to be conducted in person. Thus, 
the General Staff’s level of influence remained at a strategic level, having no or 
limited capacity to influence the operational and tactical aspects of the 
organisation. 
 
The adoption of a traditional military structure within the KLA improved the 
communications channels. It gave a structure in which instructions from the 
General Staff or the Operational Zone leaders could be passed, in theory, to all 
levels of the organisation. In reality, it did not necessarily give the commanders of 
the KLA greater control over the organisation. Command and control within the KLA 
from its creation, to the end of the conflict, was a consultative process. It was 
dependent on the interpersonal relationships between commanders and their bond 
with those who they commanded. The KLA leadership model was not vertical but 
horizontal and heavily reliant on consent and consensus. 
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The level of control of the KLA by the General Staff was further hindered by the fact 
some of the KLA’s units were self-sufficient, and were not completely reliant on the 
General Staff for money or materials. Thus, some units with impunity could ignore 
instructions issued by the General Staff.  
 
At its height, although the KLA had adopted a traditional military structure, it still 
maintained a loose and informal command and control structure, whose 
effectiveness was dependent on the interpersonal relationships of the commanders 
in the conflict zone. In addition to the military structures, a village defence network 
had also emerged. This network, in many instances, had aligned itself with the KLA 
for aid when it came under attack and for access to resources, such as weapons.  
 
The three case studies also indicated the PESTELO environment influenced the 
structure of the three groups. The WUO only maintained an organisational presence 
in the northern half of the United States. The group went underground and adopted 
a cellular structure, based on the already existing communes it had previously 
established. The group also purged members who were not considered devoted 
enough to the cause and tested any new members out of fear of infiltration. The 
group perceived the PESTELO environment as hostile to their cause. Through their 
analysis of the environmental conditions, they concluded the cellular structure, 
based on the foci, would ensure the group’s survival and the foci would become the 
seeds of a revolutionary movement. The WUO had misread the environmental 
conditions and by the 1980s had ceased to exist, although some diehard members 
did join other radical groups, after the WUO had faded from existence. 
 
The PESTELO environment also influenced the structure of the PIRA. In the initial 
stages of The Troubles, the PIRA maintained a large traditional military structure, 
which consisted of brigades, battalions, and companies. In the early stages of The 
Troubles, the “no go” areas within Belfast and other towns and cities afforded the 
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PIRA safe havens. The Belfast Brigade in some areas of the city used a cellular 
organisational structure, due to the hostile environment. In the early stages of the 
struggles, the PIRA was not universally supported across Northern Ireland. In many 
geographic locations, the PIRA was not the only Republican group operating. In the 
case of Derry/Londonderry, the PIRA lacked sufficient homophily with the local 
population to maintain a large structure or recruit members. As such, the 
Derry/Londonderry element of the PIRA was only a battalion and was not 
restructured into a brigade until its more successful rival, the OIRA, declared a 
ceasefire, effectively leaving the PIRA in Derry/Londonderry as the only significant 
group in the city. Similar comments can be made in terms of the PIRA rural units. In 
the rural areas, the PESTELO environment was conservative and favoured the pre-
existing organisation, the OIRA. 
 
After 1972, the environment within Northern Ireland became more hostile. 
Operation Motorman denied the PIRA and other like groups, the safe havens behind 
the barricades of the “no go” areas. Furthermore, there was an increased and 
concerted intelligence effort by the security forces to undermine the PIRA. This 
included the infiltration of the group. Although the PIRA claims, it was a planned 
and conscientious restructuring of the group into cells to mitigate the security 
forces efforts to infiltrate the group, there is information, which contradicts this 
claim. This information strongly suggests the hostile environment, after 1972, had 
made it hazardous for the units of the PIRA to openly communicate and operate, 
This isolated the units of the PIRA from each other, which meant the various units 
of the PIRA, had effectively become cells. The changes in the environment imposed 
a cellular structure on the PIRA, which was formalised in the latter half of the 1970s. 
The South Armagh IRA differed from other rural units in Northern Ireland, it joined 
on the formation of the PIRA. When the rest of the PIRA adopted the cellular 
structure, it maintained the traditional brigade and battalion organisation. It was 
self-sufficient both financially and materially. It maintained an independent 
technical capacity and it was proficient in creating improvised explosive devices. It 
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operated in an area, which was strongly Republican, and the members of the 
brigade had strong family and community connections, decreasing the likelihood of 
infiltration. Furthermore, the brigade’s activities made South Armagh a hostile 
operational environment for the security forces. This ensured the communications 
channels between the units in South Armagh, were not disrupted, permitting the 
South Armagh Brigade to maintain the formalised military structure. 
 
The PESTELO environment also affected the KLA structure. Initially, the PESTELO 
environment was hostile. The KLA was only able to raise small units in the rural 
areas where the population had a history of opposing repressive regimes. Thus, the 
clans shared greater homophily with the KLA than those who lived within the urban 
areas. The urban areas shared greater homophily with the LDK, who were the KLA’s 
main rival. At this time, there was not the support in the urban areas for the use of 
violence to achieve Kosovo’s independence. The PESTELO environment differed in 
the urban and rural areas. 
 
The KLA units raised in the early part of the conflict were based on existing social 
structures and as such, were cellular in nature. As the PESTELO environment 
deteriorated and the rival LDK started to lose credibility within the Kosovar 
population, the size of the KLA marginally increased, but the structure of the group 
remained constant. It was not until the Serbs intervened in Kosovo with significant 
force, did the number of KLA recruits increase. By the end of 1998, the KLA 
controlled significant amounts of territory and enjoyed the support of a significant 
portion of the Kosovar population. Due to the attacks on Kosovar villages in the 
rural areas, many villages formed their own units to defend their homes. These 
village defence units were not formally part of the KLA at the time of formation, but 
due to the success of the KLA, many of these village defence associations aligned 
themselves with the KLA, taking on KLA iconography and dress. The success of the 
KLA led to unaligned groups seeking to become part of the KLA. This is similar to 
Islamic extremist groups and Sunni tribesmen in Iraq aligning their group or tribe 
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with Islamic State. The perception of success leads to others wanting to be part of 
that success.  
 
The PESTELO environment was also altered in the KLA’s favour, by the intervention 
of the international community, which enhanced the KLA’s probability of a victory. 
In this environment, the KLA started a process of restructuring on a military model. 
Superficially, the KLA had a military structure, but this was not completely the case. 
In this time of transition, the KLA was reorganising into a formal military structure, 
but in many respects, it still operated as a cellular networked organisation. The 
culture was an artefact of the earlier evolutionary stage of the group, that is; the 
KLA was an amalgam of many previously independent units, which worked within a 
defined strategic framework, but were operationally and tactically independent of 
the central command. This was the structure, which remained in place until the end 
of the conflict. 
 
There is insufficient information to ascertain whether Dunbar’s cognitive limits are 
significant in the structuring of the three case studies. There was insufficient 
detailed information about the organisational structures of the three case studies to 
conduct any analysis with any level of confidence. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
available information indicates these groups, at the time of emergence, utilised pre-
existing social structures. Their aim was to form an army. In reality, the KLA was the 
only group, which neared this goal. As such, its final structure was in the process of 
converging on that of a traditional military organisation. The structure of the 
military around the world follows the same model, with some minor variations. 
These structures have been honed by centuries of warfare, and are accepted as best 
practice. Thus, the structure of the KLA was predetermined by this goal and not by 
the cognitive limits of the human brain. In all three case studies, the PESTELO 
environment and homophily were the most significant factors that determined the 
structure of each group. 
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The case studies suggest the emergent structure of terrorist groups, utilise the 
existing social structures, which is consistent with complexity theory and the theory 
of complex adaptive systems. The environment and the physical geography, in 
which the group operates, govern the density of the communications channels, 
which in turn, determines the structure of the group. In harsh environments, the 
bandwidth of the communications channels is narrow. In environments with narrow 
channels of communications, the leadership cadre can only set the strategic goals of 
the group. The limited size of the communications channels between elements of 
the group limits the transfer of information. As such, a cellular organisation 
emerges, where the operational and tactical imperatives are determined by the cell, 
within the group’s strategic framework. In moderately friendlier environments, a 
formal structure will start to emerge, because the density of the communications 
channels within the organisation increases. As it takes time for new 
communications channels to propagate, the structure will become a loosely 
connected network, where command and control remains weak. If the group is 
perceived to be successful, other groups may align with it. In this type of structure, 
the command and control would be consultative and based on consensus. If the 
group controls territory (safe havens) and its resources, a formalised military style 
structure will emerge. If the group is geographically dispersed, a regional command 
structure will emerge. As the environmental factors vary across the geographic 
space, so will the structure of the group, as structure is dependent on local 
environmental factors and the density of the communications channels. Thus, the 
group may have a formalised structure in one region, a loosely coordinated network 
structure in another and a cellular structure in regions with a harsher environment.  
 
Figure 17 below, illustrates an environment, which transitions from harsh to 
friendly, with the structure evolving from a simple cellular organisation, to a 
disconnected cellular organisation with a leadership cadre, to a networked 
structure with a leadership cadre, to a loosely connected military style structure and 
finally a formalised military structure. Likewise, the organisation will devolve down 
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the same path, as the environment becomes harsher. It is a bidirectional transition. 
The density of the communications channels within the organisation, determines 
structure. 
 
Figure 17 – Evolving Structure as a function of Environment 
 
 
Are terrorist groups, complex adaptive systems? 
John Holland described the characteristics of a complex adaptive system as follows: 
1. A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel 
and interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these 
interactions.877 
2. Control of a complex adaptive system, tends to be distributed across the 
system, but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation 
between the parts of the system.878 
3. A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the 
system acting as building blocks for a higher level.879 
877 Fromm, The Emergence of Complexity: p 183-84. 
878 Ibid., p 184. 
879 Ibid. 
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4. A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it 
learns and adapts to changes in the environment.880 
5. A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.881 
 
A goal of the thesis was to investigate whether the description of Al Qaeda as a 
complex adaptive system could be extended, more broadly, to other types of 
terrorist groups. For this to be the case, each of the groups would have to be 
consistent with the five characteristics outlined by Holland. 
  
A complex adaptive system is a network of many entities acting in parallel and 
interacting in a dynamic environment, which is a product of these interactions. 
Hypothesises H1b, H2a, H3a and H3b suggested this characteristic was valid for all 
three groups under study. Each of the groups effectively operated as a network. The 
KLA, PIRA, and WUO were all loose affiliations of individuals and groups, which were 
independently working in parallel towards a shared goal or aspiration. Each of the 
groups operated and interacted in a dynamic environment, which was influenced 
and altered by their actions and the actions of others, outside the boundaries of the 
network. 
 
Control of a complex adaptive system tends to be distributed across the system, 
but coherent behaviour arises out of competition and co-operation between the 
parts of the system. 
Analysis undertaken in the testing of hypothesises H1b, H2a, H3a, and H3b 
indicated the command and control of each of the three case studies were not 
centrally controlled. They further indicated the various elements typically 
responded independently to local environmental conditions, but the actions of the 
various elements, of each of the groups, were consistent with the overall strategic 
goal of the group. Although all groups had a centralised leadership and on paper a 
880 Ibid. 
881 Bousquet, "Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad". p 6. 
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hierarchical structure, the leadership was incapable of exercising operational or 
tactical control over the elements of the groups. In each case, their influence was 
limited to setting the strategic framework. Each of the elements operated and co-
operated in a coherent manner within the strategic framework towards the 
common goal. 
 
A complex adaptive system has many levels of organisation with parts of the 
system acting as building blocks for a higher level. 
Hypothesises H1b and H3a indicated group structure emerged over time and was 
built of pre-existing social and organisational structures. The smallest element of 
each of the groups studied was the cell. These cells were organised as part of a 
larger organisation. In its simplest form, the group’s leadership controlled the cell, 
but as the group grew in size, intervening levels of organisation emerged to 
coordinate the activities of the groups, through consensus and co-operation, 
optimising the group’s communications network. As the groups grew larger, further 
layers of the organisation emerged to manage the communications overhead of the 
groups. Each part of the group was a building block for high levels of the 
organisation. Thus, the group structure was consistent with a complex adaptive 
system. 
 
A complex adaptive system constantly rearranges its building blocks as it learns 
and adapts to changes in the environment. 
Hypothesises H1a, H1b, and H2a indicated the environment was a significant factor, 
and central to each of the group’s emergence and growth. In each case, there were 
already pre-existing entities within the environment, which formed the initial 
building blocks of each of the groups. Hypothesises H2a and H3a demonstrated how 
each of the group’s structure evolved, adapted, and changed to meet the changes 
in the dynamic environment in which they operated. The fundamental feature of 
the group’s structure was its communication network. This network evolved and 
optimised for the environmental and geographical conditions in which the group 
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operated. Security of this network was paramount, but the maintenance of security 
influenced the bandwidth of this network, thus influencing the amount of control 
the leadership could exercise over the organisation. The geographic distance 
between the building blocks of the group, also influenced the group’s structure, as 
environmental conditions could and did, vary from location to location. Thus, an 
organisation structure in one location may not have been appropriate in another. 
Hypothesis H2a demonstrated the environment also affected the level of homophily 
shared between the group and the community and in turn influenced the size of the 
group. The KLA and PIRA are good examples of this point. When environmental 
conditions in Kosovo and Northern Ireland changed, to the detriment of the 
community in question, the community shared a greater affinity (homophily) with 
these groups. The increase in affinity (homophily) led to an increase in the 
membership of each of the groups. This was not the only factor, which influenced 
their growth. Each of these two groups also had safe havens to accommodate this 
growth, which presented the groups with favourable environmental conditions 
allowing this growth without risk.  
 
In the case of the KLA, during its period of expansion, it controlled large areas of 
rural Kosovo and in the case of the PIRA, it had safe havens in the “no go areas”, 
prior to Operation Motorman. In this environment, each group was able to develop 
quite complex structures. As the KLA grew, it gravitated to a traditional military 
structure, but the conflict ended before the re-organisation could be formalised. 
Significantly, when the PIRA lost these areas in 1972, after Operation Motorman, 
the size of the PIRA declined. With this decline, the structure of the group evolved. 
A simpler structure emerged. This occurred for a number of reasons directly related 
to the environment. Firstly, it was a reflection of the group’s decline in membership. 
Secondly, the changed environment did not permit the PIRA to maintain the 
complexity of structure, which it had prior to Operation Motorman. The WUO is an 
opposite case. The WUO lacked affinity with the community and in reality had no 
significant safe havens, so, as the environmental factors, which had led to the 
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emergence changed or disappeared, the WUO size declined. These changing 
environmental conditions eventually led to the demise of the group. As such, there 
were many levels, with each part acting as a building block of a higher level. 
Therefore, each group constantly rearranges its building blocks or structure as it 
learns and adapts to changes in the environment, as highlighted in H3a and H3b. 
 
A complex adaptive system is emergent and self-organising.  
A key feature to emerge from this thesis is the dependent relationship between the 
groups, the connections the groups share with the community (homophily) and the 
various elements of the PESTELO environment. Hypothesises H1a, H1b, and H2a 
indicated the environmental factors were significant in the groups’ emergence and 
growth. Geographic proximity and social affinity (homophily) were central to the 
groups’ emergence. Geographic proximity and social affinity (homophily) created a 
shared experience of the environmental conditions and increased the probability of 
the interaction of the various individuals or entities who would come together to 
form the group. As such, the three case studies were found to be emergent. 
 
Hypothesises H2a, H3a, and H3b showed each group studied was self-organising. 
Hypothesises H2a, H3a and H3b indicated the group’s structural organisation was a 
response to the environment in which it operated and evolved to meet any 
challenges created by environmental change. For example, as the environmental 
conditions, which led to the creation of the WUO, changed to a state where they 
were no longer significant to the broader population, the size of the WUO declined 
to a point where the group ceased to exist. 
 
In the case of the PIRA, as the environmental conditions within Northern Ireland 
were harsh, the size of the group increased, which led to the creation of new units 
to accommodate the new members. In these environmental conditions, whilst the 
PIRA controlled the “no go” areas, it was able to maintain a military style structure. 
When parts of the organisation lost these safe zones, the group devolved into an 
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organisation based on the cell or ASU. The size of the group also decreased. Those 
units of the PIRA, which still operated in friendly areas or safe zones, maintained 
their pre-existing structure, as there was no environmental imperative to change. 
As such, there was a clear relationship between the environment and the structural 
organisation of the group. 
 
In the case of the KLA, initially the environment was harsh and it lacked support in 
the urban areas of Kosovo. In this period of its life cycle, the KLA maintained a 
cellular structure. As the environment changed with the Serbs using military force 
to maintain control of the province, the Kosovars gained international support. This 
combined with the KLA’s effective control of rural areas, led the KLA to grow in size 
and evolve from a group of cells to a network, which was starting to adopt a military 
structure. Thus, the changing environment led to the growth in the size of the 
group, which self-organised into networks and in the final stages of the conflict, the 
emergence of military style structures. 
 
The study of the three terrorist groups suggests, in terms of structural organisation 
in certain environments (harsh to friendly), the groups gravitated to common 
structural organisations. In very harsh environments, the cellular structure was 
common. As the harshness of the environment declined, the structure became a 
network of disconnected cells with a leadership cadre, followed by connected 
network structure and leadership, then a loosely connected military structure 
where command was based on consensus. In each of these models, leadership 
could only exercise control at a strategic level. In friendly environments, the 
structure would resemble a centralised military structure. The commonalities of the 
structures suggest these are points of dynamic stability and in terms of complexity 
theory are “Attractors”. On paper, these groups technically had a hierarchical 
structure, but in reality the hierarchical command and control structure, did not 
exist. The leadership set the strategic goal of the group and the various elements of 
the group operated independently to achieve these goals. 
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Hypothesis H1a, H1b, H2a, H3a, and H3b indicate the three case studies displayed 
characteristics of emergent and self-organising systems. In conclusion, the three 
case studies share all five of Holland’s characteristics of a complex adaptive system. 
As such, in these cases, the complex adaptive systems model is a useful tool to 
understand the factors, which led to the emergence of the terrorist groups and the 
influence on their structure. 
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Summary 
The basis of the model used within this thesis resides in the complexity theory and 
the theory of complex adaptive systems. It does not consider terrorist groups in 
isolation, but as a part of an ever-changing dynamic environment. This environment 
is described by the individual political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, 
ecological, legal, and organisational environmental factors. The principles of 
emergence and self-organising embedded in this environment are used to describe 
the emergence of these types of groups and how these groups self-organise. 
Homophily (social affinity) is the rule of preferential attachment used to describe 
the underlying principle involved in emergence and self-organising. As part of 
complexity theory, the size of the group is considered in terms of the environmental 
and homophyllic factors. That is the level of homophily determines the size of the 
group. The changing environment can affect the homophily between the group and 
the larger population, and in doing so, influences the group’s size. When there is 
more than one entity within a system, they will optimise their communications 
networks to ensure secure communications between each of the entities. Thus, the 
structure of the group is defined by its attempts to self-organise its communications 
network, so it can operate effectively as a cohesive entity over a geographic space 
and within a dynamic environment.   
 
The thesis found terrorist groups emerge in environments where a social group has 
a grievance and concluded that there is no legitimate avenue within the 
environment to have this grievance addressed. This in itself is not sufficient for a 
group to emerge. As Crenshaw previously indicated, there needs to be a trigger 
event or events. These perturbations, within the environment, can lead to the 
radicalisation of individuals or groups. This radicalisation process does not 
necessarily lead to the formation of terrorist groups, but forms part of the process 
of emergence. The groups in the case studies emerged from other organisations 
who were engaged in a peaceful, political approach to bring about change. Those 
who formed the terrorist group had rationalised the peaceful approach was not 
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going to succeed and success could only be achieved through violence. The case 
studies highlighted radicalisation as a scaled process, with the uncommitted at the 
bottom, consisting of multiple levels, with the violent extremists at the top. 
 
The case studies also highlighted the importance of homophily in the formation of 
the groups and the need for individuals to be in geographic proximity to permit 
them to communicate and come together, which is consistent with the principles of 
complexity theory and the theory of complex adaptive systems. The three case 
studies also indicated the size of the group, related to the amount of homophily the 
group had with the broader community, which was influenced by the PESTELO 
environment. The case studies indicated the environment creates a pool of recruits. 
The more adverse the environment was to a social group, the larger the pool of 
recruits and vice versa. The case studies also indicated; if the group did not possess 
safe havens, then this limited the size of the group. 
 
The case studies demonstrated the groups’ structure was dynamic, was dependent 
on size, geographic dispersion, and lacked day-to-day centralised control. The 
structure of the groups was consistent with those of complex adaptive systems. The 
elements of the groups acted in parallel, working towards the same goal. The 
structure of the groups was built on pre-existing social structural elements, which 
acted as building blocks for the higher levels of the organisation. The various 
elements of the groups adapted to meet the environmental challenges present to 
the groups over its life cycle, which led to the structure of groups evolving over 
time. It was found that groups, which were traditionally thought to maintain 
hierarchical structures, behaved more like networks, because of limitations placed 
on the communications channels by the environment. This led the groups to 
maintain a decentralised and distributed leadership model, where each of the 
elements worked independently towards the group’s goal. This network structure, 
model of leadership and control, is consistent with a complex adaptive system. 
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It was not possible, based on the limited available data, to ascertain whether 
Dunbar’s cognitive limits played a role in the structure of the groups, but the results 
were consistent with other anthropological social organisational theories. There 
were hints of a possible relationship, but there were also other explanations. This 
area of the thesis may be worthy of further study. 
 
It would also be worthwhile to test a broader range of other terrorist groups to 
ascertain whether the complex adaptive system model can be applied more 
generally. The three case studies in this thesis and the work conducted by others in 
regards to Al Qaeda, suggest this could be the case. This model and method of 
analysis and study could have far broader application, providing additional insight 
into the emergence, structure, and demise of terrorist groups. 
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